Full Opinion

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & OPPORTUNITIES ET AL. (AC 48207) Westbrook, Pierson and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff employer appealed from the trial court’s judgment affirming the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni- ties concluding that the plaintiff discriminated against the defendant C by terminating her employment on the basis of disability. C had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and approved for the state’s medical marijuana program prior to the termination of her employment by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly upheld the commission’s determination that C established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Held: The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding there was substantial evidence in the record to support the establishment of a prima facie case of disability discrimination was unavailing, as the evidence in the record demonstrated the plaintiff’s awareness of C’s disability, including C’s medical diagnosis with PTSD and referral to the state’s medical marijuana program, which was faxed to the plaintiff six days prior to the plaintiff’s termination of C’s employment. The trial court properly determined that the evidence was sufficient to sup- port the commission’s findings of pretext and intentional discrimination, as the commission found that the plaintiff gave shifting explanations for the termination of C’s employment, and the commission rejected the plaintiff’s stated reason for terminating C’s employment, finding it to be untrue. Argued September 15—officially released November 17, 2026 Procedural History Appeal from the decision of the human rights referee of the named defendant sustaining a complaint of disability discrimination filed by the defendant Latoya Council, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment affirming in part the decision of the referee, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities Elizabeth McKenna, with whom, on the brief, were Lori B. Alexander and Matthew W. Beckwith, for the appellant (plaintiff). Catherine M. Spain, for the appellee (named defen- dant). Opinion PIERSON, J. The plaintiff, Charter Communications, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirm- ing in relevant part the decision of the named defendant, Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (com- mission), concluding that the plaintiff discriminated against the defendant Latoya Council by terminating her employment on the basis of disability. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly upheld the commission’s determination that (1) Council estab- lished a prima facie case of disability discrimination and (2) the plaintiff’s proffered reason for the termination was pretextual. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as found by the commission’s presiding human rights referee (referee), and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Council began her full-time employment as a strategic accounts coordina- tor with the plaintiff on August 12, 2014. Aside from some incidents of tardiness, Council was an excellent employee who worked hard, completed her assignments, achieved expected performance, and was willing to take on additional assignments; oftentimes, she completed her existing work more quickly than her coworkers. As a condition of her employment, Council consented to the plaintiff’s policies, which included a drug-free workplace policy. The policy prohibits employees from being under the influence of marijuana while working and from possessing or using it while on the plaintiff’s property. The policy also mandates drug testing in cer- tain circumstances, including where the plaintiff has reason to believe, or a reasonable suspicion, that the employee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol while Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities working. Under the policy, an employee who tests posi- tive or refuses to assent to a test as prescribed is subject to the immediate termination of their employment. On May 23, 2016, Jane Buckley, an advanced practice registered nurse, assessed Council and determined that she met the criteria for chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Buckley referred Council to Judith Major, a medical doctor, with whom Council consulted on May 25, 2016. Dr. Major confirmed the PTSD diagnosis and recommended Council for the Connecticut medical marijuana program. On June 8, 2016, while driving to work, Council observed that her car’s oil check light was illuminated, despite her having had the car’s oil changed the day before. After arriving at work, Council parked her car in the plaintiff’s parking lot and entered the building. During one of her work breaks, she went outside to check the car’s oil and experienced difficulty repositioning the oil dip stick. Two of her coworkers, Norm Sherents and Noel Machado, who were walking nearby, stopped to assist, and Machado replaced the dip stick. While assisting Council, both Sherents and Machado detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Neither Sherents nor Machado observed Council smoking or possessing marijuana, or any smoke emanating from Council’s car. After assisting Council, Sherents—who believed that Council had used marijuana, either on or off the plaintiff’s property—reported his observations to his supervisor, Jesse Walker. After her break, Council returned to work; the incident was not discussed with her that day. On June 9, 2016, Walker informed Jennie Barbot, the plaintiff’s human resource officer, of Sherents’ report. Sometime after Council arrived at work, Barbot called her into an office.1 Barbot informed Council that she 1 Barbot also interviewed Sherents and Machado. In connection with its