Sharon Bell v. Andrew Battaglia

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT SHARON BELL, Appellant, v. ANDREW BATTAGLIA, Appellee. No. 2D19-280 January 12, 2022 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Scott Cupp, Judge. Kenneth R. Turner, Jr. of The Ken Turner Law Firm, LLC, Naples, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee. ATKINSON, Judge. Sharon Bell appeals the entry of a final order on Andrew Battaglia's petition for dating violence injunction, which prohibited her from contacting Battaglia for six months. We reverse because Bell did not cyberstalk Battaglia by sending a single text message to Battaglia's wife. Bell and Battaglia dated off and on for a number of months. Battaglia petitioned for a dating violence injunction against Bell following an incident he alleged occurred on December 11, 2018. He claimed that Bell struck and pulled on his arms in an attempt to prevent him from leaving with his things. He also included in his petition four prior incidents involving Bell that occurred at two Naples restaurants while he was with another female acquaintance. He indicated on his petition that he was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of dating violence because Bell had "stalked, harassed, and assaulted" Battaglia at various locations and because she had "made threats to harass [Bell], his family and friends personally and on social media." At the hearing, Battaglia testified that Bell sent the following text message to his wife: You don't know me but I would like to tell you about your husband. You should know what he is doing. I have dated him for 4 months. Tonight he was abusive and hit me and threw me down because I wouldn't show him my phone. I had to go to the hospital for my wrist. 2  He has a hidden account and uses money from that you don't know about. He pulls cash from it so you don't know where he is. He is terrified you will take his pension. I hope you do. He is a miserable person that deserves to be found out. Just thought you should know and I am sorry if this hurts you. Bell admitted that she sent the text message because she was hurt and upset. Battaglia testified that Bell had threatened in the past to contact his wife for the purpose of making his divorce more financially painful to him. Battaglia also testified about text messages that Bell had sent directly to him. And both Battaglia and Bell gave diverging accounts of an altercation that occurred after an evening of drinking. Battaglia admitted that he had thrown her phone on the floor. But he denied Bell’s allegations that he had hurt her and thrown her to the floor, testifying instead that it was she who had attacked him in an attempt to prevent him from leaving before losing her grip and falling back. Battaglia repeatedly assured the court that he was in no fear of physical danger from Bell. The court discounted the fracas, as well as the text messages Bell sent directly to Battaglia, as bases for granting the injunction: "It does not appear to me that there has been any tremendous 3 violence against you. . . . [A]ll the other stuff, you know, while uncomfortable and obnoxious – I looked at all the texts you guys gave me. There's not any threats in those texts." What the court did find salient to Battaglia's petition was the communication between Bell and Battaglia's wife: "[T]he behavior with regard to your wife, that definitely does constitute stalking." The trial court told Bell regarding her text to the wife, "[T]hat is stalking behavior" and "[t]here's no excuse for it." The trial court explained to Battaglia, "I mean, if you don't want to talk to her, block her number. However, it does concern me that she did contact your wife, which seems a little out of the range of what's appropriate[.]" The court entered a final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence, which included the following: After hearing the testimony of each party present and of any witnesses, . . . based on the specific facts of this case, that Petitioner is a victim of dating violence and/or Petitioner has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of an act of dating violence by Respondent, and that an immediate and present danger of dating violence exists to Petitioner or to a member of Petitioner's immediate family. 4 The court entered an order enjoining Bell for a period of six months from committing any violence against Battaglia, having any contact with him, and from going to a list of places in Naples that Battaglia frequently visits. "Dating violence" is defined as "violence between individuals who have or have had a continuing and significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature." § 784.046(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018). To be entitled to an injunction for protection against such violence, one must either be "the victim of dating violence and ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act of dating violence" or have "reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of an act of dating violence." § 784.046(2)(b). "Violence" is defined as "assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, by a person against any other person." § 784.046(1)(a) (emphasis added). "Stalking occurs when a person 'willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.' " 