NetChoice v. Fitch
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-60348
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-60348 November 19, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
NetChoice, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Lynn Fitch, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Mississippi,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:24-CV-170
______________________________
Before Richman, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns a renewed preliminary injunction enjoining the
State of Mississippi and Attorney General Lynn Fitch from enforcing the
Walker Montgomery Protecting Children Online Act, Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 45-38-1 to 45-38-13 (2024); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5 (2025). The
Act regulates certain internet platforms by imposing what Mississippi
contends are content-neutral regulatory requirements designed to further the
State’s compelling interest in protecting minors from sexual predators.
NetChoice, L.L.C., a nonprofit trade association of internet-focused
companies, brought a facial challenge to the Act on First Amendment
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grounds and secured a preliminary injunction from the district court.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603
U.S. 707 (2024), we vacated that injunction and remanded for further
proceedings. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Fitch, 134 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2025) (Fitch
I). NetChoice amended its pleadings to allege an as-applied challenge. The
district court then issued essentially the same relief it had in Fitch I—a
preliminary injunction blocking the Act in toto—with the caveat that the
injunction applied only to the nine NetChoice member platforms regulated
by the Act.
But NetChoice failed to demonstrate that the Act is unconstitutional
as applied to its individual members’ sites. In turn, the district court did not
appropriately tailor the relief it issued. So we vacate the preliminary
injunction and remand for further proceedings consistent with Moody and
this opinion.
I.
In 2024, Mississippi enacted HB 1126, the Walker Montgomery
Protecting Children Online Act. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 45-38-1 to
45-38-13; Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5. The Act was named in memory
of Walker Montgomery, a 16-year-old Mississippian who committed suicide
after he was the target of a sextortion plot by online predators. The Act
regulates online platforms that the Mississippi Legislature determined are
susceptible to use by sexual predators to prey on children. Specifically, the
Act applies to platforms that allow users (1) to interact with other users;
(2) to create profiles that others may see; and (3) to create or post content
that others can see. The Act excludes platforms that provide access to
“news, sports, commerce, [or] online video games,” but only incidentally
offer “interactive” or “chat” functions, as well as platforms that provide
“access to career development opportunities.”
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The Act imposes three main duties upon covered sites. First, sites
must register and “make commercially reasonable efforts to verify” the age
of those who make accounts with the platform. Second, they must secure
through “commercially reasonable” methods the “express consent of a
parent or guardian” before allowing a known minor to hold an account.
Third, they must make “commercially reasonable efforts” to implement
strategies to “prevent or mitigate” the exposure of known minors to a series
of listed harms. The Act also limits covered platforms’ ability to collect and
use minors’ data, and the law provides for enforcement by minors’ parents
and the Attorney General. Violation of the Act may result in civil monetary
penalties and criminal liability.
Before the Act could take effect, NetChoice filed this lawsuit and
sought a TRO and preliminary injunction, arguing the Act facially violated
the First Amendment. The district court agreed with NetChoice, found that
it was likely to succeed on the merits of its facial challenge to the Act, and
granted a preliminary injunction. NetChoice, LLC v. Fitch, 738 F. Supp. 3d
753, 761 (S.D. Miss. 2024), vacated and remanded, Fitch I, 134 F.4th at
799. The same day, the Supreme Court handed down Moody, which
delineated the methodology that courts must use when analyzing and
deciding facial challenges in the first instance. 603 U.S. 707. In view of
Moody’s instruction, we vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to
allow the district court to apply Moody’s framework to NetChoice’s facial
challenge. Fitch I, 134 F.4th at 809.
