Full Opinion

Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 26-30020 FILED November 5, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Toshei A. Woods, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Louisiana Special School District, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:24-CV-159 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and King and Stewart, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Pro se Plaintiff–Appellant Toshei Woods appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant–Appellee Louisiana Special School District (the “Special School District”) on her employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).1 For the following reasons, we VACATE and REMAND the district court’s _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 judgment on Woods’ Title VII discrimination claim and AFFIRM its judgment as to Woods’ remaining claims. I. Facts and Procedural History On July 1, 2021, the Louisiana Legislature created the Special School District to provide educational services to sensory-impaired children with exceptionalities who reside in Louisiana.2 Before this legislative reorganization, the Louisiana Department of Education operated the Special School District. The Special School District comprises three schools: the Louisiana School for the Deaf, the Louisiana School for the Visually Impaired, and the Louisiana Special School Programs. Beginning on July 1, 2021, all individuals working for those three schools became employees of the newly reorganized Special School District. At all relevant times, Dr. Ernest Garrett served as the Superintendent of the Special School District.3 As the Superintendent, Dr. Garrett held sole appointing authority and was the only official authorized to approve the hiring, firing, or promotion of any Special School District employee. Dr. Garrett is an African American male who is hearing-impaired. Woods is an African American female who is not hearing-impaired. In November 2020, Woods was hired as Regional Coordinator for the Special School District. She served in this role until April 26, 2021, when she was _____________________ 2 Woods did not dispute the Special School District’s statement of material facts. Under the district court’s Local Rule 56(f), “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Because Woods failed to properly controvert the Special School District’s statement of material facts, we consider those facts admitted. 3 Dr. Garrett was appointed to the position of Superintendent in September 2019 and served in the role until July 25, 2022. 2 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 transferred to the central office to serve as the Systems & Accountability Administrator. In both roles, Woods reported to Shirley Lewis. Following the July 1, 2021, legislative reorganization, Woods became an employee of the Special School District. That same day, she was promoted to the newly created position of Director of Accountability: Testing, Assessment, and Research, and reported to Dr. Marie Smith. Woods was the first individual to hold this position, and her salary was $90,000. Following her promotion, various individuals began voicing their concerns to Dr. Garrett about Woods’ job performance. Based on these reports and his close working relationship with Woods, Dr. Garrett concluded that she lacked the skills necessary to succeed as Director. Specifically, he noticed that she lacked experience working with visually and hearing-impaired individuals, which impeded her ability to manage the objectives of her role. When Dr. Garrett raised these performance issues with Woods, she was unreceptive to his feedback. On October 29, 2021, Dr. Garrett directed the Special School District staff to notify Woods that she was being terminated because of her poor performance in the role. The Director position remained vacant from October 2021 through July 2022. On July 25, 2022, Dr. Garrett’s employment with the Special School District ended. That same day, Acting Superintendent of the Special School District, Katherine Granier, promoted Annette Chelette, a white woman, to the role of Director. On August 3, 2023, Woods filed a complaint against the Special School District, alleging violations of Title VII based on race, sex, and color, and claims of hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and retaliation under Title VII, and violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).4 On October 11, 2023, the Special _____________________ 4 29 U.S.C. § 623. 3 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 School District moved to dismiss Woods’ complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Woods did not file a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. On December 4, 2023, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Special School District’s motion, dismissing Woods’ ADEA claim but allowing her Title VII claims to proceed. Following discovery, on August 1, 2025, the Special School District moved for summary judgment. On September 3, 2025, Woods filed a cross- motion for summary judgment but failed to contest or dispute the Special School District’s statement of material facts. The district court referred the motions to the magistrate judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending dismissal of Woods’ remaining claims. Woods failed to object to the R&R. On December 11, 2025, the district court adopted the R&R and entered final judgment dismissing Woods’ case with prejudice. On January 9, 2026, Woods timely appealed. II. Standard of Review “When a party who is warned of the requirement to file timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation fails to file any such objections, and the magistrate judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions are accepted by the district court, our review is for plain error.” Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017). “When, however, the district court undertakes an independent review of the record, our review is de novo, despite any lack of objection.” Id. Because the district court took an independent review of the record here, our review is de novo.5 _____________________ 5 The district court stated that it conducted a de novo review. 4 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Summary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). III. Discussion Woods presents four issues on appeal. First, she argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment by characterizing Dr. Garrett’s comments as “stray remarks” rather than direct evidence of discrimination. Second, she argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on grounds that she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.6 Third, she asserts the district court erred in granting summary judgment by dismissing her hostile work environment claim. Fourth, she contends that the district court denied her due process by dismissing her case after she failed to timely object to the magistrate judge’s R&R. We address each issue in turn. A. Title VII Discrimination Based on Race, Color, and Sex We first turn to Woods’ argument that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims of employment discrimination based on race, color, and sex. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual because of race, color, _____________________ 6 Woods also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her retaliation claim by failing to determine that she engaged in protected activity and that a causal connection existed between that activity and her termination. Because these arguments directly challenge the prima facie elements of retaliation, we address them with her retaliation claim below. 5 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. A plaintiff can prove discrimination through direct or circumstantial evidence. Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 2015). We evaluate each path below. 1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination Framework Woods first argues that Dr. Garrett made multiple comments directly relating to her protected characteristics, which she contends sufficiently shows direct evidence of discrimination. Specifically, she points to Dr. Garrett’s statements that “he hoped [Woods] wasn’t like the average angry black woman, to be more lady like and less masculine,” that her afro-styled hair was intimidating, and his questioning of the length of her eyelashes. Additionally, Woods notes that Dr. Garrett stated that he was “not getting rid of any [w]hite folks.” According to Woods, Dr. Garrett made these statements during Woods’ tenure as Director, they relate to her termination, and only Dr. Garrett was authorized to terminate her. The district court held that these comments do not meet the demanding standard required to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. We agree. To qualify as direct evidence, the remarks must prove the discriminatory intent without inference or presumption. Etienne, 778 F.3d at 476. Dr. Garrett’s comments would require an inferential leap to definitively prove that Woods’ termination was based on those characteristics. Accordingly, these statements do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Id. 6 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 2. Circumstantial Evidence: McDonnell Douglas Framework Because Woods does not establish direct evidence of discrimination, we analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.7 Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007). Under this framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment, shows that others similarly situated were treated more favorably.” Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation modified). After a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s [termination], which must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant.” Rogers v. Pearland Indep. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). If an employer shows a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was “pretext for discrimination, or that a motivating factor for the employment decision was the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.” Id. (citation modified). Here, the parties do not dispute that Woods satisfies the first three prima facie elements. Regarding the fourth element, however, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the nine-month delay before Annette Chelette, a white woman, assumed the official title of Director of Accountability: Testing, Assessment, and Research meant that Woods was not “replaced.” The relevant standard is whether Woods was “replaced by _____________________ 7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 7 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 someone outside of the protected group.” Okoye, 245 F.3d at 512–13. Woods, an African American woman, meets this standard. According to Dr. Smith during her deposition, Chelette began unofficially fulfilling the Director duties in January 2022—less than two months after Woods’ termination— before being formally promoted to the role seven months later. We have previously held that a plaintiff satisfies the replacement prong when an employer takes an adverse action and assigns the plaintiff’s former responsibilities to an employee outside the protected class. See, e.g., Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 447 F. App’x 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding a prima facie case of racial discrimination where a plaintiff was demoted and his former responsibilities were absorbed by a white employee). Because Chelette absorbed Woods’ responsibilities within two months of Woods’ termination, Woods has established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Okoye, 245 F.3d at 513. The burden now shifts to the Special School District to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Woods’ termination. Here, in granting summary judgment, the district court relied on the Special School District’s evidence that Dr. Garrett had long-standing concerns regarding Woods’ performance and terminated her after observing no improvement.8 However, the Special School District’s evidence on this point consists entirely of an unsworn affidavit from Dr. Garrett that is neither notarized nor signed under penalty of perjury as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746.9 “It is a settled rule in this circuit that an unsworn affidavit is incompetent to raise a fact issue precluding summary judgment.” Nissho- _____________________ 8 The record indicates that Woods was never provided with a reason for her termination. 9 Dr. Garrett was never deposed in this case. 8 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1988). Because the Special School District bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it cannot satisfy this burden by relying on incompetent evidentiary submissions. Id. Consequently, because the Special School District failed to produce competent evidence of a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for Woods’ termination, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim. We therefore vacate the district court’s summary judgment ruling on this issue and remand for it to make a determination as to whether other competent summary judgment evidence exists in the record to support the Special School District’s position that Woods was terminated for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. B. Title VII Retaliation Woods next argues that she engaged in protected activity under Title VII because she opposed a practice that she reasonably believed violated the statute. She points out that she complained to Dr. Garrett and Dr. Smith, both orally and in writing via email, that Dr. Heather Laine, the Principal of Louisiana School for the Deaf, was “discriminating against the hearing.”10 Woods made this complaint during her tenure as Director to Dr. Garrett and was terminated approximately three months later. She contends that the three-month temporal proximity establishes a causal connection. She further argues that the Special School District’s failure to provide a reason for her termination, the subsequent filling of her role by a white woman, and the proximity of Dr. Garrett’s comments to her complaint about Dr. Laine _____________________ 10 It is not clear from the record what Woods means when she argues that Dr. Laine was “discriminating against the hearing.” For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Woods means that Dr. Laine was discriminating against people who are not deaf or do not have hearing loss. 9 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 collectively demonstrate that her termination was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she engaged in protected activity; 2) her employer took an adverse employment action; and 3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Protected activities consist of: “(1) opposing any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII (opposition activity) or (2) making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (participation activity). Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation modified). “We have interpreted Title VII’s opposition clause to mean that a plaintiff engages in protected activity when she complains of an employment practice that she ‘reasonably believes’ violated Title VII.” Badgerow v. REJ Props., Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 619 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2016)). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Badgerow, 974 F.3d at 619. “If the employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. On appeal, Woods contends that her complaint to Dr. Garrett about Dr. Laine “discriminating against the hearing” was sufficiently specific to constitute protected opposition activity. We disagree. Title VII strictly prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. It does not encompass 10 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 discrimination based on disability, which is instead governed under the separate statutory framework set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 621. Because Title VII’s protections are explicitly defined, a complaint regarding “discriminating against the hearing” cannot support a reasonable belief that Title VII itself was violated. We cannot deduce an opposition to any protected class under Title VII from Woods’ complaint to Dr. Garrett regarding Dr. Laine “discriminating against the hearing” because it does not constitute “protected activity” within the meaning of the statute.11 Consequently, because Woods fails to satisfy the first element of a prima facie case of retaliation, we need not analyze the remaining elements of her claim or the employer’s burden. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Woods’ retaliation claim. C. Hostile Work Environment Woods further contends that the district court selectively quoted from her deposition and ignored the totality of Dr. Garrett’s comments, which she argues collectively created a hostile work environment. She asserts that while she expressed that she was happy in her role as Director, her ability to handle Dr. Garrett’s comments reflected a coping mechanism that she developed in response to the ongoing harassment. Additionally, she argues that Dr. Garrett’s comments about the “angry black woman” stereotype, her afro hair being intimidating, the length of her eyelashes, and his statement that he _____________________ 11 Even though Woods asserts that she informed Dr. Smith that Dr. Laine was “discriminating against the hearing,” there is no evidence in the record, including Dr. Smith’s deposition, to support such a claim. If anything, Dr. Smith stated during her deposition that there were cultural issues between hearing individuals and the deaf community, which does not suggest discrimination. Regardless, as stated above, any alleged discrimination against hearing persons does not fall under Title VII. 11 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 was not terminating any white people were not isolated incidents but instead constituted a continuous pattern of racial and sex-based harassment. To show a prima facie case of hostile work environment, an employee must show: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term[,] condition[,] or privilege of employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). “For harassment to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment” it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (citation modified). “The plaintiff must show subjective awareness of the hostility or abusiveness and that his awareness is objectively reasonable.” Clark v. City of Alexandria, 116 F.4th 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2024). We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a work environment is objectively hostile. Id. We look at “(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (citation modified). Here, we agree with the district court that Woods fails to establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment. Although Woods subjectively 12 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 perceived Dr. Garrett’s comments as unwelcome and based on race or sex, they do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive. Under the totality of the circumstances, Dr. Garrett’s comments— while occurring over the course of her brief tenure as Director, amounted to mere offensive utterances. See Clark, 116 F.4th at 479. The comments, while repetitive and highly insensitive, did not constitute physically threatening or humiliating behavior. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that the comments would unreasonably interfere with a reasonable person’s job performance. See Stewart v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 330– 31 (5th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Woods testified that the comments did not interfere with her ability to perform her job. Because the harassment failed to alter a term, condition, or privilege of her employment, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Woods’ hostile work environment claim. See Celestine, 266 F.3d at 354 (dismissing allegation of racial harassment because it was not sufficiently severe or pervasive). D. Due Process and the R&R Objection Deadline Finally, Woods argues that the district court denied her due process by adopting the magistrate judge’s R&R and dismissing her case, without providing explicit notice that she was required to file objections, particularly considering the district court’s trial scheduling order. Although Woods is proceeding pro se and that can be challenging, she is nevertheless expected to meet court deadlines and follow the rules of procedure. See Hulsey v. State of Tex., 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (citation modified)). Woods knew from the magistrate judge’s R&R that she had fourteen days from receipt of the R&R to file written objections. The R&R was issued on November 26, 2025, and explicitly provided Woods with clear, written notice 13 Case: 26-30020 Document: 49-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 26-30020 of the fourteen-day objection deadline. Her opportunity to file written objections thus expired before the district court’s entry of final judgment on December 11, 2025. Contrary to Woods’ contention, the district court’s scheduling order did not suspend, stay, or otherwise supersede her statutory deadline to object to the R&R. Because the record clearly demonstrates that Woods received proper notice of her opportunity to object and the procedural consequences of failing to do so, no due process violation occurred. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (explaining that “[d]ue process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections” (citation modified)). Accordingly, we hold that Woods’ argument on this issue lacks merit. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Woods’ Title VII discrimination claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment as to Woods’ remaining claims. 14