Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 1 of 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13912 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ TAURUS BRYANT, Petitioner-Appellant, versus CITY OF ORLANDO, et al. Respondents-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-1622-WWB-NWH ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant, Taurus Bryant, brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Officer Ivan Sumayang and the City of Orlando, al- USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 2 of 8 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13912 leging use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amend- ment. 1 The district granted summary judgment in favor of the de- fendants, concluding that qualified immunity protected Officer Sumayang and that Monell protected the City. After careful review, we affirm. I We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg- ment, including its determinations on qualified immunity and mu- nicipal liability. Bridges v. Poe, 155 F.4th 1302, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2025). In doing so, we construe all facts and draw all inferences in a light favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 1313. Summary judgment is appropriate only in the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. In brief, the relevant facts are as follows. One evening, Of- ficer Sumayang identified a vehicle matching the description of a car involved in an armed carjacking. He ran the car’s plate and de- termined that the vehicle was stolen. He followed the vehicle, 1 Bryant also raised a challenge to discovery-related matters. He was in- structed to refile objections to the magistrate judge’s order, but his counsel admit that he failed to do so “due to interoffice turmoil,” Reply Br. of Appel- lant at 17, and that he “ma[d]e[] the argument without knowing if it ha[d] been properly preserved,” Br. of Appellant at 31. We hold this issue forfeited and do not address it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We have concluded that, where a party fails to timely challenge a magistrate judge’s nondispositive order before the dis- trict court, the party waived his right to appeal those orders in this Court.”). USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 3 of 8 25-13912 Opinion of the Court 3 lights off, speeding to keep up. The stolen vehicle stopped, Bryant exited, and a foot chase ensued through the yards of a residential neighborhood. As he pursued Bryant, Officer Sumayang yelled, “On the ground!” Sumayang Body Camera Footage at 02:31–02:32. The officer proceeded to fire his taser twice at Bryant. Bryant stum- bled to the ground, and Officer Sumayang repeatedly yelled for him to remain down. Id. at 02:49–02:59. Officer Sumayang jumped on Bryant’s back, placed his firearm against the back of Bryant’s head, and repeatedly told Bryant, “I’ll blow your head off,” “You hear that?! Single Action! I’ll blow your head off!” Id. at 02:59–03:05. At this point, Bryant addressed Officer Sumayang and said, “Yes sir, yes sir.” Id. at 03:01–03:05. Seconds later, another officer arrived and helped restrain Bryant. Id. at 03:06. About 18 seconds elapsed between Officer Sumayang firing his taser and Bryant’s verbal re- sponse. II Qualified immunity provides “complete protection for gov- ernment officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In order to properly invoke qualified immunity, an officer must first establish that his actions fell “within the scope of his dis- cretionary authority.” Id. (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). No one here disputes that Officer Sumayang USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 4 of 8 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13912 acted within his discretionary authority. Accordingly, we presume that qualified immunity should apply, and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove otherwise. Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1239– 40 (11th Cir. 2021). To do so, Bryant must show both (1) a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that “the right was clearly estab- lished at the time of the alleged violation.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019). The “clearly established” stand- ard sets a high bar; it shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Bris, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). We may address these two prongs in either order, Pearson v. Calla- han, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), and we opt here to begin with the “clearly established” prong. A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a violation of clearly established law. Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 1993). He may do so in three ways: (1) citing “case law with indistinguishable facts”; (2) pointing to a “broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right”; or (3) demonstrating that the of- ficer’s conduct was “so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009). 2 2 Bryant cites district-court opinions and unpublished circuit opinions, but they cannot clearly establish law for qualified-immunity purposes. See Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2017); J W ex rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2018). USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 5 of 8 25-13912 Opinion of the Court 5 Bryant has not successfully done any of those things. With respect to what we will call “bucket one,” Bryant has repeatedly conceded that no comparable case law exists. And, so far as we can tell, he is right. With respect to bucket two, Bryant argues that our case law has established a broad principle that the “use of gratuitous force against compliant suspect[s]” violates the Fourth Amendment. Re- ply Br. of Appellant at 11; see also Br. of Appellant at 25 (citing Saun- ders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002)). The problem is that when Officer Sumayang pulled his weapon on Bryant, it was by no means clear that Bryant was compliant. As Bryant admits, in all the cases he cites, the compliant suspect was already handcuffed. See Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1265; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199–1200; see also Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, we have no similar indica- tion that Bryant had ceased resisting. To the contrary, Officer Sumayang had taken Bryant to the ground mere seconds before pointing his gun at Bryant. Officer Sumayang acted within the haze of the physical arrest, without the certainty that his suspect was effectively constrained; “all danger” was not clearly “vitiated.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199–1200. Finally, with respect to bucket three, Bryant asserts that it is “obviously clear” that Officer Sumayang’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment, Br. of Appellant at 22, and, therefore, that rec- USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 6 of 8 6 Opinion of the Court 25-13912 itation of materially similar case law is not necessary to defeat qual- ified immunity. He essentially argues that when law-enforcement officers use “egregious” and “heinous” levels of force, id. at 24, they are inherently on notice that their conduct falls squarely within the prohibitions of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). But Graham requires a case-by-case, multifactor analysis of excessive-force claims, recognizing that the line between excessive and permissible force is often “hazy.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (cita- tion modified). In order to demonstrate an obviously clear use of excessive force, Bryant must therefore show that “every reasonable officer” would “inevitably” deem Officer Sumayang’s conduct “un- lawful.” Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1232 (emphasis added) (quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993), modified 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994)). He cannot locate this case within that narrow exception; we cannot say that “every reasonable officer” would have disagreed with Officer Sumayang’s decision to point, but not shoot, his firearm at a suspect who was not obviously com- pliant. Thus, Graham and its progeny do not permit invocation of the obvious-clarity exception in this case. We therefore hold to the typical, stringent “clearly established” test, which requires a far greater degree of specificity, as the Supreme Court is wont to re- mind us. See, e.g., Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (“Where constitutional guidelines seem inapplicable or too remote, it does not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force.”). Because no law clearly established the unlawfulness of Of- ficer Sumayang’s conduct, he is entitled to qualified immunity. USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 7 of 8 25-13912 Opinion of the Court 7 III We turn next to Bryant’s attempt to hold the City of Or- lando liable for Officer Sumayang’s use of force. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a plaintiff must show that the “govern- ment’s policy or custom . . . [w]as the moving force of the consti- tutional violation.” Id. at 694. And, in order to establish a custom, a plaintiff must prove, “with competent evidence,” “a pattern or practice of constitutional violation.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1168 (11th Cir. 2018). This is no small feat; “the bar to estab- lish municipal liability is very high.” Id. at 1169. Bryant has failed to clear that bar. Instead of making the necessary showing Monell explicitly requires, he points to the ab- sence of a policy “prohibit[ing] an officer’s use of a department[-]is- sued firearm to apprehend a nonviolent suspect.” Br. of Appellant at 27. His allegations are threadbare—they implicate only his own experience, and thus he cannot establish that the City had a “longstanding and widespread practice” of condoning excessive force. Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quot- ing Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Simmons, 879 F.3d at 1168–69 (“[Plaintiff’s] shooting must be evaluated as a single incident. Even assuming that [plain- tiff’s] shooting was unconstitutional, this incident alone does not establish a custom of tolerating excessive force.”). Therefore, Bry- ant cannot establish municipal liability under § 1983. USCA11 Case: 25-13912 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 8 of 8 8 Opinion of the Court 25-13912 IV Bryant has failed to establish that Officer Sumayang violated clearly established law or that the City had a policy or custom of encouraging excessive force. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.