Full Opinion

Filed 9/29/26; Certified for Publication 10/21/26 (order attached) COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JOHN DOE N.K., D086336 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. CVPS2202847) PALM SPRINGS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Eric A. Keen, Judge. Affirmed. Slater, Slater, Schulman, James W. Lewis, Tiffany M. Schneider, and Babak Shirdel, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Winet Patrick Creighton & Hanes, Randall L. Winet and Erin N. Taylor, for Defendant and Respondent. 1 Plaintiff John Doe N.K. (N.K.) sued Defendant Palm Springs Unified School District (the District), claiming former District teacher Maryann Eleanor McKenzie1 sexually abused him while he was attending Palm Springs High School (High School) during the 1978–1979 school year. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District, ruling in part that the undisputed facts established the District was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence that its supervisory personnel had actual or constructive knowledge of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities either before or while the abuse was ongoing. On appeal, N.K. contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the District allegedly failed to offer any affirmative evidence to show that it “properly vetted” and “actively supervise[d]” McKenzie, as it has no evidence of its policies, procedures, or standards from 1978. N.K. thus argues the trial court erred when it summarily adjudicated his third and fifth causes of action against the District for its alleged negligent (1) hiring, supervision, and retention of McKenzie, and (2) supervision of N.K., respectively.2 We conclude (1) the District met its initial burden of making a prima facie showing that its supervisory personnel had no actual or constructive knowledge of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities; (2) N.K. in response 1 McKenzie is now known as Maryann Eleanor Richmond. For convenience, we will refer to her as McKenzie. Although not a party to this appeal, we note she has denied any wrongdoing in this case. 2 N.K. has not challenged on appeal the trial court’s ruling summarily adjudicating his fourth cause of action against the District for its alleged breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.). 2 proffered no evidence to create a triable issue of material fact on the District’s liability, including any evidence that the District (through its administrative and supervisory employees) “knew or should have known” of McKenzie’s dangerousness but nevertheless left N.K. in her supervision without taking any corrective action; and (3) the lack of any evidence of the District’s policies, procedures, or standards from more than 40 years ago, and whether or not it complied with such, including regarding its hiring, supervision, and retention of teachers, did not create a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Overview McKenzie received her teaching credential in August 1978. A month later, the District hired her as a science teacher for the High School. The District confirmed through personnel records that McKenzie left the District’s employment in January 1980. N.K. was 16 years old and a junior at the High School during the 1978– 1979 school year. He was a student in McKenzie’s class and was her teacher’s aide. B. Lawsuit N.K. sued Does 1 and 2 in 2022, and later identified the Doe defendants as the District and McKenzie, respectively. He alleged that McKenzie began “groom[ing]” him when he was her student, which included “physical touches,” “hugs and embraces,” and “inappropriate conversations of a sexual nature”; and that the “grooming turned into overt sexual advances” in which McKenzie “coerced” him to spend time with her off campus, which led to sexual conduct “on at least 15 occasions.” 3 As relevant here, in his third cause of action N.K. alleged that the District was liable under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820 for breaching its duty to “adequately investigate, hire, train, supervise and oversee” McKenzie; that the District’s “administrators, principals, and other supervisory employees” “knew or should have known” that McKenzie was “unfit” to teach and “posed a risk of harm” to the High School students; and that the District was negligent in failing to implement and enforce District- wide “procedures or policies that were aimed at preventing, detecting, or deterring” sexual assault and/or harassment of students by District employees. In his fifth cause of action, N.K. alleged the District was liable for negligently supervising, monitoring, and protecting him “by ignoring clear and obvious signs” that McKenzie “was spending significant amounts of time alone with minor students, without authorization or justification”; “making inappropriate comments toward minor students”; and “sexually assaulting, sexually abusing, and engaging in wrongful sexual conduct” toward him and other students. N.K. further alleged in support of this cause of action that the District’s administrators and supervisory employees “received multiple serious complaints about [McKenzie] prior to the time that she engaged in any misconduct towards Plaintiff, including but not limited to complaints that [McKenzie] was spending significant amount of time with minor students unsupervised and without justification” both in and out of the classroom; was “making inappropriate comments of [a] sexual nature in front of minor students”; and was “inappropriately touch[ing] students,” including “sexually harass[ing] and abus[ing]” them. 4 C. The District’s Summary Judgment Evidence N.K. testified at his deposition that there were three incidents of sexual abuse by McKenzie (as opposed to 15 or more such incidents, as he alleged in his complaint). The first occurred during the school lunch hour, when McKenzie asked N.K. to help move a table at her home, which he estimated was located about a quarter mile from the High School. According to N.K., as soon as they entered McKenzie’s home she started