investigation of the matter, however, the plaintiff did not inter- view coworkers who sat in cubicles adjoining Council’s. Moreover, the plaintiff’s Newtown office had external cameras affixed to every Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities was following up on a report that on June 8, 2016, her car smelled of marijuana. Barbot asked if she used mari- juana, to which Council replied that she had not used marijuana on the plaintiff’s property or while at work and that she was not the only individual who used the car. Council stated, however, that she had consumed marijuana within the previous thirty days, had applied for the state medical marijuana program, and had a medical marijuana card.2 Because Council did not have the card with her, Barbot requested verification of Coun- cil’s status from Dr. Major. Barbot also asked Council why she used marijuana. Council did not share that she had PTSD because she did not feel comfortable doing so. Following Barbot’s June 9, 2016 conversation with Council, Dr. Major faxed Barbot a note stating that Council had been diagnosed with PTSD and been recom- mended for the medical marijuana program. The next day, June 10, 2016, and at the plaintiff’s direction, Council submitted to an oral saliva drug test. As of that date, the plaintiff had been notified that Coun- cil had a PTSD diagnosis with a related physician recom- mendation for medical marijuana. Council took the test, and the plaintiff placed Council on paid leave pending the test result. Council tested positive for marijuana on June 15, 2016. That same day, the plaintiff terminated Council’s employment for violating its drug-free work- place policy. On October 19, 2016, Council filed a complaint with the commission in which she alleged, among other claims,3 corner of the building. The plaintiff did not review video footage from the outdoor cameras that would have recorded Council in the parking lot on June 8, 2016. 2 On or about July 7, 2016, Council completed her application for Connecticut’s medical marijuana program. She was approved for the program on July 26, 2016, with an effective certification date retroactive to May 25, 2016, the date of her appointment with Dr. Major. Council received her physical medical marijuana card sometime in late July. 3 In addition to alleging employment discrimination under the Con- necticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., Council asserted violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities employment discrimination under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.4 A public hearing was held before the referee on October 12 and 13, 2022. On May 17, 2023, the referee issued a final decision in which he determined that the plaintiff discriminated against Council by terminat- ing her employment on the basis of mental disability. In addition to other relief, the referee ordered the plaintiff to pay Council $62,530.5 The plaintiff appealed this order to the Superior Court. On November 1, 2024, the court, Budzik, J., affirmed the referee’s conclusion that the plaintiff discriminated intentionally against Council, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s decision. This appeal followed. At the outset, we set forth the well settled legal prin- ciples governing this appeal. “Our review of an agency’s (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, Council claimed that the plaintiff (1) retaliated against her by terminating her employment and appealing her unemployment claims, (2) harassed her by repeat- edly discussing her tardiness, (3) failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, (4) discriminated against her on the basis of disability under the ADA, and (5) failed to engage in an interactive dialogue concerning potential reasonable accommodations for her disability. The referee denied Council’s retaliation, harassment, and reasonable accommodation claims. The referee concluded, however, that Council established disability discrimination under the ADA and, further, that the plaintiff failed to engage in an interactive dialogue with Council. The referee also granted certain injunctive relief. The trial court vacated the referee’s conclusions as to disability discrimination under the ADA and the plaintiff’s failure to engage in an interactive dialogue, as well as its injunctive orders pertaining to the plaintiff’s treatment of the termination of Council’s employment and her personnel file. Council does not challenge these rulings on appeal. 4 Council brought her CFEPA employment discrimination claim under General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) (1). General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discrimina- tory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent . . . to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual . . . because of the individual’s . . . present or past history of mental disability . . . .” 5 The referee also ordered the plaintiff to pay $9646 to the state as reimbursement for unemployment compensation and dependency allow- ances paid to Council by the state. Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities factual determination is constrained by General Stat- utes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. . . . [I]t is [not] the function of the trial court [or] of this court to retry the case . . . . An agency’s factual determina- tion must be sustained if it is reasonably supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. . . . Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review. . . . “More specifically, in defining substantial evidence in the directed verdict formulation, [our Supreme Court] has said that it is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsis- tent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. . . . As a result, [i]n determining whether an administrative finding is supported by sub- stantial evidence, the reviewing court must defer to the agency’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. . . . Ultimately, [t]he question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion but whether the record before the [agency] supports the action taken.