Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0458n.06 Case No. 25-5773 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 16, 2026 MITZI SANDERS, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff - Appellant, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ) SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF ) MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE EDUCATION, ) OPINION Defendant - Appellee ) ) Before: GIBBONS, SUTTON, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Mitzi Sanders alleged that she was not hired to a classroom teaching position as a cosmetology instructor at Gallatin High School because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). After a jury found in favor of the Sumner County Board of Education, Sanders appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) refused to give her proposed jury instructions, (2) refused to answer one of the jury’s questions with a new instruction, and (3) excluded evidence of other acts of alleged discrimination by the Board of Education. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the district court. I. In March of 2022, Dr. Ron Becker, the principal of Gallatin High School, posted a job announcement for a new cosmetology teaching position at the school. Mitzi Sanders applied for the position that same month and was interviewed by Becker and assistant principal Johnnie No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. Anderson shortly thereafter. At that time, Sanders was 64 years old and had been a Tennessee- licensed cosmetologist since 1975, a Tennessee-licensed cosmetology instructor since 2012, and had spent 30 years of her career operating her own hair salon. During the interview, Becker told Sanders that hiring a teacher was “like hiring a coach” and that he did not “want to hire a coach and have them leave shortly after.” DE 115, Trial Tr., Page ID 2355–56. Sanders assured Becker and Anderson that she was in good health, had no plans to retire, and was passionate about teaching cosmetology and wanted to continue to do so. After interviewing Sanders and four other candidates, Becker and Anderson narrowed down their top candidates to Teresa Dunn and Jennifer Grainger. They felt that Dunn and Grainger would best connect with the school community and were most prepared to work with textured hair types—a skill they weighted heavily in the hiring process because of the demographics of the student body. Dunn was offered the job first but ultimately declined it. The position was then offered to Grainger, who accepted. Grainger was 43 years old at the time and was a licensed cosmetologist, but unlike Sanders, she had not yet received the cosmetology instructor’s license that allows teachers to report student hours to the Tennessee Board of Cosmetology. Sanders filed suit against the Sumner County Board of Education, alleging that this hiring decision was made because of her age in violation of the ADEA. The Board moved for summary judgment, contending that Sanders did not provide direct evidence of age discrimination and could not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board’s reasons for selecting Grainger instead of Sanders were pretextual. Because Sanders offered circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework and denied the Board’s motion. The court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of pretext, as the record contained “ample” evidence from which a reasonable juror could -2- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. conclude that Sanders was as qualified as Grainger. DE 30, Mem. Den. Summ. J., Page ID 1675. Furthermore, it held that Sanders could point to statements in her interview that constituted probative evidence of discrimination. The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before trial, the Board sought to exclude evidence that Sanders had applied to cosmetology teacher positions at two other high schools in the Sumner County school district, once in 2021 and once in 2024, and was passed over in favor of a younger, less experienced candidate in each instance. The Board argued that this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. Furthermore, the Board contended that if this evidence were admitted, it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, creating a risk of unfair prejudice, unnecessary delay, and jury confusion that would substantially outweigh its limited probative value. In response, Sanders argued that these prior hiring decisions were relevant and admissible as background evidence of discrimination despite not providing an independent basis for recovery. She went on to argue that the court should determine the admissibility of this evidence by applying the Griffin v. Finkbeiner framework, which is used to evaluate “evidence of discrimination by the employer against non-party employees.” 