Tuttle v. Gallegos
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-20132
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 16, 2026
No. 25-20132
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________
Clerk
Clifford F. Tuttle, Jr., as Representative of the Estate of
Dennis W. Tuttle, Deceased; Robert Tuttle; Ryan Tuttle;
Jo Ann Nicholas; John Nicholas,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Felipe Gallegos,
Defendant—Appellant,
______________________________
Jo Ann Nicholas, individually and as an heir of the Estate of Rhogena
Nicholas; John Nicholas, as temporary administrator of the Estate
of Rhogena Nicholas,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Felipe Gallegos,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 4:21-CV-270, 4:21-CV-272
______________________________
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Before Jones, Clement, and Richman, Circuit Judges.
Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
We withdraw our prior opinion and substitute the following:
This is a high-profile qualified immunity case that involves a police
officer, Felipe Gallegos, shooting and killing Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena
Nicholas, after a squad of officers from the Houston Police Department
(“HPD”) executed a no-knock search warrant at their 7815 Harding Street
residence on January 28, 2019. Plaintiffs, the estates of Tuttle and Nicholas,
sued the officers and the City of Houston for several state and federal claims,
including a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment against Gallegos. Gallegos moved for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion because it
held that materially disputed facts precluded summary judgment. Gallegos
appealed, arguing there were no constitutional violations, and that, even if
there were, the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident.
The facts of this case are tragic. But tragic facts alone do not establish
liability under the Constitution. Because Gallegos did not violate Tuttle’s or
Nicholas’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, we REVERSE.
I
A
The following facts are undisputed.
The Search Warrant. This case’s genesis began on January 8, 2019,
when Patricia Garcia, Tuttle and Nicholas’s neighbor, repeatedly called 911
and falsely claimed that her daughter was doing drugs inside Tuttle and
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Nicholas’s house. Garcia also claimed there were guns inside the house, 1 so
HPD Officers Richard Morales and Nichole Blankenship-Reeves went to
investigate the scene outside the house. Neither officer observed any criminal
activity, or anyone entering or exiting the home. Blankenship-Reeves relayed
a note about the house to Lieutenant Marsha Todd in the Narcotics Division.
Todd then passed the tip to Squad 15 Officer Gerald Goines.
The falsehoods did not end with Garcia. To secure a no-knock warrant
to search the house, Goines falsely claimed in an affidavit that, on January 27,
2019, a confidential informant purchased heroin and observed a firearm at
the house. He also falsely claimed that fellow Squad 15 Officer Stephen
Bryant observed the drug purchase. With the search warrant in hand, Goines
and his Squad 15 supervisors, Sergeants Clemente Reyna and Thomas Wood,
reviewed the warrant and the tactical execution plan. Once Wood approved
the plan, he joined Squad 15 Officers Frank Medina and Gallegos on a tactical
“drive-by” of the house. Goines then led the pre-raid briefing with the
officers who would later help execute the search warrant. He described the
property and communicated to the officers that they should expect a female
resident, a male resident known to carry a gun, and an aggressive dog.
The Raid. After the briefing, eighteen officers were dispatched to the
house to execute the search warrant. The “entry team” consisted of Squad
15 Officers Medina, Bryant, Gallegos, Goines, Cedell Lovings, Manuel
Salazar, Oscar Pardo, Eric Sepolio, and Nadeem Ashraf, as well as Sergeants
Reyna and Wood. Six other HPD Officers—Morales, Blankenship-Reeves,
Joseph Arechiga, Samuel Garza, Valeriano Rios, and Yvette Ortiz—assisted
_____________________
1
Garcia pleaded guilty to one count of false information and hoaxes for making
these false reports and was sentenced to forty months of imprisonment. Her sentence was
affirmed by this court. See United States v. Garcia, No. 21-20309, 2022 WL 1014146 (5th
Cir. Apr. 5, 2022) (per curiam).
