Full Opinion

Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 25-60496 October 22, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Jackson Federation of Teachers; Barbara Phillips, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; James Thomas, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Dawn Zimmerer, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; L.E. Jibol, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; United Campus Workers Southeast Local 3821; Madisyn Donley, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Alexis Cobbs, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Karen Aderer, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Fostering LGBTQ+ Advocacy, Resources, and Environments; Women in Science and Engineering; Joy Parikha, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Greg Powell, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Jakob Clark, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Ashley Rogers, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus Lynn Fitch, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Mississippi; Gee Ogletree, in their official capacity as President of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Steven Cunningham, in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Amy Arrington, in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of 1 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 State Institutions of Higher Learning; Donald Clark, Jr., in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Et al., Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:25-CV-417 ______________________________ Before Smith, Haynes, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge: The district judge issued a preliminary injunction barring enforce- ment of a new state law regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion. We vacate the injunction and remand for reassignment to a different district judge. * * * * * In April 2025, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1193 (H.B. 1193), a law designed to keep Mississippi public education funds from being spent on diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) initiatives and similar controversial programs. The law prevents government-run institutions from requiring activities such as diversity training or pushing DEI ideology, so defined, in the course of government-funded business. H.B. 1193 does four main things. First, it prevents educational institu- tions from mandating DEI programs and diversity trainings in a variety of contexts. Second, it stops public educational institutions from punishing stu- dents for their views on DEI. Third, it prohibits regulated institutions from endorsing or promoting DEI through course materials. Finally, it prevents institutions and their educators from otherwise engaging in DEI methods or actions, preventing bad actors from circumventing prohibitions and frustrat- ing its purposes. The statute also creates an administrative process to handle 2 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 claims that a given educational institution is not in compliance. H.B. 1193 excepts several activities from its sweep, including scholarly work, the activ- ities of students and their groups, and creative engagement. Plaintiffs, a smattering of teachers, professors, students, parents, and activist organizations, filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge, claiming the law violates the First Amendment, unconstitutionally contravenes the void- for-vagueness doctrine, and otherwise violates various Fourteenth Amend- ment doctrines. The proceedings in the district court were a botch job, to say the least. Judge Henry Wingate issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoin- ing enforcement of H.B. 1193 that contained several factual assertions nowhere to be found in the record, or indeed, in any proceeding of the case. Those included mention of plaintiffs and defendants not in the complaint, supposed “declarations” from non-existent or never-present individuals, false quotations purporting to be taken from the text of H.B. 1193, and several erroneous claims that the law had already led to the demise of apparently fictitious programs. After this came to light, Judge Wingate replaced the TRO without explaining. Forging forward despite the bungled TRO, Judge Wingate issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction. The various state defendants appeal. At oral argument in this court, it was discovered that even the “cor- rected” TRO—which was incorporated by reference into the preliminary injunction order—still contained hallucinated information (namely, a cita- tion to a purported Fourth Circuit case, “Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk,” that does not exist). 3 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 This district judge carelessly exercised his Article III power by issuing sloppy edicts based on falsehoods and fabrications. Upon discovering some of these falsehoods, Judge Wingate dug in his heels and claimed that the hal- lucinated claims had no bearing on its reasoning; he offered no explanation as to why he included such apparently irrelevant material in the original TRO or why the TRO nevertheless was justified in its absence. Moreover, the district court got the law wrong. The TRO and prelim- inary injunction order rested on impoverished legal analysis that barely paid lip-service to the precedents of the Supreme Court or this court, seeming at times purposely to misconstrue the law by manipulating the words of statutes and cases, without regard to their texts’ meaning as a whole. 