Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-2198 _____________________________ DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, Appellants, v. A.B., mother of J.O.S. and A.S.M.P., minor children, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Thomas H. Williams, Judge. May 15, 2026 PER CURIAM. The Department of Children and Families (the Department) appeals the denial of its petition for termination of A.B.’s (the mother’s) parental rights, arguing the trial court erred when it granted A.B.’s motion to dismiss the petition. It asserts the trial court erroneously failed to take all the evidence as true and to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department. Because the trial court applied the incorrect standard when ruling on A.B.’s motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Evidence of severe abuse of A.B.’s minor children was brought to the Department’s attention by the hospital after the six-week- old baby girl was admitted for treatment unrelated to the abuse injuries. The mother did not take the baby to the hospital because of concern for broken bones. Due to the severity of the injuries discovered, the Department filed an Expedited Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and asked that the children, including the baby and her toddler brother, be declared dependent. A hearing was held on the petition, and after the Department rested, A.B. moved to have the expedited petition dismissed, claiming that the Department had failed to prove the termination grounds alleged. A.B.’s attorney argued that there was no evidence that A.B. was the one who caused the children’s injuries, or that she knew those injuries occurred and knowingly failed to prevent those injuries to the children. The trial court granted A.B.’s motion, finding that the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother engaged in egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, or had engaged in aggravated, chronic, or sexual abuse under section 39.806(1)(g), Florida Statutes. It further concluded that no evidence was presented that A.B. caused the injuries or knowingly failed to prevent the injuries. “Motions for judgment of dismissal in dependency cases are akin to motions for directed verdict in civil cases.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. A.L., 307 So. 3d 978, 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing M.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 992 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). A directed verdict is appropriate only where there is “no evidence upon which a jury could find against the party for whom the verdict is directed.” Id. (quoting White v. City of Waldo, 659 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). Stated another way, “[a] directed verdict is appropriate ‘only when the evidence considered in its entirety and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom fail to prove the plaintiff’s case under the issues made by the pleadings.’” Id. (quoting White, 659 So. 2d at 708). “A party who moved for a directed verdict admits for the purpose of testing the motion the facts in evidence and in addition admits every reasonable and proper conclusion based thereon which is favorable to the adverse party.” Id. (quoting White, 659 So. 2d at 708). 2 In making its findings, the trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department. The evidence established that the baby suffered from over twenty-five breaks in her ribs, a broken clavicle, and a hemorrhage in her right eye, in addition to a bruise on her left shoulder and an abrasion to her left upper chest area. The medical director for the Child Protective Team testified that these injuries would have caused the baby to be uncomfortable and cry with position changes and clothing changes, and that a proper caregiver would have been aware of these injuries. In fact, CPT’s nurse practitioner testified she could feel the baby’s ribs moving at the breaks simply by holding her and turning her over and noted in her report that the broken bones were “clicking.” In addition, the baby’s toddler brother presented with a fresh “loop” bruise indicative of having been hit with a belt or cord, together with multiple other bruises in various stages of healing, indicative of other abuse in the household, which the mother also failed to acknowledge. While the trial court was correct that the baby was diagnosed with pneumonia and coronavirus and that this could have caused the baby to be fussy, the court overlooked the undisputed fact that the pain caused by the injuries would have been more prevalent with movement, not attributable to general fussiness. Further, the trial court opined at the hearing that it would be more difficult for a general layperson to see the bruises on A.P. because she is black. But numerous witnesses testified to the marks on the baby’s body, and none indicated they were not visible to the naked eye. Additionally, the evidence showed the baby suffered from both acute and subacute fractures, indicating she was abused on, at a minimum, two separate occasions, but A.B. was unable to provide any explanation for the injuries and stated that she did not know the baby was injured. Yet there was no evidence that another caregiver had the baby during the timeframe these injuries were sustained, nor any explanation of how A.B. could have failed to notice them or why she failed to seek emergency care for the baby. Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard in granting the motion to dismiss, and because there is competent, substantial evidence to support the grounds alleged by the 3 Department, we reverse. On remand, the trial court should consider whether the evidence established a prima facie case for termination when the issues and evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the Department. REVERSED and REMANDED. BILBREY, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel of Children’s Legal Services, Tallahassee, for the Florida Department of Children and Families. Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Amanda Victoria Glass, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, of the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, Tallahassee. Michael J. Titus of the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4