Students Engaged in Advancing Texas v. Ken Paxton

Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit _____________ FILED July 24, 2026 No. 24-50721 Lyle W. Cayce _____________ Clerk Computer & Communications Industry Association; NetChoice, L.L.C., Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus Ken Paxton, Attorney General, State of Texas, Defendant—Appellant, consolidated with _____________ No. 25-50096 _____________ Students Engaged in Advancing Texas; M.F., by and through next friend, Vanessa Fernandez; Ampersand Group, L.L.C.; Brandon Closson, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus Ken Paxton, Attorney General, State of Texas, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC Nos. 1:24-CV-849, 1:24-CV-945 ______________________________ Before Higginbotham, Ho, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge: This case concerns two pre-enforcement challenges to Texas House Bill 18 (“H.B. 18”), “The Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment Act,” which regulates social media websites. First, the nonprofit organizations Computer & Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) and NetChoice, L.L.C. (“NetChoice”) (collectively, “the CCIA plaintiffs”) challenged all of H.B. 18 as a content- based law. They focused their challenge on the law’s requirement that certain social media-based “digital service providers” (“DSPs”) monitor and filter content accessible to known minors to prevent exposure to several categories of potentially harmful speech (“the monitoring and filtering requirement”). Second, nonprofit organization Students Engaged in Advancing Texas (“SEAT”), two individual Texans, and advertising firm The Ampersand Group (“Ampersand”) (collectively, “the SEAT plaintiffs”) challenged the same monitoring and filtering requirement. They also challenged H.B. 18’s language that mandates covered DSPs to make users register their ages before creating accounts (“the age-registration requirement”), to not display targeted advertisements to known minors (“the targeted ads requirement”), and to make a commercially reasonable effort to prevent advertisers from targeting known minors with advertisements facilitating, promoting, or offering unlawful products, services, or activities (“the unlawful ads requirement”), and that mandates all DSPs to monitor their content and, if more than one-third of it is obscene 2 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 for adults or minors under Texas law, verify that users accessing their digital service are 18 or older (“the age-verification requirement”). In both cases, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motions except as to the age-registration requirement and the other provisions not specifically challenged. Texas Attorney General Paxton appealed the preliminary injunction orders, and we consolidated the cases for appeal. We hold that the SEAT plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, and that their challenge to the age-verification requirement is now foreclosed by precedent. The monitoring and filtering requirement challenged by the CCIA plaintiffs, however, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). We therefore VACATE and REMAND in part, and AFFIRM in part. I A H.B. 18, which took effect on September 1, 2024, imposes requirements on DSPs. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 509.001–.152; see Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (W.D. Tex. 2024) (enjoining certain provisions of H.B. 18 before it took effect). It defines DSPs as persons who “own[ ] or operate[ ] a digital service” and determine the purpose and means of collecting and processing personal identifying information of users of the digital service. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.001(2). With the exception of its age-verification requirement, H.B. 18 applies only to DSPs whose digital service “connects users in a manner that allows users to socially interact with other users on the digital service,” “allows a user to create a public or semi-public profile for purposes of signing into and using the digital service,” and “allows a user to create or 3 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 post content that can be viewed by other users of the digital service,” including via a message board, chat room, or other “landing page, video channel, or main feed that presents to a user content created and posted by other users.” Id. § 509.002.1 H.B. 18’s monitoring and filtering requirement mandates covered DSPs to develop and implement a strategy to prevent known minors’ exposure to “harmful material” and other content “that promotes, glorifies, or facilitates” “suicide, self-harm, or eating disorders”; “substance abuse”; “stalking, bullying, or harassment”; and “grooming, trafficking, child pornography, or other sexual exploitation or abuse.” Id. § 509.053. “Harmful material” is defined with reference to its definition in the Texas Penal Code. Id. § 509.001(3); Tex. Penal Code § 43.24(a)(2). H.B. 18’s targeted ads requirement forbids covered DSPs from using a digital service to display “targeted advertising” to a minor without the consent of a verified parent. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.052(2)(D). H.B. 18’s unlawful ads requirement mandates covered DSPs to make a commercially reasonable effort to prevent advertisers from targeting known minors with advertisements “that facilitate, promote, or offer a _____________________ 1 H.B. 18 exempts from its coverage state and local government websites, financial institutions, medical websites, small businesses, higher education websites, employee management software, school education software, and e-mail and direct messaging services that provide only those services. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.002(b). H.B. 18 also exempts digital services that “primarily function[ ] to provide a user with access to news, sports, commerce, or content primarily generated or selected by the [DSP]” and provide only incidental social functions. Id. § 509.002(b)(10). 4 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 product, service, or activity that is unlawful for a minor in [Texas] to use or engage in.” Id. § 509.055. H.B. 18’s age-verification requirement mandates every DSP to monitor its content and, if it determines that it publishes or distributes material more than one-third of which is “harmful material or obscene” as defined by Texas law, use a commercially reasonable method to verify the age of any person seeking to access content through its digital service to confirm that they are 18 years of age or older, and deny access to those who are not. Id. § 509.057. H.B. 18 may be enforced by means of (1) a deceptive trade practice action brought by the Consumer Protection Division of the Texas Attorney General’s Office, or (2) an action for a declaratory judgment or injunction brought by the parent or guardian of a known minor “affected by” a violation. Id. §§ 509.151–.152. B CCIA is a nonprofit organization that promotes open markets, systems, and networks. Its members include technology and social media companies such as Google (including YouTube), Meta (including Facebook, Instagram, and Threads), and X. NetChoice is a nonprofit trade association that includes these same members, in addition to the companies that own Nextdoor, Snapchat, and Pinterest. SEAT is a coalition of Texas students from middle school to college- age who “seek to increase youth visibility and participation in policymaking, including via social media.” SEAT is concerned that its members will lose access to constitutionally protected speech due to the monitoring and filtering, age-verification, and targeted ads requirements. In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, SEAT pointed to specific social media posts and categories of content it believes minors will not be able to view 5 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 when H.B. 18 goes into effect. It also asserted that it wishes to use targeted digital advertising to mobilize students, grow local organizing bases on school campuses, and advocate for the repeal of laws in a way that it believes might be blocked by the targeted ads and unlawful ads requirements. M.F. is a 16-year-old high school student who “uses social media to learn about current events and opportunities, follow the news, discover music, and conduct research for his debate team and other school activities.” M.F. believes that H.B. 18 may block him from viewing content pertaining to important topics like bullying and substance abuse for research and other purposes, from viewing art or music that he finds stimulating and comforting, from sharing resources with peers struggling with issues like self-harm, and from accessing targeted ads that might be useful. Ampersand is an Austin, Texas-based advertising agency that “publishes social-good and public service advertisements on YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and gaming platforms.” Ampersand’s advertising does not target minors directly by age, but “for certain [advertising] campaigns, it purposefully seeks to reach teens through other means, such as by targeting ad placements on content or topics already frequented by teens.” Ampersand believes that the targeted ads requirement will chill it from advertising certain educational content in places accessible to teens or even to all ages, including content raising awareness regarding such issues as sex trafficking and substance abuse. It also believes that the unlawful ads requirement might prevent it from distributing ads about campaigns to decriminalize or oppose prohibition of certain activity, such as campaigns regarding the distribution of banned books or sex-education materials. Since H.B. 18 took effect, it has ceased pursuing grants for projects specifically involving youth outreach, and declined to pursue a specific grant related to protecting children from gun violence out of fear that these ads would be blocked by the targeted ads requirement. 6 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 Brandon Closson is an adult Texas resident who shares content about bipolar disorder via Instagram and other social media websites. Closson believes that H.B. 18 may prevent him from sharing his content with his minor audience, which he intends to educate and encourage to seek professional medical help when needed, citing specific posts and categories of content he believes would be filtered. He also contends that H.B. 18 may prevent that audience from receiving mental health-related targeted ads, and that the age-verification requirement may encourage users to refrain from accessing helpful content due to privacy concerns. Attorney General Paxton is sued in his official capacity. The Attorney General and the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General’s Office have authority to enforce H.B. 18. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.151. II A CCIA and NetChoice sued Attorney General Paxton in the Western District of Texas on July 30, 2024. On the same day, they moved for a preliminary injunction and, in the alternative, a restraining order. CCIA and NetChoice argued that all of H.B. 18 failed strict scrutiny and was unconstitutionally vague. They also challenged H.B. 18’s monitoring and filtering requirement as a content-based and viewpoint-based law and prior restraint. They further argued that this requirement was unconstitutionally vague and preempted by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. They brought both facial and as-applied challenges. In an August 30, 2024 Order, after determining that CCIA and NetChoice had associational standing to bring their pre-enforcement challenge, the district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction only as to the monitoring and filtering requirement. The court held that the 7 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 monitoring and filtering requirement failed strict scrutiny because it was overbroad, overly restrictive, and underinclusive on its face, and thus was facially unconstitutional. The court further held that the monitoring and filtering requirement was also unconstitutionally vague on its face and preempted by the CDA. The district court denied the motion with respect to the CCIA plaintiffs’ challenge to H.B. 18 as a whole because they had not shown that a substantial number of H.B. 18’s total applications were unconstitutional in relation to its plainly legitimate sweepThe district court also determined that H.B. 18’s definition of covered DSPs was not unconstitutionally vague. The Attorney General timely filed a notice of appeal on September 5, 2024. B The SEAT plaintiffs sued Attorney General Paxton in the Western District of Texas on August 16, 2024. On August 24, 2024, they moved for a preliminary injunction. The SEAT plaintiffs challenged H.B. 18’s age- registration, monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age- verification requirements, in addition to other provisions not before us on appeal, arguing that these requirements created a system of unconstitutional prior restraints, failed strict or intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, and were also unconstitutionally vague. They brought both facial and as-applied challenges. In a February 7, 2025 Order, after determining that the plaintiffs had standing based on the indirect chill to their speech and listening rights, the district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction as to the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements. The court held that these provisions failed strict scrutiny and thus were facially unconstitutional. The court also held that the monitoring 8 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 and filtering and unlawful ads requirements were unconstitutionally vague on their face. The district court denied the motion as to the remaining challenged provisions, including the age-registration requirement, which it held the plaintiffs had not shown independently prohibited speech. The Attorney General timely filed a notice of appeal on February 7, 2025. He moved to consolidate these appeals on February 14, 2025. We granted the motion on February 21, 2025. III We have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from preliminary injunctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Healthy Vision Ass’n v. Abbott, 138 F.4th 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2025). “A grant of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Factual determinations within the preliminary injunction analysis are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions within the analysis are reviewed de novo.” Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2018 (citations omitted)). To demonstrate that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm from granting the injunction, and (4) that the public interest favors granting the injunction. Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 577 (5th Cir. 2023). Under the circumstances, the preliminary injunction factors in effect collapse with the merits. “[T]he nonrecoverable costs of complying with a putatively invalid regulation typically constitute irreparable harm,” Restaurant L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 66 F.4th 593, 597 (5th Cir. 2023), and “complying with a regulation later held invalid almost always produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs,” Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 9 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 341 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 433 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Likewise, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). “Where the State is appealing an injunction, its interest and harm merge with the public interest,” but “neither [the State] nor the public has any interest in enforcing a regulation that violates federal law.” Book People, 91 F.4th at 341 (alteration in original) (quoting All. for Hippocratic Med. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 78 F.4th 210, 251 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d on other grounds, 602 U.S. 367 (2024)). This leaves what is “arguably the most important factor: likelihood of success on the merits.” Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th 1080, 1099 (5th Cir. 2023). Our analysis proceeds in three parts: (A) we hold that the SEAT plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, and that their challenge to the age-verification requirement is foreclosed; (B) we hold that the monitoring and filtering requirement challenged by the CCIA plaintiffs is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); and (C) we decline to reach the constitutional issues presented. A The Attorney General argues that none of the SEAT plaintiffs have standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements because as non-DSPs, they are not directly regulated by H.B. 18 and do not face a credible threat of enforcement. Standing requires (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Book People, 91 F.4th at 328. Plaintiffs “bear[ ] the burden of establishing the three familiar elements of standing.” Id. (alteration in 10 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 original) (quoting Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2023)). “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross,” but rather, “‘plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press’ against each defendant, ‘and for each form of relief that they seek.’” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61 (2024) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)). In the typical pre-enforcement challenge, plaintiffs can establish an injury in fact by showing “(1) [they] ha[ve] an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, (2) [their] intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the policy in question, and (3) the threat of future enforcement of the challenged policies is substantial.” Book People, 91 F.4th at 329 (alterations in original) (quoting Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020)). Where the alleged injury in fact is a law’s chilling effect on the plaintiff’s speech, “[t]he chilling effect must have an objective basis; ‘[a]llegations of a subjective “chill” are not an adequate substitute.’” Tex. State LULAC v. Elfant, 52 F.4th 248, 256 (5th Cir. 2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)). Where the law the plaintiffs challenge directly regulates a third party rather than the plaintiffs themselves, plaintiffs face an additional hurdle. Because a future injury may constitute a sufficiently “imminent” injury in fact only where it is “certainly impending” or there is a “substantial risk that the harm will occur,” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (citation modified), plaintiffs must show that regulated third parties “will likely react in predictable ways” to the challenged law, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019). “In cases of alleged future injuries to unregulated parties from government regulation,” therefore, the question becomes: “Is it likely that the government’s regulation or lack of regulation of someone else will cause a concrete and particularized injury in fact to the 11 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 unregulated plaintiff?” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 385 n.2 (2024) (emphasis added). “At th[e preliminary injunction] stage, Plaintiffs ‘must clearly show only that each element of standing is likely to obtain in the case at hand.’” Book People, 91 F.4th at 329 (quoting Missouri v. Biden, 83 F.4th 350, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024)). The district court held that the SEAT plaintiffs had standing because H.B. 18 “produces a ‘determinative or coercive effect’ on [DSPs], which results in preventing speech and produces Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Students Engaged in Advancing Tex. v. Paxton, 765 F. Supp. 3d 575, 587–91 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)). The district court based its ruling on each plaintiff’s statements regarding intended social media posts and desired access to content, relying primarily on Book People, Inc. v. Wong and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) to hold that the law’s potential coercive effect on DSPs produced a concrete injury in fact that was traceable to the challenged law and redressable by injunction. Students Engaged in Advancing Tex., 765 F. Supp. 3d at 588–91.2 Somewhat beyond what the district court acknowledged, the SEAT plaintiffs’ standing theory is importantly novel. “A threatened future injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to constitute an injury in fact, and a ‘theory of _____________________ 2 For example, as to the monitoring and filtering requirement, the district court credited that SEAT reasonably understood H.B. 18 to require filtering of its “previous and planned educational Instagram posts concern[ing] bullying, sexual assault, and suicide,” Closson’s fear that H.B. 18 “will lead social media companies to prevent him from posting about bipolar disorder, eating disorders, substance abuse, and his identity as a member of the LGBTQ+ community,” and M.F.’s concern that he would be unable to listen to songs featuring “references to suicide.” Students Engaged in Advancing Tex., 765 F. Supp. 3d at 588. 12 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 standing[ ] which relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[ ] does not satisfy the [certainly-impending] requirement.’” Louisiana v. Haaland, 86 F.4th 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)). The SEAT plaintiffs allege that their speech would be censored, or that they are self-censoring, in response to a law that does not apply directly to them and that, as of the complaint’s filing, had not yet been enforced against the third-party DSPs who would presumably otherwise host their content.3 Alternatively, some plaintiffs allege that they will lose their right to listen to or otherwise receive desired content if and when the DSPs respond in predictable ways to H.B. 18’s requirements. In other words, the SEAT plaintiffs claim an injury in fact based on predicted censorship or a present chill, arising from someone else’s predictable response to the challenged law. The indirect nature of the SEAT plaintiffs’ challenge poses a problem for our pre-enforcement standing analysis. Typically, we ask only whether the challenged law “arguably proscribe[s]” the conduct plaintiffs intend to engage in. Book People, 91 F.4th at 329 (citation modified). This makes sense with respect to direct regulation, because a reasonably perceived threat of bad consequences for constitutionally protected conduct might chill a reasonable person from engaging in that conduct, even if the threat might not materialize. See Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Th[e] special [chill-based] standing rule for First Amendment cases recognizes that people should not have to expose themselves to actual arrest or prosecution in order to challenge a law that infringes on speech.” (citation modified)). Strictly speaking, however, H.B. 18 proscribes none of the _____________________ 3 The Attorney General has initiated an H.B. 18 enforcement action against TikTok, but the action does not involve the challenged requirements, and the SEAT plaintiffs do not allege that they use or fear censorship on TikTok. 