Martinez v. University of Texas
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-50181
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-50181 November 19, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Alberto Martinez; Emilio Zamora,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
University of Texas at Austin; Jay Hartzell, in his official
and individual capacity,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:23-CV-1574
______________________________
Before Haynes, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
The former president of a Texas state university appeals the denial of
his motion to dismiss, based on qualified immunity, a lawsuit filed under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 by two professors for alleged disparate treatment and
retaliation. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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I
Alberto Martinez, a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican origin, and Emilio
Zamora, a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent, are full professors in the history
department at the University of Texas at Austin (University). Martinez, who
was promoted to the highest tenure rank in 2015, has published seven books
and “numerous articles” that have garnered “highly positive” reviews from
peer-reviewed journals around the world; he served as a research fellow at
numerous “prominent institutions” and taught “significantly more”
courses than others in the department. Zamora, who has taught in the history
department since 2000, has published numerous works, including seven
award-winning books, and garnered numerous awards and fellowships.
A
In 2017 and 2018, Martinez and Zamora (Professors) “began having
informal conversations among themselves and with other Hispanic
faculty . . . regarding their shared sense that [the University] was paying
them” less than similarly situated, non-Hispanic faculty. On May 2, 2018,
Professors, along with other Hispanic professors, brought their concerns that
“Hispanic faculty were being paid less and received fewer promotions and
appointments than non-Hispanic faculty” to the history department. They
“request[ed] rectification of the disparities in compensation and lack of
promotion to positions of leadership.”
That same day, the history department “created an [e]quity
[c]ommittee.” Professors and five other faculty members served on the
equity committee, which “reviewe[ed] relevant employment and salary
information” and “found significant disparities against Hispanic [p]rofessors
in the [h]istory [d]epartment.” It documented its findings in a report, which
they presented to the history department on October 15, 2018. The report
“highlighted and opposed the fact that Hispanic faculty as well as other
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minority faculty were being paid lower salaries than other White faculty
within the department [whom] had a less-accomplished publication record.”
Professors also “learned that [other Hispanic full professors from
other departments] . . . were also experiencing compensation and other
disparities” relative “to non-Hispanic full [p]rofessors.” They, along with
six of these other professors, convened with the vice provost in the summer
of 2018. The vice provost gave them “charts that confirmed Hispanic pay
disparities . . . throughout” the University and “arranged for the group . . . to
meet with [his] Council for Racial and Ethnic Equity and Diversity,” known
as “CREED.”
On September 18, 2018, Professors, along with the other professors,
“present[ed] the disparities” to CREED. In turn, “CREED created seven
subcommittees to . . . work on a Hispanic [f]aculty [i]nitiative which
delivered a report to the [p]rovost . . . in May 2019.” “CREED stated that
it would analyze pay disparities” but never did.
Professors and the same six professors formed the “Independent
Equity Committee.” Over the course of several months, that committee
analyzed “salary and performance information” and generated a “Hispanic
Equity Report” (HER) on October 8, 2019, which was delivered to the
University’s “top administrators.” The HER recounted data indicating pay,
promotion, and role disparities between Hispanic and White professors.
Then, the University “provided data charts to Texas State
Representative from Travis County . . . Gina Hinojosa.” The University’s
“own review of the data, controlling for field and experience, revealed that
Hispanic full [p]rofessors had consistently received lower salaries than White
full [p]rofessors for nine consecutive years (2009 – 2018) with an annual
average of 12% lower per year[.]”
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The University has several policies regarding promotions and
endowments that take two forms: Regents Rules and Regulations (Rules), or
provisions in the Handbook of Operating Procedures (HOP), which
collectively vest the president with authority over all matters related to pay,
and establish criteria for raises.1 At a faculty meeting on November 11, 2019,
Gregory Fenves—then the University’s president—“acknowledged that
disparities affecting Hispanics existed and recognized the need to address”
them, “just as [the University] had [previously] done for female . . . and
Black professors.” Following the provost and then-President Fenves
“publicly acknowledg[ing] in writing and verbally on multiple occasions” the
existence of the disparity, the provost “allocated $3 million” to be used for
“[e]quity [r]aises.” After the equity raise program was announced, but
before the funds were allocated, then-President Fenves and the provost left
the University.