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 347 Conn. 241, 246–47, 297 A.3d 167 (2023). In employment discrimination cases, “[t]he frame- work [the] court employs . . . under Connecticut law was adapted from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas), and its progeny. . . . Under this analysis . . . for the employee to first make a prima facie case of dis- crimination, the [employee] must show: (1) the [employee] Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities is a member of a protected class; (2) the [employee] was qualified for the position; (3) the [employee] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employ- ment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. . . . The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment deci- sion in question. . . . This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. . . . The employee then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discrimina- tory bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor- tunities, supra, 347 Conn. 257. I To begin, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the establishment of a prima facie case of disability discrimination under CFEPA. We disagree. General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent . . . to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual . . . because of the individual’s . . . pres- ent or past history of mental disability . . . .” General Statutes § 46a-51 (20) defines “ ‘[m]ental disability’ ” as “refer[ring] to an individual who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’ ”6 The referee determined that the defendants established a prima facie case of dis- ability discrimination under General Statutes (Rev. to 6 Although General Statutes § 46a-51 has been amended several times since the events at issue in this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-139, § 2; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities 2015) § 46a-60 because Council had PTSD as defined by the American Psychiatric Association,7 the termination of her employment was an adverse employment action, and her employment was terminated shortly after the plaintiff learned of her diagnosis, thereby permitting an inference of discrimination. The trial court determined there was substantial evidence in the record to support these conclusions. We agree. First, the finding that Council had a disability, and was therefore a member of a protected class, is supported by evidence of Council’s PTSD. The referee credited Dr. Major’s note containing that diagnosis. As both the referee and trial court noted, PTSD is a condition recognized by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). See American Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed. 2013) pp. 271–80.8 Second, the plaintiff does not dispute case. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute. 7 The plaintiff argues that “[t]he referee’s determination that [the plaintiff] regarded Council as having a disability under the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] and the CFEPA was erroneous as a matter of law and fact, [and] that determination, which was essential to the referee’s conclusion that Council had made out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, must be vacated.” (Emphasis added.) This argument regarding the referee’s finding is inapposite. First, we note that the referee used the “regarded as” language in adjudicating Council’s ADA claim. The trial court, however, vacated the finding that Council had a disability under the ADA because her PTSD did not substantially limit a major life activity, as required by the ADA. Neither party challenges that conclusion here. Second, the referee determined that, under CFEPA, Council “has a mental disability, PTSD, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s [D]iagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.” (Emphasis added.) A fair reading of this finding demonstrates that the referee did not determine that the plaintiff regarded Council as having a disability but, rather, that Council has a disability. 8 Since the publication of the fifth edition of the DSM-5 in 2013, which was the edition in effect in 2016, a text revision was published in 2022 (DSM-5-TR). The DSM-5-TR also includes PTSD as a diagnosis. See American Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed. Text Rev. 2022) pp. 301–13. Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities that Council was qualified for her position.9 Third, there was uncontroverted evidence to support the finding that Council suffered an adverse employment action, including testimony from Council and the plaintiff’s human resources senior manager, Marian VanLenten, that Council’s employment was terminated. The plaintiff’s argument on appeal centers on the last element necessary to establish a prima facie case of dis- ability discrimination, namely, whether the evidence supported a finding that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment took place under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination. The plaintiff contends that “[t]he only reasonable inference from the evidence in this case is that . . . Council’s diagnosis played no role in” the plaintiff’s termination of her employment.10 According to the plaintiff, the referee’s conclusion was merely speculative, particularly in light of the evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that Council violated its drug-free workplace policy. The