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with “perimeter security.” While Morales, Blankenship-Reeves, Rios, Ortiz,
and Garza wore body-worn cameras (“BWC”), they failed to activate them
before the raid, in violation of HPD policy. They instead activated their
BWC at different times during and after the raid.
On arrival, the entry team organized into a “stack” and breached the
front door while announcing themselves as HPD officers. Medina, the first
to enter the house, broke left after entering through the front door. According
to Medina, he saw Nicholas standing to his left and told her to put her hands
on her face and get down. Nicholas did not comply, and she continued to yell
and “flail” her hands. Medina then heard a gunshot to his right. He also saw
and shot an “angry” dog. Moments later, Medina was shot in the shoulder
and fell back against a couch. There, Medina first saw Tuttle behind a wall in
the dining room area. Medina then fell unconscious. Bullet fragments
consistent with a .223-caliber gun were later found in Medina’s wound.
Lovings, the second officer to enter the house, broke right. He saw a
dog running toward him and then saw a “muzzle flash.” 2 He fired his M6
.223-caliber rifle at the dog “several” times. He then saw another muzzle
flash from the dining room area, where he saw Tuttle standing with a gun.
Tuttle and Lovings exchanged fire. Tuttle shot Lovings in the neck with a
.357-caliber revolver gun, leaving Lovings paralyzed from the neck down.
Lovings was unsure whether any of the bullets he fired struck Tuttle, but he
observed Tuttle “flinch” and hide back behind a wall. Lovings, who lay
paralyzed on the floor, saw Tuttle attempt to take his gun.
Salazar and Pardo were the third and fourth officers to enter the
house. When Salazar stepped through the door, he saw Lovings shoot at the
dog. He also saw Tuttle fire three or four shots toward Medina from behind
_____________________
2
A muzzle flash is a glimpse of light that accompanies a gunshot.
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a wall, and heard Medina exclaim that he was “hit.” Salazar fired his
Springfield 191 .45-caliber handgun at Tuttle around ten times. Pardo, the
last of the two to enter, only made it a few steps inside before he heard
someone yell “dog” and the firing of multiple gunshots. Pardo heard Medina
say he was “hit” and saw him lying on the couch. Pardo was then pushed out
of the house with Salazar. At this point, only Medina and Lovings remained
inside the house. Both of them had sustained gunshot wounds.
The following facts are disputed. Three versions are at play.
1
According to the City, Squad 15 Officers, and Robert Gonzales,
Gallegos was outside the house—to the right of the front porch—during the
above events. From that position, he heard several gunshots and Medina yell
that he was “hit.” He observed Salazar and Pardo “fall backwards off the
front porch” and saw Lovings drop in the threshold of the doorway. Gallegos
then acquired a visual of the inside, observing Medina unconscious on the
couch. Nicholas was standing over Medina, cursing and tugging at the gun
attached to Medina’s vest. Nicholas’s hands later tested positive for gunshot
residue. After seeing Nicholas tugging at Medina’s gun, Gallegos fired at
Nicholas with his M6 .223-caliber rifle between one and three times. At least
one of those bullets struck and killed her. Sepolio then went inside and helped
extract the wounded Medina.
After the fatal shot to Nicholas, Gallegos heard more gunshots inside
the house. Still located along the right side of the house, he stepped back from
the door and shot through the wall toward where he believed Tuttle was
positioned. Gallegos broke a window, so he could see inside the house. But
all he saw was an empty bedroom. Gallegos then retreated to a tree and yelled
for someone to extract Lovings. Goines went toward the front door but was
struck in his face by a bullet or bullet fragments, so he, too, retreated.
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Afterward, Reyna approached the front door, and Gallegos saw “two hands
come out of the front door holding a revolver” pointed at Reyna. Tuttle and
Reyna exchanged fire, with Reyna using his .40-caliber Glock. Bullet
fragments from Tuttle’s gunshots struck Reyna’s face.
