Full Opinion

Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 25-50181 November 19, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Alberto Martinez; Emilio Zamora, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus University of Texas at Austin; Jay Hartzell, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:23-CV-1574 ______________________________ Before Haynes, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* The former president of a Texas state university appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, based on qualified immunity, a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 by two professors for alleged disparate treatment and retaliation. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part. _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 I Alberto Martinez, a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican origin, and Emilio Zamora, a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent, are full professors in the history department at the University of Texas at Austin (University). Martinez, who was promoted to the highest tenure rank in 2015, has published seven books and “numerous articles” that have garnered “highly positive” reviews from peer-reviewed journals around the world; he served as a research fellow at numerous “prominent institutions” and taught “significantly more” courses than others in the department. Zamora, who has taught in the history department since 2000, has published numerous works, including seven award-winning books, and garnered numerous awards and fellowships. A In 2017 and 2018, Martinez and Zamora (Professors) “began having informal conversations among themselves and with other Hispanic faculty . . . regarding their shared sense that [the University] was paying them” less than similarly situated, non-Hispanic faculty. On May 2, 2018, Professors, along with other Hispanic professors, brought their concerns that “Hispanic faculty were being paid less and received fewer promotions and appointments than non-Hispanic faculty” to the history department. They “request[ed] rectification of the disparities in compensation and lack of promotion to positions of leadership.” That same day, the history department “created an [e]quity [c]ommittee.” Professors and five other faculty members served on the equity committee, which “reviewe[ed] relevant employment and salary information” and “found significant disparities against Hispanic [p]rofessors in the [h]istory [d]epartment.” It documented its findings in a report, which they presented to the history department on October 15, 2018. The report “highlighted and opposed the fact that Hispanic faculty as well as other 2 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 minority faculty were being paid lower salaries than other White faculty within the department [whom] had a less-accomplished publication record.” Professors also “learned that [other Hispanic full professors from other departments] . . . were also experiencing compensation and other disparities” relative “to non-Hispanic full [p]rofessors.” They, along with six of these other professors, convened with the vice provost in the summer of 2018. The vice provost gave them “charts that confirmed Hispanic pay disparities . . . throughout” the University and “arranged for the group . . . to meet with [his] Council for Racial and Ethnic Equity and Diversity,” known as “CREED.” On September 18, 2018, Professors, along with the other professors, “present[ed] the disparities” to CREED. In turn, “CREED created seven subcommittees to . . . work on a Hispanic [f]aculty [i]nitiative which delivered a report to the [p]rovost . . . in May 2019.” “CREED stated that it would analyze pay disparities” but never did. Professors and the same six professors formed the “Independent Equity Committee.” Over the course of several months, that committee analyzed “salary and performance information” and generated a “Hispanic Equity Report” (HER) on October 8, 2019, which was delivered to the University’s “top administrators.” The HER recounted data indicating pay, promotion, and role disparities between Hispanic and White professors. Then, the University “provided data charts to Texas State Representative from Travis County . . . Gina Hinojosa.” The University’s “own review of the data, controlling for field and experience, revealed that Hispanic full [p]rofessors had consistently received lower salaries than White full [p]rofessors for nine consecutive years (2009 – 2018) with an annual average of 12% lower per year[.]” 3 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 The University has several policies regarding promotions and endowments that take two forms: Regents Rules and Regulations (Rules), or provisions in the Handbook of Operating Procedures (HOP), which collectively vest the president with authority over all matters related to pay, and establish criteria for raises.1 At a faculty meeting on November 11, 2019, Gregory Fenves—then the University’s president—“acknowledged that disparities affecting Hispanics existed and recognized the need to address” them, “just as [the University] had [previously] done for female . . . and Black professors.” Following the provost and then-President Fenves “publicly acknowledg[ing] in writing and verbally on multiple occasions” the existence of the disparity, the provost “allocated $3 million” to be used for “[e]quity [r]aises.” After the equity raise program was announced, but before the funds were allocated, then-President Fenves and the provost left the University. In July 2020, after the University appointed an interim president, Jay Hartzell (President), only $1.7 million was allocated for pay raises. Of that, only 18% was given to Hispanic faculty members, and disparities remained. Martinez then authored another report and submitted it to President on July 27, 2020. Due to “recent cutbacks[,]” the report “requested funding _____________________ 1 Because the operative complaint cites the Rules and HOP, they are “central” to the claims it asserts, and they are attached as exhibits to the motion to dismiss, we may consider them. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Rules 31102 and 30501 establish a mandatory, annual evaluation policy for all tenured faculty and employees for purposes of making salary recommendations. HOP provision 2-2160 vests the University’s budget council and applicable department chair with the duty to “prepar[e] recommendations” regarding “salary rates.” It allocates to the president “decisions with regard to salary advancement,” which are “subject to confirmation by the Chancellor.” The president “may accept, reject, or modify all recommendations forwarded and may make decisions with regard to salary increases . . . regardless of whether a recommendation has been received.” 