5 Brungart v. Pullen, 296 So. 3d 973, 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting § 784.048(2)); see Whitlock v. Veltkamp, 296 So. 3d 528, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ("[T]he statutory definition of 'domestic violence' includes a wide range of actions, including stalking in its three forms . . . ."). " 'Cyberstalk[ing]' means," inter alia, "to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(d) (emphasis added). Here, the dating violence injunction was based upon a single text message to Battaglia's wife that the trial court deemed to be "cyberstalking." This was error because the text message was sent to a third party, not Battaglia. See Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Mr. Scott did not communicate words, images, or language via email or electronic communication directly to Mr. Blum."); see also Brungart, 296 So. 3d at 979 (concluding that the act of sending videos and communications to third parties did not constitute stalking). Cyberstalking requires that the 6 communications be "directed at a specific person," and that they cause "substantial emotional distress to that person." § 784.048(1)(d); cf. § 784.046(1)(b) (providing that, unlike dating violence, "[r]epeat violence" can be committed by violence or stalking "directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member" (emphasis added)). Although Battaglia was the subject of the text message that Bell admitted sending to his wife, he was not the recipient. See Scott, 191 So. 3d at 504–05 (concluding that emails sent to third parties did "not constitute words 'directed at a specific person' for purposes of the cyberstalking statute simply because they are about [the petitioner]"); cf. David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[W]here comments are made on an electronic medium to be read by others, they cannot be said to be directed to a particular person."). Additionally, the trial court's reliance on a single text message comes short of the repeated acts required to establish stalking. Cf. Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (reversing entry of stalking injunction after "trial court expressly disregarded" an alleged "history of confrontations" and relied 7 instead on a single altercation, which was insufficient to "support a finding of stalking, which requires evidence of repeat harassment"). "By its statutory definition, stalking requires proof of repeated acts." Carter v. Malken, 207 So. 3d 891, 893–94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citing Laserinko v. Gerhardt, 154 So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)) ("A minimum of two incidents of harassment are required to establish stalking."); cf. Whitlock, 296 So. 3d at 530 n.2 ("If the stalking consists of harassing or cyberstalking, the petitioner must show 'a course of conduct' directed at the petitioner which causes the petitioner 'substantial emotional distress . . . and serv[es] no legitimate purpose.' " (quoting § 784.048(1)(a), (c) & (d))). The trial court erred by entering a dating violence injunction in favor of Battaglia and against Bell based upon a single text message sent by Bell to Battaglia's wife. However, the six-month injunction had already expired when Bell filed her initial brief in this case. Despite its expiration, Bell requested that this court set aside the final judgment. Respondent Battaglia did not file a brief or motion in this appeal, and the issue of mootness was not asserted by either party. Upon a divided vote of the panel, this court issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot 8 because the injunction had expired by its terms. No response to the order was received. Florida appellate courts have routinely decided appeals from expired domestic violence and stalking injunctions on the merits because of the "collateral consequences" that could result from the judgment. See Yaklin v. Yaklin, 296 So. 3d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Although the record indicates that the injunction has expired, we remand with instructions to vacate the injunction 'because of the unintended collateral consequences that may result from such a judgment.' " (quoting Phillips v. Phillips, 151 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014))); see also Stover v. Stover, 287 So. 3d 1277, 1278 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (concluding that the expiration of the domestic violence injunction did not render moot the issue of whether the evidence presented to the trial court warranted the injunction); Phillips, 151 So. 3d at 59 (reversing and remanding with instructions to vacate the injunction for protection against domestic violence "[a]lthough the injunction ha[d] expired . . . because of the unintended collateral consequences that may result from such a judgment" (citing Young v. Smith, 901 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))); Jones v. Jones, 32 So. 3d 772, 773–74, 774 9 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("Presumably, this injunction has already expired and was not renewed. We do not treat the order on appeal as moot because we are concerned about the potential collateral effects of such an order on Mr. Jones."); Young, 901 So. 2d at 373 ("[A] determination