On remand, NetChoice filed an amended complaint, adding a new
paragraph alleging that “the Act is unconstitutional as applied to NetChoice
members and their services regulated by the Act.” But other than
interlineating the phrase “as applied” throughout the rest of the complaint,
NetChoice did not further amend its pleading’s substance. NetChoice then
renewed its request for an injunction, now on an “as-applied” basis. In its
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amended motion, NetChoice asserted that resolution of the “as-applied
claims . . . does not require engaging in the additional facial-challenge
analysis contemplated by [Fitch I].” NetChoice grounded its as-applied
challenge on a newly submitted declaration from its General Counsel,
Bartlett Cleland, as well as the declarations it had previously submitted from
Alexandra Veitch (of YouTube), Gautham Pai (of Nextdoor), and Denise
Paolucci (of Dreamwidth). Beyond those declarations, neither NetChoice
nor its member websites proffered evidence about how the Act would
function as applied to them. 1
The district court again entered an injunction. The district court
enjoined the Act in its entirety, but now only as applied to the nine member
platforms identified by NetChoice. The district court determined that
injunctive relief was merited because NetChoice had “carried its burden of
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim
that the Act is unconstitutional under a First Amendment as-applied
challenge.”
Mississippi appealed and requested that this court stay the
preliminary injunction pending appeal. This court did so, NetChoice v. Fitch,
No. 25-60348, 2025 WL 2078435, at *1 (5th Cir. July 17, 2025), and
NetChoice then filed an emergency application before the Supreme Court to
vacate the stay. The Supreme Court left the stay in place without noted
dissent. 2 NetChoice, LLC v. Fitch, 606 U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025)
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1
The NetChoice members covered by the new injunction are Reddit, YouTube
(operated by Google), Facebook and Instagram (operated by Meta), X (formerly Twitter),
Snapchat, Pinterest, Nextdoor, and Dreamwidth.
2
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion stating his view that NetChoice
had “demonstrated that it is likely to succeed on the merits” under current First
Amendment precedents but that the emergency application should be denied “because
NetChoice has not sufficiently demonstrated that the balance of harms and equities favors
4
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(mem.). Now, we weigh the merits of the district court’s second preliminary
injunction.
II.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) it is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s
favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20; see also Harrison
v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 339 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Jefferson Cmty. Health Care
Ctrs., Inc. v. Jefferson Par. Gov’t, 849 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2017)). We
review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion. Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d
692, 696 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “A district court abuses its
discretion if it (1) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous
conclusions of law when deciding to grant the injunction, or (2) misapplies
the factual or legal conclusions when fashioning its injunctive relief.” Texas
v. United States, 50 F.4th 498, 530 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Valentine v.
Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021)).
III.
The district court erred in granting its second injunction. The district
court explained that it granted as-applied injunctive relief because it found
NetChoice had “carried its burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of its claim that the Act is unconstitutional under a
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it at this time.” NetChoice, 145 S. Ct. at 2658 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial
of application to vacate stay of preliminary injunction).
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First Amendment as-applied challenge” as to nine of the member sites. But
because the district court did not perform the fact-intensive analysis
necessary to substantiate why the Act is unconstitutional as applied to each
member website, and because it did not tailor injunctive relief to each
member website, it erred in issuing the second injunction. Below we explain
(A) what was required for as-applied relief, and (B) how the district court
failed to meet that standard.
A.
“[C]lassifying a lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to
which the invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the
corresponding ‘breadth of the remedy.’” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119,
138 (2019) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331
(2010)). To succeed in a facial constitutional challenge under the First
Amendment, a movant must establish that “a substantial number of [the
law’s] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 723 (alteration in original)
(quoting Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021)). 3 By
contrast, “a plaintiff generally cannot prevail on an as-applied challenge
without showing that the law has in fact been (or is sufficiently likely to be)
unconstitutionally applied to him.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 485
n.4 (2014); see also United States v. Mgmt. Consulting, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 3d
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3
This standard is distinct from how courts weigh facial challenges in other
contexts: Generally, a plaintiff lodging a facial constitutional challenge “must establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Though the Supreme Court has somewhat “lowered
that very high bar” in First Amendment cases, Moody, 603 U.S. at 723, the test for facial
relief in First Amendment cases nonetheless remains a rigorous one.
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610, 619 (E.D. Va. 2022) (discussing the difference between facial and as-
applied challenges).
“[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges . . . . goes
to the breadth of the remedy . . . , not what must be pleaded in a complaint.”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 331; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v.
Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 172–73 (4th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (explaining the
origins and purposes of facial challenges as compared to as-applied
challenges). In weighing an as-applied challenge, “a developed factual record
is essential,” Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 292 (5th Cir. 2014), and “the
court confines its analysis to the statute’s constitutionality as to the particular
plaintiff,” LIA Network v. City of Kerrville, 163 F.4th 147, 162 (5th Cir. 2025).
So, for example, in an as-applied challenge, “[i]f a frail and elderly
grandmother uses marijuana for a chronic medical condition a day before
possessing a gun . . . the constitutional analysis will consider only those
circumstances, not what a different defendant might do.” United States v.
Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2024). It is expressly the burden of the
plaintiff bringing an as-applied challenge to adduce the facts upon which it
bases its challenge. In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 434 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(citing Khachaturian v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 980 F.2d 330, 331 (5th Cir.
1992)). That is, the plaintiff must proffer “enough facts for the [c]ourt to
decide the constitutional claim while avoiding ‘premature interpretation of
statutes’ requiring speculation or conjecture on a ‘factually barebones
record.’” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
The contours of the analysis that courts must undertake prior to
issuing as-applied relief are somewhat unclear, as “[t]his area of the law is
murky: ‘confusion abounds’ over the attributes and analysis necessary for
each type of challenge.” LIA Network, 163 F.4th at 161; see also Justice, 771
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F.3d at 292 (“Confusion abounds over the scope of as-applied and other
types of First Amendment challenges that a plaintiff can pursue when
challenging a statute.”). This opacity is exacerbated when courts are
wrestling with cases which involve “new technologies with transformative
capabilities.” TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 62 (2025) (per curiam).
But a couple things are clear. First, for a plaintiff successfully to argue
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the statute actually applies, i.e., that it works to impinge on the plaintiff’s
constitutionally-protected conduct. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 485 n.4. Second,
as noted above, to determine whether a plaintiff has made that showing, “a
developed factual record is essential.” Justice, 771 F.3d at 292. Generally,
where plaintiffs have not “developed a sufficiently concrete record,” they
are unlikely to “sustain their as-applied challenge.” Id.; see also Worley v. Fla.
Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e are not equipped
to evaluate [a] case as an as applied challenge because the record does not tell
us enough about what [plaintiffs] are doing.”). Moreover, “[p]articularized
facts are what allow a court to issue a narrowly tailored and circumscribed
remedy.” Justice, 771 F.3d at 292. Indeed, the “hallmarks” of an as-applied
remedy are “dependability and a limited scope.” Id. at 294.
Moody offers guidance for a proper as-applied analysis and narrowly
tailored remedy. There, the Supreme Court provided a targeted analysis of
the state laws at issue as applied to Facebook’s NewsFeed and YouTube’s
homepage, with the significant caveat that “[n]othing said [in Moody]
addresses any of the laws’ other applications . . . .” 603 U.S. at 727
(emphasis added). In other words, the Court cabined its own as-applied
analysis to a narrow question: the application of Texas’s editorial-focused
regulations against Facebook and YouTube’s application of content-
moderation policies to their feeds. The analysis did not extend even to other
products or functionality offered by those companies. Id. at 734. And the
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Court cautioned that any assumption that its as-applied analysis could be
extrapolated to cover comparable products or functionality (such as other
major online platforms’ feeds) would be fraught, given that the “record [was]
incomplete even as to the [non-Facebook or YouTube] social media
platforms’ main feeds.” Id. 4 In short, an as-applied injunction is necessarily
a limited one, constrained by the specifics of the factual record. This
constraint requires any as-applied relief to be narrowly tailored to the specific
unconstitutional applications of the law—grounded in the record of the
case—as to each individual plaintiff.
B.
Here, the present record is not developed enough to have allowed the
necessary crafting of any as-applied remedy. Indeed, the record before us
does not even demonstrate that the Act applies to all the platforms
NetChoice asserts are covered. It follows that the district court was unable
to engage in the searching analysis that Moody and other precedent
contemplate. Simply put, the district court had too little to go on in entering
its second injunction—which included a complete bar on enforcement of the
Act as to nine covered platforms operated by NetChoice’s members.
Because the injunction was not narrowly tailored as applied to those sites, the
relief entered by the district court was at least premature, if not unwarranted.
