Reeves v. Dobbins
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-60557
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 20, 2026
No. 24-60557
____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Peter Reeves,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Sam Dobbins, in his individual capacity; Charles Henderson, in
his individual and official capacities as Interim Chief of Police of Lexington,
Mississippi; City of Lexington; Cordarius Epps, in his
individual capacity; Justin Newell, in his individual capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:23-CV-333
______________________________
Before Haynes, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Peter Reeves sued the City of Lexington, Mississippi as well as current
and former officers of its police department. He alleges the defendants
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-60557
violated his constitutional rights after he was stopped at a traffic roadblock
set up by local law enforcement.
During the stop, an officer reportedly detected the smell of marijuana
in Reeves’ car. The officer then detained Reeves and searched his vehicle.
The search revealed Oxycontin pills, and Reeves was arrested for possession
of a controlled substance. He was also cited for an illegal window tint and
lack of insurance. While the drug charge was later dismissed, Reeves paid
the traffic citations.
Reeves now seeks damages and an injunction, alleging that the road-
block was part of a racially discriminatory program set up by former Lexing-
ton Police Chief Sam Dobbins. He asserts that police used the roadblock to
raise revenue by targeting black areas of Lexington. Reeves claims that, be-
cause of these traffic roadblocks, he was subjected to an unconstitutional sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment and equal protection violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment to the City and officers.
It found Reeves’ claims for both damages and injunctive relief were barred
by our court’s precedents interpreting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). See, e.g., Olivier v. City of Brandon, 2023 WL 5500223 (5th Cir. Aug.
25, 2023) (holding Heck “precludes injunctive relief against future enforce-
ment of an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance” where the plaintiff was pre-
viously convicted under the ordinance).
The district court concluded that Reeves “paid the fines for the win-
dow tint and no insurance infractions and thus stands convicted of these of-
fenses for Heck purposes.” Relying on the panel decision in Olivier, it rea-
soned that “Heck bars the claim in its entirety because if the program was
unconstitutional, then this stop was unconstitutional, and the fact of Reeves’
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driving without insurance was discovered as a result of the allegedly illegal
roadblock program.”
Therefore, the court explained, Reeves’ success on his claims would
“necessarily imply” the invalidity of his traffic citation convictions. Because
it determined Reeves’ claims were Heck-barred, the district court did not
evaluate the underlying merits of the constitutional claims.
***
The Supreme Court has since corrected our court’s approach to the
Heck bar in the context of forward-looking relief. See Olivier v. City of Bran-
don, 607 U.S. 552 (2026).
Heck continues to bar Reeves’ damages claim. But we reverse the
judgment of the district court with respect to Reeves’ pursuit of injunctive
relief, in light of Olivier, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
The district court held that Heck bars Peter Reeves’s claims for both
damages and injunctive relief. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In
Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. 552 (2026), the Supreme Court
unanimously reiterated that Heck does not apply to “prospective injunctive
relief” and instead applies to “the ‘retrospective use of § 1983 to collaterally
attack criminal convictions.’” Id. at 559 (alteration omitted) (quoting Olivier
v. City of Brandon, 121 F.4th 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc)). As I’ve previously explained, these
rules are longstanding and well settled. See Wilson v. Midland County, 116
F.4th 384, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1858
(2026) (mem.). With respect to Reeves’s claim for injunctive relief, in other
words, Olivier leaves no room for further analysis or reconsideration. Heck
does not bar Reeves’s request for an injunction.
The damages claim is trickier. When “the invalidity of [a] conviction”
is an element of a § 1983 damages claim, the plaintiff must show that his
conviction was favorably terminated before he can bring suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82, 489–90. As I explained:
[F]avorable termination is itself an element of any § 1983 claim
that seeks money damages for a tainted conviction. Until that
tainted conviction is favorably terminated—that is, reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive process, set aside by a
state court of competent jurisdiction, or set aside by a federal
habeas court—the § 1983 damages claim does not accrue. That
is because unless and until the tainted conviction is favorably
terminated, the facts authorizing the § 1983 damages suit have
not come into existence.
Wilson, 116 F.4th at 390–91 (citations omitted).
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Reeves’s allegedly tainted convictions are traffic offenses. Mississippi
law says that “[i]t is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the
[traffic laws], unless such violation is by such chapters or other law of this
state declared to be a felony.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-11(1). Because
run-of-the-mill traffic violations are misdemeanors, a violator must be
“legally convicted thereof in a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of
the person.” Id. § 99-19-3(1). That means that all elements of the traffic
violation must be proven by the State or municipality beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., Tubwell v. State, 359 So. 3d 249, 251 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).
Typically, a criminal conviction occurs under Mississippi law only after (1) a
trial verdict or (2) a plea in open court of guilty or nolo contendere. Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-19-3(1). But Mississippi carves out an exception to these
typical procedures for misdemeanor traffic violations. See Miss. R. Crim.
P. 3.1(c). “In all cases in the circuit, county, justice and municipal courts
involving a traffic misdemeanor violation . . . where a person has been issued
a ticket,” an alleged violator may choose to pay “the amount of the fine . . .
in advance to the clerk of the court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-3(2).
“[S]uch action shall be a plea of nolo contendere by such person and the
court, upon the advance payment of fine . . . may convict the person of the
offense stated in the ticket . . . without further appearance by the person.”
Ibid.
Here, Reeves alleges that his two traffic offenses—for failure to
maintain insurance and for illegal window tint—are unconstitutional. He
contends that Lexington police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments in stopping him in a racially discriminatory manner, and that
but for that stop, he would not have been charged with either offense. Reeves
pleaded nolo contendere to both, was convicted of both, and now contends that
both convictions are unconstitutional and actionable under § 1983. The
invalidity of both convictions, therefore, are elements of his § 1983 damages
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action. That triggers the Heck bar and its favorable-termination requirement,
and it means Reeves cannot sue under § 1983 unless and until he shows that
his convictions were set aside or otherwise favorably terminated. He has not
made that showing, so Heck bars this suit.
Reeves’s principal counterargument is that his particular traffic
tickets were invalid. His tickets are not in the record, and therefore he
contends, we have no basis to believe his tickets comported with Mississippi
law and gave him notice of his right to a trial. Blue Br. 19–36. But “my tickets
were illegal” is precisely the sort of argument that Heck bars in § 1983 suits—
because Reeves could’ve (and hence must’ve) raised it on direct appeal or in
another state court forum for challenging his misdemeanor convictions. In
any event, Mississippi imposes uniformity requirements on all tickets, and
those requirements include notice that early payment waives any right to
further process. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-21(2); Red Br. at 17 & n.5
(reproducing ticket language). And Reeves has done nothing to show that his
particular tickets somehow deviated from this statutory obligation.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
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