Eleazer v. Oracle America
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 5, 2026
Docket25-50975
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-50975 November 5, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Jameka Eleazer,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Oracle America, Incorporated,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:24-CV-777
______________________________
Before Willett, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Jameka Eleazer brought Title VII claims against Oracle America, her
former employer, after she was terminated. Eleazer alleged racial
discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Oracle, concluding that Eleazer had failed to state a prima facie
case of racial discrimination and that, separately, she had failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies regarding retaliation. We affirm.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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I.
A.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jameka Eleazer, a black woman, was hired by
Oracle America (Oracle) in February 2019. Eleazer began her employment
as a Business Development Consultant (BDC), an entry-level position
which, though labeled a sales job, did “not have responsibility for booking or
closing any actual sales.” The main role of a BDC was to find sales
opportunities and share them with Oracle team members responsible for
closing deals.
Eleazer was promoted to the position of Application Sales
Representative (ASR) in July 2020. As an ASR, her role shifted from merely
identifying sales opportunities for her team to selling new products and
product expansions to existing Oracle clients. Concurrently, Eleazer became
responsible for satisfying sales attainment and sales pipeline generation
quotas, as well as meeting key performance indicators (KPIs) regarding
phone calls made, emails sent, meetings scheduled and attended, and
product demonstrations given.
As an ASR, Eleazer reported to Mike Miezo until he left Oracle in
2022. Thereafter, she reported to Nicole Levitt—Eleazer’s “Area
Manager” and second-level supervisor—for the remainder of the 2022 Fiscal
Year, which ran from June 1 to May 31.
Levitt completed Eleazer’s Fiscal Year 2022 performance review.
Levitt gave Eleazer “needs improvement” ratings in the review’s three
categories, labeled “overall summary,” “performance goals,” and
“competencies.” In the “overall summary” category, Levitt noted that
Eleazer had met 62% of her annual sales attainment quota in FY22 and that,
in FY23, Eleazer should take “a more proactive approach to engagement and
developing a compelling event that may not already exist.” In the
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“performance goals” category, Levitt remarked that Eleazer “understands
that lack of urgency and reactiveness . . . resulted in deals being left on the
table” during the fiscal year. Eleazer’s self-assessment, included in the
FY22 review, painted a rosier picture. While acknowledging that she “did
not meet 100% of [her quota]” for the year, Eleazer gave herself an “exceeds
expectations” score in the review’s three categories. Eleazer remarked that
she had “fostered great relationships” and spoke broadly of her growth.
Eleazer closed by stating that she was “better equipped to engage in a more
efficient way” in FY23 and that she was “excited to share [her] progress”
moving forward.
Garrett Miller, a Regional Sales Manager, replaced Levitt as Eleazer’s
first-level supervisor in June 2022. Eleazer’s performance continued to
suffer. Miller documented Eleazer’s performance deficiencies in a
performance management log. Miller noted that Eleazer “lack[ed] a sense of
urgency,” “regularly missed various deadlines,” and “failed to complete
tasks in a timely manner.” He stated that Eleazer “lacked the ability to drive
her own sales without relying on significant assistance,” either from Miller
or her assigned field team. For her part, Eleazer contended that Miller
interfered with her work by micromanaging her, changing aspects of her deals
without permission, and revising sales opportunities she had forecasted
without permission. Eleazer stated that Miller was “unprofessional” and
“unethical.” At one point, she equated Miller’s status as her supervisor to a
form of “[w]hite supremacy.”
Miller began formally to address Eleazer’s performance deficiencies
in Fall 2022, when he approached Levitt (who had resumed her role as
Eleazer’s second-level supervisor) and Denise Choi (the designated Human
Resources Business Partner for Miller’s sales area) for advice. Thereafter,
Miller held regular “performance sync” meetings with Eleazer that escalated
into his issuing Eleazer a performance improvement plan (PIP) when her
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performance continued to drag. Miller sent the PIP to Eleazer on March 29,
2023. It flagged a “[l]ack of overall attainment,” “[p]ipeline and forecasting
issues,” and a “[l]ack of urgency to complete day-to-day tasks,” and it
warned that Eleazer’s failure to improve could lead to her termination.
Eleazer subsequently disputed the PIP in meetings with both Levitt and
Choi. But Choi ultimately determined that Eleazer had not identified
“anything improper” with the PIP or Miller’s handling of the situation.
