Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketAC48207
JudgeWestbrook; Pierson; DiPentima
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
& OPPORTUNITIES ET AL.
(AC 48207)
Westbrook, Pierson and DiPentima, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff employer appealed from the trial court’s judgment affirming
the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni-
ties concluding that the plaintiff discriminated against the defendant C by
terminating her employment on the basis of disability. C had been diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and approved for the state’s
medical marijuana program prior to the termination of her employment
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
upheld the commission’s determination that C established a prima facie case
of disability discrimination. Held:
The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the establishment of a prima
facie case of disability discrimination was unavailing, as the evidence in the
record demonstrated the plaintiff’s awareness of C’s disability, including C’s
medical diagnosis with PTSD and referral to the state’s medical marijuana
program, which was faxed to the plaintiff six days prior to the plaintiff’s
termination of C’s employment.
The trial court properly determined that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the commission’s findings of pretext and intentional discrimination, as
the commission found that the plaintiff gave shifting explanations for the
termination of C’s employment, and the commission rejected the plaintiff’s
stated reason for terminating C’s employment, finding it to be untrue.
Argued September 15—officially released November 17, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the human rights referee of
the named defendant sustaining a complaint of disability
discrimination filed by the defendant Latoya Council,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain and tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment
affirming in part the decision of the referee, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
Elizabeth McKenna, with whom, on the brief, were
Lori B. Alexander and Matthew W. Beckwith, for the
appellant (plaintiff).
Catherine M. Spain, for the appellee (named defen-
dant).
Opinion
PIERSON, J. The plaintiff, Charter Communications,
LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirm-
ing in relevant part the decision of the named defendant,
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (com-
mission), concluding that the plaintiff discriminated
against the defendant Latoya Council by terminating
her employment on the basis of disability. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the court improperly upheld
the commission’s determination that (1) Council estab-
lished a prima facie case of disability discrimination and
(2) the plaintiff’s proffered reason for the termination
was pretextual. We disagree and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the commission’s
presiding human rights referee (referee), and procedural
history are relevant to this appeal. Council began her
full-time employment as a strategic accounts coordina-
tor with the plaintiff on August 12, 2014. Aside from
some incidents of tardiness, Council was an excellent
employee who worked hard, completed her assignments,
achieved expected performance, and was willing to take
on additional assignments; oftentimes, she completed
her existing work more quickly than her coworkers.
As a condition of her employment, Council consented
to the plaintiff’s policies, which included a drug-free
workplace policy. The policy prohibits employees from
being under the influence of marijuana while working
and from possessing or using it while on the plaintiff’s
property. The policy also mandates drug testing in cer-
tain circumstances, including where the plaintiff has
reason to believe, or a reasonable suspicion, that the
employee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol while
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
working. Under the policy, an employee who tests posi-
tive or refuses to assent to a test as prescribed is subject
to the immediate termination of their employment.
On May 23, 2016, Jane Buckley, an advanced practice
registered nurse, assessed Council and determined that
she met the criteria for chronic post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Buckley referred Council to Judith
Major, a medical doctor, with whom Council consulted on
May 25, 2016. Dr. Major confirmed the PTSD diagnosis
and recommended Council for the Connecticut medical
marijuana program.
On June 8, 2016, while driving to work, Council
observed that her car’s oil check light was illuminated,
despite her having had the car’s oil changed the day
before. After arriving at work, Council parked her car
in the plaintiff’s parking lot and entered the building.
During one of her work breaks, she went outside to check
the car’s oil and experienced difficulty repositioning
the oil dip stick. Two of her coworkers, Norm Sherents
and Noel Machado, who were walking nearby, stopped
to assist, and Machado replaced the dip stick. While
assisting Council, both Sherents and Machado detected
an odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Neither
Sherents nor Machado observed Council smoking or
possessing marijuana, or any smoke emanating from
Council’s car. After assisting Council, Sherents—who
believed that Council had used marijuana, either on or
off the plaintiff’s property—reported his observations
to his supervisor, Jesse Walker. After her break, Council
returned to work; the incident was not discussed with
her that day.
On June 9, 2016, Walker informed Jennie Barbot, the
plaintiff’s human resource officer, of Sherents’ report.