13 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 speech the SEAT plaintiffs wish to share as to the plaintiffs themselves. Rather, it requires DSPs to filter categories of content that may or may not include this speech. Although “injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else” may amount to an injury in fact, generally speaking “an injury cannot be the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Book People, 91 F.4th at 331 (citation modified). At the preliminary injunction stage, therefore, in order to satisfy the imminent injury requirement, the SEAT plaintiffs must make a clear showing that the directly regulated third-party DSPs “will likely react in predictable ways” to the challenged law, Dep’t of Com., 588 U.S. at 768, and that this likely reaction will in turn pose at least a substantial risk that a “platform [will] then suppress [a plaintiff or specific speaker’s] post,” “at least partly in response to [H.B. 18], rather than in keeping with its own content-moderation policy,” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 70.4 On close examination, the SEAT plaintiffs do not make a clear showing that the DSPs’ likely response to the challenged requirements poses a substantial risk of censoring their speech. For the same reason, their self- censorship harm amounts to a “subjective” chill of the kind we have excluded from this exceptional form of standing. Tex. State LULAC, 52 F.4th at 256; see also Pool, 978 F.3d at 311 (“Not just anyone has standing to bring such a [First Amendment chill-based] suit. Plaintiffs . . . must show that they are seriously interested in disobeying, and the defendant seriously _____________________ 4 The district court sometimes framed its analysis in this way, but did not consistently apply these requirements. See Students Engaged in Advancing Tex., 765 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (“HB 18 would likely prevent the[ plaintiffs] from viewing those forms of content on social media.” (emphasis added)). In general, the district court applied the ordinary pre-enforcement requirement that constitutionally protected conduct must be only “arguably proscribed” to constitute an injury in fact, while noting that censorship from the DSPs was broadly predictable. Id. at 588–90. 14 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 intent on enforcing, the challenged measure.” (citation modified)). Similarly, the SEAT plaintiffs do not allege a concrete, specific connection between speaker and listener of the kind that the most analogous listening- based cases require, and in any case do not clearly show a likelihood that a substantial risk of harm to their listening rights is imminent. 1 First, the authorities relied on for both plaintiffs’ speech-based and listening-based theories are distinguishable. Regarding the SEAT plaintiffs’ speech-based theory, Bantam Books did not address a pre-enforcement challenge to a potentially harmful statute but rather an already harmful, targeted campaign of government threats made to book distributors, which had then ceased circulating certain of the plaintiff book publishers’ books to retailers. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 60–64. Likewise, although its enforcement mechanism was indirect, the law challenged in Book People, unlike H.B. 18, directly proscribed the plaintiffs’ own conduct: the plaintiff booksellers could not sell library materials to Texas public schools without first issuing sexual-content ratings for and flagging sexual content in those materials, and, without those sales, would have foregone a significant revenue stream. Book People, 91 F.4th at 324, 331–32. In both cases, then, the reviewing court had a more concrete injury in fact to analyze: an already- begun pressure campaign censoring specific speech, and a law directly compelling the plaintiffs to speak or lose significant revenue.5 See Bantam _____________________ 5 Similarly, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, where the Supreme Court held that booksellers had standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a law restricting their display of sexually explicit material to juveniles based on the First Amendment rights of potential book buyers, the bookseller plaintiffs themselves faced a choice between costly compliance measures and criminal prosecution under the challenged law. 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988). Like the DSPs here, then, the plaintiffs themselves were directly injured by the law’s potential enforcement. 15 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 Books, 372 U.S. at 64 n.6 (describing the “palpable injury” suffered by plaintiff book publishers in terms of already “impaired sales”); Book People, 91 F.4th at 331–33 (describing the “injurious dilemma” posed by the requirement to engage in compelled speech or else lose significant revenue). Here, the SEAT plaintiffs asked the district court to assume (1) that the DSPs will respond in predictable ways to H.B. 18 as it is interpreted by them and through the Attorney General’s enforcement of it, and (2) that their speech will be predictably censored, or is already objectively chilled, by that third-party response. The SEAT plaintiffs have not pointed to a case where a court found standing for a pre-enforcement, chill-based challenge to a law that did not directly apply to the plaintiffs. In a similar way, the listening-based case law on which the SEAT plaintiffs rely has been applied “only where the listener has a concrete, specific connection to the speaker.