Levitt and Miller terminated Eleazer from her role at Oracle effective
June 1, 2023, following the completion of FY23 and Eleazer’s failure to
improve significantly. Eleazer’s sales quota and sales attainment metrics
were then among the worst on her team, as demonstrated by the following
table:
Table 1 - FY23 Sales Quota Metrics for Garrett Miller’s Direct Reports
Name FY23 Sales Attainment FY23 Pipeline Generation
AH FY Total: 133% FY Total 62%
Q1: 93%; Q2: 8%; Q3: 45%; Q4: 3% Q1: 143%; Q2: 28%; Q3: 25%; Q4: 50%
AS FY Total: 110% FY Total: 98%
Q1: 0%; Q2: 124%; Q3: 49%; Q4: 183% Q1: 134%; Q2: 178%; Q3: 40%; Q4: 40%
AW FY Total: 66% FY Total: 64%
Q1: 336%; Q2: 0%; Q3: 0%; Q4: 48% Q1: 85%; Q2: 73%; Q3: 67%; Q4: 20%
JW FY Total: 64% FY Total: 120%
Q1: 0%; Q2; 68%; Q3: 26%; Q4: 112% Q1: 242%; Q2: 48%; Q3: 130%; Q4: 61%
JL FY Total: 41% FY Total: 62%
Q1: 0%; Q2: 161%; Q3: 0%; Q4: 18% Q1: 88%; Q2: 59%; Q3: 42%; Q4: 60%
Eleazer FY Total: 37% FY Total: 24%
Q1: 154%; Q2 12%; Q3: 49%; Q4: 0% 1 Q1: 22%; Q2: 20%; Q3: 28%; Q4: 26%
_____________________
1
Eleazer contends that her Q4 FY23 sales attainment figure (0%) was manipulated
because Levitt and Miller terminated her hours before one of her deals closed. Oracle
demurs that, even were Eleazer retained until the deal closed, her FY23 attainment total
would have been 50% (the second lowest on her team), and her FY23 pipeline generation
total would have remained at 24%, a distant last place.
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B.
Shortly after her termination, Eleazer sought administrative redress
for alleged discrimination. In June 2023, she submitted an initial inquiry form
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On the form,
Eleazer stated her “reason(s) for [the] claim” as: “Race, Sex (including
pregnancy, sexual orientation and gender identity), Retaliation—I
complained to my employer about job discrimination.”
On September 17, 2023, Eleazer filed a formal charge of
discrimination against Oracle with the EEOC and the Texas Workforce
Commission Civil Rights Division. It alleged racial discrimination, stating
that “other [ASRs] who did not meet [Miller’s] expectations . . . were not
discharged as a result,” nor were they “constantly presented with
unprofessionalism by Garrett Miller or informally put on” PIPs for failing
to meet expectations. The charge also stated that all ASRs “under the
Regional Manager are non-black.” Eleazer did not mention retaliation or
sex-based discrimination in the charge.
Eleazer sued Oracle 2 in Texas state court on June 12, 2024, alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Chapter 21 of the
Texas Labor Code. Eleazer alleged that Oracle committed disparate
treatment racial discrimination by treating her less favorably than non-black
_____________________
2
At all relevant times, Oracle America, Inc., the defendant named in this case, was
a subsidiary of (and thus distinct from) Oracle Corp., the entity named in Eleazer’s charge
of discrimination. E.g., Oracle Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 114, Ex. 21.01 (June
21, 2022). Though this distinction might have been relevant for purposes of analyzing
administrative exhaustion at the outset of this case, Oracle forfeited the issue by failing to
raise it in the district court. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551–53 (2019)
(describing Title VII’s charge-filing requirements as non-jurisdictional and therefore
forfeitable if not timely raised). Therefore, we do not analyze the issue here.
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employees and ultimately terminating her employment. Eleazer also alleged
retaliation stemming from her opposition to that discrimination.
Oracle removed to federal district court and moved for summary
judgment on both Eleazer’s federal and state claims. The district court
granted Oracle’s motion. It held that Eleazer had not presented competent
summary judgment evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she had failed to identify a non-black comparator who was treated
more favorably for nearly identical conduct under nearly identical
circumstances. And the court held that Eleazer had failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies for purposes of her retaliation claim. Eleazer timely
appealed.
II.
The district court had jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction to review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Gulf & Miss. River Transp. Co. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co., 730 F.3d 484, 488
(5th Cir. 2013). “‘Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law,’ and a dispute is genuine if ‘the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”
Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted).
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At summary judgment,“[e]vidence is construed ‘in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor.’” R & L Inv. Prop., L.L.C. v. Hamm, 715 F.3d 145, 149
(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 221
(5th Cir. 2011)). However, a non-movant cannot defeat summary judgment
with “speculation, improbable inferences, or unsubstantiated assertions.”
