Civil Rights Corps v. LaSalle

24-2251-cv Civil Rights Corps v. LaSalle In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ___________________________________________ August Term 2024 Argued: June 26, 2025 Decided: July 29, 2026 Docket No. 24-2251-cv ___________________________________________ CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS, CYNTHIA GODSOE, NICOLE SMITH FUTRELL, DANIEL S. MEDWED, JUSTIN MURRAY, ABBE SMITH, STEVEN ZEIDMAN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HECTOR D. LASALLE, in his official capacity as Presiding Justice of the Second Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Defendant-Appellant. * ___________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 21-CV-9128, Victor Marrero, District Court Judge. ___________________________________________ Before: MENASHI, LEE, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges. * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the case caption as set forth above.  Defendant-Appellant Presiding Justice Hector D. LaSalle of the Second Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (“Justice LaSalle” or “the State”) appeals from a judgment entered on July 22, 2024, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, District Judge). In 2021, Plaintiffs-Appellees filed grievance complaints against purportedly unethical New York state prosecutors with the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts of the Second Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. After the Grievance Committee informed them that any resulting proceedings against the twenty-one prosecutors would remain confidential, Plaintiffs-Appellees brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Section 90(10) of the New York Judiciary Law, which by default seals and mandates confidentiality of attorney grievance matters, violates their First Amendment right of access as applied to their complaints. At summary judgment, the district court ruled that a First Amendment presumption of access does attach to formal disciplinary hearings in the Second Department, to records necessary to understand those hearings, and to final dispositions by the Grievance Committee. Because Section 90(10) impermissibly interferes with that right, the district court found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied against Plaintiffs-Appellees’ complaints. On appeal, we find that, despite the State’s contentions otherwise, Plaintiffs- Appellees’ claims are ripe and abstention, pursuant to O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), is unwarranted. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the experience- and-logic test supports a qualified, presumptive First Amendment right of access to formal disciplinary hearings in the Second Department, including all pertinent records, and select dispositions of the Grievance Committee. Consequently, the State may not prohibit Plaintiffs-Appellees’ access to such proceedings and records pertaining to their complaints without making specific, on-the-record findings justifying confidentiality. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. ___________________________________________ GREGORY L. DISKANT, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 2  STEPHEN J. YANNI, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. David A. Schulz, Tobin Raju, Media Freedom & Information Clinic, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, for New York Media Coalition, amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees. Domenick Napoletano, New York State Bar Association, Albany, NY; Rolando T. Acosta, Dante W. Apuzzo, Catherine Perez, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, New York, NY, for New York State Bar Association, amicus curiae in support of Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________ EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judge: Defendant-Appellant Presiding Justice Hector D. LaSalle of the Second Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (“Justice LaSalle” or “the State”) appeals from a judgment entered on July 22, 2024, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, District Judge). In 2021, Plaintiffs-Appellees Civil Rights Corps (“CRC”) and law professors Cynthia Godsoe, Nicole Smith Futrell, Daniel S. Medwed, Justin Murray, Abbe Smith, and Steven Zeidman (collectively, “the Law Professors”) filed twenty-one grievance complaints against purportedly 3 unethical New York state prosecutors with the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts of the Second Judicial Department (“Second Department”) of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (“Appellate Division”). After the Grievance Committee informed them that any resulting proceedings against the twenty-one prosecutors would remain confidential, Plaintiffs-Appellees brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Section 90(10) of the New York Judiciary Law, which by default seals and mandates confidentiality of attorney grievance matters, violates their First Amendment right of access as applied to their complaints. At summary judgment, the district court ruled that a First Amendment presumption of access does attach to formal disciplinary hearings in the Second Department, to records necessary to understand those hearings, and to final dispositions by the Grievance Committee. Because Section 90(10) impermissibly interferes with that right, the district court found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied against Plaintiffs-Appellees’ complaints. On appeal, we find that, despite the State’s contentions otherwise, Plaintiffs- Appellees’ claims are ripe and abstention, pursuant to O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), is unwarranted. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the experience- 4 and-logic test supports a presumptive First Amendment right of access to formal disciplinary hearings in the Second Department, including all pertinent records, and select dispositions of the Grievance Committee. Consequently, the State may not prohibit Plaintiffs-Appellees’ access to such proceedings and records pertaining to their complaints without making specific, on-the-record findings justifying confidentiality. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. BACKGROUND I. Attorney Grievance Process Overview Before turning to the specifics of the grievance complaints filed by Plaintiffs- Appellees, we begin with an overview of New York’s system for regulating the practice of law, including disciplining attorneys for behavior that violates the Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”), which are applicable to all members of the New York Bar. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(2); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.8.4. Responsibility over attorney affairs is vested in each of the four state Appellate Divisions, which in turn may appoint attorney grievance committees that consist of at least twenty-one voluntary members with a minimum of three non-lawyers. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.4. The Appellate Divisions also employ staff, principally 5 chief attorneys and other subordinate counsel, to assist each of the attorney grievance committees. Id. § 1240.5. A. Second Department’s Grievance Procedure Although New York’s grievance procedures are virtually identical across Appellate Divisions, we focus on the entities relevant to this appeal: the Second Department and the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts (the “Committee”), which is one of three such committees for the Second Department. Presiding Justice LaSalle appoints members of the Committee, as well as its Chief Attorney. Before an attorney is publicly disciplined in the Second Department, any allegations of their misconduct must pass through three stages of review: (1) an initial screening of the submitted complaint by the Chief Attorney and other staff; (2) a factual investigation culminating in a report from the staff to the Committee, which then determines whether there is probable cause of professional misconduct “warranting the imposition of public discipline,” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(2)(vi); and (3) if authorized by the Committee, formal proceedings before the Second Department that may sustain the charges. Each step of the process is governed by both public regulations and the internal Second Department Grievance Committee 6 Manual & Forms (the “Manual”). The system kicks into gear with the filing of a complaint. Although often submitted by a current or former client, anyone—with or without personal knowledge of the alleged misconduct—can submit a complaint against an attorney. Per the regulations, the person or entity that submits a complaint is referred to as the “complainant.” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.2(e). In the initial screening phase, Committee staff assign a file number to the complaint, access the named attorney’s registration information and disciplinary history, and then assess whether the complainant’s allegations satisfy the “threshold conditions” of jurisdiction (i.e., that the allegations concern a New York attorney), venue (i.e., that the attorney’s primary office is within the Committee’s territorial bounds), and “standing.” J. App’x at 971–72. Complaints without jurisdiction or filed in an improper venue are typically dismissed or transferred. Although not publicly defined, the Manual explains that a lack of “standing” is found when the complainant has (1) “no connection” to the named attorney or the underlying matter, or (2) no “personal knowledge of the underlying facts” (e.g., “simply relaying to the Committee information . . . learned from some other source”). J. App’x at 310. When the sender of the complaint lacks standing, an investigation 7 might still be initiated “if there is a sufficient basis to open a sua sponte complaint,” but the sender is not “designate[d]” as the “complainant,” id., and will be “den[ied] . . . any further information” regarding the complaint’s status, id. at 970. After these threshold inquiries, staff provide a recommendation to the Chief Attorney on how to proceed. The Chief Attorney can decide to “decline to investigate” a complaint if (1) the person or conduct are not covered by the Rules, (2) the complaint’s allegations do not amount to a prima facie claim of professional misconduct, (3) the remedy sought by the complaint is more appropriately sought in another forum, or (4) the allegations relate to a pending legal action. Id. at 972; see also 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(1)(i). Alternatively, in certain circumstances, the Chief Attorney could refer the complaint to another forum. For any of these outcomes, the complainant must be notified. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(1)(ii). If the Chief Attorney decides to open an investigation, a complaint enters the second stage of review. The respondent attorney is informed of the allegations and given an opportunity to respond—typically, any written response is reviewable by the complainant. To build a fulsome record, the Chief Attorney and staff may, inter alia, interview witnesses, issue a subpoena, or depose the respondent attorney. Id. § 1240.7(b). The respondent attorney must comply or 8 potentially face sanctions, including the interim suspension of their law license. Id. § 1240.9(a). After gathering facts, the Chief Attorney and staff “comprehensive[ly]” document their findings in a report, catalogue evidence for both sides, and provide the Committee with their recommendation of “possible dispositions.” J. App’x at 973 (citation modified). The Committee reviews the report, asks follow-up questions, and requests additional information if needed. After deliberation, the Committee votes and, based on the majority’s views, issues its resolution of the complaint. As relevant here, the Committee may choose between four dispositions: (1) a dismissal, (2) a “Letter of Advisement,” (3) a “written Admonition,” or (4) an authorization for a formal proceeding. 1 See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(2). A dismissal is warranted when “no misconduct occurred.” J. App’x at 950. A letter of advisement is appropriate when the respondent “engaged in conduct requiring comment [but] that, under the facts of the case, does not warrant imposition of discipline.” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(2)(iv). A written admonition reflects that, 1 The Committee may also (1) “refer the complaint to a suitable alternative forum upon notice to the respondent and the complainant” if the complaint “involves a fee dispute, a matter suitable for mediation, or a matter suitable for review by a bar association grievance committee,” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.7(d)(2)(ii), or (2) “make an application for diversion” to a monitor program for, e.g., substance abuse or mental health issues, id. §§ 1240.7(d)(2)(iii), 1240.11. 9 “by a fair preponderance of the evidence,” the respondent “engaged in professional misconduct, but that public discipline is not required to protect the public . . . or deter the commission of similar misconduct.” Id. § 1240.7(d)(2)(v). Lastly, the Committee may authorize the Chief Attorney to prosecute the respondent in a formal disciplinary proceeding before the Second Department if the Committee finds “probable cause . . . that the respondent engaged in professional misconduct warranting the imposition of public discipline.” Id. § 1240.7(d)(2)(vi). All of these dispositions are presumptively confidential. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(10) (“[A]ll papers, records and documents upon the application or examination of any person for admission as an attorney and counsellor at law and upon any complaint, inquiry, investigation or proceeding relating to the conduct or discipline of an attorney or attorneys, shall be sealed and be deemed private and confidential.”). The Committee’s disposition is memorialized in a closing letter. In separate transmittals, the complainant is notified of the determination in “general terms,” whereas the respondent attorney is provided with a recital of the “facts that support the Committee’s determination” and advised of their “right to seek review or reconsideration.” J. App’x at 867. Although the Committee cannot suspend or 10 disbar an attorney, its letters of advisement and written admonitions are not inconsequential. Both become a part of an attorney’s perpetual disciplinary record. For example, the Committee or Second Department could consider instances of such private discipline in “determining the action to be taken or the discipline to be imposed upon a subsequent finding of misconduct.” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.2(b), (i). If authorized by the Committee’s finding of probable cause, a complaint moves on to the third and final stage: a formal disciplinary proceeding in the Second Department. The process starts when the Committee files a “notice of petition” in the Second Department and serves the petition, detailing specific charges and allegations, on the respondent attorney. 2 See id. § 1240.8(a)(1). By default, the attorney has 20 days to answer and reply. Id. As a “special proceeding[]” under New York law, id., the de facto adversaries are the Committee, as the “petitioner” represented by the Chief Attorney and staff, and the respondent attorney, who may also be represented by counsel. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(6). The two sides exchange statements of fact and engage in discovery as needed and 2 Once the filing of a petition is authorized, the staff report informing the Committee’s deliberations is not made available to the Second Department, the respondent attorney, or the complainant. 