In July 2020, after the University appointed an interim president, Jay
Hartzell (President), only $1.7 million was allocated for pay raises. Of that,
only 18% was given to Hispanic faculty members, and disparities remained.
Martinez then authored another report and submitted it to President
on July 27, 2020. Due to “recent cutbacks[,]” the report “requested funding
_____________________
1
Because the operative complaint cites the Rules and HOP, they are “central” to
the claims it asserts, and they are attached as exhibits to the motion to dismiss, we may
consider them. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
2000). Rules 31102 and 30501 establish a mandatory, annual evaluation policy for all
tenured faculty and employees for purposes of making salary recommendations. HOP
provision 2-2160 vests the University’s budget council and applicable department chair
with the duty to “prepar[e] recommendations” regarding “salary rates.” It allocates to the
president “decisions with regard to salary advancement,” which are “subject to
confirmation by the Chancellor.” The president “may accept, reject, or modify all
recommendations forwarded and may make decisions with regard to salary
increases . . . regardless of whether a recommendation has been received.”
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for [the University’s] academic programs in American Ethnic studies”
because in 2018, the University “cut $1,552,195 from academic programs
working on Hispanic, Black, Native American, and Asian American topics.”
Of these cuts, 87.5% “were from those units focused on Hispanic topics.”
President did not restore the funding.
Professors continued to oppose the disparities facing Hispanic faculty
at the University from 2018 through 2020 by working on committees, which
“communicated directly with multiple [University] administrators.”
Notably, on August 3, 2020, one of these committees submitted “a written
request for equity raises to President [] and [the] interim [p]rovost.”
President did not respond.
Because President “fail[ed] . . . to address the disparity issues,” on
October 14, 2020, Martinez filed a discrimination complaint with the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL). “Between the latter part of October 2020 and
the early part of 2021,” eight other Hispanic professors, including Zamora,
filed discrimination complaints with the DOL.
In November 2020, the provost created another committee, the
“Equity Review Process Consultative Committee” (ERPCC). The
ERPCC “was to assess salary equity among professors and to work with an
outside contractor, hired by President, that would analyze salary inequities.”
It was also to “advise on how to use the remaining equity funds allocated”
by the former provost. Martinez was appointed to the ERPCC, which soon
recommended the hire of an outside contractor, which President approved.
But before the contractor began work, in February 2021, President
“cancelled the contractor’s work and disbanded the ERPCC” without
explanation.
On November 1, 2021, a different committee of the Hispanic Faculty
and Staff Association (HFSA) finalized another report that documented
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statistics which demonstrated disparate pay among Hispanic University staff
members. The HFSA presented this report to President, who did not act.
Six months later, President e-mailed University employees regarding
planned raises in the fall of 2022, but that email did not mention Hispanic
employees or any disparities they face at the University. The University
“increased both [Professors’] salaries, but not enough to eliminate the
disparities with comparable non-Hispanic professors.”
B
As with matters of pay, the University also has several Rules and
HOP provisions regarding promotions and endowments.2 On March 11,
2020, Martinez applied to be the chair of the history department. Rather than
using “its established application, interview, evaluation, recommendation,
and selection process[,]” the University named a non-Hispanic professor to
be chair who had not applied for the position, and was not interviewed,
evaluated, or recommended. Professors allege “Martinez was more
qualified” for the position because he “had actually applied and went
through the interview process,” “had been at [the University] longer,” “had
more years in rank as a full professor, taught more courses, and had more
_____________________
2
As to promotions, Rules 31102 and 30501 establish a mandatory annual evaluation
program, the results of which are to be used to make salary decisions. As to endowments,
Rule 60202 notes that “holders of [e]ndowed [a]cademic [p]ositions shall have a
distinguished record of excellence” based on their professorships and accomplishments. It
charges the president with the responsibility “for maintaining oversight of
[e]ndowments . . . , including assignment of holders and use of distributions,” but permits
the president to “delegate that authority.” HOP provision 2-2440 establishes “selection
criteria” for endowed academic decisions. With respect to both promotions and
endowments, under HOP provision 2-2160, “the president may accept, reject, or modify
all recommendations forwarded and may make decisions with regard to . . . promotion in
rank, the award of tenure, renewal of appointment, . . . regardless of whether a
recommendation has been received.”