Gallegos saw Tuttle shoot at Reyna, so Gallegos shot Tuttle in his left
hand. Reyna retreated away from the house, and Tuttle retreated inside.
Gallegos moved from his position near the tree to gain a visual inside the
doorway. He saw Tuttle inside the house, leaning against the front door and
holding a gun to his chest with his right hand. Tuttle raised his gun toward
Gallegos, and Gallegos shot at him several times. Tuttle was struck at least
once in the shoulder and twice in the buttocks area. Tuttle fell to the ground,
out of Gallegos’s view. Pardo tried to retrieve Lovings, who was still lying
paralyzed inside the doorway. Pardo also saw Tuttle sitting on the floor near
Lovings with a gun in his hand, so he shot at Tuttle once and fell back to
Gallegos’s position.
Gallegos walked up the front porch stairs and saw Tuttle through the
doorway. Tuttle was in a seated position on the floor with a gun in his right
hand, resting on his thigh. Tuttle yelled at Gallegos, asking what he wanted
and stating there were “no drugs.” When Gallegos told Tuttle to stop
moving, Tuttle “looked directly at Gallegos” and “began to raise the
weapon.” Gallegos raised his own weapon, and Tuttle “flinched.” So,
Gallegos shot Tuttle one more time, fatally striking him in his upper back and
neck area. The full episode—from Squad 15’s initial entry into the house to
Gallegos’s final shot at Tuttle—lasted eighty seconds.
2
According to Plaintiffs, the story is different. Four problems, they say,
exist with the version offered by the City, Squad 15 Officers, and Gonzales.
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Problem 1: While Medina, Lovings, Goines, and Reyna each suffered
gunshot wounds during the raid, the evidence suggests that only Lovings was
shot by Tuttle. Plaintiffs argue that Medina, Goines, and Reyna’s injuries
were consistent with .223-caliber weapons, which only the officers carried.
Problem 2: Gallegos shot Nicholas after Medina was extracted from the
house, so Gallegos could not have seen Nicholas standing over Medina.
Plaintiffs rely on BWC video, which shows Squad 15 Officers exiting a white
van and moving toward the house. About seventeen seconds after their exit,
the video captures a loud noise. A series of gunshots ring out ten seconds
later. According to Plaintiffs, these shots were mostly fired by Salazar and
Lovings, and, about two seconds later, Sepolio and Medina can be seen
running from the direction of the house toward Squad 15’s white van. The
video then shows a flash of light in the front of the house. According to
Plaintiffs, the video also portrays Medina and Sepolio behind a van and an
unidentified officer—who they say is Gallegos—to the far left of the house.
Five seconds later, several more gunshots are heard. Plaintiffs assert that
these shots were likely fired by Salazar and Lovings. Plaintiffs also claim that,
at this point, Gallegos moved toward the house and engaged Nicholas.
Problem 3: Gallegos could not have shot Nicholas if she was standing
over Medina. Nicholas had been shot once on her right thigh and once on the
right side of her torso. According to Dr. Michael Maloney, Plaintiffs’ scene
reconstructionist expert, if Nicholas was standing over Medina while Medina
was on the couch, Gallegos could not have shot Nicholas on her right side
because only her left side was exposed to Gallegos.
Problem 4: Tuttle’s injuries would have prevented him from holding
or raising his weapon at Gallegos before Gallegos shot him the final two times.
Maloney determined that Tuttle was shot a total of nine times, and the first
seven shots inflicted wounds to “both” of Tuttle’s “arms and hands.”
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These wounds, according to Maloney, would have rendered Tuttle
“incapable of holding a weapon.” So, when Gallegos shot Tuttle the final
two times, Tuttle could not have raised or pointed his gun at Gallegos.