4 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 for [the University’s] academic programs in American Ethnic studies” because in 2018, the University “cut $1,552,195 from academic programs working on Hispanic, Black, Native American, and Asian American topics.” Of these cuts, 87.5% “were from those units focused on Hispanic topics.” President did not restore the funding. Professors continued to oppose the disparities facing Hispanic faculty at the University from 2018 through 2020 by working on committees, which “communicated directly with multiple [University] administrators.” Notably, on August 3, 2020, one of these committees submitted “a written request for equity raises to President [] and [the] interim [p]rovost.” President did not respond. Because President “fail[ed] . . . to address the disparity issues,” on October 14, 2020, Martinez filed a discrimination complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). “Between the latter part of October 2020 and the early part of 2021,” eight other Hispanic professors, including Zamora, filed discrimination complaints with the DOL. In November 2020, the provost created another committee, the “Equity Review Process Consultative Committee” (ERPCC). The ERPCC “was to assess salary equity among professors and to work with an outside contractor, hired by President, that would analyze salary inequities.” It was also to “advise on how to use the remaining equity funds allocated” by the former provost. Martinez was appointed to the ERPCC, which soon recommended the hire of an outside contractor, which President approved. But before the contractor began work, in February 2021, President “cancelled the contractor’s work and disbanded the ERPCC” without explanation. On November 1, 2021, a different committee of the Hispanic Faculty and Staff Association (HFSA) finalized another report that documented 5 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 statistics which demonstrated disparate pay among Hispanic University staff members. The HFSA presented this report to President, who did not act. Six months later, President e-mailed University employees regarding planned raises in the fall of 2022, but that email did not mention Hispanic employees or any disparities they face at the University. The University “increased both [Professors’] salaries, but not enough to eliminate the disparities with comparable non-Hispanic professors.” B As with matters of pay, the University also has several Rules and HOP provisions regarding promotions and endowments.2 On March 11, 2020, Martinez applied to be the chair of the history department. Rather than using “its established application, interview, evaluation, recommendation, and selection process[,]” the University named a non-Hispanic professor to be chair who had not applied for the position, and was not interviewed, evaluated, or recommended. Professors allege “Martinez was more qualified” for the position because he “had actually applied and went through the interview process,” “had been at [the University] longer,” “had more years in rank as a full professor, taught more courses, and had more _____________________ 2 As to promotions, Rules 31102 and 30501 establish a mandatory annual evaluation program, the results of which are to be used to make salary decisions. As to endowments, Rule 60202 notes that “holders of [e]ndowed [a]cademic [p]ositions shall have a distinguished record of excellence” based on their professorships and accomplishments. It charges the president with the responsibility “for maintaining oversight of [e]ndowments . . . , including assignment of holders and use of distributions,” but permits the president to “delegate that authority.” HOP provision 2-2440 establishes “selection criteria” for endowed academic decisions. With respect to both promotions and endowments, under HOP provision 2-2160, “the president may accept, reject, or modify all recommendations forwarded and may make decisions with regard to . . . promotion in rank, the award of tenure, renewal of appointment, . . . regardless of whether a recommendation has been received.” 6 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 publications and/or a better publication record,” according to “metrics created and used” by the University “in evaluations for raises.” In May 2020, the University filled another position in the history department without “follow[ing] any formal application processes or procedures” and without giving “others an opportunity to apply . . . for the position.” Professors allege they were “more qualified for the . . . position” given their “longer record[s] of employment with” the University, their longer tenure as “full professor[s],” and having “taught more courses and had more publications and/or a better publication record . . . .” Similarly, in June 2022, the University selected another non-Hispanic professor to serve as the interim chair of the history department without a “formal announcement” of the vacancy, an interview process, or a chance for anyone to apply. Based on their relative tenure, teaching load, and publication record, Professors claim to have been more qualified for the position than the person the University selected. When the University sought to appoint another interim department chair, Martinez applied for the position, but on February 7, 2023, “without interviewing or communicating with the applicants, [it] selected” a non- Hispanic person who did not apply. As noted, Martinez claims to have been more qualified for the position than the person selected. C Professors brought claims against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for: (1) disparate pay, promotions, and endowments; and (2) retaliation. They asserted § 1983 claims against President in his individual and official capacities, alleging violations of § 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for (1) disparate pay and promotions; and (2) retaliation. Zamora also alleged disparate treatment as to endowments. 