hugging and kissing him, then led him into her bedroom and sexually assaulted him. N.K. was in “shock,” “completely” surprised, and “numb from the whole thing.” Afterwards, she drove him back to the High School, and parked in the school parking lot. N.K. did not tell anyone about this incident until “after [he] was no longer in school.” The next incident of sexual abuse occurred about two weeks later, after McKenzie suggested they go to lunch off campus at a delicatessen N.K. frequented with friends during the school lunch hour. N.K. testified they instead went to her home, as McKenzie claimed she needed to grab an item. Once inside, she led him into the bedroom and sexually abused him. As before, N.K. did not tell anyone about the incident; he also continued working as her teacher’s aide. The final incident of sexual abuse began one evening during a prearranged parent/teacher conference at N.K.’s home. N.K. testified that McKenzie knew his mother (now deceased) was a professional musician. McKenzie brought another District teacher to the conference who also had an interest in music. N.K. in his deposition initially identified the other District 5 teacher as “Mr. Coleman,” but later testified his name was “Mr. Turner.” 3 As the conversation turned from N.K.’s schoolwork to music, McKenzie offered to buy everyone dinner. She and N.K. then left to order pizzas at a nearby restaurant. Once at the restaurant, they learned the food would not be ready for 45 minutes, “at the earliest.” McKenzie suggested they wait at her home, as she lived nearby. Once inside her home, she sexually abused N.K. for the third and final time. Afterwards, they picked up the pizzas and returned to N.K.’s home. Upon their return, N.K.’s mother became suspicious and confronted McKenzie, who admitted in front of Coleman, N.K., and N.K.’s older brother (also deceased) that she and N.K. “had just had sex.” N.K.’s mother called law enforcement. N.K., however, was unsure whether officers arrested McKenzie that night. After this incident, N.K. did not return to the High School. Instead, someone from the school brought him a “stack of books” that he used for “independent study” to finish the semester. N.K. joined the United States Marine Corps the following year, and did not attend his senior year of high school. Also during his deposition, N.K. confirmed that there were no sexual “encounters” outside of the three at McKenzie’s home; that he had no “information” that “anyone at the school district knew about” such encounters while they were ongoing; and that it was only “after the fact[,] when 3 The parties mostly refer to this other teacher as “Mr. Coleman.” For convenience, we will do the same. N.K. testified he did not know if Coleman was still alive. 6 [McKenzie] got exposed” at N.K.’s home, that another District teacher (i.e., Coleman) became aware of McKenzie’s sexual abuse of N.K. Before that disclosure, however, N.K. had no “information” that Coleman knew McKenzie had been sexually abusing N.K. N.K. also testified McKenzie never did anything he “deemed to be inappropriate in terms of her discussions with [him] or touching [him]” while in the classroom. She never “hug[ged]” or “kiss[ed]” him at school, or “show[ed] affection” toward him in front of any other District teacher, including on and off school grounds. He also had no “information” that “any administrator or anyone at the school knew about” the sexual abuse between the first encounter and “the night that [his] mother found out.” And, when asked if he had “any information” that the District “should have been aware of any kind of signs that [McKenzie] was giving during school,” he testified, “I wouldn’t know.” His response was the same when asked whether he could “recall” anything “overt enough for someone to say, ‘Why didn’t this administrator or teacher [k]now what [McKenzie] was doing?’ ” In N.K.’s interrogatory responses, which included information similar to the general allegations of his complaint, he stated on “information and belief” that administrative and supervisory employees of the District had “received complaints and warnings from students and parents about Defendant McKenzie’s inappropriate behavior, including that McKenzie (1) was spending significant amounts of time with students, both on and off campus without any authorization, justification, and supervision; (2) made inappropriate comments of [a] sexual nature in class to minor students; (3) inappropriately touched students, including Plaintiff; and (4) sexually harassed and abused students, including Plaintiff.” N.K. further stated in his responses (again, on information and belief) that despite the District’s 7 knowledge of such complaints “before and during Defendant McKenzie’s sexual abuse of Plaintiff,” the District “failed to take any corrective or preventive action” against her. The District’s person most knowledgeable (PMK) testified at his deposition that the District had no records of its policies, procedures, standards or rules from 1978 regarding its hiring of teachers or teachers’ conduct with students. The PMK also was unaware whether or not the District interviewed McKenzie, conducted a background check of her, checked her references before she was hired, and/or evaluated her performance as a teacher at the High School, as no such records currently existed in her personnel file. D. N.K.’s Evidence in Opposition to Summary Judgment N.K. claimed a triable issue of material fact existed based on his deposition testimony that the District knew or should have known of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities when she admitted in front of Coleman, another High School teacher, that she and N.K. “had just had sex.” He also cited to his testimony that McKenzie asked him to help move the table at her home while they were in a classroom together at the High School, to show she engaged in inappropriate conduct while on campus. N.K. also relied on the deposition testimony of the PMK to support his opposition. As noted, the PMK testified the District had no evidence whether McKenzie (1) was “investigated,” “disciplined,” subjected to a “background check,” or “monitored and/or evaluated during her employment” with the District; or (2) received instruction and/or training regarding “sexual abuse or sexual abuse prevention.” The PMK further testified the District had no information dating back to 1978 of (3) its “rules concerning appropriate contact between teachers and students”; (4) “safeguards or measures, if any, 8 that it took to protect students”; or (5) its hiring practices or policies concerning “mandated reporting policies and procedures.” N.K. argued the lack of such evidence created one or more triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment. E. Summary Judgment Motion and Ruling The District moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, in July 2024. As relevant here, it claimed the undisputed facts established that no District supervisory personnel “knew or should have known” that McKenzie was sexually abusing N.K. or that she “posed a risk to students in general,” based on some observable, inappropriate “behavior.”4 In opposition, N.K. argued that the District’s failure “to affirmatively present any evidence that its hiring, retention, and supervision of McKenzie or Plaintiff was reasonable as a matter of law” precluded summary judgment. He also argued that “controlling precedent” precluded summary judgment because breach and causation were questions of fact that could not be decided as a matter of law. 4 The District separately moved for summary judgment under Education Code section 44808, claiming it was immune from liability because the three sexual assaults of N.K. occurred off campus. (See Ed. Code, § 44808 [providing, with certain exceptions, that a school district and its employees are not “liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property”].) Because we conclude the undisputed facts establish that the District’s supervisory personnel had no actual or constructive knowledge of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether, as a separate basis to affirm summary judgment, the District was immune from liability under this statute. 9 The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. It found that the District met its initial burden by showing that N.K. could not establish one or more elements of his negligence based causes of action against the District; and that N.K. in response proffered “no evidence . . . that the District knew or should have known that Ms. [McKenzie] would sexually abuse the Plaintiff.” The court ruled that N.K.’s own responses to interrogatories based on “information and belief” did not constitute evidence that the District “knew or should have known” of “warning” signs regarding McKenzie’s aberrant “behavior” toward N.K. that would alert the District and create a triable issue of material fact based on its failure to take “corrective or preventive action.” The trial court also found N.K.’s deposition testimony supported summary judgment, as he testified to having no evidence that the District, through its supervisory personnel, had any information that put it on notice “of any kind of signs that [McKenzie] was giving during school” as to her dangerous propensities, not only as to N.K. “but [to] other students as well.” DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment and Standards of Review Where, as here, “a defendant moves for summary adjudication on a cause of action for which the plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial, the defendant ‘must present evidence that either “conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff's cause of action” or “show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,” evidence necessary to establish at least one element of the cause of action.’ ” (Doe v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 668.) Once the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of one or more material 10 facts as to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–850 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “A party cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact.” (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) “ ‘On review of an order granting . . . summary judgment, we examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] We review the entire record, ‘considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.’ [Citation.] Evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment is liberally construed, with any doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) “The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on us, because we review the court’s ruling, not its rationale.” (Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 514, 522.) We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.) For negligence, ordinarily breach of duty is a question of fact. (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1366 (Thompson).) Breach, however, may be determined as a matter of law on summary judgment “if reasonable jurors following the law could draw only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Ibid.) 11 B. Liability of a School District for Sexual Abuse of a Student 1. Guiding Principles “[P]ublic entity tort liability is exclusively statutory.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868 (C.A.); citing Gov. Code, § 815 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”].) Applicable here, section 815.2 of the Government Code provides that a “public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his [or her] employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his [or her] personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Finally, section 820 of the Government Code sets forth the liability of public employees themselves.5 Liability may not be imputed to a public school district for the intentional sexual misconduct of teachers and other employees. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 441, 451 [school district not vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of an employee because such conduct is beyond the scope of employment].) A school district does, however, “owe students under their supervision a protective duty of ordinary care, for breach of which the school district may be held vicariously liable. [Citations.] If a supervisory or administrative employee of the school district is proven to 5 Government Code section 820, subdivision (a) states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his [or her] act or omission to the same extent as a private person.” 12 have breached that duty by negligently exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation by [a school employee], resulting in [the student’s] injuries, and assuming no immunity provision applies, liability falls on the school district under section 815.2” of the Government Code. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865–866.) C.A. thus recognized that a public school district may be vicariously liable in negligence if its “administrators and employees knew or should have known of [the teacher’s] dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, retained, and failed to properly supervise [him or] her.” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875; accord, Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 26 (Roe) [“[A] school district is liable for the negligence of supervisory employees who ‘knew or should have known of [a school employee’s] dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, retained and failed to properly supervise’ the employee.”], quoting C.A., supra, at p. 875.) C.A., however, emphasized that a “district’s liability must be based on evidence of negligent hiring, supervision or retention, not on assumptions or speculation. That an individual school employee has committed sexual misconduct with a student or students does not of itself establish, or raise any presumption, that the employing district should bear liability for the resulting injuries.” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 878.) Constructive knowledge of sexual abuse by district supervisory personnel exists if such personnel observed a teacher or employee “do anything abusive or inappropriate [to a student], or giving rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior” by such teacher or employee. (Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Court (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718, 722 (Rancho Cucamonga); accord, Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 122, 137 (Doe) [constructive knowledge may 13 be imputed “where the misconduct is not ‘ambiguous’ ” or when the inappropriateness is “ ‘open and obvious’ ”].) 2. Analysis We conclude that the District met its initial burden by making a prima facie showing that the District’s supervisory personnel had no actual or constructive knowledge of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities; and therefore, that it did not breach the “protective duty of care” it owed N.K. by failing to take appropriate corrective or preventive action. (See C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865–866.) The District made its prima facie showing by submitting the following evidence: (1) N.K. in his deposition admitted he was not aware of any facts suggesting the District had actual or constructive knowledge of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities; and (2) the District’s interrogatories asked him to state all facts and information in his possession regarding its knowledge and he responded with factually devoid allegations made on “information and belief” that failed to specify any actual evidence. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855 [the defendant may satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment through “admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that [the plaintiff] has discovered nothing”]; accord, Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102–1103 [“a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid 14 discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred”].)6 The burden then shifted to N.K. to make a prima facie showing of the existence of one or more triable issues of material fact on the breach of duty question. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849–850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 107 [“If plaintiffs respond to comprehensive interrogatories seeking all known facts with boilerplate answers that restate their allegations, . . . the burden of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once defendants move for summary judgment.”].) And as we have noted, breach can be decided as a matter of law “if reasonable jurors following the law could draw only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Thompson, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366.) N.K., however, proffered no evidence to show that District supervisory personnel, or, for that matter, any District employee, “knew or should have known” of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities either before she began sexually abusing N.K. or while the abuse was ongoing. (See C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 865.) Indeed, N.K. admitted in his deposition that before the 6 N.K. does not claim that his own conclusory interrogatory responses created a triable issue of material fact. On summary judgment, “the responding party may not use its own interrogatory responses in its own favor.” (Great American Ins. Cos. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 445, 450; accord Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 740; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410 [“[a]t the trial or any other hearing in the action, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, the propounding party or any party other than the responding party may use any answer or part of an answer to an interrogatory only against the responding party” (italics added)].) 