Sometime after Council arrived at work, Barbot called
her into an office.1 Barbot informed Council that she
1
Barbot also interviewed Sherents and Machado. In connection with
its investigation of the matter, however, the plaintiff did not inter-
view coworkers who sat in cubicles adjoining Council’s. Moreover,
the plaintiff’s Newtown office had external cameras affixed to every
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
was following up on a report that on June 8, 2016, her
car smelled of marijuana. Barbot asked if she used mari-
juana, to which Council replied that she had not used
marijuana on the plaintiff’s property or while at work
and that she was not the only individual who used the
car. Council stated, however, that she had consumed
marijuana within the previous thirty days, had applied
for the state medical marijuana program, and had a
medical marijuana card.2 Because Council did not have
the card with her, Barbot requested verification of Coun-
cil’s status from Dr. Major. Barbot also asked Council
why she used marijuana. Council did not share that she
had PTSD because she did not feel comfortable doing so.
Following Barbot’s June 9, 2016 conversation with
Council, Dr. Major faxed Barbot a note stating that
Council had been diagnosed with PTSD and been recom-
mended for the medical marijuana program.
The next day, June 10, 2016, and at the plaintiff’s
direction, Council submitted to an oral saliva drug test.
As of that date, the plaintiff had been notified that Coun-
cil had a PTSD diagnosis with a related physician recom-
mendation for medical marijuana. Council took the test,
and the plaintiff placed Council on paid leave pending
the test result. Council tested positive for marijuana on
June 15, 2016. That same day, the plaintiff terminated
Council’s employment for violating its drug-free work-
place policy.
On October 19, 2016, Council filed a complaint with the
commission in which she alleged, among other claims,3
corner of the building. The plaintiff did not review video footage from
the outdoor cameras that would have recorded Council in the parking
lot on June 8, 2016.
2
On or about July 7, 2016, Council completed her application for
Connecticut’s medical marijuana program. She was approved for the
program on July 26, 2016, with an effective certification date retroactive
to May 25, 2016, the date of her appointment with Dr. Major. Council
received her physical medical marijuana card sometime in late July.
3
In addition to alleging employment discrimination under the Con-
necticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et
seq., Council asserted violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
employment discrimination under the Connecticut Fair
Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes
§ 46a-51 et seq.4 A public hearing was held before the
referee on October 12 and 13, 2022. On May 17, 2023, the
referee issued a final decision in which he determined that
the plaintiff discriminated against Council by terminat-
ing her employment on the basis of mental disability. In
addition to other relief, the referee ordered the plaintiff
to pay Council $62,530.5 The plaintiff appealed this order
to the Superior Court. On November 1, 2024, the court,
Budzik, J., affirmed the referee’s conclusion that the
plaintiff discriminated intentionally against Council,
holding that there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the referee’s decision. This appeal followed.
At the outset, we set forth the well settled legal prin-
ciples governing this appeal. “Our review of an agency’s
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, Council claimed that
the plaintiff (1) retaliated against her by terminating her employment
and appealing her unemployment claims, (2) harassed her by repeat-
edly discussing her tardiness, (3) failed to reasonably accommodate
her disability, (4) discriminated against her on the basis of disability
under the ADA, and (5) failed to engage in an interactive dialogue
concerning potential reasonable accommodations for her disability.
The referee denied Council’s retaliation, harassment, and reasonable
accommodation claims. The referee concluded, however, that Council
established disability discrimination under the ADA and, further, that
the plaintiff failed to engage in an interactive dialogue with Council.
The referee also granted certain injunctive relief. The trial court vacated
the referee’s conclusions as to disability discrimination under the ADA
and the plaintiff’s failure to engage in an interactive dialogue, as well
as its injunctive orders pertaining to the plaintiff’s treatment of the
termination of Council’s employment and her personnel file. Council
does not challenge these rulings on appeal.
4
Council brought her CFEPA employment discrimination claim under
General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) (1). General Statutes (Rev.
to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discrimina-
tory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the
employer or the employer’s agent . . . to discharge from employment
any individual or to discriminate against such individual . . . because of
the individual’s . . . present or past history of mental disability . . . .”
5
The referee also ordered the plaintiff to pay $9646 to the state as
reimbursement for unemployment compensation and dependency allow-
ances paid to Council by the state.
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
factual determination is constrained by General Stat-
utes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. . . . [I]t is
[not] the function of the trial court [or] of this court
to retry the case . . . . An agency’s factual determina-
tion must be sustained if it is reasonably supported by
substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. . . .
Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record
affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . This substantial
evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less
judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of
the evidence standard of review. . . .