1 The district court—or perhaps, being charitable, its AI agent—ignored and manipulated governing law, apparently to satisfy a policy agenda. Because of the extraordinarily grave errors by the district court, we vacate and remand for assignment to a different district judge. Per the Supreme Court’s decision in Moody, we instruct the new judge to conduct proceedings consistent with federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this circuit. _____________________ 1 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (Best interpretation of law will “rationally” fit with “the policy of the law in general and the [statutory scheme] in particular.”); Dig. 1.3.17 (Celsus, Dig. 26) (“Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem.”) (“To know the laws is not to grasp their words, but their strength and power.” (author’s translation)). Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717–18 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (impermissible for courts to isolate and extract words of statutory definition divorced from the whole of the law). Accord Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608– 09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 4 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 I. A. Procedural History Plaintiffs are a teachers’ group, a campus union, two student groups, professors, teachers, college students, and parents of K-12 students. Sets of plaintiffs propose to represent putative classes of Mississippi teachers, pro- fessors, students, and parents or guardians of minor students. In June 2025, they filed a pre-enforcement suit two months after the passage of H.B. 1193, naming several state officials charged with enforcing the act as defendants. On July 20, 2025, Judge Wingate entered the TRO. Two days later, defendants filed a motion to clarify or correct the order, pointing out several factual inaccuracies. Later that same day, the district court removed the orig- inal TRO from the docket and replaced it with a seemingly corrected version backdated to July 20. The court denied defendants’ request to restore the original TRO to the docket as a superseded order, claiming that the hallucinated parties, hear- ings, and facts were merely “clerical.” After accusations that AI had been used in the original TRO made national headlines, Judge Wingate admitted to having used AI to prepare the TRO and blamed the errors on his law clerk’s employment of AI in drafting it. On August 18, 2025, Judge Wingate granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, claiming that H.B. 1193 facially violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness. On September 16, 2025, defendants timely appealed. B. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because there is a federal cause of action, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1). 2 We review a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Atchafa- laya Basinkeeper v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2018). Questions of law within the analysis are reviewed de novo, factual determinations for clear error. Id. A district court that grants a preliminary injunction based on incorrect legal principles “[b]y definition” abuses its discretion. Little v. Llano County, 138 F.4th 834, 842 n.7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 886 (2025). II. This Case Must Be Reassigned on Remand. The details of the district judge’s orders frame our holding that re- assignment is necessary to do justice. A. The District Judge’s Actions 1. The TROs The original TRO—the one actually issued on July 20, 2025—named as plaintiffs eleven individuals and organizations who had never been party to the case 3; named as defendants two officials who were not actually sued 4; claimed, without evidence, that three post-secondary institutions had already cancelled DEI initiatives or programming because of the act 5; further de- clared, again without evidence, that staff at another school had been told not _____________________ 2 See, e.g., Jiao v. Xu, 28 F.4th 591, 596 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2022). 3 These were Dr. Daphne Chamberlain, Dr. Robert Luckett, Dr. Brian Pugh, Z. Luckett, Mississippi Votes, the Black Student Union at Jackson State University, Spec- trum (a purported student organization), Aidan Carr, Christopher Brent, the Mississippi Library Association, and Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. – Mississippi Chapters. 4 These were the Commissioner of Higher Education Dr. Al Rankins, Jr. and State Superintendent of Education Dr. Lance Evans (who is a defendant in another capacity but not as Superintendent of Education). 5 ECF 54 at 3; see ECF 22. 6 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 to discuss certain topics, including “historical interpretations involving sys- temic racism” 6; misquoted H.B. 1193 as applying to “race or sex stereo- typing,” “race or sex scapegoating,” “critical race theory,” and “institu- tional bias,” despite none of these terms’ appearing in the act’s text; and ref- erenced purported declarations of four individuals who do not appear in the record at all and may not even exist. On July 22, 2025, defendants filed a motion to clarify, pointing out these errors. ECF 54. In response, the court, without explanation, replaced the original TRO with a seemingly corrected version. Though that document was docketed on July 22, it was backdated to July 20. ECF 58 at 2; see also ECF 58–2. Defendants requested that the original order be restored to the docket to keep the record whole and requested that the court explain the inaccuracies in the original order. The district court denied that motion, claiming the factual inaccuracies were merely “clerical.” 7 In response, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley accused the district court of using artificial Intelligence (“AI”) to prepare the TRO, with the substan- tive errors’ arising from AI-generated hallucinations. 8 Fifteen days later, Judge Wingate admitted the errors, claiming that a law clerk had used AI to assist drafting an earlier version of the TRO that was docketed by mistake. 9 His letter stated that he had removed the original TRO from the docket to avoid confusion and that the errors were clerical, in his view, because they _____________________ 6 ECF 54 at 3. Other topics were also listed as banned that never were, and “con- fusion” was described with no evidence thereof in the record. 7 We are grateful—and, indeed, lucky—that the defendants provided a copy of the original TRO as an exhibit in their July 28 motion, ECF 58-1, given that Judge Wingate kept it from public view. 8 Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Oct. 6, 2025), bit.ly/42tKEKg. 9 Letter from Hon. Henry T. Wingate at 1 (Oct. 2, 2025), bit.ly/430akP3. 7 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 did not relate to “core legal reasoning or the ultimate judgment on the merits” but instead to “failure to confirm the accuracy of certain information.” 10 The seemingly corrected TRO did not explain how or why the factual inaccuracies were not necessary to the reasoning of the original TRO. The merits analysis failed to cite a binding authority from after the year 2000. 11 It claims that H.B. 1193 constitutes viewpoint discrimination, without any anal- ysis whatsoever of a state government’s authority to regulate its own speech. 12 And the document did not correct all of the errors: At Fifth Circuit oral argument, it was discovered that the doctored TRO cited to “Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 503 F.2d 422, 426–27 (4th Cir. 1974).” ECF 51 at 2–3. That case does not even exist; it is an apparent AI hallucination. 13 2. The Preliminary Injunction The order granting the preliminary injunction likewise lacks thor- oughness. 14 For example, defendants explained that, because of the facial _____________________ 10 Id. at 2. It is not clear to this court how so many mistaken facts could not at least marginally “affect” “core legal reasoning” or support for the judgment on the merits. 11 See ECF 51 at7–13. The order managed to cite Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), for a proposition of substantive law that flies in the face of this circuit’s Garcetti framework. See ECF 51 at 9. A decision of the Ninth Circuit binds neither us nor the district court. The order’s public-interest analysis did manage to cite more recent binding caselaw. See ECF 51 at 13. 12 ECF 51 at 7. 13 The citation, 503 F.2d 422, is in the middle of United States v. Anderson, 503 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1974). See id. at 422. The pincite is to two pages of Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1974). See id. at 426–27. Neither case “discuss[es]” the “interplay between TRO and preliminary injunction.” ECF 51 at2–3. Even if the case did exist, it wouldn’t be binding in this circuit. 14 In fact, given that the preliminary injunction order “generally incorporates by reference its discussion and analysis in its TRO,” the hallucinated case discussed above is 8 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 posture of this case, the regulation only “theoretically” may apply to the plaintiffs; Judge Wingate took that as proof that the “regulations . . . almost assuredly would spill over to the public.” ECF 74 at18. The district court’s holding as regards the facial First Amendment challenge, meanwhile, cites only two cases (only one from the last two decades) 15 and instead focuses on things such as what “[o]ne witness wondered” and what one parent “thought . . . could be considered” excised by the State of Mississippi’s regulation. ECF 74 at 18–21. The court referenced Moody v. NetChoice, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), only to circumvent it. Indeed, the district court’s conclusory analysis claims that Moody’s framework is only “supposedly” required: Essentially, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not made the show- ing supposedly necessary under Moody v. NetChoice. This Court dis- agrees. Plaintiffs, through declarations, testimony, and logical argu- mentation, have identified many concrete examples of [materials and programs] that are arguably on the chopping block should HB 1193’s content-based restrictions be enforced. Plaintiffs affirmatively stated that they could think of no constitutional applications of the chal- lenged provisions. Defendants, on the other hand, while they carry no burden, did not offer competent evidence and argument as to consti- tutional applications adequately to rebut Plaintiffs’ showing. ECF 74 at 20–21. The district court brushes off the Moody framework as a “supposed” formality that was satisfied merely because plaintiffs identified programs and books that, in their view, are “arguably on the chopping block.” That does not come close to satisfying the inquiry demanded by Moody. It is egregious _____________________ arguably part of the shoddy reasoning of the preliminary injunction, too. 15 That was an erroneous citation of “Kennedy v. Bremerton [sic],” ECF 74 at 19, referring to Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022). 9 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 for the district court just to assume that plaintiffs’ assertions that certain materials are “on the chopping block” must mean a constitutional violation has occurred, without any independent legal analysis whatsoever. 16 It is even worse for the court merely to take the plaintiffs’ claims as true, with barely a glance at the arguments of the defendants. That is legal analysis so poor that it hardly deserves the label. The order defends its analy- sis by claiming that the plaintiffs “do not seek to challenge HB 1193’s prohi- bitions on unlawful discrimination,” ignoring the fact that several of the challenged portions arguably do nothing more than prohibit unlawful dis- crimination. 17 ECF 74 at 9. Moody demands that a plaintiff raising a facial First Amendment chal- lenge show that the law’s “unconstitutional applications substantially out- weigh its constitutional ones.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 724. A facial challenge may succeed only by following Moody’s two-step process: first, establish the scope of the law, i.e., which activities and which parties the law regulates; second, determine which would and would not be constitutional and “com- pare the two sets” to see whether there is a “sphere of [constitutional] appli- cations” that can defeat the facial claim. Id. at 724–25, 726. The key inquiry of the second step, our circuit has held, is whether the plaintiff can meet the “rigorous” standard by showing that “the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful appli- cations” is so “lopsided” as substantially to outweigh the lawful reach of the _____________________ 16 The district court cannot claim that it followed Moody in good faith by hiding behind the thin reed of defendants’ alleged failure to “offer competent evidence and argument as to constitutional applications.” Since defendants argued that there are many constitutional applications and that Plaintiffs’ worries were mistaken, see ECF 43 at 8–17, the district court’s statement is not a reflection of forfeiture by defendants. 17 See infra part III.A. 10 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 law. 18 That Judge Wingate twice refers to the Moody framework as “suppos- edly” required calls into question whether he even tried in good faith to fol- low the law. 19 ECF 74 at 15, 20. Inferior courts must perform the Moody analysis exactly “in the way . . . described” in order properly to rule on a First Amendment facial challenge. Moody, 603 U.S. at 726. The district court’s laxity in observing the binding authority of the Supreme Court is yet another reason to doom the preliminary injunction. The district court’s remaining substantive reasoning is poor at best. Judge Wingate cites a couple of parents who were allegedly worried about the law’s impact, ECF 74 at 18–19; the fact that defendants are “loudly noncom- mittal,” something bordering on paradoxical that has nothing to do with legal analysis, id. at 19; and, on vagueness, the passing thought that “if [H.B. 1193] lives down to the fears it has generated, has a mouthful of sharp teeth which could inflict deep bites,” id. at 21. More subtle, but still deeply troubling, are the legal basis for, and scope of, the preliminary injunction. Citing the fact that defendants admitted that the law of university academic publication freedom “remains unclear,” Judge Wingate wrote that “Defendants’ recognition, alone, at this time, preaches that an injunction should issue when a key consideration is yet un- determined. This Court should pause when faced with an unsettled area with such dire possible consequences.” ECF 74 at 19. _____________________ 18 Students Engaged in Advancing Tex. ex rel. Fernandez v. Paxton, 177 F.4th 665, 672 n.19 (5th Cir. 2026) (first quoting Moody, 603 U.S. at 723, then quoting United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 784 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 19 Then again, Judge Wingate may merely have been expressing legitimate confu- sion, since he seems to think, in at least one instance, that Moody requires a certain “showing” by plaintiffs “with their vagueness theory.” ECF 74 at 15. 11 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 That gets the entire law of injunctive relief completely backwards. Maybe Judge Wingate thinks that preliminary injunctions are not extra- ordinary relief that interrupt the normal function of a democratically elected legislature and executive, but instead are a way for courts to “pause” in the face of “an unsettled area” of law. ECF 74 at19. Under U.S. law, however, things are different. The law forbids district courts from “pausing” if the outcome is totally uncertain. To impose preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that the party requesting it is likely to succeed on the merits. Planned Parenthood v. Kauffman, 981 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). And the burden is on that party—in this case, the plaintiffs—because injunctive relief is, by its nature, an extraordinary remedy requiring a high bar. Id. A preliminary injunction cannot stand just because there is a possi- bility of success on the merits. The authorizing judge may justify injunctive relief only by ruling that there is likelihood of success. Finally, the scope of the preliminary injunction is impermissibly broad. The order badly misunderstands Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025). Judge Wingate cites CASA’s holding that injunctive relief should be scoped as is “necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff,” id. at 2562–63 (2025), for the proposition that “[i]n this Court’s eye, injunctions of this type should be all-or-nothing renditions,” ECF 74 at 16. That is almost exactly the opposite of what CASA says. The quoted portion was the Supreme Court’s cautioning against overbroad relief and urging judges to tailor relief to what is absolutely necessary and nothing more: In other words, the Court rejects precisely the notion that injunctions “should be all-or- nothing renditions.” 20 The Court instructs inferior courts to avoid the kind _____________________ 20 At least, to the extent that an injunction could be considered a “rendition.” 12 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 of hand-waving that presumes injunctions should issue broadly merely because the stakes are high or the legal issues are complex. The district court later gestures toward putative class certification to establish a statewide scope, but its misunderstanding of CASA tainted its decision to issue such a broad injunction. Indeed, CASA flatly rejects the idea that class actions may be used to circumvent the prohibition on universal injunctions: The whole point of its ruling was that class actions are more constrained and more fair than universal injunctions. 21 A district court that took CASA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 seriously would never grant such sweeping relief to such putative and dubious classes. B. Our Circuit Precedent Demands Reassignment on Remand. This court may reassign any case on remand when necessary for jus- tice, per our supervisory power over the district courts. 22 Admittedly, how- ever, reassignment on remand is an “extraordinary” and “rarely invoked” power; indeed, this power is so sparingly exercised that our court has not settled on which of two “independent” 23 tests it uses to determine whether the circumstances demand reassignment in the interest of justice. Willey, _____________________ 21 CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2555; see id. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision will have very little value if district courts award relief to broadly defined classes” without going through the “rigorous analysis” required by Rule 23. (citation omitted)). 22 United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 851 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Willey v. Harris Cnty. Dist. Att’y, 27 F.4th 1125, 1137 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A]ppellate courts may reassign cases to a different judge on remand under their authority to ‘require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106)). Accord Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994). 23 Willey, 27 F.4th at 1137 (quoting In re DaimlerChrysler Corp., 294 F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 2002)). The two tests are actually not so independent, since the second test essen- tially asks whether an objective observer would reasonably question which way the second factor of the first test tilts, at least, as regards a judge’s impartiality. See id. (citing United States v. Khan, 997 F.3d 242, 249 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021)). 13 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 27 F.4th at 1137. The first way to determine whether reassignment is warranted con- siders (1) whether the original judge would, on remand, “reasonably be expected . . . to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected”; (2) “whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice”; and (3) whether any “waste and duplication” caused by reassignment would disproportionately outweigh “any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.” Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler, 294 F.3d at 700–01). The second test asks whether the facts and circumstances of the pro- ceedings “might reasonably cause an objective observer to question the judge’s impartiality.” Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler, 294 F.3d at 701). Thus, the second test is a simplified one that essentially collapses the more complex test’s first two factors and recognizes that satisfaction of those almost cer- tainly means that the third is satisfied except, perhaps, in the most compli- cated, fact-intensive cases. 24 This case easily calls for reassignment. We begin with the first test. On the first factor, the fact that the district court merely excised the AI- hallucinated “facts” from its original TRO—without explaining why the order should still stand even without the false evidence to support it—may already evince a “substantial difficulty” in setting aside views based on _____________________ 24 Some panels of this circuit have instead held the second test is entirely redundant of the first. See Pulse Network, L.L.C. v. Visa, Inc., 30 F.4th 480, 495 n.25 (5th Cir. 2022). We continue with the two tests, however, because the first test is broader in some ways than the second (for example, where a judge may have trouble putting aside evidence ruled inadmissible on appeal but where his partiality is not at issue). 14 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 “findings determined to be erroneous.” 25 Given the embarrassment of the AI hallucinations and mistakes of law in the two TROs and the preliminary injunction, it would be an understandable—though obviously unjust—temp- tation for the judge to want to find a way to prove that, even with correct law and fact, his initial view should prevail. The judge would therefore reason- ably be expected to have substantial difficulty in setting aside previous views and unfounded “findings.” From there, the second and third factors are easily met. On the for- mer, the public esteem for the judiciary would be diminished by sending this case back to the same judge for judgment on facts and law entirely different from those upon which he supported his initial TRO. As for the latter factor, the benefit to the rule of law will handily outweigh the costs of process under a new judge—especially because our holding clarifies the scope of H.B. 1193 and lays out the law for the new judge to apply to each circumstance within his or her sweep, per the Supreme Court’s instructions in Moody. And, “regrettably,” the waste of the tainted proceedings is “already on the bal- ance sheet.” Latiolais v. Cravins, 574 F. App’x 429, 436 (5th Cir. 2014). The second test is also satisfied. We are confident that an objective observer might question the impartiality of the proceedings, for the reasons stated above, and therefore might further question later proceedings run by the same judge. We now turn to the proper scope of H.B. 1193 and the correct law to apply on remand. _____________________ 25 The wording of the second TRO is certainly worse than the strong language that merited reassignment in DaimlerChrysler, smacking of prejudgment of the issues in this case. See DaimlerChrysler, 294 F.3d at 701 n.1 (judge frequently referenced the “enormous coffers” and “elite force of lawyers” of defendant automaker, alleging “the most manipu- lative and craven [sic]approach to litigation that this Court has ever witnessed”). 