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publications and/or a better publication record,” according to “metrics
created and used” by the University “in evaluations for raises.”
In May 2020, the University filled another position in the history
department without “follow[ing] any formal application processes or
procedures” and without giving “others an opportunity to apply . . . for the
position.” Professors allege they were “more qualified for the . . . position”
given their “longer record[s] of employment with” the University, their
longer tenure as “full professor[s],” and having “taught more courses and
had more publications and/or a better publication record . . . .”
Similarly, in June 2022, the University selected another non-Hispanic
professor to serve as the interim chair of the history department without a
“formal announcement” of the vacancy, an interview process, or a chance
for anyone to apply. Based on their relative tenure, teaching load, and
publication record, Professors claim to have been more qualified for the
position than the person the University selected.
When the University sought to appoint another interim department
chair, Martinez applied for the position, but on February 7, 2023, “without
interviewing or communicating with the applicants, [it] selected” a non-
Hispanic person who did not apply. As noted, Martinez claims to have been
more qualified for the position than the person selected.
C
Professors brought claims against the University under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act for: (1) disparate pay, promotions, and endowments; and
(2) retaliation. They asserted § 1983 claims against President in his individual
and official capacities, alleging violations of § 1981 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for (1) disparate pay and promotions;
and (2) retaliation. Zamora also alleged disparate treatment as to
endowments.
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The district court granted the University and President’s motion to
dismiss Professors’ Title VII retaliation claims for failure to adequately allege
a causal nexus between their opposition to discrimination and the
University’s alleged retaliatory acts.3 It denied the motion to dismiss
Professors’ Title VII disparate impact and treatment claims against the
University and Professors’ § 1983 claims against President in his individual
capacity. The University and President now appeal that denial.4
II
This court reviews dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.
Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). To survive,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “To state a claim that is facially
plausible, a plaintiff must plead factual content that ‘allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009)). “We take the well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint as true,” Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469,
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[,] and
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Elsensohn v. St.
_____________________
3
The district court also struck Professors’ Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims
on behalf of a putative class, and dismissed all official capacity claims against President;
those claims are not at issue here.
4
The University initially joined the President in this appeal, asserting “pendent
jurisdiction to review the plausibility of Professors’ Title VII claims against” it, but it
ultimately conceded that, under our precedent, this court “should not reach” the Title VII
claims. Because “we have refused to recognize” jurisdiction of this sort, the University’s
appeal as to Professors’ Title VII claims for lack of jurisdiction is dismissed. See Zarnow v.
City of Wichita Falls, 500 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting McKee v. City of Rockwall,
877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989)).
8
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Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Office, 530 F.3d 368, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2008). This
court reviews the denial of qualified immunity de novo. Green v. Thomas, 129
F.4th 877, 883 (5th Cir. 2025).5
III
President argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
asserting qualified immunity from Professors’ § 1983 claim alleging that he
violated their rights under § 1981.
“Section 1983 is a federally created cause of action to redress civil
rights violations.” Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th
Cir. 1991). It “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under
color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws’ of the United States[.]” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512
U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)). “[T]o
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) demonstrate
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” White-Page v. Harris County, 114 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished). Professors allege a violation of their rights under § 1981,
which “prohibits racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts.”
White Glove Staffing, Inc. v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., 947 F.3d 301, 308 (5th
Cir. 2020).
“Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity,” Hall v.
Trochessett, 105 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1173,
_____________________
5
“Because [Professors’] claims arise under § 1983, and the denial of [qualified
immunity] is a ‘final decision’ under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over
[President’s] appeal.” Jackson v. Duff, 161 F.4th 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2025).
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(2025), “an affirmative defense,” Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d
572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009). “Claims against individual public officials under §
1981 are [likewise] subject to the defense of qualified immunity . . . .” Foley v.
Univ. of Hou. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003). “The doctrine of
qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability
when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan
v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011).