7 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 The district court granted the University and President’s motion to dismiss Professors’ Title VII retaliation claims for failure to adequately allege a causal nexus between their opposition to discrimination and the University’s alleged retaliatory acts.3 It denied the motion to dismiss Professors’ Title VII disparate impact and treatment claims against the University and Professors’ § 1983 claims against President in his individual capacity. The University and President now appeal that denial.4 II This court reviews dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). To survive, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “To state a claim that is facially plausible, a plaintiff must plead factual content that ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009)). “We take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true,” Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469, “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[,] and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Elsensohn v. St. _____________________ 3 The district court also struck Professors’ Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims on behalf of a putative class, and dismissed all official capacity claims against President; those claims are not at issue here. 4 The University initially joined the President in this appeal, asserting “pendent jurisdiction to review the plausibility of Professors’ Title VII claims against” it, but it ultimately conceded that, under our precedent, this court “should not reach” the Title VII claims. Because “we have refused to recognize” jurisdiction of this sort, the University’s appeal as to Professors’ Title VII claims for lack of jurisdiction is dismissed. See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 500 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989)). 8 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Office, 530 F.3d 368, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2008). This court reviews the denial of qualified immunity de novo. Green v. Thomas, 129 F.4th 877, 883 (5th Cir. 2025).5 III President argues that the district court erred in denying his motion asserting qualified immunity from Professors’ § 1983 claim alleging that he violated their rights under § 1981. “Section 1983 is a federally created cause of action to redress civil rights violations.” Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991). It “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States[.]” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)). “[T]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” White-Page v. Harris County, 114 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). Professors allege a violation of their rights under § 1981, which “prohibits racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts.” White Glove Staffing, Inc. v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., 947 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2020). “Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity,” Hall v. Trochessett, 105 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1173, _____________________ 5 “Because [Professors’] claims arise under § 1983, and the denial of [qualified immunity] is a ‘final decision’ under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over [President’s] appeal.” Jackson v. Duff, 161 F.4th 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2025). 9 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 (2025), “an affirmative defense,” Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009). “Claims against individual public officials under § 1981 are [likewise] subject to the defense of qualified immunity . . . .” Foley v. Univ. of Hou. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011). “[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome [qualified immunity] must show: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Jackson v. Duff, 161 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). “Courts may address the two prongs in any order, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails either prong.” Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 138 F.4th 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 146 S. Ct. 1492 (2026). Here, President disputes that Professors have pleaded sufficient facts to overcome both prongs. A As to the first prong, whether Professors plausibly alleged a violation of their rights secured by § 1981,6 see id., President argues that Professors _____________________ 6 Professors argue that, because President did not seek their dismissal below, to the extent their § 1983 claims are based on the Equal Protection Clause rather than § 1981, they are not before the court. But Professors do not distinguish between the § 1983 claims based on their rights under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981; both claims are asserted under § 1983 for seeming violations of the same right to be free from disparate treatment or retaliation, and both turn on the same facts. A retaliation claim likely cannot be based on the Equal Protection Clause, however, though we have not decided that precise question. See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1996); Wilcox v. Lyons, 970 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 2020); R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 440 (6th Cir. 2005); Boyd v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004); Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340 (11th Cir. 1995). 10 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 failed to allege that he was personally involved in both the disparate treatment and retaliation of which they complain. To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) “he is a member of a racial minority”; (2) “the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race”; and (3) “the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute, such as making and enforcing of a contract.” Perry v. VHS S.A. Partners, L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918, 931 (5th Cir. 2021).7 In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 is “the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989). “‘Personal involvement is an essential element’ of . . . liability under § 1983.” Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2018)). “[A] § 1983 plaintiff must additionally plead and prove which actions of the individual defendant caused them harm.” Duff, 161 F.4th at 348 (quoting Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2020)). The defendant must be “either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation . . . or there must be a causal connection between an act of the [defendant] and the [statutory] violation sought to be redressed.” Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Professors plausibly pleaded that President is personally involved in their discrimination as to their disparate treatment claim. They alleged that, under the University’s Rules and HOP, President made the principal decisions regarding pay, promotions, and endowments. As to pay and _____________________ 7 Here, President does not dispute that Professors are members of a racial minority or that the claims concern activities protected by § 1981. 