3
The third version of these events comes from Maloney, Plaintiffs’
own expert. According to Maloney, Gallegos shot Nicholas “after Medina
[was] shot and collapse[d] on the couch.” His version, unlike Plaintiffs’
version, concluded that Medina was inside the house when Nicholas was
shot. So, Plaintiffs advance a theory—with respect to Medina’s location—
that differs from their own expert. Maloney’s investigation further revealed
that, from Gallegos’s shooting position, he could not have seen Nicholas.
Even still, Maloney opines that Gallegos shot Nicholas through the front
door where Tuttle was standing, and the bullet was “destabilized by the
doorframe,” grazed Tuttle’s forearm, and ultimately killed Nicholas. This
conclusion was corroborated in part by the discovery of Tuttle’s and
Nicholas’s DNA on a bullet recovered from the couch inside the house.
B
In suing the City of Houston, the Squad 15 Officers, and Gonzales,
Plaintiffs asserted state law wrongful death and survival claims, and § 1983
claims flowing from unlawful search and seizure due to (1) lack of probable
cause arising from obtaining the search warrant and (2) excessive force
arising from the raid. Several claims have been dismissed. 3 Besides Goines,
all remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment or judgment on the
_____________________
3
On January 6, 2025, the district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims
against Sepolio, Salazar, Wood, Pardo, Medina, Reyna, Lovings, and Ashraf.
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pleadings on all remaining claims against them. Relevant to this appeal, the
district court denied Gallegos’s motion for summary judgment. 4
Gallegos timely appealed.
II
Our review implicates multiple standards “corresponding to qualified
immunity, summary judgment, [and] interlocutory review of [a] qualified
immunity denial[].” Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020).
Since the interplay of these standards “gets tricky,” we take each in turn. Id.
A
The qualified-immunity doctrine shields public officials from suit for
damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established
constitutional right. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir.
2003). On a theoretical level, qualified immunity seeks to “balance two
competing societal interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 328 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). In practice, qualified immunity adjusts “the nature of the
summary-judgment burden, how and when the burden shifts, and what it
_____________________
4
The district court also granted in part Gonzales’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, granted Gonzales’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part Bryant’s
motions for summary judgment, and granted the City’s motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were: (1) § 1983 excessive force claims against Gallegos, as well
as derivative wrongful death and survival claims; (2) § 1983 failure to intervene claims
against Bryant based on lack of probable cause for the search warrant, as well as a derivative
survival claim; and (3) § 1983 excessive force and lack of probable cause claims against
Goines, as well as state law wrongful death and survival claims.
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takes to satisfy the burden.” Id. at 329. In determining whether a defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must ask: “(1) was a statutory or
constitutional right violated on the facts alleged; and (2) did the defendant’s
actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998
F.3d 165, 172 (5th Cir. 2021). These steps may be evaluated in any order, and
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to show
either one. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. In these cases, the plaintiff bears the
burden. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
B
At this stage, the burden shifting changes, too. Typically, under the
summary judgment standard, the party moving for summary judgment must
initially show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“The movant satisfies this burden by showing that a reasonable jury could
not find for the nonmovant, based on the burdens that would apply at trial.”
Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252 (1986)). To overcome the plaintiff’s case, the defendant must show “that
the record cannot support a win for the plaintiff—either because the plaintiff
has a failure of proof on an essential element of its claim or because the
defendant has insurmountable proof on its affirmative defense to that claim.”
Id. The defendant can achieve this by introducing undisputed evidence or by
“pointing out . . . an absence of evidence to support the [plaintiff’s] case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the defendant succeeds,
then “the burden shifts [back] to the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a
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genuine issue of material fact and that the evidence favoring the plaintiff
permits a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329.
Qualified immunity modifies that typical burden-shifting framework.
Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
When a public official makes “a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity,”
the burden shifts back to the “plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.” Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
“To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment,
the plaintiff need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than
‘mere allegations.’” Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir.