15 first incident, McKenzie never engaged in any acts either inside or outside the classroom that he deemed inappropriate, including hugging or kissing him or showing any signs of affection toward him; nor was he aware of any “signs” or “overt” behavior by her that would have put the District’s supervisory personnel on notice of her dangerous propensities. His undisputed testimony that he was “shock[ed],” “completely” surprised, and “numb” when McKenzie “came on to him” during their first encounter further supports the finding there were no outward signs or manifestations of McKenzie’s dangerousness before this incident. Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that all three incidents of sexual abuse occurred off school grounds, inside McKenzie’s home. N.K. testified he did not disclose the abuse until after he left the High School. And, after the first incident, he continued to work as a teacher’s aide in McKenzie’s class, further supporting the reasonable inference he did not disclose the abuse while it was ongoing. The evidence is also undisputed that no District employee knew about the sexual abuse until after the fact, as N.K. testified, when his mother confronted McKenzie and she admitted—in Coleman’s presence—to having just had sex with N.K. As to Colemen, the only evidence N.K. offered was that he also was a teacher at the High School who, like his mother, enjoyed music. N.K., however, offered no evidence that Coleman was an administrator or supervisor of the District, and/or that Coleman disclosed McKenzie’s sexual abuse to any such supervisory personnel, or anyone else, for that matter. N.K. also testified that he had no knowledge whether Coleman knew of the abuse before the third and final molestation. Based on the foregoing, we independently conclude the trial court properly granted the District’s motion as to N.K.’s third and fifth causes of 16 action, as there is no evidence the District’s supervisory personnel “knew or should have known” of McKenzie’s dangerous propensities, thereby creating a triable issue of material fact whether it breached its “protective duty of ordinary care” to N.K. (See C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 865.) N.K. argues his case is similar to the facts in Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 113, where the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for a public school district. We disagree. In Doe, a 13-year-old student sued the public school district for negligent supervision of its teacher and/or minor students, after the teacher sexually assaulted her. (Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) The trial court granted summary judgment for the district, ruling that it owed no duty to protect Doe “unless it knew [the teacher] had previously engaged in sexual misconduct with minors or had a propensity to do so” (ibid.); and that the teacher’s conduct as to Doe was “ambiguous” and did not give rise to a duty of care (ibid.). In reversing in part the grant of summary judgment, the Doe court concluded that “school administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have knowledge of a particular employee’s history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse.” (Ibid.) In this case, by contrast, the District is not disputing it owed a duty to properly supervise its teachers (including McKenzie) and/or minor students (including N.K.). Instead, it contends there is no triable issue of material fact on breach of duty. And as to breach of duty, this case is unlike Doe because in Doe there were observable signs supporting a finding that the school district breached its duty of care by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent Doe’s abuse. (Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) 17 Specifically, in opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff in Doe submitted deposition testimony from “several of her peers” who observed that Doe and the teacher “regularly ‘flirted’ with each other and that [the teacher] frequently tickled and hugged Doe and played with her hair.” (Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) Her evidence also included statements from “[m]ultiple students” that “Doe sometimes rested her head on [the teacher’s] shoulder when he hugged her and that Doe wore [the teacher’s] jacket at school.” (Ibid.) Another classmate observed Doe becoming upset at the teacher when he would not let her “sit on his lap” (ibid.); saw Doe and the teacher alone together in a classroom at least 20 times; and “felt as though she was ‘intruding on a couple’ ” when they were together (ibid.). And another classmate described “girlfriend/boyfriend-type behavior” between Doe and the teacher, including interactions when Doe would “cry.” (Ibid.) By the end of Doe’s eighth grade year, most of the students in Doe’s class were talking about the “ ‘obvious’ ” relationship between Doe and the teacher. (Ibid.) Doe also submitted a declaration from a school administrator and former superintendent of several school districts in which he opined the various interactions between Doe and the teacher “were examples of ‘open and obvious’ predatory behavior that ‘clearly gave rise to an appearance of impropriety’ ” that the teacher’s “supervisors failed ‘to spot[ ] and respond[ ] to red flags.’ ” (Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) Doe’s expert also opined that the teacher’s direct supervisor did not adequately supervise him, as she only checked on him “about once a week,” despite the fact the teacher was “the only adult present” in the classroom. (Ibid.) The facts in Doe are readily distinguishable from those in this case. Here, unlike the minor student in Doe, N.K. failed to proffer evidence in 18 opposition to summary judgment to show there was one or more triable issues of material fact regarding the District’s alleged negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining McKenzie (third cause of action), and/or in leaving N.K. unsupervised in her care (fifth cause of action). Instead, we conclude our case is similar to the facts in Rancho Cucamonga. There, a former middle school student sued the public school district claiming he was sexually abused both on and off campus by the director of the school’s childcare program during the 2001–2002 school