that a person had either victimized a domestic partner with an act of violence or placed that domestic partner in reasonable fear of imminent danger, is a serious finding of fact that can have many unintended collateral consequences."); Stone v. McMillian, 270 So. 3d 510, 512 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("Although the injunction is no longer in effect, this appeal is not moot."); Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 988 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("Although the injunction has now expired, the appeal is not moot."); Mitchell v. Brogden, 249 So. 3d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("The injunction has now expired on its own terms, so it no longer has effect. Nonetheless, we cannot dismiss the appeal as moot because 'collateral legal consequences flowing from such an injunction outlast the injunction itself.' " (quoting Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011))); Vaught v. Vaught, 189 So. 3d 332, 333 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (finding that appeal from domestic violence injunction that had expired was not 10 moot "due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause" (quoting Selph v. Selph, 144 So. 3d 676, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014))); Jacquot v. Jacquot, 183 So. 3d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for relief from judgment of domestic violence injunction on mootness grounds "[b]ecause the expiration of an injunction for protection against domestic violence is one of the recognized exceptions to the dismissal of a moot case"); Selph, 144 So. 3d at 679 ("Although the injunction in this case has since expired, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the injunction."); Kunkel v. Stanford ex rel. C.S., 137 So. 3d 608, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (reversing and remanding with instructions to vacate the expired injunction for protection against domestic violence "due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause" (quoting Stone v. Stone, 128 So. 3d 239, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013))); Stone, 128 So. 3d at 242 ("Although the injunction has now expired, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the injunction due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause."); Murphy, 55 So. 3d at 716 (concluding that expiration of the injunction did not render the appeal moot, 11 "because collateral legal consequences flowing from [a final injunction for protection against repeat violence] outlast the injunction itself"); Rodman v. Rodman, 48 So. 3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that "injunctions for protection against domestic violence are an exception to the usual rules of mootness because of the collateral legal consequences that flow from such an injunction").1 But see Molina v. Valenzuela, 252 So. 3d 772, 772–73 1 A majority of these cases deal with domestic violence injunctions. Others concern injunctions for protection against stalking and acts of repeat violence. In this case, the trial court entered an injunction for protection against dating violence based on stalking, supported by allegations of cyberstalking. However, both the statutory provisions pertaining to domestic violence and those pertaining to dating violence and repeat violence contain the same definition of violence. Compare § 741.30(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ("If it appears to the court that an immediate and present danger of domestic violence exists, the court may grant a temporary injunction . . . ." (emphasis added)) and § 741.28, Fla. Stat. (2018) (defining domestic violence as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death"), with § 784.046(2)(b) ("[A]ny person who has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of an act of dating violence . . . has standing in the circuit court to file a sworn petition for an injunction for protection against dating violence." (emphasis added)) and § 784.046(1)(a), (d) (defining violence as it pertains to dating violence as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (dismissing appeal as moot from stalking injunction that had expired because appellant failed to "argue that there may be collateral consequences relating to her ability to possess a firearm, or any other collateral consequences" after responding to an order to show cause by "request[ing] a ruling on the appropriateness of the court's actions and so the public records reflect that none of her actions violated Florida law"). It can be safely inferred from the face of recorded opinions cited above that the appellate courts decided the issue of mootness without an inquiry into the specific facts and circumstances of the individual protective injunction case. The issue is typically dispatched in a perfunctory manner that suggests an order to show cause is unnecessary in light of the general acceptance of this issue as one excepted from the usual considerations of mootness. See, or death, by a person against any other person"). In other words, a putative victim could establish entitlement to a protective injunction in identical fashion, but the type of injunction varies depending upon his or her relationship with the respondent alleged to have committed the violence. Compare § 741.30(5)(a) (defining domestic violence as that committed on "one family or household member by another family or household member"), with § 784.046(1)(d) (defining dating violence as violence "between individuals who have or have had a continuing and significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature"). 