Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed September 2, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D26-0791 Lower Tribunal No. 21-15424 D002 ________________ S.C.T.A., a Grandmother, Appellant, vs. Department of Children and Families, et al., Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos Guzman, Judge. Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights and Gregory L. Smith (New York, NY), and Jane M. Liu (Chicago, IL), Carlton Fields, P.A., and Joseph H. Lang, Jr., and Jason T. Long (Tampa), for appellant. Sarah Todd Weitz, and Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee the Guardian ad Litem; Karla Perkins, and Stephanie C. Zimmerman (Bradenton), for appellee Department of Children and Families. Before MILLER, LOBREE, and GOODEN, JJ. MILLER, J. UPON APPELLEES’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL Appellees, the Department of Children and Families and the Guardian ad Litem, have moved to dismiss an appeal filed by appellant, S.C.T.A., the paternal grandmother of six-year-old I.D.T.M. Appellees assert alternative grounds for dismissal, all of which focus on the justiciability of the underlying appeal. We deny the requested relief. I I.D.T.M. was born in Honduras in May 2020. After his birth, he resided with S.C.T.A. and his parents. In November 2020, the family fled Honduras, purportedly to escape targeted violence. They settled in Mexico. In May 2021, I.D.T.M.’s mother took him to the United States. When I.D.T.M.’s father attempted to join them, he was detained and deported to Honduras. Three months later, the Department obtained custody of I.D.T.M. By the end of the year, the circuit court terminated both parents’ parental rights and placed I.D.T.M. with paternal relatives in Florida. S.C.T.A. traveled to the United States seeking to obtain custody of I.D.T.M. She rented an apartment complying with the Department’s home study requirements and submitted an adoption application. Meanwhile, the Department moved 2 I.D.T.M. to nonrelative foster care, and his caregivers filed an adoption application. The Adoption Applicant Review Committee (“AARC”) reviewed the competing adoption applications. In June 2025, despite finding that S.C.T.A. was fit to adopt her grandson, AARC recommended that the Department deny her application and instead grant that of the nonrelative caregivers. The following month, the Department formally denied S.C.T.A.’s application. In August 2025, S.C.T.A. timely moved for review under section 39.812(4)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2025), in the circuit court, alleging that the Department deviated from its own policies by applying an obsolete version of chapter 65C of the Florida Administrative Code in denying her application. She specifically contended the Department refused to consider her “preferred relative” status in weighing the respective adoption applications. This factor was statutorily barred from consideration at the inception of AARC’s review but required for consideration before the Department denied S.C.T.A.’s application. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(c) (eff. June 10, 2025) (“Relative. Consideration must be given to whether an applicant is a relative as defined in s. 39.01, F.S.”); § 39.01(76), Fla. Stat. (2025) (the term “relative” includes grandparents). 3 In November 2025, the circuit court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on S.C.T.A.’s review motion. Three months later, the court rendered a written order denying the motion. S.C.T.A. timely moved for rehearing, contending that the order failed to address the fundamental issue of whether the Department disregarded its own policies in reviewing and denying her adoption application. S.C.T.A. further raised constitutional challenges to the scope of judicial review afforded under section 39.812(4)(b), as amended as of July 1, 2024, which eliminated the right to full judicial review of administrative action under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. On March 18, 2026, the circuit court denied rehearing. Before the permissible appellate window lapsed, the trial court finalized the nonrelative caregivers’ adoption of I.D.T.M. without first providing notice to S.C.T.A. S.C.T.A. timely appealed the denial of her review motion to this court and separately filed a petition in the circuit court seeking to vacate the adoption. That petition remains pending. II A The Department contends the appeal is moot because I.D.T.M. has been adopted by his nonrelative caregivers. It posits that though section 39.013(2), Florida Statutes (2025), confers jurisdiction on the circuit court 4 when an initial shelter, dependency, or termination of parental rights petition is filed or a child is taken into custody, section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes, divests the court of that jurisdiction upon the finalization of an adoption. See id. (“The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted.”). We are not persuaded that the mere fact that the adoption was finalized during the appellate window stands as an impenetrable barrier to further review. The Florida Supreme Court has “defined an issue as moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect.” Casiano v. State, 310 So. 3d 910, 913 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And here, there remains pending a parallel proceeding to nullify the adoption. Irrespective, it is long-established that an exception to mootness arises where an appeal raises a question of great public importance, the issue is likely to recur yet evading review, or collateral legal consequences affecting the rights of a party stem from the decision. See Godwin, 593 So. 2d at 212. In these proceedings, S.C.T.A. has raised a colorable claim that the Department deviated from longstanding, binding legal principles and the public policy of this state in adversely deciding her application, curtailing her right to due process by stymieing her access to 5 judicial resources, and finalizing the competing adoption petition without affording her notice, and, in so doing, created a scenario wherein she is now deprived of any opportunity to even engage in visitation with her grandson. In our view, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the exception. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 690 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“The agency must apply the law in effect at the time it makes its final decision.”); E.J. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 219 So. 3d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Florida follows the general rule that ‘a change in a licensure statute that occurs during the pendency of the application for licensure is operative as to the application, so that the law as changed, rather than as it existed at the time the application was filed, determines whether the license should be granted.’” (citations omitted)); see also § 39.5085, Fla. Stat. (2025) (establishing the Relative Caregiver Program and recognizing unique role of supporting relatives); Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(c) (eff. June 10, 2025) (“Consideration must be given to whether an applicant is a relative as defined in s. 39.01, F.S.”); R. 65C-16.002 (eff. July 20, 2023– June 9, 2025) (“Cultural values and traditions are more likely to be passed on to those who have a shared history with extended family. Consideration must be given to the quality of the relationship with a relative seeking to adopt a child. Some children will already know and trust the relative seeking to 6 adopt. If not, the willingness of the relative to participate in pre-placement activities to promote the development of a relationship must be considered.”); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So. 2d 699, 703–04 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“[T]he strong public policy which exists in this state in favor of the natural family unit” and “the strong public policy of this state which favors the establishment and continuity of family units” (citation omitted)), approved, 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984); LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (recognizing Florida’s “strong public policy in favor of the natural family unit”). B Invoking section 39.812, Florida Statutes, the Department further contends that S.C.T.A. lacks standing to pursue her appeal. Section 39.812(4)(b)3. provides, in relevant part, “[a] denied applicant only has standing under this chapter to file a motion to review the department’s denial and to present evidence in support of such motion.” But the statute further states, “[s]uch standing is terminated upon the entry of the court’s order.” Id. We must harmonize these provisions with the constitutional right of the people of our state to seek review of final judgments or orders from the trial courts. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (“District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final 7 judgments or orders of trial courts . . . .”); Bain v. State, 730 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“[A]ll final orders are appealable as a matter of right.”); Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”); see also In re J.B., 101 So. 3d 407, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“When jurisdiction exists under the constitution, the legislature cannot impose a limitation on that jurisdiction.” (citing State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 2000))); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005) (“While we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.”); Gray v. Cent. Fla. Lumber Co., 140 So. 320, 323 (Fla. 1932) (If a statute “admits of two interpretations, one of which would lead to its constitutionality and the other to its unconstitutionality, the former rather than the latter must be adopted.”). In this context, the review that occurred below was evidentiary in nature. The trial court therefore served in a factfinding rather than a purely appellate capacity.1 In light of this posture and the 1 See § 39.013(4), Fla. Stat. (“[I]f the court has terminated jurisdiction, the order may be subsequently modified by a court of competent jurisdiction in any other civil action or proceeding affecting placement of, access to, parental time with, adoption of, or parental rights and responsibilities for the same minor child.”); but see C.V. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. Servs., 19 So. 8 aforementioned constitutional guarantees, we do not construe the language of the statute as compromising our own jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 1, Fla. Const. (“The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts.”); Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. Bunsee, 380 So. 3d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (Tanenbaum, J., dissenting) (“Finality instead must refer to the conclusive exercise of judicial power on a claim . . . .”). And regardless, S.C.T.A. has, at a minimum, raised a plausible claim of entitlement to relief in certiorari. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (“A district court of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.”). C We similarly reject the additional argument that section 63.182(1), Florida Statutes bars this appeal. That statute of repose extinguishes actions “to vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a judgment of adoption or an underlying judgment terminating parental rights.” § 63.182(1), Fla. Stat. This appeal challenges only the order denying the motion for review under section 3d 381, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (grandparents “are not parties and do not have standing to appeal” certain placement orders). 9 39.812(4), not the adoption judgment itself. The statute is therefore inapplicable. In closing, we are mindful of the lauded interest in achieving permanency for I.D.T.M. See §39.621(1), Fla. Stat. (“Time is of the essence for permanency of children in the dependency system.”); S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 782–83 (Fla. 2016) (“[T]here is a strong policy incentive in achieving permanency for children in care as quickly as possible.”). We therefore separately impose an expedited briefing schedule. Motions denied. 10