11 permitted. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.8(a)(2). At any time after the petition has been filed and served, the parties to the proceeding may file a joint motion with the Second Department stipulating to certain facts and requesting the imposition of discipline by consent. Id. § 1240.8(a)(5). Otherwise, to the extent facts are disputed, the Second Department may refer unresolved issues to a special referee for a hearing. See id. § 1240.8(b)(1). The hearings begin with opening statements, followed by witness examinations, and conclude with summations. After consideration of any “post-hearing submissions,” the referee must file in the Second Department a “written report setting forth the referee’s findings and recommendations,” which the parties may then move to “affirm or disaffirm.” Id. The Second Department “may” sustain the charges if the referee found, “by a fair preponderance of the evidence, each essential element of the charge,” or it may reject the referee’s findings. Id. As for remedy, the Second Department is broadly empowered to “impose discipline or take other action” that is “appropriate to protect the public, maintain the honor and integrity of the profession, or deter others from committing similar misconduct.” Id. § 1240.8(b)(2). Ultimately, the Second Department will either dismiss the complaint, remand the matter back to the Committee for private 12 discipline (e.g., a letter of advisement or written admonition), or impose public discipline via censure, suspension, or disbarment. B. Confidentiality Requirements Virtually everything connected with the grievance procedure is kept out of the public eye. Pursuant to N.Y. Judicial Law § 90(10), “all papers, records and documents . . . upon any complaint, inquiry, investigation or proceeding relat[ed] to the conduct or discipline of an attorney . . . shall be sealed and be deemed private and confidential.” N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(10). The veil may be pierced in a limited number of ways. By statute, if the Second Department sustains a charge that results in public discipline, “the records and documents in relation thereto shall be deemed public records.” Id. But interested parties cannot contemporaneously access the disciplinary proceedings (e.g., sit in on a hearing). Instead, the records are retrospectively available upon request. 3 New York Judicial Law § 90(10) also permits the Second Department to discretionarily “divulge[] all or any part of” the disciplinary record “upon good 3 Though not germane to this appeal, information regarding the grievance proceedings can be disclosed in two other ways. First, the complainant and respondent attorney are notified of the Committee’s dispositions in the distinct letters discussed earlier. Second, a respondent attorney can obtain records of their own disciplinary history or, if permitted by the Second Department, can choose to waive confidentiality. 13 cause being shown.” Id. Any interested party, including a member of the public, may file a good-cause application. Each application must explain why disclosure is requested, identify the records or proceedings sought, and detail why other methods for obtaining the information “are unavailable or impractical.” 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1240.18(d). The Presiding Justice can require that good-cause applications be made upon notice to the Committee and/or the respondent attorney. From 2013 to 2023, the Second Department received around 160 good- cause applications, largely from law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations. The Second Department “rarely receives” requests for other purposes. J. App’x at 855. II. Factual Background On May 3, 2021, the Law Professors 4 filed twenty-one complaints (the “Grievance Complaints”) against attorneys currently and formerly associated with the Queens County District Attorney’s Office for their misconduct, substantiated by judicial findings and public information, while serving as 4 The Law Professors have backgrounds and practices that span legal ethics, professional responsibility, and criminal law and procedure. All are duly licensed lawyers, and all except one are members of the New York Bar. 14 assistant district attorneys. 5 The Grievance Complaints were publicly posted by the Law Professors on AccountabilityNY.org, a website sponsored by CRC. Each complaint asks that the named attorney be publicly disciplined. 6 Within a month of the complaints being filed, James Johnson, then- Corporation Counsel for New York City, sent a letter (the “Johnson Letter”) on June 2, 2021, on behalf of the Queens District Attorney’s Office to the Committee, criticizing the Law Professors’ “very public campaign” as “contrary to both the law and the principles on which the grievance process is based,” and accused the Law Professors of engaging in “misuse and indeed abuse of the grievance process 5Since then, the Law Professors have filed twenty-nine additional complaints. Those complaints are not at issue in this appeal. 