11 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 endowments, they alleged that, although President knew that Professors received disparate pay and endowments relative to their comparators, he refused to rectify the disparity. As to promotions, Professors pleaded that, on several occasions, they were passed over for promotions; the University instead selected non-Hispanic people who never applied and who were less qualified. “No commitment” regarding these matters could be made without President, and he could initiate a change in pay or position unilaterally. Based on these allegations, Professors have plausibly alleged that President was “personally involved” in their disparate treatment in that he perpetrated and perpetuated that disparate treatment—“caus[ing] the deprivation.” See Lozano, 718 F.2d at 768.8 As to Professors’ retaliation claim, they alleged that, after documenting discrimination against Hispanic faculty at the University through various committees, which produced reports and presented them to President, funds were earmarked to remedy the disparities. Under President, only a fraction of the funds went to Hispanic faculty, the disparities remained, and “no commitment” regarding pay could be made without him. After asking President directly for equity raises to remedy the disparities, President refused. Professors filed discrimination claims with the DOL. While discrimination claims were pending and Professors continued to oppose discrimination against Hispanics, the University created a committee for the sole purpose of reviewing pay disparities and proposing a solution. Professors allege that President himself disbanded the committee without explanation. Based on these allegations, Professors plausibly alleged that President—the _____________________ 8 President nevertheless argues that, as to each decision regarding pay, promotions, and endowments, he was not as involved as alleged. But at the pleading stage, we must accept Professors’ allegations as true, construe them in the light most favorable to them, and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Elsensohn, 530 F.3d at 372. 12 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 decisionmaker—was “personally involved” in retaliating against them for their advocacy and DOL complaints because he “caused the deprivation” with each choice he allegedly made. See Lozano, 718 F.2d at 768. Professors have plausibly alleged that President was personally involved in both their disparate treatment and retaliation claims under § 1983.9 B President also argues, under the first prong of the qualified immunity, that Professors failed to allege a violation of their right to be free from race- based disparate treatment and retaliation under § 1981. We disagree. 1 The elements of disparate treatment claims under Title VII and § 1981 “are identical.” Pratt v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 606 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001). “Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than others based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In [these] . . . cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2007). Ultimately, a plaintiff “must show that his circumstances are ‘nearly identical’ to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of the protected class.” Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)). _____________________ 9 President also argues that Professors failed to allege personal involvement because they did not plead that he was deliberately indifferent to, or ratified, the alleged discrimination. But Professors have not pursued either theory, below or on appeal. Instead, as to each claim, they have consistently pleaded and argued that President, as decisionmaker over these matters, is directly responsible for the discriminatory decisions; at this pleading stage, the University’s Rules and HOP bolster that theory. 13 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 “Discriminatory intent may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Walls v. Miss. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 322 (5th Cir. 1984). When a case is based on circumstantial evidence, “a court analyzes the . . . claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019). Under this framework, the plaintiff carries “the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Then, the burden “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. Id. If the defendant produces a race-neutral reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that that reason is pretextual. Id. at 804.10 “[A] plaintiff need not make out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766 (quoting Raj, 714 F.3d at 331). Although it is error to require a showing of that sort at this stage, “we have said that it can be ‘helpful to reference’ that framework when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of the disparate treatment claim.” Id. at 767 (quoting Chimm, 836 F.3d at 470–71). Instead of having to plausibly allege each prima facie element, a plaintiff only “must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make their case plausible.” Id. (quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470). At the pleadings stage, the prima facie elements are subsumed by the “ultimate elements.” See id. The “ultimate elements” of a disparate treatment claim are: (1) “an ‘adverse employment _____________________ 10 “McDonnell Douglas. . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Nevertheless, it is a “‘helpful . . . reference’” to determine “whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged” these elements. Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766. 14 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status.’” Id. (quoting Raj, 714 F.3d at 331). a President argues that Professors’ disparate pay claims fail because: (1) they are based on unintentional discrimination, or non-discriminatory economic factors; and (2) Professors did not allege the specifics of their claim, like “what pay decision they are challenging,” “who, specifically, made these decisions,” what they “should have been paid,” or sufficient comparator evidence.11 As to the first “ultimate element” of Professors’ disparate pay claim, there is no dispute that if they were paid less than similarly situated non- Hispanic professors as they allege, they suffered an adverse employment action. See Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2002) (“An act affecting compensation is itself a type of adverse employment action that is actionable in a discrimination case.”). As to the second “ultimate element,” that the adverse action was “because of” Professors’ “protected status,” see Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766,— i.e., that the discrimination was “intentional,” Professors pleaded that they “were being paid less . . . than non-Hispanic faculty,” as confirmed by the various reports, and as acknowledged by the University immediately before President took office. Before President started, the University pledged $3 million to remedy that disparity, but when President decided how that money would be allocated, as was his prerogative under the University’s Rules and HOP, he declined to remedy the disparity despite being asked to do so. The pay disparities persisted for Martinez and Zamora. Further, they alleged that _____________________ 11 President does not dispute that Professors’ disparate treatment claims concern activities protected by § 1981. 