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 75. This cuts against the district court’s reasoning that it could “logically deduce that the threat of penalties on covered entities would result in changes to their practices,” and thus assume a cognizable right-to-listen injury downstream from the regulated parties. Students Engaged in Advancing Tex., 765 F. Supp. 3d at 590 n.8. The SEAT plaintiffs’ best listening-based case is Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the Supreme Court held that prescription drug consumers had standing to challenge Virginia’s ban on pharmacists’ advertisement of prescription drug prices. 425 U.S. 748, 749–50, 756–57 (1976). There is a surface similarity between this case and, at least, the SEAT plaintiffs’ challenge to the targeted ads requirement: Ampersand and SEAT state that they wish to run ad campaigns that they would run but for H.B. 18’s requirement that DSPs restrict minors’ access to targeted ads, and M.F. says he wishes to receive potentially helpful targeted advertising, so the precise category of speech these plaintiffs wish to send or receive may be proscribed by this requirement. 16 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 Even so, the SEAT plaintiffs allege no concrete, specific connection to a speaker whose speech will be affected by this or any other requirement, but only a more general concern that they will lose access to broad categories of speech. This is only a little more specific than the “startlingly broad” theory the Supreme Court rejected in Murthy v. Missouri, which would have granted “all social-media users the right to sue over someone else’s censorship,” based on a general interest in “hearing unfettered speech on social media” and professional needs. 603 U.S. at 75. The SEAT plaintiffs’ analogy to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy is therefore also imprecise. 2 Of course, that none of the SEAT plaintiffs’ cited cases is precisely analogous to the facts at issue here does not necessarily defeat their standing argument. This is particularly the case given the novelty of the technology involved, and of social media laws like H.B. 18. Turning to the specifics of their attempted showing, and applying the Supreme Court’s test from Murthy, we ask simply whether the SEAT plaintiffs have clearly shown they are likely to establish there is “a substantial risk that, in the near future, at least one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response to [the challenged law.]” 603 U.S. at 58. We conclude that they have not. First, SEAT points to the potential censorship of “important topics such as bullying and resulting suicides, sex education, and other issues that the State of Texas may wrongly interpret as pornographic or promoting ‘grooming’” under the monitoring and filtering requirement. It also cites two of its specific previous posts in favor of anti-bullying and anti-book ban laws, whose explicit mentions of bullying, LGBTQ mental health and suicide, human trafficking, and other statutory terms it believes would trigger this requirement. SEAT also argues that the unlawful ads requirement could prevent SEAT members “from receiving advertisements over social media 17 Case: 24-50721 Document: 186-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/24/2026 24-50721 c/w No. 25-50096 about campaigns to decriminalize certain activity that [it does] not believe should be criminalized—such as reading banned books or participating in a drag queen read-aloud in a school library.”6 The minor plaintiff M.F. cites specific topics such as marijuana legalization that he believes H.B. 18 would bar him from researching, and songs that he believes he would be prevented from listening to because they deal with covered subjects like substance abuse and self-harm. He also states the he would be prevented from sharing resources regarding substance abuse, eating disorders, or self-harm with his peers, and expresses a more general concern that H.B. 18 will place Texas minors at a disadvantage in college, when preparing to vote, and when faced with issues such as whether to use vapes and other regulated substances later in life, including how to use social _____________________ 6 SEAT also stated via supplemental declaration that it wishes to use “targeted digital advertising” to mobilize students and local organizing bases on school campuses around issues before the Texas Legislature. It specified that because it wishes to promote discussion of potential repeals of laws restricting “students’ access to library books” and “gender-affirming healthcare for minors,” this advertising “could arguably fall under” the unlawful ads requirement as well, as promoting conduct currently deemed unlawful for minors. These statements are unsupported by allegations in the complaint, where SEAT alleged only generally that it “uses social media accounts on Instagram, X, Facebook, and LinkedIn to share opportunities, news, and calls to action with Texas students,” and that it “uses Instagram to educate students about local legislative attempts to ban books and their rights under the First Amendment.” Unlike the other SEAT plaintiffs, no specific allegations regarding SEAT itself were made in the section of the complaint dealing specifically with the targeted advertising and unlawful ads requirements. District courts in this circuit have followed the sensible rule “that a request for a preliminary injunction must also be based on allegations related to the claims in the complaint.” Bucklew v. St. Clair, No. 3:18-CV-2117-N, 2019 WL