Fishman v. City of New Rochelle
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-423
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-423
Fishman v. City of New Rochelle
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
ALISON J. NATHAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
MARC H. FISHMAN, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 25-423
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE,
Defendant-Appellee,
New Rochelle Police Department, Police
Officer Lane Schlesinger, Shield No. 1058,
Commissioner Joseph F. Schaller, Police
Detective W. Joseph, Shield No. 18, County
of Westchester, Robert Gazzola, in his
official capacity as Police Commissioner of
the City of New Rochelle Police
Department, Sergeant Myron Joseph,
Shield #18,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: CANER DEMIRAYAK, Law Office of Caner
Demirayak, Bronx, NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: LALIT K. LOOMBA, The Quinn Law Firm,
White Plains, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Nelson S. Román, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 22, 2025 judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
Marc Fishman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the City of New Rochelle (the “City”) on his claims under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794. In December
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2018, Fishman, who suffers from cognitive and hearing disabilities, was arrested
by the New Rochelle Police Department (“NRPD”) for violating an order of
protection entered against him by the Westchester County Family Court. He
subsequently sued the City, Westchester County, and several NRPD officials,
alleging that they violated his rights under the ADA and RA by refusing him
access to his “disability aide” and romantic partner, Isabel Bolivar, App’x at 76–
77, 224–25, 309, during his custodial interview at the police station. On appeal,
Fishman contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
the City because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to “whether [Fishman]
was reasonably accommodated” during his custodial interview. Fishman Br. at
4. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural
history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to resolve this
appeal.
I. Background.
On June 13, 2018, the Westchester County Family Court awarded Fishman’s
ex-wife, Jennifer Solomon, sole legal custody of their children and entered an order
of protection directing Fishman “to stay away from the children, their home, and
their schools, except for certain supervised parental [visits], until and including
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June 13, 2019.” Matter of Solomon v. Fishman, 120 N.Y.S.3d 340, 342 (2d Dep’t 2020);
see Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 28-2 (order of protection). On December 15, 2018, Bolivar
drove Fishman and Ann Elliott, a court-appointed visitation supervisor, to New
Rochelle for Fishman’s scheduled visit with his son. Instead of driving to the
meeting location, Bolivar drove them directly to Solomon’s house. When they
arrived, Fishman called out to his son, who was playing outside. Solomon saw
the interaction and called the NRPD to report Fishman’s violation of the order of
protection. Fishman, Bolivar, and Elliott then drove to the police station so
Fishman could (i) preemptively assert that Solomon had prevented him from
seeing his son and (ii) “try[] to explain” why his conduct was “permitted by the
custody and supervised visitation order.” Fishman Br. at 3.
When they arrived at the stationhouse, Officer Lane Schlesinger interviewed
Fishman. The parties dispute whether Fishman requested an accommodation
during his interview. Fishman argued below that he attempted to show
Schlesinger his “traumatic brain injury card” and requested that Bolivar be
allowed to accompany him into the interview – a request which was denied.
App’x at 54. The City, by contrast, asserted that, although Fishman informed
Schlesinger that he had a cognitive disability, Fishman did not request a specific
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accommodation and was “perfectly lucid in conversation.” Id. at 175 (¶¶ 55-56).
According to Schlesinger’s deposition testimony, Fishman’s “verbosity,” as well
as his “lack of any manifest difficulty in understanding or answering questions,”
led him to conclude that Fishman did not require an accommodation during his
custodial interview. Id. (¶ 56).
Ultimately, after conducting interviews, reviewing the order of protection,
and conferring with his supervisors, Schlesinger determined that he had probable
cause to believe that Fishman had violated the order of protection. Schlesinger
therefore arrested Fishman, who was eventually convicted of criminal contempt.
See N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50.
II. Discussion.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Knox v.
CRC Mgmt. Co., 134 F.4th 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2025). “Summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Galloway
v. County of Nassau, 141 F.4th 417, 422–23 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). Where, as here, “each side has moved for summary judgment, the district
court in entertaining the motions – and the court of appeals in reviewing the
district court’s decisions – are required to assess each motion on its own merits
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and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.” Wachovia Bank,
Nat’l Ass’n v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir.
2011). “Accordingly, in reviewing the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to [the City], we take the record in the light most favorable to
[Fishman].” Id.
Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A plaintiff asserting a
claim under Title II must demonstrate “(1) that [he] is a qualified individual with
a disability; (2) that [he] was excluded from participation in a public entity’s
services, programs[,] or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a
public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to [his]
disability.” Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds under a theory
that the defendant failed to make a reasonable accommodation, we ask “whether
a plaintiff with disabilities as a practical matter was denied meaningful access to
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services, programs[,] or activities to which he . . . was legally entitled.” Wright v.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added and internal
quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Fishman contends that the parties’ “disagreements on whether
[Fishman] request[ed] an accommodation create a dispute of material fact as to
whether [the City] failed to accommodate [Fishman].” Fishman Br. at 18 (quoting
Sp. App’x at 10). According to Fishman, Schlesinger “disregarded [Fishman’s]
demand for a reasonable accommodation” – namely, access to Bolivar – “and as a
result unlawfully arrested him.” Id. at 3. That was “discriminatory,” Fishman
maintains, because “it denied a disabled person the same access to the police
encounter as non-disabled persons.” Reply Br. at 10–11. We disagree.
Even viewing the evidence in his favor—and assuming that Title II applies
to police interrogations—Fishman received “meaningful access” to those services
to which he was “legally entitled” under the ADA. Wright, 831 F.3d at 72 (internal
quotation marks omitted). For starters, Schlesinger followed all applicable law-
enforcement protocols in conducting the investigation and effectuating the arrest.
To fully apprise himself of the situation, Schlesinger interviewed Fishman,
Solomon, and Elliott. He also reviewed the order of protection before conferring
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with his supervisors as to the proper course of action. Only then did Schlesinger
determine that Fishman’s actions “violated the order [of protection],” App’x at
264, and that “[t]here was probable cause to make the arrest,” id. at 269, for a
violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50. On this record, no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the Schlesinger’s purported refusal to honor Fishman’s
accommodation request denied him “effective access,” Wright, 831 F.3d at 73, to
“the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132.
In response, Fishman offers a grab bag of hypotheticals. Had Bolivar been
permitted to accompany him into the custodial interview, he argues, she would
have been able to (i) “give a third perspective on what happened that day,” App’x
at 56; (ii) “isolate the portions of the order of protection that have a carve-out for
visitation,” Fishman Br. at 10; and (iii) “explain” to Schlesinger that Fishman had
not violated the order of protection, id. Assuming Bolivar succeeded in
convincing Schlesinger that “[Fishman’s] conduct was legal,” id. at 13, Fishman
insists he would not have been “convicted of crimes he was actually innocent of”
or “lost $150,000 in income as a result of the [ten]-month suspension of his real
estate broker’s license” following his conviction. Id. at 14.
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Once again, we are unpersuaded. It is well established that “[t]he ADA
mandates reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in order to put
them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does not authorize a
preference for disabled people generally.” Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d
102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). The record is clear that Schlesinger was
able to understand Fishman’s view “that Ms. Solomon violated the custody order,
and that [Fishman] was being deprived of his rights.” App’x at 132. Schlesinger
nevertheless determined that he had probable cause to arrest Fishman for violating
the order of protection; once he had done that, he was not required to give Bolivar
a crack at more effectively making Fishman’s case for why he had not done so.
Cf. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
government “cannot have unlawfully discriminated against [the plaintiffs] by
denying a benefit that it provides to no one.”). Indeed, we have long held that
“once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause,
he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of
innocence before making an arrest.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir.
2006) (alteration adopted); see also Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989)
(emphasizing that “[i]t would be unreasonable and impractical to require that
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every innocent explanation for activity that suggests criminal behavior be proved
wrong, or even contradicted, before an arrest”). In stringing together a series of
“what-ifs,” Fishman seeks little more than to relitigate his criminal-contempt
conviction through the ADA and RA. Neither statute provides an avenue for
doing so.
Put simply, because nothing in the record indicates that Fishman was
“denied meaningful access to services, programs[,] or activities to which he . . .
was legally entitled,” Wright, 831 F.3d at 72, the district court properly granted
summary judgment to the City on his ADA claim. 1
* * *
We have considered Fishman’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1“Because [s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA impose identical requirements,”
Fishman’s RA claim also fails as a matter of law. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618
(2d Cir. 1999).
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