6 By way of example, consider the complaint requesting the disbarment of Charles Testagrossa. Corralling only public sources and disclaiming any personal knowledge, the Law Professors summarized in a 21-page dossier how, in violation of the Rules, Testagrossa suppressed exculpatory evidence and deliberately misled the Queens County Supreme Court in the 1999-2000 trials of George Bell, Gary Johnson, and Rohan Bolt for the murders of Ira Epstein and off-duty police officer Charles Davis. See generally People v. Bell, 143 N.Y.S.3d 840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021). Testagrossa’s violations of constitutional and ethical obligations led to the wrongful conviction and unjustified imprisonment of Bell, Johnson, and Bolt for over two decades. Id. at 852–55. In March 2021, the Queens County Supreme Court vacated the convictions, noting that “[t]hese three defendants were undoubtedly wronged by [Testagrossa’s] misconduct,” including his on-the-record “misrepresentation[s]” and “deliberate falsehood[s].” Id. at 853. Nonetheless, the Second Department has not yet publicly disciplined Testagrossa, who remains a licensed New York attorney. 15 to promote a political agenda [that] is harmful to the profession.” J. App’x at 93– 95. Disclaiming any view on the merits of the allegations, Johnson requested only that the Committee “consider the manner in which the [Grievance Complaints were] filed” in their review process. Id. at 93. The letter was simultaneously transmitted to the Law Professors but warned that “any disclosure of this letter . . . without proper court permission would [also] be unlawful under the Judiciary Law.” Id. at 95 n.4. About a week after the Johnson Letter, the Grievance Committee’s Chief Attorney, Diana Kearse, acknowledged receipt of the “complaints against current or former Assistant District Attorneys” in a letter sent to the Law Professors (the “Kearse Letter”). 7 Id. at 98. However, the Kearse Letter stated that, since the Grievance Complaints openly admitted that the petitioners lacked personal knowledge, the “allegations would be initiated by the Grievance Committee, sua sponte, and remain confidential pursuant to New York State Judiciary Law § 90, unless they resulted in public discipline imposed by the Appellate Division.” Id. The letter did not confirm “whether any investigations will or will not be 7 Although some Grievance Complaints initially had been sent to other appropriate Grievance Committees, the complaints were all transferred to the Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts. 16 pursued.” Id. In effect, because the Law Professors were deemed not to have standing under the Manual, they would not be informed of any updates regarding the Grievance Complaints. To date, none of the Grievance Complaints have resulted in public discipline. It is not known if the Grievance Complaints have been dismissed, resulted in nonpublic discipline, or are otherwise still pending. Neither the Law Professors nor CRC have filed good-cause applications. Although the Law Professors requested updates on each of the Grievance Complaints via letter to the Committee, that request did not prompt a response. III. Procedural History and the District Court Decision CRC and the Law Professors (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated the instant action, arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in November 2021 against the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, the Queens County District Attorney, the Chair of the Committee, the Chief Attorney of the Committee, and the Presiding Justice of the Second Department (collectively, “Defendants”), all in their official and personal capacities. Plaintiffs asserted five claims: (1) retaliation in violation of the Law Professors’ First Amendment right to make and publicize the Grievance Complaints (the “First Claim”); (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 17 Equal Protection Clause by denying the Law Professors standing as “complainants” (the “Second Claim”); (3) as-applied and facial challenges to Section 90(10) for violating the First Amendment and its New York State Constitution analogue because the provision operates as a content-based speech restriction that prevents publicizing the Grievance Complaints, the Johnson and Kearse Letters, and any future information that the Committee may share (the “Third Claim”); (4) violation of a qualified public right of access to government proceedings and records under the First Amendment, as applied to the Grievance Complaints (the “Fourth Claim”); and (5) a declaratory finding of “good cause” with respect to the Grievance Complaints so that the public would be apprised of any developments (the “Fifth Claim”). 8 Along with the complaint, Plaintiffs attached various exhibits, including the Johnson and Kearse Letters, under seal to avoid violating Section 90(10). But, in January 2022, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to unseal those documents. The district court held that that both a common law and First Amendment right of access attached to the exhibits because they were “judicial 8 The First Claim was against Corporation Counsel, the Queens District Attorney, and the Committee Chair and Chief Attorney. The Second Claim was against the Committee Chair and Chief Attorney. The latter three claims were against all Defendants. 