“More specifically, in defining substantial evidence in
the directed verdict formulation, [our Supreme Court]
has said that it is something less than the weight of the
evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsis-
tent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from being supported
by substantial evidence. . . . As a result, [i]n determining
whether an administrative finding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, the reviewing court must defer to the
agency’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. . . .
Ultimately, [t]he question is not whether the trial court
would have reached the same conclusion but whether the
record before the [agency] supports the action taken.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities, 347 Conn. 241, 246–47, 297 A.3d 167
(2023).
In employment discrimination cases, “[t]he frame-
work [the] court employs . . . under Connecticut law was
adapted from the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell
Douglas), and its progeny. . . . Under this analysis . . .
for the employee to first make a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, the [employee] must show: (1) the [employee]
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
is a member of a protected class; (2) the [employee] was
qualified for the position; (3) the [employee] suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employ-
ment action occurred under circumstances that give rise
to an inference of discrimination. . . . The employer may
then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justification for the employment deci-
sion in question. . . . This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. . . .
The employee then must demonstrate that the reason
proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that
the decision actually was motivated by illegal discrimina-
tory bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford
Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, supra, 347 Conn. 257.
I
To begin, the plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred in concluding that there was substantial evidence
in the record to support the establishment of a prima
facie case of disability discrimination under CFEPA.
We disagree.
General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) provides
in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice
in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the
employer or the employer’s agent . . . to discharge from
employment any individual or to discriminate against
such individual . . . because of the individual’s . . . pres-
ent or past history of mental disability . . . .” General
Statutes § 46a-51 (20) defines “ ‘[m]ental disability’ ”
as “refer[ring] to an individual who has a record of, or
is regarded as having one or more mental disorders,
as defined in the most recent edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders.’ ”6 The referee determined
that the defendants established a prima facie case of dis-
ability discrimination under General Statutes (Rev. to
6
Although General Statutes § 46a-51 has been amended several times
since the events at issue in this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No.
25-139, § 2; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
2015) § 46a-60 because Council had PTSD as defined by
the American Psychiatric Association,7 the termination
of her employment was an adverse employment action,
and her employment was terminated shortly after the
plaintiff learned of her diagnosis, thereby permitting an
inference of discrimination. The trial court determined
there was substantial evidence in the record to support
these conclusions. We agree.
First, the finding that Council had a disability, and
was therefore a member of a protected class, is supported
by evidence of Council’s PTSD. The referee credited
Dr. Major’s note containing that diagnosis. As both
the referee and trial court noted, PTSD is a condition
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5). See American Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed.
2013) pp. 271–80.8 Second, the plaintiff does not dispute
case. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of
the statute.
7
The plaintiff argues that “[t]he referee’s determination that [the
plaintiff] regarded Council as having a disability under the [Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)] and the CFEPA was erroneous as a matter
of law and fact, [and] that determination, which was essential to the
referee’s conclusion that Council had made out a prima facie case of
disability discrimination, must be vacated.” (Emphasis added.) This
argument regarding the referee’s finding is inapposite.
First, we note that the referee used the “regarded as” language in
adjudicating Council’s ADA claim. The trial court, however, vacated
the finding that Council had a disability under the ADA because her
PTSD did not substantially limit a major life activity, as required by
the ADA. Neither party challenges that conclusion here.
Second, the referee determined that, under CFEPA, Council “has a
mental disability, PTSD, as defined in the most recent edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s [D]iagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders.” (Emphasis added.) A fair reading of this finding
demonstrates that the referee did not determine that the plaintiff
regarded Council as having a disability but, rather, that Council has
a disability.
8
Since the publication of the fifth edition of the DSM-5 in 2013,
which was the edition in effect in 2016, a text revision was published
in 2022 (DSM-5-TR). The DSM-5-TR also includes PTSD as a diagnosis.
See American Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (5th Ed. Text Rev. 2022) pp. 301–13.
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
that Council was qualified for her position.9 Third, there
was uncontroverted evidence to support the finding
that Council suffered an adverse employment action,
including testimony from Council and the plaintiff’s
human resources senior manager, Marian VanLenten,
that Council’s employment was terminated.