13 e.g., Jones, 32 So. 3d at 774, n.1 ("Presumably, this injunction has already expired and was not renewed. We do not treat the order on appeal as moot because we are concerned about the potential collateral effects of such an order on Mr. Jones." (emphasis added)); Rodman, 48 So. 3d at 1022 (recognizing "injunctions for protection against domestic violence a[s] an exception to the usual rules of mootness"). This inference is corroborated by a review of available appellate records, which reveals that in several cases this court has decided an appeal from an expired injunction without issuing an order to show cause, regardless of whether the parties had raised the issue. For example, in Phillips v. Phillips, our dissenting colleague explained that the potential for "unintended collateral consequences" supported this court's decision to review and reverse an expired domestic violence injunction, which this court did without issuing an order to show cause or soliciting argument from the parties, which did not themselves raise the issue of mootness. See Phillips, 151 So. 3d at 59 ("Although the injunction has expired, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the injunction because of the unintended collateral consequences that may result 14 from such a judgment." (emphasis added)); see also Yaklin, 296 So. 3d at 533 (same); Sinopoli v. Clark, 290 So. 3d 159, 160 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (same); Stover, 287 So. 3d at 1277, n.2 (same). Our dissenting colleague attempts to draw a distinction between domestic violence injunctions and other types of violence injunctions—such as the one involved in this case, dating violence—but her explanation fails to identify a distinction of sufficient pertinence to justify the disparate treatment. She does suggest that litigants in domestic violence matters involve the same cast of characters "typically" involved in family law matters. And her assertion that expired domestic violence injunctions might have an effect on pending or future family law proceedings in which the parties are or could later become involved is well taken. Indeed, "[e]vidence of domestic violence" is an enumerated factor to be considered in determining whether a parenting plan is in the best interests of a child. See § 61.13(3)(m), Fla. Stat. (2019). However, there is no reason to presume that dating violence injunctions (or injunctions against repeat violence or stalking) could not similarly work "to the advantage or disadvantage of the parties in any collateral proceedings in which they become involved." 15 Presuming that such advantage would be attained by besmirching the reputation of an opposing party or portraying her as incapable of responsibility, it is reasonable to believe that an expired stalking, repeat violence, or dating violence injunction would also have relevance to the court's assessment of that party's character or accountability. Cf., e.g., § 61.13(3)(t) (requiring the court to consider "[a]ny other factor that is relevant to the determination of a specific parenting plan"). And each of the various injunctions against violence would bear equally upon a litigant's propensity for violence because, as previously discussed, the respective statutes all share the same definition of "violence." See footnote 1, supra. We provide no commentary here regarding under what circumstances an expired injunction of any kind would be a proper consideration in ancillary or unrelated legal matters. Rather, we discuss the possibility to illustrate the ineffectiveness of our dissenting colleague's attempt to carve out expired domestic violence injunctions from her blanket pronouncements regarding all other expired injunctions against violence. We are unaware of anything peculiar to expired domestic violence injunctions that would explain how or why they are so uniquely susceptible to 16 collateral consequences that the burden she would place on appellants in cases involving other types of expired injunctions should be relaxed for those involving domestic violence injunctions. Our dissenting colleague misplaces reliance on Molina, 252 So. 3d 772, in support of her argument that domestic violence injunctions should receive special treatment. The dicta in the Fourth District's Molina opinion provided no explanation for the distinction it drew between expired stalking injunctions and expired domestic violence injunctions other than the inaccurate insinuation that the latter pose a unique "potential prohibition on owning a firearm" that exempts them from the mootness analysis. See id. at 772–73. Florida's prohibition on possession or control of a firearm applies equally to injunctions restraining a person "from committing acts of stalking or cyberstalking" as it does to those restraining a person "from committing acts of domestic violence." See § 790.233(1), Fla. Stat. More importantly, both the Federal and Florida prohibitions