18 documents” filed in an Article III court, and no countervailing interest justified continued secrecy. See Civil Rights Corps v. Pestana, No. 21-cv-9128, 2022 WL 220020, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2022). Subsequently, the district court largely denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Civil Rights Corps v. Pestana, No. 21- cv-9128, 2022 WL 1422852, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2022). In June 2022, the district court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to their Third Claim, regarding the First Amendment challenges to the restrictions on their ability to publicize the Grievance Complaints and related documents. Without reaching Plaintiffs’ facial challenge, the district court determined that Section 90(10) was unconstitutional as applied because it improperly restrained the publication of a “complainant’s own grievance complaint related to attorney discipline” and all related correspondence. Civil Rights Corps v. Pestana, No. 21-cv-9128, 2022 WL 2118191, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2022). The State raises no challenge to that ruling on appeal. Later, through stipulations in March 2023 and April 2024, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss with prejudice all claims against all defendants except for the Fourth Claim—an as-applied First Amendment qualified right of public access claim to all proceedings and records associated with the Grievance Complaints—as against 19 Justice LaSalle. In a thoughtful and well-reasoned July 2024 order and opinion spanning over a hundred pages, the district court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the one remaining claim and denied in full Justice LaSalle’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 9 Civil Rights Corps v. LaSalle, 741 F. Supp. 3d 112, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). To reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right-of-access claim, the district court first reaffirmed its subject-matter jurisdiction and then explained why abstention was unnecessary under the circumstances. Id. at 137–52. The district court rejected the State’s contention that the Plaintiffs’ claims were unripe as a constitutional and prudential matter. 10 Because Plaintiffs “are suffering an ongoing injury, which is certain to 9 In recapping the district court’s decision, we focus on its holdings and pertinent reasoning as relevant to the issues raised by the parties on appeal. All other contentions have been forfeited. See, e.g., McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is not our obligation to ferret out a party’s arguments.”). 10 Regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court also rejected the State’s claims that Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury-in-fact that satisfied Article III’s standing requirement and that Justice LaSalle was entitled to state sovereign immunity as reflected in the Eleventh Amendment. See Civil Rights Corps, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 137–41, 144–46. The district court also rejected Justice LaSalle’s affirmative defenses of absolute judicial immunity and absolute legislative immunity, given that Plaintiffs do not seek damages and their claim is not focused on Justice LaSalle’s role as a policymaker, only his role in following Section 90(10)’s command to keep attorney disciplinary matters confidential. Id. at 152–55. 20 continue,” by reason of the denial of their access, the district court found that the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim was constitutionally ripe. Id. at 142. The district court explained that Plaintiffs’ failure to file good-cause applications was immaterial, seeing as “[i]t is well-established that exhaustion of remedies under state law is not required to make a Section 1983 claim ripe.” Id. (citing Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 185 (2019)). Moreover, because the applicability of a First Amendment right of access to the Grievance Complaints presents a purely legal question, there was no prudential reason to wait for the filing of a good-cause application before determining the issue. Id. at 143. Similarly, the district court reasoned that prudence did not require it to wait to address the right of access issue until after the relevant disciplinary hearings because Section 90(10) “does not allow the State to disclose even the pendency of disciplinary proceedings until they end in disbarment or suspension,” and thus the court had no way of knowing “the stage to which those proceedings have progressed to date” or whether those hearings will ever happen. Id. The district court found the State’s invocation of abstention similarly unavailing. 11 Id. at 147. Though a federal court may not ordinarily abstain from 11 The district court had earlier held, in its ruling on the State’s motion to dismiss, that the 21 exercising its subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has recognized that a court still retains some discretion regarding whether to grant certain forms of relief. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 358–59 (1989). Most relevant for present purposes, the State claimed that abstention was required under O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), wherein the Supreme Court cautioned that federal courts should not grant injunctive relief that effectively supervises “the operation of state court functions” and so “is antipathetic to established principles of comity,” id. at 501. The State argued that Plaintiffs’ requested relief would work such an intervention by “usurp[ing] the Younger, O’Shea, and Pullman abstention doctrines were inapplicable. Civil Rights Corps, 2022 WL 1422852, at *3–7. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In its summary judgment motion, the State again raised Younger and O’Shea abstention and raised anew the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Civil Rights Corp., 741 F. Supp. 3d at 147. See generally D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). In reiterating that Younger abstention, which “warn[s] of federal injunctions dictating the course of ongoing state criminal proceedings,” does not apply, the district court reasoned that although “disciplinary proceedings are of a sufficiently similar character to criminal proceedings” such that Younger abstention’s concerns of “comity and federalism” are triggered, Plaintiffs did not ask for any direct intervention into the proceedings themselves—only access. Civil Rights Corps, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 147– 48. As for Rooker-Feldman abstention, which proscribes a district court’s “review [of] ‘state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings,’” the district court found that the sealing of attorney grievance proceedings and records “cannot be fairly said to be a judicial function” because it does not concern “a dispute between parties.” Id. at 151–52 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). Because the State does not challenge these rulings on appeal, we focus on O’Shea abstention. 22 state court’s role” in deciding good-cause applications and by “requir[ing] an extensive revamp” of the Second Department’s recordkeeping protocol for disciplinary proceedings. Civil Rights Corps, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 148 (citation modified). Nevertheless, the district court found O’Shea abstention unwarranted under the circumstances. Id. at 151. It reasoned that a state court’s role in adjudicating good-cause applications was irrelevant to a potential declaratory judgment that a First Amendment right of access attaches to the Grievance Complaints, since the “affirmative requirement of ‘good cause’ to access public records falls among the provisions of Section 90(10) that Plaintiffs find constitutionally offensive to the First Amendment’s presumption of access.” Id. at 149. Assuming Plaintiffs prevail, the State would have latitude in devising a constitutionally compliant procedure. The district court also was not convinced that the relief would necessarily require a wholesale restructuring of recordkeeping procedures, given that Plaintiffs only sought access to records associated with the twenty-one Grievance Complaints. But even if such a revamp were necessary, it would be a mild intrusion on state courts’ affairs as compared to the relief in O’Shea, where “a sweeping permanent injunction that prohibited two state judges from doing their 23 work in a racially discriminatory way” would have subjected “every future decision by the defendant judges” to “re-litigat[ion in federal court] (with no clear legal standard) for compliance with the federal injunction.” Id. Here, the district court found that the scope and nature of federal court involvement would be narrower and less intrusive, homed in on only “a state court’s recordkeeping policies and the closure of a hearing room to the public.” Id. at 150. Arriving at the merits, the district court began by explaining the relevant law. Whether a First Amendment qualified right of access attaches to “a particular government proceeding or record,” id. at 155, turns on the experience-and-logic test announced by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (“Press-Enterprise II”), 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); see Civil Rights Corps, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 155–56. That test requires assessing “(1) ‘whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public,’ and (2) ‘whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’” Hartford Courant Co. v. Carroll, 986 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8). Once a First Amendment presumption is established under the experience-and-logic test, it may still be overcome “based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values 24 and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. (“Press-Enterprise I”), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). The district court then assessed whether a right of access attaches at each stage of the grievance process. Starting with formal Second Department proceedings that might lead to the imposition of public discipline—the most severe sanction—the district court found that both experience and logic confirm that the First Amendment requires presumptive open access to both the “hearings and any documents necessary to understand those hearings.” Civil Rights Corps, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 156. On experience, the district court explained that, since the English common law of the founding period, judges have been empowered to discipline attorneys in open court, an