“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome [qualified immunity] must show:
(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Jackson
v. Duff, 161 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). “Courts may
address the two prongs in any order, and defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity if the plaintiff fails either prong.” Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys.,
138 F.4th 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech
Univ. Sys., 146 S. Ct. 1492 (2026). Here, President disputes that Professors
have pleaded sufficient facts to overcome both prongs.
A
As to the first prong, whether Professors plausibly alleged a violation
of their rights secured by § 1981,6 see id., President argues that Professors
_____________________
6
Professors argue that, because President did not seek their dismissal below, to the
extent their § 1983 claims are based on the Equal Protection Clause rather than § 1981, they
are not before the court. But Professors do not distinguish between the § 1983 claims based
on their rights under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981; both claims are asserted
under § 1983 for seeming violations of the same right to be free from disparate treatment
or retaliation, and both turn on the same facts. A retaliation claim likely cannot be based on
the Equal Protection Clause, however, though we have not decided that precise question.
See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1996); Wilcox v. Lyons, 970 F.3d 452, 458 (4th
Cir. 2020); R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 440 (6th Cir. 2005); Boyd
v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004); Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338,
340 (11th Cir. 1995).
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failed to allege that he was personally involved in both the disparate treatment
and retaliation of which they complain.
To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1)
“he is a member of a racial minority”; (2) “the defendant had an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race”; and (3) “the discrimination concerned one
or more of the activities enumerated in the statute, such as making and
enforcing of a contract.” Perry v. VHS S.A. Partners, L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918,
931 (5th Cir. 2021).7 In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the Supreme
Court held that § 1983 is “the exclusive federal damages remedy for the
violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a
state actor.” 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989).
“‘Personal involvement is an essential element’ of . . . liability under
§ 1983.” Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2018)). “[A] § 1983
plaintiff must additionally plead and prove which actions of the individual
defendant caused them harm.” Duff, 161 F.4th at 348 (quoting Jones v.
Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2020)). The defendant must be
“either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation . . . or there
must be a causal connection between an act of the [defendant] and the
[statutory] violation sought to be redressed.” Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756,
768 (5th Cir. 1983).
Professors plausibly pleaded that President is personally involved in
their discrimination as to their disparate treatment claim. They alleged that,
under the University’s Rules and HOP, President made the principal
decisions regarding pay, promotions, and endowments. As to pay and
_____________________
7
Here, President does not dispute that Professors are members of a racial minority
or that the claims concern activities protected by § 1981.
11
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endowments, they alleged that, although President knew that Professors
received disparate pay and endowments relative to their comparators, he
refused to rectify the disparity. As to promotions, Professors pleaded that, on
several occasions, they were passed over for promotions; the University
instead selected non-Hispanic people who never applied and who were less
qualified. “No commitment” regarding these matters could be made without
President, and he could initiate a change in pay or position unilaterally. Based
on these allegations, Professors have plausibly alleged that President was
“personally involved” in their disparate treatment in that he perpetrated and
perpetuated that disparate treatment—“caus[ing] the deprivation.” See
Lozano, 718 F.2d at 768.8
As to Professors’ retaliation claim, they alleged that, after
documenting discrimination against Hispanic faculty at the University
through various committees, which produced reports and presented them to
President, funds were earmarked to remedy the disparities. Under President,
only a fraction of the funds went to Hispanic faculty, the disparities remained,
and “no commitment” regarding pay could be made without him. After
asking President directly for equity raises to remedy the disparities, President
refused. Professors filed discrimination claims with the DOL. While
discrimination claims were pending and Professors continued to oppose
discrimination against Hispanics, the University created a committee for the
sole purpose of reviewing pay disparities and proposing a solution. Professors
allege that President himself disbanded the committee without explanation.
Based on these allegations, Professors plausibly alleged that President—the
_____________________
8
President nevertheless argues that, as to each decision regarding pay, promotions,
and endowments, he was not as involved as alleged. But at the pleading stage, we must
accept Professors’ allegations as true, construe them in the light most favorable to them,
and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Elsensohn, 530 F.3d at 372.
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decisionmaker—was “personally involved” in retaliating against them for
their advocacy and DOL complaints because he “caused the deprivation”
with each choice he allegedly made. See Lozano, 718 F.2d at 768.