year. (Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.) In affirming summary adjudication of the plaintiff’s cause of action for negligent supervision of the director, the Rancho Cucamonga court found the “undisputed facts show[ed] no district employee, let alone a supervisor, witnessed any of the alleged sexual assaults or inappropriate behavior by [the director] . . . . There also [was] no evidence any district employee observed anything that reasonably should have triggered suspicion of abuse to justify an inference of constructive knowledge.” (Id. at p. 722.) In reaching its decision, the Rancho Cucamonga court distinguished its facts from those in Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 13, a case also relied on by N.K. In Roe, the plaintiffs sued the public school district after a school janitor sexually abused them when they were in the first grade. The district demurred, claiming the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that it “knew of any prior acts of sexual abuse” by the janitor and had no “actual knowledge” of his abuse against the students. (Id. at p. 21.) The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to the plaintiffs’ negligence-based causes of action. (Id. at p. 22.) In reversing, the Roe court concluded the complaint stated a valid cause of action for negligent supervision of the janitor. (Roe, supra, 19 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) The Court of Appeal noted the plaintiffs had alleged that “two principals, one of whom was also a school district director, and an assistant principal witnessed plaintiffs sitting on [the janitor’s] lap and the [the janitor] escorting plaintiffs across campus to empty rooms,” in violation of school policy about being alone with students in rooms with closed doors and having physical contact with students. (Id. at p. 30.) Although the janitor’s conduct was in “ ‘plain view’ ” of supervisory personnel, they never “intervened, investigated, or reported what they observed concerning [the janitor’s] interactions with plaintiffs.” (Id. at p. 19.) In finding the facts of Roe distinguishable, the Rancho Cucamonga court noted there was no evidence in the case before it that district employees saw the director of the school’s childcare program “do anything abusive or inappropriate” to the middle school student “giving rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior.” (Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 722, citing Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) As in Rancho Cucamonga and unlike in Roe, N.K. has proffered no evidence that McKenzie engaged in “inappropriate behavior” observed by District supervisory personnel that could have given rise to a “suspicion of abuse” and put the District on constructive notice of her dangerous propensities. (See Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 722; Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) We therefore conclude N.K. failed to create a triable issue of material fact showing the District breached its duty of care in supervising McKenzie and/or N.K. N.K. contends he raised a triable issue of material fact as a result of the District’s inability to show what, if any, of its policies, procedures, or standards existed in 1978—and whether the District complied with such— regarding its hiring, supervision, or retention of District teachers. The 20 District’s PMK testified that the District had no such records, including whether it conducted a background check of McKenzie or checked her references before hiring her. That the District was unable to produce records that may (or may not) have existed 40-plus years ago is hardly surprising. We are unaware of any authority imposing a duty on a public school district to keep records over such an extended period of time, nor has N.K. provided any such authority. (See Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699– 700 [“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.”]; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [we noted that “[i]uses do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived [or forfeited]” (italics added)].) Indeed, once the burden shifted to N.K. to proffer admissible evidence to create one or more triable issues of material fact (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849–850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2)), it was his obligation to proffer evidence of the District’s negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of McKenzie, not “assumptions or speculation” based on records that may or may not have existed more than 40 years ago. (See C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 878; accord, Advent, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 443, 459 [“ ‘ “Speculation . . . is not evidence” that can be utilized in opposing a motion for summary judgment.’ ”]; Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand LLP (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [an “opposition to summary judgment will be deemed insufficient when it is essentially conclusory, argumentative, or based on conjecture and speculation” (italics added)].) We thus reject his claim that 21 the District’s lack of records regarding its policies, procedures, or standards for hiring and retention of teachers in 1978 precluded summary adjudication of his third and fifth causes of action. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The District is entitled to its costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) BUCHANAN, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. O’ROURKE, J. 22 Filed 10/21/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JOHN DOE N.K., D086336 Plaintiff and Appellant, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. CVPS2202847) v. PALM SPRINGS UNIFIED ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION SCHOOL DISTRICT, FOR PUBLICATION Defendant and Respondent. THE COURT: The opinion in this case filed September 29, 2026, was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the requests for publication pursuant to rule 8.112