plaintiff maintains that, “[o]ther than knowing the name of her medical 9 When the issue is irrelevant, our appellate courts have stated that qualification for a position is not an element of the employee’s prima facie case. See Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App. 312, 330, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015) (“[i]f . . . the question of qualification is not relevant to the main question of whether there was discrimina- tion, our Supreme Court holds that no such showing is necessary on the part of the plaintiff”), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016); see also Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 514 n.34, 43 A.3d 69 (2012) (“In some employment contexts, such as claims involving hiring, promoting or granting tenure, the plaintiff must show that she was qualified to hold her employment position . . . . The test for establishing disparate treatment in employment is flexible, however. . . . Because . . . the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified for her position is not relevant to the question of whether she was subjected to harsher discipline than other employees on the basis of her race, we conclude that it is not an element of her prima facie case.” (Citations omitted.)); cf. Curry v. Allen S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 398–99, 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (requiring terminated employee to show qualification to con- tinue job where employer’s stated reason for termination was grounded in whether employee could perform his job). 10 To the extent these arguments rely on the referee’s determinations with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, see footnote 7 of this opinion. Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities condition through the mention of PTSD in Dr. Major’s single medical note, no evidence was presented that any decision maker at [the plaintiff] had any other informa- tion about her medical condition.” It is axiomatic that we may not “substitute [our] judg- ment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evi- dence on questions of fact” and “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 246–47. Put differently, “[o]ur deferential standard of review allows for the record to contain competing evi- dence that would allow a different fact finder to reach a different conclusion.” Id., 248. Although an inference of discrimination cannot rest merely on “speculation of discrimination,” the evidence needed to support it is “minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the [terminated employee’s] favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 260. “Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include . . . the sequence of events leading to the [employee’s] discharge . . . or the timing of the discharge . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The substantial evidence supports a finding that the termination of Council’s employment occurred under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimina- tion. The referee credited the following evidence of the plaintiff’s awareness of Council’s disability before ter- minating her employment, as well as the sequence of events giving rise to a permissible inference of pretext: Buckley diagnosed Council with PTSD on May 23, 2016; Dr. Major confirmed that diagnosis and recommended Council for the Connecticut medical marijuana program on May 25, 2016; and Dr. Major faxed to the plaintiff verification of Council’s diagnosis and recommendation for the program on June 9, 2016, just six days before Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities Council’s employment was terminated on June 15, 2016. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the referee to find that, at the time it terminated her employment, the plaintiff was aware of both Council’s disability and refer- ral to the medical marijuana program. For these reasons, there was substantial evidence in the record to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. II The plaintiff also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the referee’s determination that the plaintiff’s justification for the adverse employment action was pretextual. We are not persuaded. Employment discrimination may “be proven either directly, with evidence that the employer was motivated by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly, by proving that the reason given by the employer was pretextual.” Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 401, 880 A.2d 151 (2005). To meet that burden, “[e]vidence establishing the falsity of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by the employer may be, in and of itself, enough to support the trier of fact’s ultimate finding of inten- tional discrimination.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 276. “For falsity to establish pretext, the [terminated employee] must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable [fact finder] could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted nondiscriminatory] reasons.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 277. In reviewing a referee’s finding that the reason advanced by an employer for an adverse employment action was pretextual, courts must be mindful of the “highly deferential standard of review, which requires that a reviewing court abide by a referee’s credibility findings and requires a relatively low level of proof, i.e., Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ‘something less than the weight of the evidence . . . .’ ” Id., 278. “[T]his standard is more deferential than the standard of review applied to findings of fact made by trial courts or juries.” Id. “[S]pecific pieces of evidence, when viewed in isolation, may not be sufficient to support an inference of discrimination beyond mere conjecture or surmise. Nevertheless, evidence is not to be viewed in a vacuum.” Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 517, 832 A.2d 660 (2003). The plaintiff asserts that it had a nondiscriminatory justification for the termination of Council’s employ- ment, namely, that Council violated the drug-free work- place policy by testing positive for marijuana. The referee disbelieved the plaintiff’s proffered justification, finding that it was false and pretextual. The referee’s finding of pretext was based on evidence (1) of the plaintiff’s shifting explanations for the termination of Council’s employment, and (2) that Council did not violate the drug-free workplace policy. First, the referee found that the plaintiff gave shifting explanations for the termination of Council’s employ- ment. Specifically, at the public hearing before the com- mission, the plaintiff cited as reasons for termination both Council’s tardiness and her inaccurate represen- tation that, on June 9, 2016, she had a medical mari- juana card. As observed by the referee, the only reason provided by the plaintiff for Council’s discharge prior to the public hearing was the purported violation of the plaintiff’s drug policy, not tardiness or misrepresenta- tions about her medical marijuana card. See, e.g., Weiss v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 332 Fed. Appx. 659, 663 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[i]nconsistent or even post-hoc explanations for a termination decision may suggest discriminatory motive”); Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital, 196 F.3d 89, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1999) (varying justifications are sufficient to suggest pretext). Second, the referee rejected the plaintiff’s reason for terminating Council’s employment, finding it to be Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities untrue. The plaintiff’s stated reason for terminating Council’s employment was that she violated the drug- free workplace policy by using or possessing marijuana on the plaintiff’s property, or otherwise working under the influence of marijuana.11 The referee concluded that this justification was false because there was no credible evidence that Council violated the policy.12 As noted by the referee, Council “was not observed smoking mari- juana. She did not slur her words. She was not observed in the possession of any drugs. No smoke was observed coming from her vehicle. She did not appear to be under the influence of any substance. There was no evidence of any impairment impacting her work.” As the policy prohibits the use and possession of marijuana on the plaintiff’s property, and working while under its influ- ence, the evidence supports the conclusion that Council 11 We reject the plaintiff’s argument that the referee and the trial court misapplied the proper legal standard by placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that its justification was not pretextual and that its determination that Council violated the policy was factually correct. The referee determined properly that Council met her burden of establish- ing pretext and intentional discrimination because she illustrated the falsity of the proffered nondiscriminatory reason and, further, that the plaintiff’s decision was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias. See Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportuni- ties, supra, 347 Conn. 257 (“The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision in question. . . . The employee then must dem- onstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) 12 The referee’s credibility assessment was based, in part, on the incon- sistent testimony of Sherents and Machado with respect to whether Council was under the influence of marijuana at work. As the referee explained, “Sherents smelled marijuana on [Council]. [Machado] only smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. [Machado] thought that [Council] seemed giggly, silly, and under the influence. [Sherents] thought she was not under the influence but rather that she was frus- trated, frantic, and unnerved over her car problems. [Sherents’] testi- mony was inconsistent. He first testified that [Council] was not under the influence of any drugs. . . . He later testified that she was under the influence.” (Citations omitted.) These factual findings support the referee’s determination that Council’s employment was not terminated for violating the drug policy but, rather, that the termination of her employment was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias. Charter Communications, LLC v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities did not violate the policy’s terms and the plaintiff’s reason for terminating her employment was false. The referee’s finding of falsity, taken together with Council’s prima facie case, is sufficient to establish pretext.13 See Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 282. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the referee’s findings of pretext and intentional discrimination. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 13 The plaintiff argues that the evidence presented should have been interpreted differently in support of a finding that the plaintiff did not discriminate against Council. As noted previously, however, the applicable standard of review prohibits reversal on the ground that separate fact finders could reach different conclusions. See Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 347 Conn. 274 n.18 (“the more deferential standard of review of an administrative agency decision allow[s] for the possibility that one fact finder might come to a conclusion different from another fact finder on the same evidence and neither would be reversible”).