Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 1 of 10 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13975 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ROY CHAMBERS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WARDEN BROOKS L. BENTON, Individual and Official Capacity, Coastal State Prison, ADA COORDINATOR C. WORTHEN, Individual and Official Capacity, Coastal State Prison, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MITCHELL, Individual and Official Capacity, Coastal State Prison, DOCTOR AWE, Individual and Official Capacity, Coastal State Prison, MACK, ADA Coordinator for Coastal State Prison, in his individual and official capacities, et al., Defendants-Appellees, DEPUTY WARDEN C. BETTERSON USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13975 Individual and Official Capacity, Coastal State Prison, et al., Defendants. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00002-RSB-CLR ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Roy Chambers, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conditions-of-confine- ment and deliberate-indifference claims stemming from a fire in his prison dorm and his alleged injuries from smoke inhalation. The district court held that no constitutional violation occurred and that Chambers’ claims were barred by qualified immunity. After thorough review, we affirm. We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a sum- mary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards as the district court. Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002)), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and then, under that version of the facts, turn to whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immun- ity. Id. “With the plaintiff’s best case in hand,” we “move to the USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 3 of 10 25-13975 Opinion of the Court 3 [legal] question of whether the defendant committed the constitu- tional violation alleged in the complaint without having to assess any facts in dispute.” Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We review de novo a district court’s resolution of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, and it serves as the basis for claims challeng- ing specific conditions of confinement and the deliberate indiffer- ence to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2010). Each of these claims requires a two-prong showing: (1) an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is “sufficiently serious” to constitute a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”; and (2) a subjec- tive showing that the official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 1304 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). What is necessary to show sufficient harm and what is nec- essary to show a sufficiently culpable state of mind varies with the type of Eighth Amendment claim at issue. Id.; see also Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). For conditions of confinement claims, first, under the “ob- jective component,” a prisoner must prove that the condition and/or conduct he complains of is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289; see also Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. This means that the challenged condition must be USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 4 of 10 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13975 “extreme,” and he must at the very least show that a condition of his confinement “pose[s] an unreasonable risk of serious damage. . .” to his safety. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (citation modified). Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison offi- cial acted with “subjective recklessness as used in criminal law,” by showing that the prison official was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)); Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839); see also Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2019). But, even if the prison official actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety, he cannot be found liable if he “responded reason- ably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). Because the Eighth Amendment bars the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” it also bars “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (citation modified); accord Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). The state has a “con- stitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care” to its prisoners. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). A deliberate medical indifference claim requires a plaintiff to show that he suffered an “objectively, sufficiently serious” dep- rivation and that even if the prison official was subjectively aware that his conduct caused a serious risk of harm, he did not reasona- bly respond to the risk. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (citation modified). USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 5 of 10 25-13975 Opinion of the Court 5 Qualified immunity protects government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Castro-Reyes v. City of Opa-Locka, 166 F.4th 886, 896 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). An officer rais- ing a defense of qualified immunity must show that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority, which means that the of- ficer acted in accordance with his job-related duties and within the scope of his authority. Id.; Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2025). If the officer meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the officer (1) violated a statutory or constitutional right that was (2) clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Castro-Reyes, 166 F.4th at 896. If we conclude that the officer’s conduct did not amount to a con- stitutional violation, we need not address whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Adams v. Demopolis City Schs., 80 F.4th 1259, 1275 n.15 (11th Cir. 2023). While we hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and liberally construe them, a court may not “serve as de facto counsel for a party [or] rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Camp- bell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). An appellant abandons an issue by failing to challenge it on appeal. Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (involving a pro se litigant). We may affirm on any ground sup- ported by the record. Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2020). USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 6 of 10 6 Opinion of the Court 25-13975 Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Cham- bers, we cannot conclude that the defendants acted with subjective recklessness as to either of Chambers’ Eighth Amendment claims. Chambers’ complaint arose out of an incident that occurred on April 17, 2020, when inmates started a fire in a trash can in his prison “ADA dorm” at Coastal State Prison (“CSP”). Chambers alleged that after the fire started, there were no alarms to alert the prison staff so he and other inmates screamed and banged the win- dows for over an hour, during which time he inhaled toxic smoke. After the fire, Chambers said he “begged” a prison guard, Officer Mitchell, to take him to the prison’s medical unit but Mitchell de- nied his request. When CSP’s Medical Director, Dr. Awe, later re- sponded to Chambers’ request to be seen, Chambers claimed that Dr. Awe never evaluated Chambers but reported in a note that his symptoms had been resolved. Chambers claimed the fire caused injuries to his lungs, increase of seizures, breathing issues, chest and lung complications, dizziness, vision loss, and post-traumatic stress disorder. His complaint raised two claims relevant to this appeal: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious fire safety risk, as against Warden Benton and Officer Mack, the Medical Unit Manager at CSP; and (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as against Warden Benton, Officer Mack, Officer Mitchell, and Dr. Awe. In response to his complaint, the defendants moved for sum- mary judgment and submitted declarations and affidavits in sup- port of their motion. Among other things, these submissions re- flected that Warden Benton and Officer Mack were aware that the USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 7 of 10 25-13975 Opinion of the Court 7 dormitory’s fire alarm and sprinkler systems were inoperable, so Warden Benton had imposed safeguards to protect the inmates from fire. The submissions further revealed that Chambers had been seen by CSP medical staff before the fire for several preexist- ing conditions, he had repeatedly been seen by the CSP medical staff for evaluation after the fire, and his relevant medical records in the two years after the fire consistently reported normal results. On appeal, Chambers argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his conditions of confinement claim based on evidence of CSP’s staffing deficiencies, its inoperable fire alarm and sprinkler systems, and its pending re- placement work orders. But even assuming these conditions posed an objectively substantial risk of serious harm, neither Warden Benton nor Officer Mack acted with subjective recklessness. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. While they knew the fire safety systems were inoperable and pending repair, both said they lacked authority to replace them, and in an effort to ensure inmate safety while the repair orders were pending, Warden Benton implemented 30-mi- nute “fire checks” (which Officer Mack was aware of). Prison logs confirmed that those checks regularly occurred, and an inspection two weeks before the fire showed that an evacuation plan was posted, a fire drill was performed, communication systems were functioning, and emergency and exit lighting was operational. On this record, there is no reasonable inference that Warden Benton or Officer Mack actually knew their response to the inoperable fire systems exposed Chambers to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the remedial measures show that the officials responded to USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 8 of 10 8 Opinion of the Court 25-13975 the known risk, and an official who responds to a known risk is not deliberately indifferent even if the harm ultimately occurs. Chan- dler, 379 F.3d at 1290. And while Chambers alleges that the evacu- ation’s delay suggests that those precautions were ultimately inad- equate, this delay still does not establish that Warden Benton or Officer Mack subjectively recognized that the precautions created a substantial risk of serious harm. Nor, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Cham- bers, can we say that the defendants acted with deliberate indiffer- ence to his medical needs. For starters, Chambers has pointed to no evidence showing that he had an “objectively, sufficiently seri- ous” deprivation. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. Rather, the undisputed record shows he was examined the night of the fire and numerous times thereafter, and his respiration rates, oxygen saturation rates, lung exams, and chest x-rays were always normal. Further, even if we were to assume Chambers’ symptoms following the fire constituted an objectively serious medical need, he has not pointed to any evidence showing that the defendants actually knew their conduct exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm. As for Officer Mitchell, the evidence does not show that he was working in Chambers’ dormitory the night of the fire or that he had any involvement in the day-to-day medical treat- ment of inmates. Nor does it show that Mitchell knew Chambers had a serious respiratory condition, that he observed such symp- toms, or that he otherwise recognized that denying any such re- quest would expose Chambers to substantial risk of serious harm. USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 9 of 10 25-13975 Opinion of the Court 9 As for Dr. Awe, he noted that Chambers had reported chest pain, trouble breathing, dizziness, and blurred vision after the fire, but the medical records showed that Chambers had been seen rou- tinely during this time, his temperature and oxygen saturation and other relevant readings were normal, and they did not indicate breathing complications from smoke inhalation. In addition, Chambers’ relevant vital signs remained normal during subsequent checks in the two years following the fire. On this record, Cham- bers has failed to identify any evidence that Officer Mitchell or Dr. Awe believed the measurements were unreliable or otherwise rec- ognized that their conduct exposed him to a substantial risk of se- rious harm. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262; Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234. Finally, to the extent Chambers also alleged that Warden Benton and Officer Mack were deliberately indifferent to his seri- ous medical needs, he has failed to point to any evidence rebutting Warden Benton’s declaration that he had no reason to believe that Chambers was not receiving adequate medical treatment, espe- cially since the CSP medical providers were monitoring his condi- tion. Chambers also did not point to any evidence rebutting Mack’s declaration that she confirmed with CSP medical staff that they examined him the night of the fire and, when he made a med- ical complaint three days later, she asked the CSP medical depart- ment to evaluate him again. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in Chambers’ favor, we cannot say that the record shows the subjective recklessness neces- USCA11 Case: 25-13975 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 10 of 10 10 Opinion of the Court 25-13975 sary for either of Chambers’ Eighth Amendment claims. And be- cause the district court did not err in concluding that Chambers has not shown the violation of a constitutional right, we need not ad- dress whether the court also properly concluded that the defend- ants were entitled to qualified immunity. Adams, 80 F.4th at 1275. 1 AFFIRMED. 1 Finally, Chambers has not argued on appeal that the district court erred con- cerning any claims he raised against the defendants in their official capacities. Thus he has abandoned any argument to this effect and we will not address it. Irwin, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1.