on possession of a firearm are only effective during the time the violence injunction or restraining order is in force—making the firearm prohibition irrelevant to any discussion regarding the collateral consequences of expired injunctions. See § 17 790.233(1) (prohibiting possession of firearms or ammunition "if the person has been issued a final injunction that is currently in force or effect" (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (making it "unlawful for any person . . . who is subject to" a court order restraining against "harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner" to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition" (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., United States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing the crime of illegal possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(8) as "possessing a firearm while subject to a protective order" (emphasis added)). Regardless of which variety of violence injunction is at issue, courts most often describe the collateral consequences of such expired injunctions as if they have not yet and may never occur, suggesting that to avoid dismissal for mootness it is not necessary to articulate presently apparent consequences of an expired injunction against violence. See, e.g., Jones, 32 So. 3d at 774, n.1 (expressing "concern[] about the potential collateral effects of such an order" (emphasis added)); Yaklin, 296 So. 3d at 534 (noting that consequences "may result from" an injunction judgment (emphasis 18 added) (quoting Phillips, 151 So. 3d at 59)); Young, 901 So. 2d at 373 (recognizing that an injunction "can have many unintended collateral consequences" (emphasis added)); Vaught, 189 So. 3d at 333, n.1 (deciding an appeal from an expired injunction "due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause" (emphasis added) (quoting Selph, 144 So. 3d at 679)); Phillips, 151 So. 3d at 59 (reversing an expired injunction "because of the unintended collateral consequences that may result from such a judgment." (emphasis added)). Indeed, it makes little sense to require an appellant to prognosticate about what potential collateral effects may result in the future. To require such a showing—when relevant consequences could just as easily manifest themselves in the future as exist at the time of an order to show cause—would be a vain exercise that causes unwarranted delay and wastes the resources of the court, the parties, and their advocates. Worse, it deprives a litigant of the opportunity to rectify an erroneous adverse judgment, the future collateral consequences of which she may be unable to predict at the time she is required to respond. While a protective injunction does not become a criminal matter until it is violated, a final judgment imposing such an 19 injunction shares pertinent similarities with a criminal conviction— it involves an adjudication that the respondent's malicious mistreatment of another human being met the statutory definition of violence justifying the government's significant curtailment of the respondent's liberty. Cf. Casiano v. State, 310 So. 3d 910, 915 (Fla. 2021) (discussing the distinction between an appeal from an illegal sentence that has already been served and an appeal challenging the underlying conviction, the latter of which presents a "possibility of removing the stigma of a conviction" that constitutes "a significant practical purpose demonstrating the continuing viability of the appeal" (quoting Parks v. State, 96 So. 3d 474, 475 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012))). It is not unreasonable to surmise that such a scarlet letter might affect an individual in the future—whether the judgment is based on overt acts of violence, malicious and repeated communications, or merely actions that create an imminent threat. See, e.g., Young, 901 So. 2d at 373 ("[A] determination that a person had either victimized a domestic partner with an act of violence or placed that domestic partner in reasonable fear of imminent danger, is a serious finding of fact that can have many unintended collateral consequences." (emphasis added)); see also § 784.048(1), (2) 20 (requiring a course of "willful[]" conduct including "repeated[]," "malicious[]" acts); cf. M.L.J. v. State, 93 So. 3d 348, 349 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (rejecting the State's mootness argument after the appellant's probationary period had expired because "[t]here are also financial and social consequences of M.L.J.'s case even though he received a withhold of adjudication" and "a withhold of adjudication could be relevant to future dispositions if M.L.J. ever was rearrested or sought admission or employment in an area requiring disclosure of any trial record"). It is not difficult to envision how an erroneously entered injunction could stymie future efforts to seek employment or opportunities for advancement in, for example, the fields of law enforcement, security, childcare, eldercare, or education. Positions in those fields and others are often susceptible to abuse by virtue of their access to sensitive information, authority over vulnerable individuals, or authorization to use physical force. It would not be surprising for public or private sector employers to take