Pettieway v. Supervisor Kelly
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket25-30714
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-30714 Document: 65-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 10, 2026
No. 25-30714 Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Summary Calendar Clerk
____________
Marlon James Pettieway,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Supervisor Kelly, Individually and in their official capacity; Deputy
Dofflemayer, Individually and in their official capacity; Deputy
Spurell, Individually and in their official capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:23-CV-352
______________________________
Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Marlon James Pettieway appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 25-30714
The district court entered judgment on Pettieway’s only remaining
claim on October 10, 2025. Pettieway’s deadline to appeal was November 10,
2025. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). He waited until November 24, 2025,
to notice his appeal, rendering it untimely. On October 15, 2025, however,
Pettieway did object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
granting summary judgment. Upon review of the record, that objection was
not enough to constitute a timely appeal.
We construe the pleadings of a pro se petitioner liberally. See
Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2011). Where a party’s
intent to appeal “is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party,”
he “does not forfeit his right of appeal” by mislabeling a notice. Id. (quotation
omitted). In Hernandez, the court considered the merits of the petitioner’s
appeal because he clearly intended to appeal a particular order even though
he listed the wrong case number. Id. Pettieway, on the other hand, did
properly identify the order to which his objection applied. He titled the filing
“Objection,” and stated, “I object to the Report and Recommendations of
the Court.”
“It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the
label that the petitioner has attached to it, that determines [its] true nature
and operative effect . . . .” Id. at 426; accord Armstrong v. Capshaw, Goss &
Bowers, LLP, 404 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2005) (“We have frequently
instructed district courts to determine the true nature of a pleading by its
substance, not its label.”). The substance of the relief Pettieway sought in his
October 15 filing was relief from the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. See generally Cruz v. Lumpkin, No. 21-40613, 2022 WL
1793510, at *1 (5th Cir. June 2, 2022) (noting that a report and
recommendation is not final and cannot be appealed). “[A] notice of appeal
must specifically indicate the litigant’s intent to seek appellate review . . . .”
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (considering a pro se petitioner’s
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No. 25-30714
notice of appeal). So, even when construed liberally, Pettieway’s objection
did not constitute a timely appeal.
We therefore lack jurisdiction over Pettieway’s appeal. See Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
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