689 F.3d 584, 598 (6th Cir. 2012). The district court denied the Board’s motion in what it characterized as a “preliminary determination[] in preparation for trial” and indicated it would consider objections to the introduction of such evidence as it arose during trial. DE 89, Order, Page ID 2019. At trial, the Board once again objected to the admission of evidence about the 2021 and 2024 applications and hiring decisions on FRE 402 and 403 grounds. And once again, Sanders responded that the evidence was admissible to prove other acts of discrimination that provided relevant background. The court concluded that evidence about the 2024 application was “certainly not relevant” because it came after the hiring decision at issue in the case. DE 116, Trial Tr., Page -3- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. ID 2491. The court then directed counsel to “steer well clear of any suggestion that there’s some reason [Sanders] didn’t get another job with her age or anything related to this case” and went on to exclude the evidence about the 2021 and 2024 hiring decisions for falling into “403 territory,” because the court wanted to avoid “a mini trial on another application that has nothing to do with this lawsuit.” Id. at Page ID 2490–92. Before jury deliberations began, both parties submitted additional proposed jury instructions characterizing the state regulations governing the licensing of cosmetology instructors. The instructions supported their respective arguments about whether Grainger’s lack of a cosmetology instructor’s license constituted circumstantial evidence of age discrimination against Sanders. The court did not adopt either proposed instruction but instead instructed the jury: You’ve heard discussion about—heard discussion during the trial about various state cosmetology laws and regulations. This case is not about whether the board violated state cosmetology statutes or regulations. This case is about whether the board discriminated against Ms. Sanders based on her age. DE 118, Trial Tr., Page ID 3064. Neither party objected to the court’s refusal to adopt its additional proposed instruction. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court about the relevant standard of causation. Specifically, it asked, “Does age discrimination have to be the only reason Ms. Sanders was not hired, or can it be part of the reason[?]” Id. at Page ID 3083. The court’s response to this question was to refer the jury back to the original charge, which described the standard of causation. Before doing so, the court asked the parties if they had any objections to this course of action. Counsel for the Board responded that it had no objections. Counsel for Sanders responded, “[T]he answer [to the question] is no, it doesn’t have to be the sole exclusive or only reason. That’s not but-for causation.” Id. The court then stated, “But I’ve already instructed them on that,” and -4- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. counsel for Sanders responded, “Yeah, you have.” Id. The court proceeded to refer the jury back to the original instruction. A couple of hours later, the jury reached a verdict. The jury found that the Board did not impermissibly discriminate against Sanders based on her age, and the court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed. II. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or employs an erroneous legal standard.” Barner v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., 399 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted) (quoting Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir.2004)). “We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.” Frye v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.3d 591, 600 (6th Cir. 2019). Such a refusal constitutes reversible error only if (1) “the omitted instruction[] [is] a correct statement of the law,” (2) “the instruction is not substantially covered by other delivered charges,” and (3) “the failure to give the instruction impairs the requesting party’s theory of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). Likewise, a district court’s response to questions from the jury is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 712 (6th Cir. 1992). In the context of jury instructions, abuse of discretion is a “high standard,” and reversal is only warranted “if the jury instructions, taken as a whole[]were confusing, misleading, and prejudicial.” United States v. Castle, 625 F. App’x 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When a party forfeits a claim by failing to object below, the court reviews the claim for plain error, which requires a showing of “(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of -5- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). III. On appeal, Sanders argues that the district court committed three independent errors that each mandate reversal: (1) that the district court erred when it chose to refer the jury back to the original instruction rather than providing it with the answer put forward by Sanders at trial, (2) that the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the relevant Tennessee occupational- licensing statutes governing cosmetology instructors, and (3) that the district court erred when it excluded evidence that Sumner County hired younger candidates over her when she applied for cosmetology instructor positions in 2021 and 2024. We do not find any of these arguments availing. A. Sanders contends that the court abused its discretion when, in answering the jury’s question about the standard of causation, it opted to refer the jury back to the causation instruction contained in the original jury charge rather than providing a supplemental instruction. At trial, the jury was instructed on the standard of causation to apply: To prevail on her age discrimination claim, Ms. Sanders must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a but-for cause of the board’s failure to hire her. That means that Ms. Sanders must show that age played a role in the board’s decision-making process and was a determinative reason that she was not hired. DE 118, Trial Tr., Page ID 3066–67. During deliberations, the jury asked the court, “Does age discrimination have to be the only reason Ms. Sanders