into consideration that a job applicant was subject to an injunction because he was adjudicated to have threatened or stalked a victim by physical or electronic means. Cf., e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 5N- 21 1.114(1), (2), (3)(i) (requiring a person seeking a license to provide private investigative, private security, or repossession services to maintain "good moral character" and "standards of conduct" that include "respect for the rights and property of others" and including "stalking or cyber stalking related offense[s]" among those described as "directly relate[d] to the business for which the license is held or sought"). It is also probable that knowledge of such an adjudication would affect a potential client's decision to hire an individual to perform work—such as maintenance, repair, or cleaning services— that requires the individual to have access to the client's home or other property. And the record and stigma of an erroneously entered injunction could likewise impede an appellant's participation in civic life. It is not unlikely that private organizations might take such a judgment into consideration when deciding whether to, for example, allow her to coach a little league team; mentor a girl scout troop; or serve in a parent-teacher association, a volunteer fire department, a homeowners' association, or a board of a non-profit organization—perhaps one that advocates against domestic and dating violence. Participation 22 in the political process as a candidate or campaign worker could likewise be complicated by the specter of an erroneously entered injunction easily transmissible from the public record to a widely available electronic forum. To demand of an appellant the prescience to identify which ill effects will be encountered during a future over which such a Damoclean judgment will hang is to defy a common sense understanding of the human condition. It is perhaps for unarticulated reasons similar to those described above that courts have regularly and summarily disregarded the expiration of a protective injunction as grounds for dismissal of an appeal without requiring a detailed enumeration of existing or potential collateral consequences, much less those that are peculiar to an individual appellant's current circumstances. Consistent with this trend, this court finds that the erroneously entered injunction for protection in this case should be vacated even though it has already expired pursuant to its own terms. Our dissenting colleague asserts that this amounts to the court improperly inserting itself into proceedings where it does not belong. But it was our dissenting colleague who inserted the issue 23 of mootness into these proceedings sua sponte—neither party having raised mootness and the appealing party having filed her initial brief after the injunction had been expired for months (from which an eminently reasonable deduction is that the appellant was still interested in a resolution of the matter despite having already been freed from the injunction's constraints). And although our dissenting colleague accuses the majority of exercising judicial fiat, it is worth noting that the question before us is not one of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("[T]he issue of mootness does not raise a question about our jurisdiction to decide the case. The reluctance of the Florida courts to decide moot questions is based on policy reasons, not lack of jurisdiction."); cf. In re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1134 (Fla. 2006) ("[W]e recognize that our jurisdiction, which is outlined in the Florida Constitution, is a threshold matter that must be addressed before we can decide the merits of a case." (emphasis added)). Neither is this a scenario requiring circumspection regarding our judicial role lest we encroach on the authority of another branch or read into a legal text a meaning its language cannot bear. Cf. Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 24 Company, 232 So. 3d 294, 313 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]ourts of this state are 'without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit[ ] its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications [because to] do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.' ") (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). Rather, the question before this court is whether to afford a litigant a plenary appeal from an order based on insufficiently substantiated accusations of willful, malicious conduct that has been deemed by the legislature as violence worthy of constraint through the injunctive power of state government. Our dissenting colleague is content to answer that question in the affirmative, without requiring an appellant to show cause, if the appeal is from an expired domestic violence injunction—but she insists that appellants in other cases involving expired injunctions against violence should not enjoy that presumption against mootness. We are unpersuaded that these litigants should be treated in such disparate fashion. 