15 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 President was presented with reports reiterating the disparities and requests for raises, and he still declined to do anything. At this preliminary stage, when drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, as we must, these allegations that Professors were paid significantly less than similarly situated professors suffice. See Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) (“An allegation that similarly situated non- minorities received better treatment ‘could create the necessary inference and set the predicate for establishing the [§ 1983] claim.” (quoting Crosby v. Kilgore, 9 F.3d 104, *1 (5th Cir. 1993))). Nevertheless, President asserts that Professors’ claims fail because they are based on unintentional discrimination, or non-discriminatory economic factors. He notes that the operative complaint references one of the equity reports documenting pay disparities from which Hispanic professors at the University suffer, the HER, which notes at one point that “the alleged pay disparities were due to ‘Hispanopia,’ a term they created to refer to unintentional bias against Hispanics.” But neither the HER (attached as an exhibit to President’s Motion to Dismiss), nor more importantly the complaint, assert that all pay discrimination at the University relative to Hispanic professors is unintentional. Professors pleaded the opposite. To the extent that President’s understanding of the HER may contradict Professors’ factual allegations, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, drawing all inferences in favor of . . . the non-movant.” Morgan, 659 F.3d at 418; Elsensohn, 530 F.3d at 372. As for the non-discriminatory economic factors, President argues that another 2018 report which the complaint references cited “pay compression” (a market force) “as a main cause of salary inequities.” This argument fails for the same reason— President’s arguments are not for the pleading stage. See Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767. President’s second argument that Professors did not plausibly allege: (1) what pay decisions they are challenging”; (2) “who, specifically, made 16 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 these decisions”; (3) “what [Professors] were paid”; (4) “what [Professors] believe they should have been paid”; (5) “who [Professors’] comparators are; (6) “what the comparators’ experience and qualifications are”; and (7) “what the comparators were paid,” overlooks the facts alleged. Professors’ pleadings challenge annual compensation decisions. Because the University does not publish payment to individual professors, Professors could not have alleged specific dollar amounts without discovery. As to comparator evidence, Professors pleaded that they were paid “significantly less than comparable, similarly situated non-Hispanic fellow History Department full professors under” President. They also alleged that the University paid “at least three specific, identified peers” a “higher salary” even though Professors “ha[ve] more publications/a better publication record, taught more courses at [the University], and ha[ve] more time in rank as . . . full professor[s].” President’s arguments also measure the allegations against an “inappropriately heighten[ed]” pleading standard. See id. It is true that, ultimately, Professors “must show” that their “circumstances are ‘nearly identical’ to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member” of the same protected class. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 522 (quoting Little, 924 F.2d at 97). But at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we do not “scrutiniz[e]” whether comparators are “similarly situated” because “a plaintiff need only plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim to survive a motion to dismiss.” See Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768.12 _____________________ 12 President relies on Chhim and Angus v. Mayorkas, No. 22-50600, 2023 WL 3918986 (5th Cir. June 9, 2023). But Chhim dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s Title VII claim where he pleaded “no facts” to “suggest that the applicant hired . . . was less qualified . . . or similarly situated.” 836 F.3d at 471. Angus is distinguishable on the same basis because the plaintiff “failed to allege any . . . facts as to [her comparators’] work experience, qualifications, or relevant attributes” and failed to plead “that her non-selection was on 17 Case: 25-50181 Document: 67-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 No. 25-50181 b President next argues that Professors’ disparate treatment claims based on promotions fail. The prima facie elements of a disparate promotions claim are: (1) “membership in a [protected class]”; (2) “an application for an open job or promotion for which he was qualified”; (3) “rejection”; and (4) “the employer promoted or hired a non-minority [person] for the job or continued to seek non-minority applicants for the position applied for by the plaintiff.” Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1055 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007). As noted, while reference to them is helpful, a plaintiff need not plead each prima facie element at this stage; he only must have pleaded “sufficient facts” on all the ultimate elements: “(1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her protected status.’” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768. (citation omitted). President acknowledges that Martinez “applied to a few open positions between 2019–23,” but argues that his claim is nevertheless too vague to survive. As to the first prima facie element, there is no dispute that Martinez is a member of a protected class. See Page, 726 F.2d at 1055. As to the second, Martinez pleaded that he applied to be the Chair of the History Department twice by submitting a formal application. As to the third prima facie element, rejection, and the fourth, that a non-minority person was hired, see id., Martinez pleaded that he was rejected both times and that the University filled the position with a non-minority per