15 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 III. Instructions for the District Court on Remand Moody recognized that, in constitutional facial challenges to laws implicating the First Amendment, it is often “necessary to say more” about the factual sweep of the underlying law and how the law of our constitution relates to it, “to ensure that the facial analysis proceeds on the right path in the courts below.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 726. The Moody Court provided the inferior courts with an explication of the constitutional law to apply on remand, id. at 727–33, as well as a detailed outline of the underlying state statutory scheme to bind the factual analysis, id. at 736–40. This circuit fol- lowed that scheme on remand after Moody. 26 A. “The first step in the proper facial analysis is to assess the state [law’s] scope.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 724. To give shape to the district court’s pro- ceedings on remand, we lay out the law and clarify its scope. In particular, there were differences of opinion at oral argument concerning to whom the law applies and what exactly it prohibits regulated parties from doing. We write to clarify. H.B. 1193 regulates public schools and public colleges, including teachers, professors, and other educators, §§ 1, 2(f), (g); it does not regulate students. 27 Regulated parties are prohibited from engaging in certain DEI- _____________________ 26 See NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 121 F.4th 494, 498–500 (5th Cir. 2024); see, e.g., Mary v. QEP Energy Co., 798 F. App’x 811, 813–14 (5th Cir. 2020) (instructions as to law and fact on remand). 27 While the exception for student groups in § 5(c) does not cover student-group events receiving state funding, this is properly read as applying to school administrations funding student group events as a means of evading the law. Additionally, nothing in § 3 of the Act indicates that the statute intends to regulate student conduct in the first place, because students are generally not granted authority to set curricula, create university offices, or mandate DEI or diversity training. We follow Mississippi’s rule of statutory 16 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 related activities unless the engagement is for the purposes of “scholarly research” or “creative work[s] by students, faculty, employee[s,] or staff,” § 5(b); unless it occurs under the auspices of extracurricular organizations and their guests not funded as agents of the state, § 5(c); or unless lack of such nondiscriminatory engagement would form part of a “policy to limit or restrict freedom of speech . . . that undermines the duty of a public school” to “protect academic course instruction, intellectual diversity and true expression,” § 5(d). Additionally excepted are policies necessary to comply with “academic accreditation standards or requirements,” § 5(j); actions against a student, teacher, or other regulated party to comply with state or federal law, § 5(h); and certain educational methods related to students with disabilities, § 5(i). The Act explicitly lists the DEI-related activities it prohibits, which fall into five main categories: 1. Taking action against a student for disagreement with iden- tified DEI concepts, 28 § 3 (h); _____________________ analysis: The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, but where it is ambiguous the court, in determining the legislative intent, may look not only to the language used but also to its historical background, its subject matter, and the purposes and objects to be accomplished. DePriest v. Barber, 798 So. 2d 456, 458 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass’n, 382 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980)). Cf. Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., 160 F.4th 118, 121 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing DePriest’s rule of construction for Mississippi state law). 28 Here and elsewhere, for purposes of the challenged portions of H.B. 1193, our term “DEI concepts” refers to § 2(e), which the state labels “divisive concepts” and sweeps broader than its definition of “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” in § 2(a). Because of the awkwardness of the phrasing and the capaciousness of “DEI” as a label, this seems 17 Case: 25-60496 Document: 111-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 No. 25-60496 2. Maintaining programs “including academic programs or courses” “offices,” or programs that promote or otherwise “endorse” the listed DEI concepts or “concepts promoting transgender ideology, gender-neutral pronouns, deconstruc- tion of heteronormativity, gender theory, sexual privilege or any related formulation of these concepts,” § 3(f); 3. Giving racial or sexual preference in employment or con- tracts, § 3(e), or requiring DEI training or diversity statements as a condition of enrollment, employment, or contracting, § 3(g), (d); 4. Requiring “any ‘diversity training,’” § 3(i), defined in § 2(d) as required activities like seminars, workshops, or pro- grams “that foc