25  With very few exceptions in recorded caselaw, this court and other district courts have adjudicated appeals from expired injunctions against domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, and repeat violence without requiring the appealing party to show cause why presently articulable collateral consequences obviate dismissal based on mootness. We perceive no reason why we should not decide this appeal in conformity with that precedent. Reversed and remanded with instructions. LUCAS, J., Concurs separately. KELLY, J., Dissents with opinion. LUCAS, Judge, concurring separately. I concur with Judge Atkinson's majority opinion in full. I write separately to offer a broader perspective on the issue that has divided this panel. As should be clear from the depth and tone of the opinions, we have a profound disagreement over the application of mootness to plenary appeals. The majority and dissenting opinions thoughtfully delve into the case law addressing expired injunctions and whether appellate courts ought to review them. Unfortunately, the issue of an appeal's mootness raises a first- principle problem no synthesis of case holdings is likely to resolve. 26 I don't presume to have a solution to that problem, but I believe it merits examination. Mootness, our court has observed, "is based on policy reasons, not lack of jurisdiction." See Merkle, 912 So. 2d at 594. Because we, as a district court of appeal, are constitutionally charged with deciding plenary appeals within our jurisdiction, see McFadden v. State, 177 So. 3d 562, 566 (Fla. 2015) ("Under the Florida Constitution, the district courts of appeal 'shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts . . . not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court.' " (quoting art. 5 § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.)), and appellate mootness is nowhere mentioned in the text of our constitution or any state statute, Merkle provides an inarguable assessment of mootness's essentiality. Cf. Ex parte Cox, 33 So. 509, 539 (Fla. 1902) ("In so organizing the judiciary of the state, it is evident that the framers of our constitution have undertaken to prescribe the powers of each of the courts so created . . . ."); Jesse v. State, Dep't of Rev. ex rel. Robinson, 711 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ("Subject matter jurisdiction 27 arises by virtue of law only; it is conferred by constitution or statute and cannot be created by waiver or acquiescence."). And yet, when an appellate court declines to review a case it deems moot, the effect of that decision is unquestionably jurisdictional. Cf. M.M. v. Wood, 152 So. 3d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("We therefore decline to exercise our jurisdiction to address a question that has been rendered moot by petitioner's release from secure detention."). We have an analytical conundrum, then, in that when we decide a case is moot, we are refusing to exercise jurisdiction for a patently nonjurisdictional reason. For as one commentator aptly summarized, "[c]ontrol of jurisdiction consists of two basic elements: the power to broaden and the power to restrict." Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 603, 615 (Jan. 1992). So mootness is a nonjurisdictional doctrine with jurisdictional repercussions. Nevertheless, mooting appeals has a long pedigree in the common law. Historically, it was justified for a variety of reasons, all of which seemed to revolve around the same impetus. "The demands of actual, practical litigation are too pressing to 28 permit the examination or discussion of academic questions," the New York Court of Appeals once observed. See In re Manning, 34 N.E. 931, 139 N.Y. 446, 448 (N.Y. 1893). The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed "an abstract question" in an insolvency proceeding because "judicial tribunals are not organized for the purpose of rendering decisions which can be of no possible advantage to the parties to the litigation." See In re Kaeppler, 75 N.W. 253, 253 (N.D. 1898). The Supreme Court, in Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895), opined that courts have a "duty" to "decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." In essence, courts shouldn't spend their time deciding cases that may not matter.2 2 In the federal system, mootness has come to be treated as an aspect of federal jurisdiction, when, in 1964, the Supreme Court remarked in a footnote that it lacked jurisdiction to review moot cases because of "the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy." See Liner v. Javco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 394 n.3 (1964). Exceptions to the federal application of mootness developed over time—exceptions that, in many respects, 29  Except when they should. Because there are, of course, exceptions to the rule that "[a] moot case generally will be dismissed." Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992). Even when a "controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect," the Florida Supreme Court has identified "at least three instances" of exceptions to mootness. Id. In fact, these "instances" are quite broad. Appeals that raise questions of great "public importance," or "are likely to recur," or have "collateral legal consequences that affect the rights mirror those we have crafted in Florida law—and the result in the federal system has been frequently criticized for its incoherence. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist