Do v. Comcast Cable
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 20, 2026
Docket26-20097
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 26-20097 Document: 44-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 20, 2026
No. 26-20097 Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Summary Calendar Clerk
____________
Duy Dihn Do,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Comcast Cable Communications Management, L.L.C.,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-1358
______________________________
Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
In January 2023, Duy Dihn Do was terminated from Comcast Cable
Communications Management, LLC. Do subsequently filed suit against
Comcast alleging discrimination and retaliation on the basis of sex under
Title VII, discrimination and retaliation on the basis of race and ethnicity in
violation of Section 1981, and interference and retaliation pursuant to the
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 26-20097 Document: 44-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/20/2026
No. 26-20097
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The district court later
dismissed Do’s Title VII claim. Do had “no objection to dismissal” of the
Title VII claim after Comcast filed its partial motion to dismiss. Do then filed
his second amended complaint that only included the Section 1981 and
FMLA claims. Do later sought leave to amend his complaint to add a “cause
of action for witness retaliation in violation of [Title VII] and the Americans
[w]ith Disabilities Act.” The district court denied that motion.
Comcast then filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing,
the district court granted summary judgment and entered final judgment for
Comcast. Do timely appealed.
On appeal, Do argues that he successfully established a prima facie
case of retaliation based on Title VII’s participation clause. Do’s reply brief
further confirms his reliance on Title VII. This court does not address issues
not raised in the district court, let alone issues that were voluntarily
dismissed. See Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 678 (5th Cir. 2001).
Do never directly addresses the Section 1981 claim nor how his Title
VII claim connects to it. He never mentions the FMLA claim. These claims
are thus forfeited. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
2