The plaintiff’s argument on appeal centers on the last
element necessary to establish a prima facie case of dis-
ability discrimination, namely, whether the evidence
supported a finding that the termination of the plaintiff’s
employment took place under circumstances permitting
an inference of discrimination. The plaintiff contends
that “[t]he only reasonable inference from the evidence
in this case is that . . . Council’s diagnosis played no role
in” the plaintiff’s termination of her employment.10
According to the plaintiff, the referee’s conclusion was
merely speculative, particularly in light of the evidence
supporting a reasonable suspicion that Council violated
its drug-free workplace policy. The plaintiff maintains
that, “[o]ther than knowing the name of her medical
9
When the issue is irrelevant, our appellate courts have stated that
qualification for a position is not an element of the employee’s prima
facie case. See Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App.
312, 330, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015) (“[i]f . . . the question of qualification
is not relevant to the main question of whether there was discrimina-
tion, our Supreme Court holds that no such showing is necessary on the
part of the plaintiff”), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016); see
also Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 514 n.34, 43 A.3d 69
(2012) (“In some employment contexts, such as claims involving hiring,
promoting or granting tenure, the plaintiff must show that she was
qualified to hold her employment position . . . . The test for establishing
disparate treatment in employment is flexible, however. . . . Because . . .
the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified for her position is
not relevant to the question of whether she was subjected to harsher
discipline than other employees on the basis of her race, we conclude
that it is not an element of her prima facie case.” (Citations omitted.));
cf. Curry v. Allen S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 398–99, 944 A.2d
925 (2008) (requiring terminated employee to show qualification to con-
tinue job where employer’s stated reason for termination was grounded
in whether employee could perform his job).
10
To the extent these arguments rely on the referee’s determinations
with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, see footnote 7 of
this opinion.
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
condition through the mention of PTSD in Dr. Major’s
single medical note, no evidence was presented that any
decision maker at [the plaintiff] had any other informa-
tion about her medical condition.”
It is axiomatic that we may not “substitute [our] judg-
ment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evi-
dence on questions of fact” and “the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn.
246–47. Put differently, “[o]ur deferential standard of
review allows for the record to contain competing evi-
dence that would allow a different fact finder to reach a
different conclusion.” Id., 248. Although an inference
of discrimination cannot rest merely on “speculation
of discrimination,” the evidence needed to support it
is “minimal and need not reach the level required to
support a jury verdict in the [terminated employee’s]
favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 260.
“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference
of discriminatory intent may include . . . the sequence
of events leading to the [employee’s] discharge . . . or
the timing of the discharge . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
The substantial evidence supports a finding that the
termination of Council’s employment occurred under
circumstances permitting an inference of discrimina-
tion. The referee credited the following evidence of the
plaintiff’s awareness of Council’s disability before ter-
minating her employment, as well as the sequence of
events giving rise to a permissible inference of pretext:
Buckley diagnosed Council with PTSD on May 23, 2016;
Dr. Major confirmed that diagnosis and recommended
Council for the Connecticut medical marijuana program
on May 25, 2016; and Dr. Major faxed to the plaintiff
verification of Council’s diagnosis and recommendation
for the program on June 9, 2016, just six days before
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
Council’s employment was terminated on June 15, 2016.
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the referee to
find that, at the time it terminated her employment, the
plaintiff was aware of both Council’s disability and refer-
ral to the medical marijuana program. For these reasons,
there was substantial evidence in the record to establish
a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
II
The plaintiff also argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the referee’s determination that
the plaintiff’s justification for the adverse employment
action was pretextual. We are not persuaded.
Employment discrimination may “be proven either
directly, with evidence that the employer was motivated
by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly, by proving that
the reason given by the employer was pretextual.” Jacobs
v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 401, 880 A.2d
151 (2005). To meet that burden, “[e]vidence establishing
the falsity of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
advanced by the employer may be, in and of itself, enough
to support the trier of fact’s ultimate finding of inten-
tional discrimination.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 276. “For
falsity to establish pretext, the [terminated employee]
must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action
that a reasonable [fact finder] could rationally find them
unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer
did not act for [the asserted nondiscriminatory] reasons.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 277.