2009) (quoting Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991)). “The
plaintiff must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a
jury could return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional
injury,” which is the “same” as “if the plaintiff did not face qualified
immunity.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330. Thus, “the plaintiff’s version of those
disputed facts must also constitute a violation of clearly established law.” Id.
C
If an official unsuccessfully moves for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, the denial of qualified immunity, “to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law, falls within the ambit of a final decision” under the
collateral-order doctrine “notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”
Wertenbroch v. Hardeman, 178 F.4th 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2026) (cleaned up).
Thus, we review the denial de novo. Maldonado v. Rodriguez, 932 F.3d 388,
390 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Yet our jurisdiction is limited. We may
not “review a district court’s determination that a genuine factual dispute
exists,” but we “may review de novo the materiality of disputed facts to the
qualified immunity determination.” Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th
Cir. 2010) (first and third emphases added). At this point, “all facts in
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evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movants.”
Maldonado, 932 F.3d at 390.
III
Four issues exist on appeal.
A
The first issue is whether we have jurisdiction to review fact disputes.
Plaintiffs argue that we lack jurisdiction under the collateral-order
doctrine to review certain fact disputes, including the video that allegedly
provides evidence that Medina was not inside the house when Gallegos shot
Nicholas. Gallegos disagrees, arguing that we have jurisdiction under Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), which provides “an exception” to our “general
inability to review the existence of fact disputes” when the video blatantly
contradicts Plaintiffs’ version. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 424
(5th Cir. 2021). Gallegos spills much ink explaining Scott’s application and
force here. Plaintiffs, by contrast, never mention Scott at all.
While we are generally limited to determining whether a fact dispute
is material, Terry, 609 F.3d at 761, we may assess the genuineness of evidence,
such as the video, to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ story is “blatantly
contradicted” and “utterly discredited” by this record, Scott, 550 U.S. at
380–81. But because that analysis would not assist in adjudicating this case,
we only review the materiality of the fact disputes the district court identified.
B
The second issue is whether the district court erred in concluding that
the video and Gallegos’s inconsistent statements created a genuine issue of
material fact about Medina’s location when Nicholas was shot. Here, the
court need only reach the district court’s materiality finding.
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1
Facts are “material” for the purposes of summary judgment only if
they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Thus, “substantive law will identify which facts
are material.” Id. Based on those material facts, summary judgment must be
awarded “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment,
we review “whether the factual disputes identified by the district court are
material to the denial of qualified immunity—that is, whether the factual
disputes viewed in favor of the plaintiff make out a violation of clearly
established law.” Poole, 13 F.4th at 423 (citing Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d
721, 726 (5th Cir. 2020)).
2
The district court found that whether Medina was inside the house or
not was a material fact. For the purposes of the qualified immunity analysis
here, that was error.
In placing so much emphasis on Medina’s location, the district court
failed to consider Lovings’s location in the doorway. It is undisputed that
Lovings—hit by gunfire moments earlier—was laying in the doorway. That
doorway is directly next to the couch where Gallegos claims Medina fell after
Medina was shot. According to Maloney, the distance between Medina’s
position on one side of the L-shaped couch and Nicholas was eight feet. The
report does not provide an estimation of the distance between Nicholas and
Lovings.
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These are the circumstances under which Gallegos fired the rounds
that hit Nicholas. The fact that only one wounded officer (Lovings)—instead
of two (Lovings and Medina)—was in close proximity of a suspect in the
middle of a firefight does not affect the ultimate outcome. In this specific
context, Medina’s presence is immaterial because it does not “affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also
McClain v. Delgado, 132 F.4th 362, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2025) (per curiam)
(reversing summary judgment when several fact disputes about the
underlying claim were “immaterial” to the grant of qualified immunity).
While the court has some reservations about Plaintiffs’ version of
events in light of the record, we nevertheless accept Plaintiffs’ contention
that Medina had been taken outside. So, for the purposes of our analysis, we
proceed under the assumption that Medina is outside the house when
Gallegos shot Nicholas. This, however, does not alter the undisputed fact
that Lovings remained in the threshold of the doorway, a very short distance
from Nicholas.
