A.M. v. Millville Board of Education

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0888-25 A.M., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MILLVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ Submitted October 20, 2026 – Decided November 10, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, CUM-L-0239-22. Rebenack Aronow & Mascolo, LLP, and Lesley A. O'Neill (Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC), attorneys for appellant (J. Silvo Mascolo, Lesley A. O'Neill, and Christopher E. Love (Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC) of the Washington bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs). Reilly, McDevitt & Henrich, PC, attorneys for respondent (Suzanne I. Turpin and Tyler C. McDade, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff A.M. appeals from a November 18, 2025 post-remand order granting summary judgment to defendant Millville Board of Education (BOE or defendant) and dismissing with prejudice her complaint for various claims stemming from a BOE employee's sexual assault of her while she was a student at Millville High School. Because on remand the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations analysis prescribed under the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, we vacate the November 18, 2025 order and remand for further proceedings before a different judge. I. We recount the salient facts, as primarily set forth in A.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., No. A-0670-24 (App. Div. Sept. 30, 2025) (slip op. at 2-7), for context. On May 3, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that D.C., a BOE-employed band teacher, sexually assaulted her while she was a student at Millville High School in 1980 or 1981. At the time of the assault, plaintiff was approximately fourteen or fifteen years old and was a "pom-pom girl" who often helped put away band equipment after competitions. According to plaintiff, after one of the competitions, D.C. cornered her in the equipment room A-0888-25 2 and sexually assaulted her. Plaintiff had never forgotten the assault and always understood that D.C.'s conduct was "inappropriate." On October 6, 2023, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff's complaint was barred by the CSAA's statute of limitations. After the court denied the motion without prejudice on November 17, 2023, it conducted a plenary Lopez1 hearing on the timeliness of plaintiff's claims. At the hearing, plaintiff described the sexual assault in detail and a 1993 phone call from the prosecutor's office asking that she testify against D.C. in a criminal matter involving another victim. Plaintiff declined because she "wanted to move on with [her] life." When asked whether she thought she had any mental-health issues resulting from the sexual assault, she answered, "[w]ell, I don't know." She also testified that after the assault she dropped out of high school, pulled out her hair for years—later learning from a doctor she had trichotillomania that could be related to anxiety—and experienced difficulty with intimacy as an adult. 1 Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) (holding the trial judge must conduct a preliminary hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the plaintiff has established they are equitably entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule, considering all relevant facts and circumstances). The determination must be made "conscious of the equitable nature of the issue before him [or her]," id. at 275; to consider "elements of fairness pertaining to all parties." Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 558 (2000). A-0888-25 3  Plaintiff presented testimony from Jon R. Conte, Ph.D., an expert in child sexual abuse and its psychological consequences. Dr. Conte described plaintiff's pre-assault childhood as marked by significant adversity, including instability, parental absence, and trauma. In Dr. Conte's view, the sexual assault resulted in distinct psychological consequences, including disinterest in sexuality, difficulty forming intimate relationships, social isolation, anxiety, and shame. Dr. Conte testified, however, that plaintiff had not connected many of those adult difficulties to the assault and remained at a "pre-contemplative" stage, meaning she had not yet developed insight into the relationship between the assault and her symptoms, in part because she had never pursued therapeutic treatment. Dr. Conte opined plaintiff only began to confront and potentially understand those effects in 2022, 2 after being contacted by counsel in connection with this litigation. He further testified that delayed disclosure and avoidance are common among survivors of child sexual abuse and that plaintiff's reluctance to disclose the assault was not unusual. 2 Our prior opinion contained a typographical error, misstating the year 2002 for 2022. We note the correct date, amending our prior opinion accordingly. A-0888-25 4  Defendant presented testimony from Barbara Ziv, M.D., an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Ziv agreed plaintiff had endured a traumatic childhood and had been sexually assaulted by D.C., but she opined there was no evidence the assault caused a lasting psychiatric injury or materially altered the course of plaintiff's life. Dr. Ziv testified plaintiff had already been struggling academically before the assault during a period of severe family instability, but later returned to school, earned her diploma, maintained long-term employment, and formed stable adult relationships. In Dr. Ziv's view, neither plaintiff's medical records nor plaintiff's self-report established adult psychological or interpersonal problems causally attributable to the assault. Dr. Ziv testified plaintiff appeared to have compartmentalized the event and "chose not to live her life as a victim." She also opined that plaintiff always understood what happened to her and that it was wrong, and stated delayed disclosure, shame, or avoidance did not in themselves establish psychological injury caused by the assault. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge issued an oral decision dismissing the complaint with prejudice as time barred, reciting the governing framework of R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285 (2009), under which it was required to determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would have A-0888-25 5 discovered the abuse caused injury and then, if necessary, consider whether the statute should be tolled on equitable grounds. The judge reasoned this was not a repressed-memory case and that plaintiff knew at the time of the assault D.C.'s conduct was wrong and harmful. The judge then concluded plaintiff had not established "the existence of an injury and its causal relationship" to the assault because, although the complaint alleged emotional and psychological injuries, plaintiff had not testified to such injuries, had not sought treatment for them, and had not told any doctor that her anxiety or depression stemmed from the assault. The judge discussed both experts' testimony in reaching that conclusion. He acknowledged Dr. Conte's opinion that plaintiff experienced post-traumatic symptoms, relationship difficulties, anxiety, panic, distrust of others, and self - isolation, but reasoned that Dr. Conte—not plaintiff—was the one drawing those causal connections. The judge further noted Dr. Conte testified plaintiff herself still did not appreciate those difficulties were causally related to the assault. By contrast, the judge observed that Dr. Ziv opined plaintiff had not suffered any clinically significant injury from the assault. The judge ultimately summarized his ruling as follows: The discovery rule is all about when a victim can causally connect injuries to the act of sexual abuse. A-0888-25 6  Here, in [plaintiff's] view, she has no injuries. Moreover, in her own expert's opinion, she doesn't connect any of the things he finds to be her problems with this sexual assault. That's the end of the discussion. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed. In our September 30, 2025 opinion, we referred to the Lopez hearing evidence and explained the CSAA's discovery rule turns on the reasonable discovery of both the existence of the injury and the causal relationship of that injury to the acts of sexual abuse. We observed that Drs. Conte and Ziv offered directly conflicting opinions on whether plaintiff suffered psychological injury causally related to the assault and, if so, whether and when she made that causal connection. Dr. Conte opined plaintiff suffered psychological sequelae from the assault and began to connect some of her symptoms to the assault in 2022, while Dr. Ziv opined plaintiff did not suffer any such injuries. In light of the experts' divergent opinions, we concluded the judge had not made the material credibility findings required by Rule 1:7-4(a) to permit meaningful appellate review of its factual and legal conclusions. We therefore vacated and remanded for the judge "to render the required credibility findings underpinning his factual and legal conclusions." A-0888-25 7  On remand, the judge again concluded plaintiff's complaint was time- barred for reasons set forth in an oral decision. The judge found all of the witnesses credible and stated his original ruling did not turn on comparative credibility. In the judge's view, the dispositive finding was instead that plaintiff had not testified she suffered psychological injury resulting from the sexual assault. The judge summarized the issue on remand as whether plaintiff had established "the existence of an injury" and "the causal relationship of that injury to the acts of sexual abuse," as required by R.L. He reiterated "the biggest problem with this case" was that plaintiff "never testified about any psychological injuries that she suffered as a result of this abuse" and "didn't testify as to any injury that she suffered as a result of this sexual abuse." Although Dr. Conte had opined plaintiff suffered some psychological injury, the judge reasoned that doctor had not testified "with any specific scientific certainty" as to when plaintiff discovered her own injury. The judge also rejected the notion that plaintiff experienced any "psychological awakening" in 2022, finding the only thing she realized at that time was that she "may have a legal claim." A-0888-25 8  The judge also disagreed with our recounting of Dr. Conte's testimony that plaintiff only began to understand some psychological effects of the assault in 2022. He further reasoned Dr. Conte could not say with "a reasonable degree of scientific certainty" whether the symptoms he identified were caused by the sexual assault rather than plaintiff's other childhood trauma, and that Dr. Conte had acknowledged plaintiff herself did not understand her symptoms as connected to the assault. The judge again stressed this was not a repressed- memory case and adhered to his original ruling that plaintiff had not proven the existence of an injury and its causal relationship to the assault in a manner sufficient to invoke the CSAA's reasonable-discovery rule. On November 18, 2025, the judge entered an order again granting summary judgment to defendant and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as time-barred. This appeal followed. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the judge misapplied the CSAA's statute of limitations provision and relied on the legally insufficient basis that plaintiff did not testify regarding her injuries or their causal connection to the sexual abuse, necessitating reversal and remand for trial or, alternatively, another Lopez hearing. In either event, plaintiff asserts the matter should be assigned to a different judge. A-0888-25 9  In response, defendant argues the judge correctly determined plaintiff had failed to prove she suffered any injury causally related to the sexual assault and, if so, whether she discovered that causal connection within seven years prior to filing suit. Defendant contends that, as a result, the judge properly concluded plaintiff's claim never accrued for purposes of applying the CSAA and the judge did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant as a matter of law. We analyze the parties' arguments in turn. II. We review a trial court's grant or denial "of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[,] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The court must "consider[] whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Mist A-0888-25 10 Pharm., LLC v. Berkley Ins. Co., 263 N.J. 554, 577 (2026) (quoting In re Est. of Jones, 259 N.J. 584, 594 (2025)). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). On de novo review, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). III. We first consider whether the judge conducted the appropriate statute of limitations analysis on remand. In 2019, the Legislature amended various statutes, including N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, to "increase[] the ability of victims of sexual abuse to pursue justice through the court system." W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 524 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Governor's Statement to S. 477 at 1 (May 3, 2019)). See also J.P. v. Smith, 444 N.J. Super. 