Frances Collazo v. Otsego County, Mich.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0439n.06 Case No. 25-1899 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 29, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) FRANCES COLLAZO, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN OTSEGO COUNTY, MICHIGAN; BRIAN ) LAGRANDEUR; JONATHAN WEHNER; COLE WRIGHT; JOSHUA BURLESON, ) ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) Before: McKEAGUE, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. State and local law enforcement officers received an emergency report of gunshots and shouting at Frances Collazo’s residence in Northern Michigan. When the officers came to investigate, Collazo immediately ordered them to leave the premises and was uncooperative. So the officers arrested Collazo for obstruction and—after a brief scuffle— resisting arrest. Now, in this Section 1983 suit, Collazo contends that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force to carry out an unlawful arrest. But we disagree. The record shows that the officers acted reasonably during a rapidly evolving—and potentially dangerous—situation. So we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant qualified immunity to the law enforcement officers. No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. BACKGROUND For years, Frances Collazo and her husband lived in a rural area in Northern Michigan. On multiple occasions in late 2020, officers from the Otsego County Sheriff’s Department and Michigan State Police responded to reports of domestic violence at their residence. During one of those visits, attending officers—including Otsego’s Officer LaGrandeur, a defendant in this case— arrested Collazo’s husband after discovering that he had headbutted her. And during a different visit, Collazo’s husband was belligerent and threatened one of the attending officers—State Trooper Burleson, another defendant in this case—with a shotgun. Point is, after those incidents, law enforcement officers in the area would have been on high alert when responding to an emergency call at the Collazo residence. With that in mind, turn to the events of August 1, 2021.1 That evening, Collazo and her husband—who had been drinking—had a heated discussion outside their home. It was loud—both parties had been yelling. At times, even, Collazo had shouted “at the top of [her] lungs.” Collazo Dep., R. 25-15, PageID.734. And, at some point during the exchange, Collazo’s husband took out his shotgun and shot it into the air multiple times. He did that, Collazo explains, “[b]ecause he’s a redneck.” Id. at PageID.659. This commotion caught the attention of one of Collazo’s neighbors. Although the gunshots and shouting may have been “pure and simple redneckery,” id. at PageID.660, Collazo’s neighbor 1 A “settled evidentiary hierarchy” controls how we interpret the facts from this day. Feagin v. Mansfield Police Dep’t, 155 F.4th 595, 601 (6th Cir. 2025); see Moore v. Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 2025). We begin by considering “the available [video] footage,” which in this case, “largely captures the incident in question and leaves few facts in dispute.” Feagin, 155 F.4th at 601 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Then, where the video footage leaves any gaps in our understanding, “we fill in the blanks by considering disputed evidence in a light most favorable to [Collazo], completing the story with any uncontested factual assertions the officers proffer.” Id. -2- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. was concerned by what he heard. So he called 911. Not knowing what had happened, the neighbor told the emergency dispatcher that he heard “three gunshots,” followed by “arguing” and “shouting” coming from Collazo’s residence. Emergency Dispatch Tr., R. 27-3, PageID.954-55. And he thought he heard someone shout “stand down.” Id. The neighbor explained that “[t]here’s gunshots all the time around here,” but “the gunshots followed by arguing” concerned him. Id. at 955-56. Emergency dispatch quickly relayed the message to law enforcement officers in the area, emphasizing that Collazo’s neighbor “heard three gunshots and a male and female yelling” and “a bunch of screaming” coming from her residence. Bodycam Video, R. 25-16, 03:00 to 03:10 and 05:02 to 05:13. Within minutes, officers from the Otsego County Sheriff’s Department and Michigan State Police arrived at Collazo’s house. When they got there, Collazo was alone on her backyard deck. Otsego’s Officer LaGrandeur (who, remember, had previously responded to one of the domestic violence incidents involving Collazo and her husband) approached the house first, followed by State Troopers Burleson, Wehner, and Wright. As Officer LaGrandeur approached the house, he noticed multiple buckshot marks on the garage door that appeared to be recent. As the video evidence shows, almost as soon as Officer LaGrandeur started walking towards Collazo, she ordered him to leave. Officer LaGrandeur explained that the officers were there to “find out” what was “going on.” Ring Camera Tr., R. 27-4, PageID.962. But Collazo didn’t want her husband, who had an outstanding arrest warrant at the time, to get into any more trouble. Collazo Dep., R. 25-15, PageID.670-72. So instead of telling Officer LaGrandeur about what had happened, she reiterated that everyone “need[ed] to leave right now.” Ring Camera Tr., R. 27-4, PageID.962. Again, Officer LaGrandeur explained that they weren’t going to leave until the officers assessed the situation and determined what had happened. But again, Collazo ordered the -3- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. officers off her property. Officer LaGrandeur asked her whether she wanted “to go to jail,” said he would “make it happen,” and instructed her to “be quiet.” Id. at PageID.962-63. But Collazo told the officers, once again, to “get off [her] property.” Id. at PageID.963. Officer LaGrandeur raised his voice and told Collazo, “Until we figure out what happened, we’re not going anywhere.” First