was not hired, or can it be part of the reason[?]” Id. at 3083. Sanders argues that the court had an affirmative duty to respond to the jury’s request for clarification on a central legal issue. -6- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. The parties disagree as to whether Sanders properly objected to the court’s course of action. With respect to the jury’s question, Sanders’s counsel told the court that, “[T]he answer is no, it doesn’t have to be the sole exclusive or only reason. That’s not but-for causation.” Id. at 3090. The district court responded, “I’ve already instructed them on that,” to which Sanders’s counsel replied, “Yeah, you have.” Id. Whether this was sufficient to put the court on notice that Sanders had a problem with the jury instructions is not dispositive on appeal, as Sanders’s argument fails even under abuse of discretion review. See Preferred RX, Inc. v. Am. Prescription Plan, Inc., 46 F.3d 535, 547 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the rule requiring a formal objection “was developed to fulfill the basic purpose of Rule 51; that is, to alert the trial judge to potential problem areas so that the jury can be clearly and correctly instructed”). Pointing to United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564 (6th Cir. 1989), Sanders contends that trial courts have an “affirmative duty” to supplement their instructions when the jury asks a clarifying question about a “central legal issue.” CA6 R. 39, Appellant’s Br., 35 (discussing Nunez, 889 F.2d at 1568). “Although courts should ‘respond to questions concerning important legal issues,’ a ‘reference to or rereading of the instructions may suffice’ if the issue ‘has been fully covered in the court’s instructions.’” United States v. Phillips, 872 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nunez, 889 F.2d at 1569). Nunez held that when jurors ask questions about “important legal issue[s]” that the original instructions do not squarely resolve, a court cannot answer simply by repeating the very same “general statements” that caused the confusion in the first place. Nunez, 889 F.2d at 1568–69. But where, as here, the original instruction sufficiently answers the jury’s question, the court has no general duty to elaborate further. Plaintiffs bringing claims under the ADEA must establish but-for causation, meaning that they must show that age “‘had a determinative influence on the outcome’ of the employer’s -7- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. decision-making process.” Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)). Here, the initial jury instructions adequately explained but-for causation to the jury, making it clear that age must both have “played a role in the board’s decision-making process and [have been] a determinative reason [Sanders] was not hired.” DE 118, Trial Tr., Page ID 3067 (emphasis added). The word “determinative” told the jury that, to return a verdict for Ms. Sanders, they had to find that the hiring outcome would have been different if Ms. Sanders had been under 40. Thus, the answer to the jury’s question about whether age had to be “the only reason” Sanders was not hired was “fully covered” in the original jury instructions. See Phillips, 872 F.3d at 807–08 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it referred the jury back to its original instructions to prevent jury confusion); United States v. Berry, 290 F. App’x 784, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that it was not plain error to refer the jury back to the district court’s original instructions when those instructions provided a comprehensive and accurate definition of the offense); United States v. Morris, 47 F. App’x 355, 360–61 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding the district court did not err, “plain[ly] or otherwise,” in giving instructions for an offense that provided “a complete description of [] an offense and include[d] all of the elements necessary for the government to establish a defendant’s involvement”). When reviewing the district court’s decision whether or not to provide supplemental instructions in response to questions from the jury, we must “tak[e] into account the sensitive nature of the judge’s responsibility at this stage of the trial and the duty of the trial judge to provide impartial and effective guidance on the law.” United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1978). In the instant case, it was well within the district court’s discretion to merely direct -8- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. the jury to the original charge to avoid confusion or prejudice. See Phillips, 872 F.3d at 807–08. Thus, Sanders’s first argument fails. B. Sanders next argues that the district court erred when it refused to give Sanders’s proposed jury instruction about the substance of Tennessee’s cosmetology instructor licensing laws. At trial, Sanders argued that the discrepancy in qualifications between herself and Grainger was circumstantial evidence of discrimination. To support this argument, she put on evidence about the licensing scheme for cosmetology instructors in Tennessee, which she maintained showed that Grainger was not certified to teach cosmetology when Grainger was hired. Furthermore, Sanders focused on demonstrating that there was no licensed instructor physically on premises supervising Grainger when Grainger first began teaching—a setup Sanders alleged was in violation of Tennessee licensing law for cosmetology instructors. Sanders contends that this “illegal