C
The third issue is whether the district court erred in denying
Gallegos’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to
Nicholas’s claims.
To answer that question, we must review the third fact dispute
identified by the district court: Whether Nicholas was standing over Medina
and reaching for Medina’s gun on the couch. Maloney’s investigation
determined that Nicholas “was not over the body of Officer Medina, as
reported by several officers, where he had collapsed on the couch.” Rather,
Nicholas “was physically removed by at least [eight] feet from his location.”
According to Maloney, were Nicholas over Medina “attempting to gain
control of his shotgun,” only “her left side would have been exposed to
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Gallegos[’s] shooting position.” Thus, “she could not have been shot on her
right side.” This conclusion was based on the house layout, location of the
couch, and Gallegos’s position when he shot Nicholas. Gallegos told IAD
that Nicholas was “standing directly over and facing Officer Medina,”
yelling profanities at him, before she “appeared to be lunging or reaching
towards” Medina’s gun. He later testified that Nicholas “was grabbing with
both hands [and] tugging at the shotgun.” The district court deemed this fact
dispute material because there is no constitutional violation where an officer
uses deadly force on a suspect that appears to be reaching for a weapon.
At this stage, we must construe this conflicting evidence in favor of
Plaintiffs. As already noted, we proceed under the Plaintiffs’ version of
events because the BWC does not provide enough information for the court
to determine that the Plaintiffs’ version of events is blatantly contradicted.
Thus, Nicholas is not reaching for Medina’s gun as Medina is not in the
home. But Plaintiffs do not dispute that Lovings remains in the threshold of
the doorway, feet away from Nicholas. In our analysis, we consider these
facts together in their context—in this case, an intense and dangerous
firefight that left multiple officers injured.
We therefore proceed under the following factual baseline for
purposes of our analysis: Medina, who had been shot, was outside the house
when Gallegos shot Nicholas. Further, Nicholas was not standing over
Medina and reaching for his weapon while Medina was lying injured on the
couch, but Lovings remained wounded in the doorway. In our analysis, we
consider these facts together in their context—in this case, an intense and
dangerous firefight that left multiple officers injured.
1
Turning to the constitutional analysis, we must consider, viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Nicholas, whether Gallegos’s actions
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violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment fashions a
“right to be free from excessive force during a seizure,” and that right is
clearly established. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.
2012); U.S. Const. amend. IV. “To establish a claim of excessive force
under the Fourth Amendment,” plaintiffs must show an “(1) injury,
(2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly
excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.”
Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting
Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005)).
As to the third element, we consider three factors when determining
whether force was excessive or unreasonable: (1) “the severity of the crime
at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 167 (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “The test used to determine whether a
use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment ‘is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application.’” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d
332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Instead, it
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case” to assess “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at
396–97. To determine reasonableness, courts must assess actions from the
objective view “of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. “The intent or motivation of the
officer is irrelevant; the question is whether a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed justifying the
particular use of force.” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). At this stage, while all disputed facts are construed in the
light most favorable to nonmovants, courts “evaluating the reasonableness
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of an officer’s use of force [must consider] how a reasonable officer would
have perceived those facts.” Tucker, 998 F.3d at 171–72 (citing Griggs v.
Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2016)). In other words, qualified
immunity requires courts to “consider[] only the facts that were knowable to
the defendant officers.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam).
In the specific context of an officer employing deadly force, such force
is excessive and unreasonable “unless ‘the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others.’” Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir.