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4
The separate concurrences in Moody underscore this limitation. Justice Barrett
observed that “[a]nalyzing how the First Amendment bears on [Facebook’s Newsfeed,
YouTube’s homepage, and other feeds] is complicated enough without simultaneously
analyzing how it bears on a platform’s other functions.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 745
(Barrett, J., concurring). And Justice Thomas underscored that as-applied relief
“provides some notice to the political branches, enabling the Executive Branch to tailor
future enforcement of the statute to avoid violating the Constitution or [the Legislative
Branch] to amend the statute.” Id. at 758 (Thomas, J., concurring). Both concurrences
hinge on the factual record’s being developed enough to allow for tailored, specific relief
by the district court and meaningful review of that relief on appeal.
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The factual basis for the district court’s as-applied injunction
consisted of four declarations, submitted by Bartlett Cleland, NetChoice’s
General Counsel, and Alexandra Veitch (of YouTube), Gautham Pai (of
Nextdoor), and Denise Paolucci (of Dreamwidth). These declarations
largely consist of general contentions that the affected platforms’ services
will be impacted by the Act’s requirements. But they fail to show with any
particularity how the services will be affected by the Act, as required for an
as-applied challenge. Nor does the record substantiate what products and
functions will be affected by operation of the Act.
As to six other member platforms—X (formerly Twitter), Facebook,
Instagram, Pinterest, Reddit, and Snapchat—there are no details in the
record about which of their products are affected, or how. So even accepting
the Bartlett Declaration’s assertion that these platforms are regulated by the
Act, we are left in the dark as to which of these sites’ functionalities are
covered, much less how to tailor injunctive relief as applied to each platform.
Take X as illustrative of these deficiencies. X is a microblogging
platform characterized by its continuous feed of shortform posts. But beyond
that flagship function, X maintains a large suite of other functions: the “For
You” feed, the “Following” feed, direct messaging, various advertising and
sponsorship products, a shopping platform, and Grok, X’s standalone AI
feature. See generally X for Business, https://business.x.com/en (last visited
Nov. 18, 2026). But which of these functions are implicated by the Act, or
how—or even whether—the Act regulates them, is unsubstantiated either in
the record or in the district court’s injunction.
Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, Reddit, and Snapchat are similar.
The companies are known for certain flagship products, but they each
maintain other significant functionality. See, e.g., Meta for Business,
https://www.facebook.com/business/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2026); Reddit
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for Business, https://www.business.reddit.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2026);
Pinterest for Business, https://business.pinterest.com/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2026). Yet there is nothing in the record showing how the Act would apply—
much less apply unconstitutionally—to these companies’ products. The
closest NetChoice’s proffered evidence comes to providing this essential
information is Bartlett’s testimony that “[t]he Act’s requirements are
burdensome, will make it more difficult for NetChoice members to provide
their websites to minors and adults, and will burden minors and adults’
access to highly valuable and protected speech,” and that “[t]he systems that
the Act requires covered websites to adopt will take many covered websites”
more than two months to “implement at scale.” These statements are
wholly unspecific, falling well short of the particularized facts necessary for a
court to factor when tailoring an as-applied injunction. See Justice, 771 F.3d
at 292.
Granted, in urging its as-applied challenge, NetChoice is not required
to delineate “the full scope of actors regulated by the Act and the activities it
regulates” or “weigh violative applications of the Act against non-violative
applications,” as it would be to sustain a facial challenge. Fitch I, 134 F.4th
at 809. But NetChoice still must show what activities the Act regulates as to
covered member platforms and how the regulation of those specific activities
by the Act is unconstitutional as applied. See Justice, 771 F.3d at 292; see also
Moody, 603 U.S. at 745 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“If NetChoice’s
members are concerned about preserving their editorial discretion with
respect to the services on which they have focused throughout this litigation
. . . they would be better served by bringing a First Amendment challenge as
applied to those functions.”). On the record before us, it has not done so.
