Full Opinion

25-423 Fishman v. City of New Rochelle UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ MARC H. FISHMAN, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-423 CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, Defendant-Appellee, New Rochelle Police Department, Police Officer Lane Schlesinger, Shield No. 1058, Commissioner Joseph F. Schaller, Police Detective W. Joseph, Shield No. 18, County of Westchester, Robert Gazzola, in his official capacity as Police Commissioner of the City of New Rochelle Police Department, Sergeant Myron Joseph, Shield #18, Defendants. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: CANER DEMIRAYAK, Law Office of Caner Demirayak, Bronx, NY. For Defendant-Appellee: LALIT K. LOOMBA, The Quinn Law Firm, White Plains, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Nelson S. Román, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 22, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Marc Fishman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of New Rochelle (the “City”) on his claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794. In December 2 2018, Fishman, who suffers from cognitive and hearing disabilities, was arrested by the New Rochelle Police Department (“NRPD”) for violating an order of protection entered against him by the Westchester County Family Court. He subsequently sued the City, Westchester County, and several NRPD officials, alleging that they violated his rights under the ADA and RA by refusing him access to his “disability aide” and romantic partner, Isabel Bolivar, App’x at 76– 77, 224–25, 309, during his custodial interview at the police station. On appeal, Fishman contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to “whether [Fishman] was reasonably accommodated” during his custodial interview. Fishman Br. at 4. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to resolve this appeal. I. Background. On June 13, 2018, the Westchester County Family Court awarded Fishman’s ex-wife, Jennifer Solomon, sole legal custody of their children and entered an order of protection directing Fishman “to stay away from the children, their home, and their schools, except for certain supervised parental [visits], until and including 3 June 13, 2019.” Matter of Solomon v. Fishman, 120 N.Y.S.3d 340, 342 (2d Dep’t 2020); see Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 28-2 (order of protection). On December 15, 2018, Bolivar drove Fishman and Ann Elliott, a court-appointed visitation supervisor, to New Rochelle for Fishman’s scheduled visit with his son. Instead of driving to the meeting location, Bolivar drove them directly to Solomon’s house. When they arrived, Fishman called out to his son, who was playing outside. Solomon saw the interaction and called the NRPD to report Fishman’s violation of the order of protection. Fishman, Bolivar, and Elliott then drove to the police station so Fishman could (i) preemptively assert that Solomon had prevented him from seeing his son and (ii) “try[] to explain” why his conduct was “permitted by the custody and supervised visitation order.” Fishman Br. at 3. When they arrived at the stationhouse, Officer Lane Schlesinger interviewed Fishman. The parties dispute whether Fishman requested an accommodation during his interview. Fishman argued below that he attempted to show Schlesinger his “traumatic brain injury card” and requested that Bolivar be allowed to accompany him into the interview – a request which was denied. App’x at 54. The City, by contrast, asserted that, although Fishman informed Schlesinger that he had a cognitive disability, Fishman did not request a specific 4 accommodation and was “perfectly lucid in conversation.” Id. at 175 (¶¶ 55-56). According to Schlesinger’s deposition testimony, Fishman’s “verbosity,” as well as his “lack of any manifest difficulty in understanding or answering questions,” led him to conclude that Fishman did not require an accommodation during his custodial interview. Id. (¶ 56). Ultimately, after conducting interviews, reviewing the order of protection, and conferring with his supervisors, Schlesinger determined that he had probable cause to believe that Fishman had violated the order of protection. Schlesinger therefore arrested Fishman, who was eventually convicted of criminal contempt. See N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50. II. Discussion. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., 134 F.4th 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2025). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Galloway v. County of Nassau, 141 F.4th 417, 422–23 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Where, as here, “each side has moved for summary judgment, the district court in entertaining the motions – and the court of appeals in reviewing the district court’s decisions – are required to assess each motion on its own merits 5 and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2011). “Accordingly, in reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to [the City], we take the record in the light most favorable to [Fishman].” Id. Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A plaintiff asserting a claim under Title II must demonstrate “(1) that [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that [he] was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services, programs[,] or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to [his] disability.” Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds under a theory that the defendant failed to make a reasonable accommodation, we ask “whether a plaintiff with disabilities as a practical matter was denied meaningful access to 6 services, programs[,] or activities to which he . . . was legally entitled.” Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Fishman contends that the parties’ “disagreements on whether [Fishman] request[ed] an accommodation create a dispute of material fact as to whether [the City] failed to accommodate [Fishman].” Fishman Br. at 18 (quoting Sp. App’x at 10). According to Fishman, Schlesinger “disregarded [Fishman’s] demand for a reasonable accommodation” – namely, access to Bolivar – “and as a result unlawfully arrested him.” Id. at 3. That was “discriminatory,” Fishman maintains, because “it denied a disabled person the same access to the police encounter as non-disabled persons.” Reply Br. at 10–11. We disagree. Even viewing the evidence in his favor—and assuming that Title II applies to police interrogations—Fishman received “meaningful access” to those services to which he was “legally entitled” under the ADA. Wright, 831 F.3d at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted). For starters, Schlesinger followed all applicable law- enforcement protocols in conducting the investigation and effectuating the arrest. To fully apprise himself of the situation, Schlesinger interviewed Fishman, Solomon, and Elliott. He also reviewed the order of protection before conferring 7 with his supervisors as to the proper course of action. Only then did Schlesinger determine that Fishman’s actions “violated the order [of protection],” App’x at 264, and that “[t]here was probable cause to make the arrest,” id. at 269, for a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50. On this record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Schlesinger’s purported refusal to honor Fishman’s accommodation request denied him “effective access,” Wright, 831 F.3d at 73, to “the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In response, Fishman offers a grab bag of hypotheticals. Had Bolivar been permitted to accompany him into the custodial interview, he argues, she would have been able to (i) “give a third perspective on what happened that day,” App’x at 56; (ii) “isolate the portions of the order of protection that have a carve-out for visitation,” Fishman Br. at 10; and (iii) “explain” to Schlesinger that Fishman had not violated the order of protection, id. Assuming Bolivar succeeded in convincing Schlesinger that “[Fishman’s] conduct was legal,” id. at 13, Fishman insists he would not have been “convicted of crimes he was actually innocent of” or “lost $150,000 in income as a result of the [ten]-month suspension of his real estate broker’s license” following his conviction. Id. at 14. 8 Once again, we are unpersuaded. It is well established that “[t]he ADA mandates reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in order to put them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does not authorize a preference for disabled people generally.” Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). The record is clear that Schlesinger was able to understand Fishman’s view “that Ms. Solomon violated the custody order, and that [Fishman] was being deprived of his rights.” App’x at 132. Schlesinger nevertheless determined that he had probable cause to arrest Fishman for violating the order of protection; once he had done that, he was not required to give Bolivar a crack at more effectively making Fishman’s case for why he had not done so. Cf. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the government “cannot have unlawfully discriminated against [the plaintiffs] by denying a benefit that it provides to no one.”). Indeed, we have long held that “once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration adopted); see also Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that “[i]t would be unreasonable and impractical to require that 9 every innocent explanation for activity that suggests criminal behavior be proved wrong, or even contradicted, before an arrest”). In stringing together a series of “what-ifs,” Fishman seeks little more than to relitigate his criminal-contempt conviction through the ADA and RA. Neither statute provides an avenue for doing so. Put simply, because nothing in the record indicates that Fishman was “denied meaningful access to services, programs[,] or activities to which he . . . was legally entitled,” Wright, 831 F.3d at 72, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City on his ADA claim. 1 * * * We have considered Fishman’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 1“Because [s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA impose identical requirements,” Fishman’s RA claim also fails as a matter of law. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999). 10