2018) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). “An officer’s use
of deadly force is not excessive, and thus no constitutional violation occurs,
when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious
harm to the officer or to others.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th
Cir. 2009). “The threat-of-harm factor typically predominates the analysis
when deadly force has been deployed.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th
1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021). And when assessing the force used in a particular
case, our reasonableness determination must be holistically made in the
context of all the relevant circumstances, “including facts and events leading
up to the climactic moment.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 76 (2025). 5
Our “calculus of reasonableness must” necessarily allow “for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
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5
When the district court rendered its decision, the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in Barnes v. Felix, 91 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, 145 S. Ct. 118 (2024),
to examine the propriety of the moment-of-threat doctrine. In analyzing the threat Nicholas
posed to the officers, our law at the time required “that the threat be examined only at the
moment deadly force is used,” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 466 (5th Cir. 2022),
and “[a]ny prior events leading up to the shooting . . . were simply not relevant,” Barnes,
605 U.S. at 78 (cleaned up). Thus, that doctrine is no longer good law.
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amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396–97. The Supreme Court cautions us to avoid “second-guessing a
police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a
particular situation.” Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012) (per curiam).
2
As to excessive force, Gallegos argues that Plaintiffs’ theory that
Gallegos intentionally shot Nicholas by accidentally shooting through Tuttle
is “too implausible” to support summary judgment—and “impossible”
given the evidence, including Maloney’s bullet trajectory analysis. Gallegos
also contends that Plaintiffs’ theory is premised on his subjective intent.
Thus, Gallegos asserts, the shot that killed Nicholas was constitutional “to
the extent Gallegos was aiming at Mr. Tuttle, who was grazed by the bullet.”
Plaintiffs challenge that theory, arguing that Gallegos’s conduct was
“objectively unreasonable when he shot and killed an unarmed woman who
was not threatening him.” Without citation to the record, they contend that
Gallegos forfeited his argument that, “regardless of his intent, his conduct
was still objectively reasonable.” Presumably, Plaintiffs’ assertion refers to
Gallegos’s argument that the fatal shot to Nicholas was constitutional to the
extent that an objectively reasonable officer was aiming at Tuttle. But they
do not give any airtime to this point. Even still, Plaintiffs argue that Nicholas
did not pose an immediate threat of physical harm because she “was on the
back of the couch and unarmed.” For these reasons, they argue, Gallegos
used objectively unreasonable force in shooting Nicholas inside the house.
Before analyzing the merits of this excessive-force claim, we need to
briefly engage with Plaintiffs’ secondary and tertiary arguments before us.
To begin, Gallegos did not forfeit his argument that shooting Nicholas
was objectively reasonable. Forfeiture aside, Gallegos cannot escape his
deposition testimony that he shot at Nicholas—not Tuttle. Of course, a
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No. 25-20132
question remains as to whether Gallegos could see Nicholas through the fatal
funnel of the house. Yet we must only assess materially disputed facts, not
their genuineness, Terry, 609 F.3d at 761, unless the record blatantly
contradicts them. In any event, the visual question is not materially disputed.
Gallegos attempts to wave-off his own testimony by arguing that
Plaintiffs’ theory is impossible and implausible. But no help is available. It is
quite possible—indeed plausible—that Gallegos intended to shoot Nicholas,
according to his deposition, and accidentally hit Tuttle. For example,
Maloney testified that Gallegos “fired and the bullet grazed [Tuttle’s] arm
and hit” Nicholas. Yet Maloney could not determine what Gallegos “was
aiming at” because “[t]hat would be beyond the scope of the
reconstruction.” When asked if there was evidence to contradict testimony
that Gallegos fired at Tuttle’s hand, Maloney concluded, “[t]hat would be
. . . a pretty bad shot because he hit the house instead of his hand.” Moreover,
there is no evidence—other than the bullet that struck Nicholas also grazed
Tuttle—suggesting Gallegos intended to shoot Tuttle instead of Nicholas.
To cure that unforgiving evidence in the record, Gallegos next presses
that, under an objectively reasonable officer standard, his testimony is
irrelevant because it is subjective. Of course, the “intent or motivation of the
officer is irrelevant; the question is whether a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed justifying the
part