Professors have plausibly alleged that President was personally
involved in both their disparate treatment and retaliation claims under §
1983.9
B
President also argues, under the first prong of the qualified immunity,
that Professors failed to allege a violation of their right to be free from race-
based disparate treatment and retaliation under § 1981. We disagree.
1
The elements of disparate treatment claims under Title VII and § 1981
“are identical.” Pratt v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 606 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001).
“Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that
treat an employee worse than others based on the employee’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. In [these] . . . cases, proof and finding of
discriminatory motive is required.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th
Cir. 2007). Ultimately, a plaintiff “must show that his circumstances are
‘nearly identical’ to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of
the protected class.” Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)).
_____________________
9
President also argues that Professors failed to allege personal involvement
because they did not plead that he was deliberately indifferent to, or ratified, the alleged
discrimination. But Professors have not pursued either theory, below or on appeal. Instead,
as to each claim, they have consistently pleaded and argued that President, as
decisionmaker over these matters, is directly responsible for the discriminatory decisions;
at this pleading stage, the University’s Rules and HOP bolster that theory.
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“Discriminatory intent may be established by either direct or
circumstantial evidence.” Walls v. Miss. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d
306, 322 (5th Cir. 1984). When a case is based on circumstantial evidence, “a
court analyzes the . . . claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.”
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019). Under
this framework, the plaintiff carries “the initial burden . . . of establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Then, the burden “shift[s] to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action.
Id. If the defendant produces a race-neutral reason, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show that that reason is pretextual. Id. at 804.10
“[A] plaintiff need not make out a prima facie case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766 (quoting Raj,
714 F.3d at 331). Although it is error to require a showing of that sort at this
stage, “we have said that it can be ‘helpful to reference’ that framework when
the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate
elements of the disparate treatment claim.” Id. at 767 (quoting Chimm, 836
F.3d at 470–71). Instead of having to plausibly allege each prima facie
element, a plaintiff only “must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate
elements of a disparate treatment claim to make their case plausible.” Id.
(quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470). At the pleadings stage, the prima facie
elements are subsumed by the “ultimate elements.” See id. The “ultimate
elements” of a disparate treatment claim are: (1) “an ‘adverse employment
_____________________
10
“McDonnell Douglas. . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Nevertheless, it is a
“‘helpful . . . reference’” to determine “whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged” these
elements. Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766.
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action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status.’” Id.
(quoting Raj, 714 F.3d at 331).
a
President argues that Professors’ disparate pay claims fail because: (1)
they are based on unintentional discrimination, or non-discriminatory
economic factors; and (2) Professors did not allege the specifics of their
claim, like “what pay decision they are challenging,” “who, specifically,
made these decisions,” what they “should have been paid,” or sufficient
comparator evidence.11
As to the first “ultimate element” of Professors’ disparate pay claim,
there is no dispute that if they were paid less than similarly situated non-
Hispanic professors as they allege, they suffered an adverse employment
action. See Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“An act affecting compensation is itself a type of adverse employment
action that is actionable in a discrimination case.”).
As to the second “ultimate element,” that the adverse action was
“because of” Professors’ “protected status,” see Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766,—
i.e., that the discrimination was “intentional,” Professors pleaded that they
“were being paid less . . . than non-Hispanic faculty,” as confirmed by the
various reports, and as acknowledged by the University immediately before
President took office. Before President started, the University pledged $3
million to remedy that disparity, but when President decided how that money
would be allocated, as was his prerogative under the University’s Rules and
HOP, he declined to remedy the disparity despite being asked to do so. The
pay disparities persisted for Martinez and Zamora. Further, they alleged that
_____________________
11
President does not dispute that Professors’ disparate treatment claims concern
activities protected by § 1981.
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President was presented with reports reiterating the disparities and requests
for raises, and he still declined to do anything. At this preliminary stage, when
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, as we must, these
allegations that Professors were paid significantly less than similarly situated
professors suffice. See Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869
F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) (“An allegation that similarly situated non-
minorities received better treatment ‘could create the necessary inference
and set the predicate for establishing the [§ 1983] claim.” (quoting Crosby v.
Kilgore, 9 F.3d 104, *1 (5th Cir. 1993))).