In like manner, the Supreme Court noted in Moody that a court’s as-
applied analysis must necessarily be fashioned to address specific
applications of the challenged law. See id. at 727 (“Nothing said here
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addresses any of the laws’ other applications, which may or may not share
the First Amendment problems described below.”). Properly conducted, an
as-applied First Amendment analysis of even just one functionality of a social
media platform is likely to be “complicated” and involve “platform- and
function-specific questions.” Id. at 745, 747–48 (Barrett, J., concurring).
Such analytical depth makes sense in the context of an as-applied challenge,
because without such rigor, district courts will struggle to confect
appropriately narrow relief, and reviewing courts will grapple with
meaningful review. Cf. Justice, 771 F.3d at 292; Worley, 717 F.3d at 1249; see
Ficher v. Bickham, 70 F.4th 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting that we are “a
court of review, not first view”).
Here, the district court did not engage in that kind of “platform- and
function-specific” analysis before entering its second injunction. The crux
of its analysis regarding which members’ platforms and functionalities are
regulated by the Act is confined to a single paragraph:
A threshold issue is whether the challenged provisions are
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. NetChoice maintains
that “[t]he Act is unconstitutional as applied to covered
members’ services: Dreamwidth, Facebook, Instagram,
Nextdoor, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, X, and YouTube.”
. . . NetChoice . . . “has provided three member declarations
from Google, Nextdoor, and Dreamwidth discussing how the
Act applies to their respective services” and “has also
explained how the Act applies to its covered members, both in
its own declaration and its pleadings.” The Court concurs with
NetChoice that, based on its evidentiary submissions at this
stage of the case, it has made a sufficient factual showing that
the Act applies to the aforementioned members.
While the district court mechanically catalogued the NetChoice members
affected by the Act, it did not identify those members’ specific functionalities
or platforms covered by the Act (or any that are not). Nor did the court
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articulate how the Act was unconstitutional as applied to those functionalities
and platforms. Before entering its second injunction providing as-applied
relief, the court was required to engage in that analysis. Cf. Moody, 603 U.S.
at 734–40 (analyzing a Texas statute as applied to Facebook and YouTube’s
principal feeds); see also Justice, 771 F.3d at 292.
Finally, the scope of the injunction at issue does not bear the hallmarks
of an as-applied injunction. Rather, it is strikingly facial. See Justice, 771 F.3d
at 294; LIA Network, 163 F.4th at 162 (noting that a “total injunction” is the
quintessential facial relief). The district court issued a blanket injunction
prohibiting Mississippi from enforcing any provision of the Act as to the nine
named member websites. That is tantamount to facial relief as to those
NetChoice members, the breadth of which was not warranted on the record
before the court. 5
To the contrary, to award as-applied relief, the district court must on
remand “determine the commercially reasonable efforts, as used in the Act,
or the Act’s requirements for each [NetChoice member], requirements likely
to be different with each [platform or functionality] facing a unique
regulatory burden.” Fitch I, 134 F.4th at 809 (internal quotations omitted).
NetChoice, as plaintiff, bears the burden to “produce the facts upon which
[it] bases [its] challenge.” In re Cao, 619 F.3d at 434 (citing Khachaturian,
980 F.2d at 331). That is, it is incumbent on NetChoice to substantiate with
specificity how each section of the Act is unconstitutional as applied
member-by-member, function-by-function, and statutory section-by-section.
See id. Assuming NetChoice makes this showing, the district court then must
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5
Indeed, Mississippi contends that the relief ordered by the district court is so
transparently facial that the district court violated this court’s prior mandate in entering its
second injunction. We disagree with the assertion that the district court acted in derogation
of Fitch I, particularly given the “murky” state of the law in this area, see supra, at 7–8.
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determine, in like specificity, whether and how the Act violates the First
Amendment as applied, providing a “factual analysis determining the
commercially reasonable effort demanded of each individual [NetChoice
member]” seeking injunctive relief. See Fitch I, 134 F.4th at 809.
IV.
Because NetChoice failed to substantiate, with the required
granularity, how the Act is unconstitutional as applied to its individual
members, the record before us does not support the district court’s second,
as-applied injunction entered in this case. As an outgrowth of that deficiency,
the district court likewise did not appropriately tailor the relief it awarded
NetChoice.
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s preliminary
injunction and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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