Full Opinion

Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 20, 2026 No. 24-60557 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Peter Reeves, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Sam Dobbins, in his individual capacity; Charles Henderson, in his individual and official capacities as Interim Chief of Police of Lexington, Mississippi; City of Lexington; Cordarius Epps, in his individual capacity; Justin Newell, in his individual capacity, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:23-CV-333 ______________________________ Before Haynes, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Peter Reeves sued the City of Lexington, Mississippi as well as current and former officers of its police department. He alleges the defendants _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-60557 violated his constitutional rights after he was stopped at a traffic roadblock set up by local law enforcement. During the stop, an officer reportedly detected the smell of marijuana in Reeves’ car. The officer then detained Reeves and searched his vehicle. The search revealed Oxycontin pills, and Reeves was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. He was also cited for an illegal window tint and lack of insurance. While the drug charge was later dismissed, Reeves paid the traffic citations. Reeves now seeks damages and an injunction, alleging that the road- block was part of a racially discriminatory program set up by former Lexing- ton Police Chief Sam Dobbins. He asserts that police used the roadblock to raise revenue by targeting black areas of Lexington. Reeves claims that, be- cause of these traffic roadblocks, he was subjected to an unconstitutional sei- zure under the Fourth Amendment and equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and officers. It found Reeves’ claims for both damages and injunctive relief were barred by our court’s precedents interpreting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See, e.g., Olivier v. City of Brandon, 2023 WL 5500223 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023) (holding Heck “precludes injunctive relief against future enforce- ment of an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance” where the plaintiff was pre- viously convicted under the ordinance). The district court concluded that Reeves “paid the fines for the win- dow tint and no insurance infractions and thus stands convicted of these of- fenses for Heck purposes.” Relying on the panel decision in Olivier, it rea- soned that “Heck bars the claim in its entirety because if the program was unconstitutional, then this stop was unconstitutional, and the fact of Reeves’ 2 Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-60557 driving without insurance was discovered as a result of the allegedly illegal roadblock program.” Therefore, the court explained, Reeves’ success on his claims would “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his traffic citation convictions. Because it determined Reeves’ claims were Heck-barred, the district court did not evaluate the underlying merits of the constitutional claims. *** The Supreme Court has since corrected our court’s approach to the Heck bar in the context of forward-looking relief. See Olivier v. City of Bran- don, 607 U.S. 552 (2026). Heck continues to bar Reeves’ damages claim. But we reverse the judgment of the district court with respect to Reeves’ pursuit of injunctive relief, in light of Olivier, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3 Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-60557 Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: The district court held that Heck bars Peter Reeves’s claims for both damages and injunctive relief. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. 552 (2026), the Supreme Court unanimously reiterated that Heck does not apply to “prospective injunctive relief” and instead applies to “the ‘retrospective use of § 1983 to collaterally attack criminal convictions.’” Id. at 559 (alteration omitted) (quoting Olivier v. City of Brandon, 121 F.4th 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc)). As I’ve previously explained, these rules are longstanding and well settled. See Wilson v. Midland County, 116 F.4th 384, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1858 (2026) (mem.). With respect to Reeves’s claim for injunctive relief, in other words, Olivier leaves no room for further analysis or reconsideration. Heck does not bar Reeves’s request for an injunction. The damages claim is trickier. When “the invalidity of [a] conviction” is an element of a § 1983 damages claim, the plaintiff must show that his conviction was favorably terminated before he can bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82, 489–90. As I explained: [F]avorable termination is itself an element of any § 1983 claim that seeks money damages for a tainted conviction. Until that tainted conviction is favorably terminated—that is, reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive process, set aside by a state court of competent jurisdiction, or set aside by a federal habeas court—the § 1983 damages claim does not accrue. That is because unless and until the tainted conviction is favorably terminated, the facts authorizing the § 1983 damages suit have not come into existence. Wilson, 116 F.4th at 390–91 (citations omitted). 4 Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-60557 Reeves’s allegedly tainted convictions are traffic offenses. Mississippi law says that “[i]t is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the [traffic laws], unless such violation is by such chapters or other law of this state declared to be a felony.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-11(1). Because run-of-the-mill traffic violations are misdemeanors, a violator must be “legally convicted thereof in a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the person.” Id. § 99-19-3(1). That means that all elements of the traffic violation must be proven by the State or municipality beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Tubwell v. State, 359 So. 3d 249, 251 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). Typically, a criminal conviction occurs under Mississippi law only after (1) a trial verdict or (2) a plea in open court of guilty or nolo contendere. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-3(1). But Mississippi carves out an exception to these typical procedures for misdemeanor traffic violations. See Miss. R. Crim. P. 3.1(c). “In all cases in the circuit, county, justice and municipal courts involving a traffic misdemeanor violation . . . where a person has been issued a ticket,” an alleged violator may choose to pay “the amount of the fine . . . in advance to the clerk of the court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-3(2). “[S]uch action shall be a plea of nolo contendere by such person and the court, upon the advance payment of fine . . . may convict the person of the offense stated in the ticket . . . without further appearance by the person.” Ibid. Here, Reeves alleges that his two traffic offenses—for failure to maintain insurance and for illegal window tint—are unconstitutional. He contends that Lexington police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in stopping him in a racially discriminatory manner, and that but for that stop, he would not have been charged with either offense. Reeves pleaded nolo contendere to both, was convicted of both, and now contends that both convictions are unconstitutional and actionable under § 1983. The invalidity of both convictions, therefore, are elements of his § 1983 damages 5 Case: 24-60557 Document: 90-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-60557 action. That triggers the Heck bar and its favorable-termination requirement, and it means Reeves cannot sue under § 1983 unless and until he shows that his convictions were set aside or otherwise favorably terminated. He has not made that showing, so Heck bars this suit. Reeves’s principal counterargument is that his particular traffic tickets were invalid. His tickets are not in the record, and therefore he contends, we have no basis to believe his tickets comported with Mississippi law and gave him notice of his right to a trial. Blue Br. 19–36. But “my tickets were illegal” is precisely the sort of argument that Heck bars in § 1983 suits— because Reeves could’ve (and hence must’ve) raised it on direct appeal or in another state court forum for challenging his misdemeanor convictions. In any event, Mississippi imposes uniformity requirements on all tickets, and those requirements include notice that early payment waives any right to further process. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-21(2); Red Br. at 17 & n.5 (reproducing ticket language). And Reeves has done nothing to show that his particular tickets somehow deviated from this statutory obligation. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment. 6