arrangement” was fashioned to “cover up th[e] fact” “that Sumner County was so averse to hiring someone as old as Sanders.” CA6 R.39, Appellant’s Br. at 52. To this end, Sanders proposed additional jury instructions on the content of the state regulations: It is my duty to instruct you on the rules of law that you must use in deciding this case. You heard testimony regarding The Tennessee Cosmetology Act of 1986. As it applies to this case, the Tennessee Cosmetology Act sets out requirements for “schools of cosmetology.” These include private cosmetology schools, public high school, and vocational school cosmetology programs, even though such programs are also regulated by the Department of Education. In this case, you have heard about two sections of the Tennessee Cosmetology Act that deal with employing licensed instructors. The Tennessee Cosmetology Act requires that schools of cosmetology are required to employ one licensed instructor for each junior instructor. The Tennessee Cosmetology Act also requires that schools of cosmetology, including public high schools, must have at least one licensed instructor on the premises whenever cosmetology classes are in operation. This is the law you should apply when deciding this case. -9- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. DE 100, Additional Proposed Jury Instr., Page ID 2075. In support of its counterargument that public high schools did not need a licensed instructor physically on premises for teacher certification purposes, the Board put forward proposed jury instructions characterizing the Tennessee Cosmetology Act differently. The court gave neither instruction but instead told the jury that the case was not about whether the Board violated licensing regulations. Rather, the court said, the case was about whether the school impermissibly discriminated against Sanders based on age. Sanders did not object to the court’s refusal to give her proposed instructions, so we review her claim for plain error. See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 527 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Merely proposing a jury instruction is insufficient to preserve an objection.”). “In the context of challenges to jury instructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2006)). “Reversal is only proper if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The instructions given by the district court in this case were not clearly erroneous. A difference in qualifications between candidates can be circumstantial evidence of discrimination in hiring. See Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t. Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 626–27 (6th Cir 2006). The jury could have evaluated such evidence, however, without receiving an instruction about whether public schools are required to have a licensed cosmetology instructor on the premises. The proposed instruction thus supports only Sanders’s more -10- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. tenuous assertion that the Board’s purported violation of Tennessee’s teacher licensing requirements after the contested hiring decision took place was also circumstantial evidence of discrimination against Sanders. This court has held that a jury instruction “constitutes plain error when it ‘misapplies the law as to a core issue in the case resulting in the substantial prejudice of the party challenging the instruction on appeal.’” Craddock v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 102 F.4th 832, 843 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Reynolds v. Green, 184 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 1999)). And in Nelson v. Christian Bros. University, we held that because a jury instruction did not “permit the jury to deliberate under an incorrect standard that affected” the “core issue” in the case, it was not plain error for the court to give that instruction. 226 F. App'x 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, the same reasoning applies. Sanders’s proposed instruction was about a secondary legal question—whether the Board was in violation of Tennessee licensing laws when it didn’t have a licensed cosmetology instructor on the premises of the school when Grainger started teaching there. This proposed instruction did not go the core issue in the case and did not impact the standard under which the jury determined whether Sanders was discriminated against. Thus, it was not plain error for the court to refuse to give the instruction. In fact, by giving the instruction that it did, the court aimed to ensure that the jury focused on the core issue. DE 118, Trial Tr., Page ID 2960 (“I want to add one other word to the third sentence, and that is this case is only about whether the board discriminated against Ms. Sanders based on her age. I’m just going to add that one word to be very clear with the jury that that’s what they are deciding and nothing else.”). Nor did any “grave miscarriage of justice” occur. Morrison, 594 F.3d at 546 (quotation omitted). The court’s instruction did not prohibit the jury from considering the -11- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. evidence it heard about state statutes or regulations, including testimony from the executive director of the Board of Cosmetology, as part of its evaluation of whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to find that the Board discriminated against Sanders. Thus, the district court did not plainly err when it declined to give Sanders’s proposed jury instruction, and Sanders’s second argument is