In reviewing a referee’s finding that the reason
advanced by an employer for an adverse employment
action was pretextual, courts must be mindful of the
“highly deferential standard of review, which requires
that a reviewing court abide by a referee’s credibility
findings and requires a relatively low level of proof, i.e.,
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
‘something less than the weight of the evidence . . . .’ ”
Id., 278. “[T]his standard is more deferential than the
standard of review applied to findings of fact made by
trial courts or juries.” Id. “[S]pecific pieces of evidence,
when viewed in isolation, may not be sufficient to support
an inference of discrimination beyond mere conjecture
or surmise. Nevertheless, evidence is not to be viewed
in a vacuum.” Board of Education v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 517,
832 A.2d 660 (2003).
The plaintiff asserts that it had a nondiscriminatory
justification for the termination of Council’s employ-
ment, namely, that Council violated the drug-free work-
place policy by testing positive for marijuana. The referee
disbelieved the plaintiff’s proffered justification, finding
that it was false and pretextual. The referee’s finding
of pretext was based on evidence (1) of the plaintiff’s
shifting explanations for the termination of Council’s
employment, and (2) that Council did not violate the
drug-free workplace policy.
First, the referee found that the plaintiff gave shifting
explanations for the termination of Council’s employ-
ment. Specifically, at the public hearing before the com-
mission, the plaintiff cited as reasons for termination
both Council’s tardiness and her inaccurate represen-
tation that, on June 9, 2016, she had a medical mari-
juana card. As observed by the referee, the only reason
provided by the plaintiff for Council’s discharge prior
to the public hearing was the purported violation of the
plaintiff’s drug policy, not tardiness or misrepresenta-
tions about her medical marijuana card. See, e.g., Weiss
v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 332 Fed. Appx. 659, 663 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“[i]nconsistent or even post-hoc explanations
for a termination decision may suggest discriminatory
motive”); Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital,
196 F.3d 89, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1999) (varying justifications
are sufficient to suggest pretext).
Second, the referee rejected the plaintiff’s reason
for terminating Council’s employment, finding it to be
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
untrue. The plaintiff’s stated reason for terminating
Council’s employment was that she violated the drug-
free workplace policy by using or possessing marijuana
on the plaintiff’s property, or otherwise working under
the influence of marijuana.11 The referee concluded that
this justification was false because there was no credible
evidence that Council violated the policy.12 As noted by
the referee, Council “was not observed smoking mari-
juana. She did not slur her words. She was not observed
in the possession of any drugs. No smoke was observed
coming from her vehicle. She did not appear to be under
the influence of any substance. There was no evidence
of any impairment impacting her work.” As the policy
prohibits the use and possession of marijuana on the
plaintiff’s property, and working while under its influ-
ence, the evidence supports the conclusion that Council
11
We reject the plaintiff’s argument that the referee and the trial
court misapplied the proper legal standard by placing the burden on the
plaintiff to prove that its justification was not pretextual and that its
determination that Council violated the policy was factually correct. The
referee determined properly that Council met her burden of establish-
ing pretext and intentional discrimination because she illustrated the
falsity of the proffered nondiscriminatory reason and, further, that the
plaintiff’s decision was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias. See
Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportuni-
ties, supra, 347 Conn. 257 (“The employer may then rebut the prima
facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for
the employment decision in question. . . . The employee then must dem-
onstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext
and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory
bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
12
The referee’s credibility assessment was based, in part, on the incon-
sistent testimony of Sherents and Machado with respect to whether
Council was under the influence of marijuana at work. As the referee
explained, “Sherents smelled marijuana on [Council]. [Machado] only
smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. [Machado] thought
that [Council] seemed giggly, silly, and under the influence. [Sherents]
thought she was not under the influence but rather that she was frus-
trated, frantic, and unnerved over her car problems. [Sherents’] testi-
mony was inconsistent. He first testified that [Council] was not under
the influence of any drugs. . . . He later testified that she was under
the influence.” (Citations omitted.) These factual findings support the
referee’s determination that Council’s employment was not terminated
for violating the drug policy but, rather, that the termination of her
employment was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.
Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities
did not violate the policy’s terms and the plaintiff’s
reason for terminating her employment was false. The
referee’s finding of falsity, taken together with Council’s
prima facie case, is sufficient to establish pretext.13 See
Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 282.
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
that the trial court properly determined that the evidence
was sufficient to support the referee’s findings of pretext
and intentional discrimination.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
13
The plaintiff argues that the evidence presented should have been
interpreted differently in support of a finding that the plaintiff did
not discriminate against Council. As noted previously, however, the
applicable standard of review prohibits reversal on the ground that
separate fact finders could reach different conclusions. See Hartford
Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra,
347 Conn. 274 n.18 (“the more deferential standard of review of an
administrative agency decision allow[s] for the possibility that one fact
finder might come to a conclusion different from another fact finder on
the same evidence and neither would be reversible”).