Nevertheless, President asserts that Professors’ claims fail because
they are based on unintentional discrimination, or non-discriminatory
economic factors. He notes that the operative complaint references one of
the equity reports documenting pay disparities from which Hispanic
professors at the University suffer, the HER, which notes at one point that
“the alleged pay disparities were due to ‘Hispanopia,’ a term they created to
refer to unintentional bias against Hispanics.” But neither the HER (attached
as an exhibit to President’s Motion to Dismiss), nor more importantly the
complaint, assert that all pay discrimination at the University relative to
Hispanic professors is unintentional. Professors pleaded the opposite. To the
extent that President’s understanding of the HER may contradict Professors’
factual allegations, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, drawing all
inferences in favor of . . . the non-movant.” Morgan, 659 F.3d at 418;
Elsensohn, 530 F.3d at 372. As for the non-discriminatory economic factors,
President argues that another 2018 report which the complaint references
cited “pay compression” (a market force) “as a main cause of salary
inequities.” This argument fails for the same reason— President’s
arguments are not for the pleading stage. See Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767.
President’s second argument that Professors did not plausibly allege:
(1) what pay decisions they are challenging”; (2) “who, specifically, made
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No. 25-50181
these decisions”; (3) “what [Professors] were paid”; (4) “what [Professors]
believe they should have been paid”; (5) “who [Professors’] comparators
are; (6) “what the comparators’ experience and qualifications are”; and (7)
“what the comparators were paid,” overlooks the facts alleged. Professors’
pleadings challenge annual compensation decisions. Because the University
does not publish payment to individual professors, Professors could not have
alleged specific dollar amounts without discovery. As to comparator
evidence, Professors pleaded that they were paid “significantly less than
comparable, similarly situated non-Hispanic fellow History Department full
professors under” President. They also alleged that the University paid “at
least three specific, identified peers” a “higher salary” even though
Professors “ha[ve] more publications/a better publication record, taught
more courses at [the University], and ha[ve] more time in rank as . . . full
professor[s].”
President’s arguments also measure the allegations against an
“inappropriately heighten[ed]” pleading standard. See id. It is true that,
ultimately, Professors “must show” that their “circumstances are ‘nearly
identical’ to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member” of the
same protected class. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 522 (quoting Little, 924 F.2d at 97).
But at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we do not “scrutiniz[e]” whether comparators
are “similarly situated” because “a plaintiff need only plausibly allege facts
going to the ultimate elements of the claim to survive a motion to dismiss.”
See Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768.12
_____________________
12
President relies on Chhim and Angus v. Mayorkas, No. 22-50600, 2023 WL
3918986 (5th Cir. June 9, 2023). But Chhim dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s Title VII claim
where he pleaded “no facts” to “suggest that the applicant hired . . . was less qualified . . .
or similarly situated.” 836 F.3d at 471. Angus is distinguishable on the same basis because
the plaintiff “failed to allege any . . . facts as to [her comparators’] work experience,
qualifications, or relevant attributes” and failed to plead “that her non-selection was on
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No. 25-50181
b
President next argues that Professors’ disparate treatment claims
based on promotions fail.
The prima facie elements of a disparate promotions claim are: (1)
“membership in a [protected class]”; (2) “an application for an open job or
promotion for which he was qualified”; (3) “rejection”; and (4) “the
employer promoted or hired a non-minority [person] for the job or continued
to seek non-minority applicants for the position applied for by the plaintiff.”
Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1055 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc.,
482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007). As noted, while reference to them is
helpful, a plaintiff need not plead each prima facie element at this stage; he
only must have pleaded “sufficient facts” on all the ultimate elements: “(1) an
‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her
protected status.’” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768. (citation omitted).
President acknowledges that Martinez “applied to a few open
positions between 2019–23,” but argues that his claim is nevertheless too
vague to survive. As to the first prima facie element, there is no dispute that
Martinez is a member of a protected class. See Page, 726 F.2d at 1055. As to
the second, Martinez pleaded that he applied to be the Chair of the History
Department twice by submitting a formal application. As to the third prima
facie element, rejection, and the fourth, that a non-minority person was
hired, see id., Martinez pleaded that he was rejected both times and that the
University filled the position with a non-minority per