unavailing. C. Finally, Sanders argues that the district court erred when it excluded evidence of the details of Sanders’s rejections from two other cosmetology instructor positions in the district as well as the ages and qualifications of the successful candidates, Kimberley Arnett and Lacey Hammock. She contends that this information was “important background evidence for the central issue in the case—whether Sumner County had discriminated against [her] based on her age.” CA6 R.39, Appellant’s Br. at 55–56. In response, the Board argues that Sanders’s counsel conceded that he would not “elicit any facts showing ‘discrimination.’” CA6 R.48, Appellee’s Br. at 65. Thus, the Board contends that Sanders cannot fairly claim on appeal that the court erred by excluding evidence of discrimination she agreed not to admit. We find the Board’s argument persuasive. Initially, Sanders’s counsel was clear that Sanders wanted the evidence introduced as “[o]ther acts of discrimination . . . admissible for background purposes.” DE 116, Trial Tr., Page ID 2489. Sanders’s counsel clarified to the court that Sanders was not seeking remedies for these separate hiring decisions and cited case law in support of the proposition that other acts of discrimination can be introduced as background evidence in support of an individual discrimination claim. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.”). The court then informed counsel that “going . . . down the path of you -12- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. discriminated against her here, and . . . you didn’t hire her for this job or that job” would be “403 territory.” DE 116, Trial Tr., Page ID 2490. Sanders’s counsel then said, “I’m not going to get into discriminat[ion], but I am going to say that [Sanders] applied and that Ms. Arnett was given the job.” Id. Based on this assertion, the court allowed in evidence about whether “[Sanders] appl[ied] for another position and didn’t get it” for the purposes of “show[ing] that she was trying to get jobs in Sumner County” as long as Sanders’s counsel did not argue that the reason she did not get these other positions was discrimination. Id. at 2491. In this circuit it is a “cardinal rule of appellate review” that a party cannot induce the court into an erroneous ruling, including rulings about the exclusion or inclusion of evidence, and “later seek[] to profit from the legal consequences of having that ruling set aside” on appeal. Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59, 60–61 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). This doctrine of invited error is based on the “principle that a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.” Id. at 60. This means that the doctrine of invited error prevents a party from inducing a court to follow a course of conduct and then “at a later stage of the case us[ing] the error to set aside the immediate consequences of the error.” Id. at 61; see also In re Bayer Healthcare & Merial Ltd. Flea Control Prods. Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 752 F.3d 1065, 1073 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that parties cannot “agree in open court with the district judge’s proposed course of conduct and [then] charge the court with error in following that course”). Here, by telling the court that she would not “get into discriminat[ion],” Sanders acceded to the court’s course of conduct and cannot fairly challenge it now. Even if the court erred in excluding testimony about this alleged discrimination, Sanders invited this error and waived her right to charge the district court with error on appeal. See In re Bayer, 752 F.3d at 1073–74; Harvis, 923 F.2d at 60–61. -13- No. 25-5773, Sanders v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. Furthermore, even if Sanders’s claim was not waived and an abuse of discretion standard applied, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the other-acts testimony. Without a “definite and firm conviction” that the court “committed a clear error of judgment,” we will leave its evidentiary rulings intact. United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 455 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). No such error occurred here. In the employment discrimination context, “‘other acts’ evidence” refers to testimony about discriminatory conduct within the same organization by or against people “who did not play a role” in the employment decision the plaintiff challenges. Griffin, 689 F.3d at 598. “Whether such evidence is relevant is a case-by-case determination that ‘depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.’” Id. (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008)). The district court here determined that the “other acts” evidence Sanders sought to introduce was minimally relevant, would distract from the other central issues in the case, and would unduly prejudice the school district. We should not disturb that reasonable conclusion. The 2021 and 2024 hiring decisions were temporally distinct and involved different decisionmakers working for different schools, each with different cosmetology programs and different hiring criteria as a result. See Griffin, 689 F.3d at 599 (identifying time, place, and identity of decisionmakers as factors bearing on admissibility). The court acted well within its discretion in limiting the testimony after weighing its probative value against the risk of prejudice and confusion. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. IV. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. -14-