Moon v. Olivarez, 26 F.4th 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2022). And “‘where the non-
movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an
absence of evidence,’ which ‘shifts to the non-movant the burden of
demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue
of material fact warranting trial.’” Stelly v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. La.
State, 149 F.4th 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994)).
III.
We first (A) consider whether Eleazer established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. We conclude that she did not because she failed to
establish a cognizable comparator. Oracle is therefore entitled to summary
judgment on that claim. We then (B) hold that Eleazer failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to her retaliation claim, such that
Oracle is entitled to summary judgment on that point, too.
A.
1.
Eleazer brings her race discrimination claims under Title VII and
Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Title VII prohibits an employer from
“discharg[ing] any individual, or [discriminating] against any individual with
respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of [her] race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Chapter 21 prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or
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discriminat[ing] in any other manner against an individual in connection with
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
“because of race . . . .” Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051. The substantive law
governing claims under Title VII and Chapter 21 is “identical.” German v.
Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2014). Therefore,
we analyze Eleazer’s Title VII and Chapter 21 claims together. See Allen v.
Radio One of Tex. II, L.L.C., 515 F. App’x 295, 297 (5th Cir. 2013).
The district court granted Oracle’s motion for summary judgment
after concluding that Eleazer had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, Eleazer must show that she:
(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the
position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse
employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by
someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less
favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the
protected group.
Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2021).
The parties do not dispute that Eleazer has satisfied the first three
elements. They disagree about whether she satisfies the fourth. Eleazer was
not replaced by a non-black employee. So, to satisfy the fourth element,
Eleazer must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” non-black employee,
i.e., a “comparator,” was treated more favorably than she. Id. at 340.
To substantiate a “similarly situated” comparator, Eleazer must show
that another individual at her job “was treated more favorably . . . under
nearly identical circumstances.” Rogers v. Pearland Ind. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d
403, 410 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). To do so, she must show that the
comparator “held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same
supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person,
and [had] essentially comparable violation histories.” Shahrashoob v. Texas
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A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 651 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Harville v. City of
Houston, 945 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 2019)). Additionally, the conduct
which drew the adverse employment action must have been “nearly
identical.” Lee v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F. 3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.
2009). If the “difference between the conduct and [that of the employee]
alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment
received from the employer,” the comparator is not similarly situated for the
purposes of an employment discrimination analysis. Id. (internal citation
omitted).
2.
Eleazer proffers her entire former team (i.e., the five other employees
overseen by Garrett Miller, shown in Table 1, supra) as potential
comparators. But, while there is no dispute that these former colleagues are
white, Eleazer provides no competent summary judgment evidence that they
were otherwise similarly situated in terms conduct or circumstances.
If anything, the record suggests that Eleazer’s conduct was worse
than, not “nearly identical” to, that of her former colleagues. Oracle
documented four areas in which Eleazer’s performance was subpar: (1) her
sales attainment numbers; (2) her sales pipeline numbers; (3) her KPI, or
sales generating, activities (e.g., making phone calls, sending emails); and
(4) her general sense of urgency and proactivity. Oracle’s evidence
demonstrates that Eleazer had the worst FY23 sales attainment and pipeline
numbers on her team, at 37% and 24% of the annual quotas, respectively. The
evidence is similar with regard to Eleazer’s KPIs and general lack of
proactivity: Eleazer had averaged 56 calls and 20 emails per week between
Q1 and Q3 FY23, well below the 100 calls and 25 emails per week expected
of ASRs. And Oracle offers that Eleazer was flagged for lack of proactivity as
early as her FY22 annual evaluation—about a year before her termination.
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Eleazer has not provided competent evidence that any one of her
colleagues performed as poorly as she did in any of these conduct areas, let
alone multiple. She offers no evidence whatsoever to suggest that her KPI
performance was similar to that of her colleagues, or that her overall
proactivity was comparable to any of her coworkers. And even looking past
those problems, Eleazer fails to show similar attainment and pipeline metrics.
As to her sales attainment, Eleazer argues that she would have been “in the
middle of the pack” had Oracle not terminated her hours before a sale closed
in Q4 FY23. But crediting Eleazer for that sale, her FY23 attainment would
still have been the second lowest on her team (and fourteen percentage points
behind fourth place) at 50% attainment.
As to her sales pipeline numbers, Eleazer asserts that they were lower
than her colleagues’ because Miller adjusted them downward while she was
employed . Again crediting Eleazer’s assertion, she provides no competent
summary judgment evidence to suggest that Miller did not do the same for
Eleazer’s former colleagues. It is therefore difficult to discern whether such
adjustments imply distinct treatment of Eleazer. Either way, Garrett’s
pipeline adjustments would not offset Eleazer’s poor performance in the
other areas discussed above. Taken together, the record demonstrates that
Eleazer performed worse than her teammates across multiple evaluation
metrics, and Eleazer provided insufficient evidence to suggest otherwise.
Nor were Eleazer’s employment circumstances “nearly identical” to
those of her former colleagues. Eleazer’s violation history is dispositive on
this point. While Oracle provides evidence that Eleazer was placed on a PIP
prior to her termination, Eleazer does not provide evidence that any of her
former colleagues were placed on similar PIPs. Indeed, the record
demonstrates that Garrett Miller had not previously placed anyone else on a
PIP. That none of Eleazer’s former colleagues were placed on a PIP is
enough to conclude that her circumstances were not “essentially
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comparable” to those of her former colleagues. See Alkhawaldeh v. Dow
Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff’s proffered
comparators were not similarly situated because, unlike plaintiff, they had
not been placed on PIPs following poor performance).
The only Oracle employee mentioned in the record with the same PIP
violation history—a Hispanic individual nicknamed “VP”—ultimately
suffered the same outcome as Eleazer. That is, VP was terminated. Eleazer
has no response to this point, other than the argument that VP’s termination
should be interpreted as further proof of Oracle’s prejudice toward racial
minorities. But even ignoring the fact that such a contention is the type of
“unsubstantiated assertion” that we do not credit at the summary judgment
stage, Moon, 26 F.4th at 226, it is irrelevant to the prima facie Title VII racial
discrimination standard, which requires Eleazer to advance a comparator
treated “less favorably” than she was—not equally (dis)favorably. See Ernst,
1 F.4th at 339. Thus, Eleazer failed to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.
B.
Eleazer did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing her
retaliation claim against Oracle. Therefore, this claim fails, too.
A plaintiff seeking to bring a claim under Title VII must first file a
timely charge with the EEOC and receive a notice of the right to sue to
satisfy exhaustion requirements. Id. at 337; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(b),
(e)(1). Administrative exhaustion requirements are not jurisdictional. Fort
Bend Cnty., 587 U.S. at 551–53. But they are nevertheless a “mainstay of
proper enforcement of Title VII remedies” and exist to “facilitate the
EEOC’s investigation and conciliatory functions and to recognize its role as
primary enforcer of anti-discrimination laws.” Ernst, 1 F.4th at 337 (internal
citation omitted).
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A claim must generally arise out of a plaintiff’s EEOC charge to
qualify as administratively exhausted. Id. (citing Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d
643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012)). But a claim need not always arise from the EEOC
charge form to qualify as a charge for purposes of exhaustion. Id. In some
circumstances, statements made in other documents can qualify as a charge.
Id. They must, however, satisfy the EEOC’s charge-filing requirements.
Id. (citing EEOC v. Vantage Energy Servs., Inc., 954 F.3d 749, 753–54 (5th Cir.
2020) (per curiam)). One requirement is that such statements are signed and
verified before a notary, an EEOC representative or other authorized
person, or under penalty of perjury. Id. at 338; see also 29 C.F.R §§ 1601.3,
1601.9.
Eleazer’s retaliation claim wholly fails to satisfy these exhaustion
requirements. To start, it is undisputed that Eleazer did not select the box
for “retaliation” on her charge of discrimination form. Nor did Eleazer
mention retaliation anywhere on the charge or describe protected activity
that would have provoked retaliation. So her retaliation claim was not
administratively exhausted by the formal charge itself.
Eleazer’s hope for satisfying exhaustion thus rests on her unsigned,
unverified intake form (which mentioned retaliation)—and on our treating it
like a charge, or as if it were incorporated into the formal charge form we
discuss above. See Patton v. Jacobs Eng. Group, Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th
Cir. 2017). But an unverified intake questionnaire “cannot be deemed a
charge” by itself. Ernst, 1 F.4th at 338 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Patton, 874 F.3d
at 443). Moreover, the record does not suggest that Eleazer appended the
unverified intake form to the formal charge of discrimination she ultimately
submitted; the inquiry form thus cannot be considered part of the charge
either. See Patton, 874 F.3d at 443. Therefore, Eleazer’s intake questionnaire
does not carry the weight of a formal charge, and no genuine dispute of
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material fact exists on that issue. Eleazer did not administratively exhaust
her retaliation claim.
IV.
For the reasons stated, the district court properly granted Oracle
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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