507, 524-28 (App. Div. 2016) (analyzing whether plaintiff's common law claims of sexual A-0888-25 11 abuse were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14- 2). The CSAA permits survivors of childhood sexual assault to file civil actions against an individual "standing in loco parentis who knowingly permit[ed] or acquiesce[d] in sexual abuse by any other person." Doe v. Est. of C.V.O., 477 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2023) (also imposing liability against both "active" and "passive" sexual abusers). The amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1) in part expanded the time limitations for filing civil claims related to sexual abuse, permitting minor victims to file suit "within [thirty-seven] years after the minor reaches the age of majority, or within seven years from the date of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act, whichever date is later." N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(b), the statute of limitations provision of the CSAA, incorporates by reference the limitations period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a. The Supreme Court's opinion in R.L. prescribes a two-step inquiry under N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1). First, the court must determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would discover that the defendant's conduct caused injury. R.L., 199 N.J. at 289. Thus, the claim accrues upon the "reasonable discovery" of both the existence of the injury and the causal relationship of that injury to the sexual abuse, determined under an A-0888-25 12 objective lens. Id. at 298-99. Second, if the complaint was filed beyond the statutory limitation after the accrual date, the court must determine whether the statute should be tolled because of the plaintiff's mental state, duress by the defendant, or other equitable grounds. Id. at 301-02. The second step is subjective. Id. at 289. Here, in lieu of the analysis prescribed by R.L., the judge found plaintiff's claim was untimely because she did not personally testify that she suffered an injury resulting from the sexual assault or that the injuries credibly testified to by her expert were causally related. The judge did not set forth the legal authority underpinning this rationale. In R.L. the Court stated a plaintiff's personal discovery of the causal connection between her injuries and an act of sexual abuse may serve as the accrual date for a cause of action under the CSAA. R.L., 199 N.J. at 300. Yet a plaintiff's own personal discovery of a causally connected injury is not the only basis for accrual. On the contrary, R.L. requires trial courts to determine, based on an objective analysis, when a reasonable person under the circumstances would have discovered they suffered a causally connected injury. Ibid. If a court then makes a finding that a plaintiff discovered the connection earlier, the accrual date is the earlier of those two events. Id. at 299-301. A-0888-25 13  In his original and remand decisions, the judge did not perform the first step of the R.L. analysis. The judge considered the dispositive question to be whether plaintiff herself testified to an injury and whether she had personally drawn the causal connection between that injury and the assault. On remand, he made the point explicitly: plaintiff had not "disclosed that she has suffered any injuries," and "the plaintiff has to testify and the plaintiff has to prove that she's having injuries that are a direct result of the abuse." That is not the standard R.L. prescribes. R.L. does not equate accrual with a plaintiff's present subjective understanding of her injury. Rather, the issue is when the injury and its causal relationship to the sexual abuse were reasonably discoverable. See id. at 299- 300. Thus, even if plaintiff never personally drew a causal connection, the judge was required to determine when a reasonable person in her position would have done so, based on the evidence in the record. See J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418, 433-34 (App. Div. 1999) (explaining that the discovery rule concerns discovery of the causal relationship between the abuse and the injury, not merely the abuse itself). The judge never made that finding. For these reasons, we vacate the November 18, 2025 order and remand for further proceedings. Because the trial court's remand decision reflects a A-0888-25 14 potentially continued commitment to an incorrect legal standard, a different judge shall consider the matter further. See R. 1:12-1(g); Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 31 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.17(B)); P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 220-21 (App. Div. 1999) ("Because the judge has taken a strong (though undoubtedly sincere) view of the merits of this case . . . . an impartial hearing requires that the case be reassigned."). To the extent a determination cannot be made under the required legal standard by another judge based on the existing record, which includes the first judge's determination that all witnesses were credible, in an abundance of caution, we direct "a different judge be assigned to conduct [a] new [Lopez] hearing so that credibility assessments may be made anew." State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 386 (2014). On remand, the judge shall initially consider the effect, if any, of supervening case law, including J.H. v. Warren Hills Bd. of Ed., 265 N.J. 140, 148 (2026), in which our Supreme Court held that the Legislature's 2019 elimination of the CSAA's "within the household" requirement does not apply to abuse occurring before December 1, 2019. The judge shall determine whether defendant qualified as an entity standing in loco parentis "within plaintiff's household" under the pre-amendment statute and the principles stated in A-0888-25 15 Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 86-94 (2006), and whether J.H. forecloses any or all of plaintiff's claims. We express no view on that determination, which the judge shall address as a threshold issue prior to proceeding with a Lopez hearing. If the judge determines plaintiff's suit may proceed after considering J.H.'s applicability, they shall consider whether plaintiff's complaint was filed within the CSAA statute of limitations under the standard prescribed by R.L. consistent with our opinion. That is, the judge should determine when a reasonable person would have become aware of the injuries caused by the abuse and when, if ever, plaintiff actually discovered she had causally-related injuries. The accrual date is the earlier of those dates. The judge should be mindful that plaintiff's testimony is not the sole means by which she may establish injury and causation. If the judge finds plaintiff's complaint was filed outside the applicable CSAA limitations period, the court shall proceed with the tolling inquiry as set forth in R.L. Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0888-25 16