Ring Camera Video, R. 25-9, 00:48 to 00:51. But Collazo, while waving her hands in LaGrandeur’s face, retorted that she was not “intimidate[d]” by him. Id. at 00:51 to 00:53. By the end of this minute-long clash, Collazo had ordered the officers to leave her property seven times. The officers’ “first priority” in addressing a high-priority 911 call, like this one, is to ensure everyone’s safety. LaGrandeur Dep. R. 25-11, PageID.550. So, to ensure that the officers could carry out their investigation as quickly as possible, Officer LaGrandeur reached over the deck railing and took Collazo by the wrist. A tussle ensued. As soon as Officer LaGrandeur took Collazo’s wrist, she grabbed the deck railing. Officer LaGrandeur attempted to steer her towards the deck stairs, but she wouldn’t let go of the railing.2 He pulled harder, causing Collazo to lose her grip. But she immediately grabbed back ahold of the railing, which again prevented Officer LaGrandeur from maneuvering her off the deck. So, after a few seconds of pulling, he took Collazo’s arm with both hands and, with one final pull, removed her from the railing. This final pull caused Collazo to lurch towards Officer LaGrandeur and into part of the deck railing that was still between them. 2 The parties dispute whether Collazo held onto the railing to resist detention and arrest. According to Officer LaGrandeur and the other officers, Collazo grabbed the railing and “pulled away” from him. LaGrandeur Dep. R. 25-11, PageID.517-18. And she told him that she was “not going to go.” Id. at PageID.517. In Collazo’s view, however, she held onto the railing to “keep [her]self steady” and prevent further injury to her knee. Collazo Dep. R. 25-15, PageID.674-75. She denies pulling away from Officer LaGrandeur. As we later explain, however, qualified immunity is warranted even under Collazo’s version of the facts. -4- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. While Officer LaGrandeur and Collazo had been arguing, Troopers Wehner, Wright, and Burleson approached the house and gathered around the deck. Trooper Wehner ran up onto the deck to help Officer LaGrandeur secure Collazo. When Trooper Wehner reached Collazo, he grabbed her other wrist and, together with Officer LaGrandeur, steered her away from the railing so that they could bring her down the deck stairs to handcuff her. At that point, Collazo relayed to the officers that she had been to the emergency room earlier that day for a knee injury. As the two officers escorted Collazo off the deck, she fell—without being pushed or shoved by them. The officers helped Collazo back to her feet and handcuffed her. And once she was cuffed, Officer LaGrandeur started walking her back to his police car. But after taking a few steps, she stumbled and fell again—like before, without being pushed or shoved by the officers. Again, Officer LaGrandeur stopped to help her get back on her feet and walked her to his car while holding her left arm. Once Collazo was secure in the backseat, the officers continued their investigation. While searching the premises, they looked through a window and noticed a shotgun and ammunition laying on a table in the kitchen. And they found spent shotgun shells and casings near the garage and deck. Eventually, the officers made contact with Collazo’s husband by phone. Without finding evidence suggesting that anyone had been harmed, the officers debated whether to obtain a warrant to search the house.3 But ultimately, because they had located Collazo, her husband, and the firearm, the officers decided against pursuing a warrant. After finishing the investigation, Officer LaGrandeur drove Collazo to the police station. 3 When determining how to proceed, the officers discussed their prior domestic-violence-related encounters involving Collazo and her husband. -5- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. Shortly thereafter, the local prosecutor initiated felony obstruction and resisting charges against Collazo. At the preliminary hearing, Collazo—who was represented by counsel—argued that her arrest was unlawful. Collazo testified, and so did Officer LaGrandeur, whom she cross- examined. She also presented multiple videos of the encounter as evidence. After considering both parties’ arguments and supporting material, the court determined that Collazo “engaged in an obstruction and opposition to what was a legitimate investigation.” Prelim. Hr’g Tr., R. 25-4, PageID.217. In the court’s view, Collazo’s “actions” interfered with the officers’ ability to conduct their investigation with the “urgency” that the circumstances required. Id. So it concluded that Officer LaGrandeur had probable cause to arrest Collazo and bound her over to the circuit court for future proceedings. Sometime later, however, the prosecutor voluntarily dismissed the charges against her, for reasons unrelated to the underlying merits of the case. As such, the state court’s probable cause decision was left undisturbed. According to Collazo, at some point during her brief struggle with law enforcement, she injured her right knee. Roughly a week after the incident, she was diagnosed with a right knee sprain. She continued to deal with pain and swelling for many months after her encounter with law enforcement. Ultimately, in March 2023—almost two years after the incident—Collazo underwent surgery to repair a torn meniscus in her right knee. So Collazo sued, claiming that during her encounter with law enforcement, the attending officers violated the Fourth Amendment. Collazo first said that Officer LaGrandeur and Trooper Wehner used excessive force while detaining her. And similarly, she contended that Troopers Wright and Burleson failed to intervene on her behalf while the other officers used excessive force. Next, she claimed that Officer LaGrandeur arrested her unlawfully. And finally, she brought a Monell claim against Otsego County, alleging it failed to train and supervise Officer LaGrandeur. -6- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. At summary judgment, the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers involved and dismissed the remaining Monell claim. Collazo now appeals. We review the district court’s decision de novo and, in so doing, resolve all factual disputes in a light most favorable to Collazo. Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman County, 93 F.4th 919, 925 (6th Cir. 2024). Once we’ve done that, Collazo’s excessive force claim becomes “a pure question of law.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 458 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8). We will thus deny summary judgment only if “there is a factual dispute on which the question of immunity turns.” Ramsey v. Rivard, 110 F.4th 860, 866 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000)). DISCUSSION The four law enforcement officers claim qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity, Collazo must show that (1) the officers violated a “constitutional right” (2) that was “clearly established” at the time of incident. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation modified). We may analyze these prongs in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). However, we need not stray from the traditional analysis here, because Collazo’s Fourth Amendment claims fail under both prongs. 1. Excessive Force Let’s start with excessive force. And let’s start with the basics. When an officer has the right to detain or arrest someone, they may legally use “some force to carry out” the seizure. Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 402 (6th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). After all, our excessive force caselaw “has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). And, we recognize that when effectuating valid seizures, “police officers -7- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397. During these circumstances, we have reiterated time and time again that not every “push,” pull, or “shove” is unconstitutional, “even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers.” Id. at 396 (citation modified); see, e.g., Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2005). Sometimes, of course, officers go too far. But, in determining whether they have, context is key. See Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80-82 (2025). So, our excessive force test asks whether the officer’s conduct was “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citation modified). We don’t apply this test using “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Rather, given the “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situations that officers often face, id. at 397, we assess reasonableness from the officers’ perspective and evaluate “only the facts that were knowable to [them]” at the time, Reich v. City of Elizabethtown, 945 F.3d 968, 979 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam)). Importantly, this inquiry “has no time limit.” Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80. As such, we may consider “other past circumstances known to the officer,” including the “history of the interaction” between them and the subject. Id. at 80- 81 (emphasis added). To aid in this reasonableness inquiry, we consider multiple factors, including (1) “the severity of the crime” being investigated; (2) whether there is an “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;” and (3) whether the individual “is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These factors, however, are not exhaustive. LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 579 (6th Cir. 2022). Nor must each one weigh in -8- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. the officer’s favor for his use of force to be reasonable. See Eastep v. City of Nashville, 156 F.4th 819, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2025). Ultimately, we must determine whether under the totality of the circumstances, a certain type of seizure—and how it was carried out—is justified. Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2017). Before applying this standard to Officer LaGrandeur’s conduct, we must address Collazo’s misunderstanding of the reasonableness inquiry. Despite our emphasis on this totality-of-the- circumstances assessment, Collazo says that our circuit has established a bright-line rule. In her view, law enforcement officers must tell a person that they are under arrest before using any amount of force on them. And under this rule, Collazo says, the district court’s decision “must be reversed” because the two officers never told Collazo that she was under arrest and therefore “were prohibited from using force” on her. Appellant Br. p. 38. But we have established no such bright-line rule. Take the primary case that she cites, Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995 (6th Cir. 2024). There, we denied qualified immunity to an officer that tased an unresisting individual twice during a routine traffic stop. Id. at 999-1000, 1008. True, in the process, we noted that the officer’s failure to tell the individual that they were under arrest “enhances the likelihood of”—but does not require—“a finding of excessive force.” Id. at 1005. But our decision did not rest on the presence of that factor alone. To the contrary, in denying qualified immunity, we “consider[ed] the totality of the circumstances” and emphasized that “none” of the three Graham factors supported use of force under the circumstances, as our objective reasonableness test requires. Id. at 1008. That the officer didn’t inform Saalim he was under arrest was simply an additional factor supporting our conclusion. And, in Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2009), we applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test the same way. See id. at 311-12, 314. So, at most, these cases show only that whether an officer told the subject that -9- No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. they are under arrest is one factor, out of many, that we may consider when evaluating whether force was reasonable. More fundamentally, Collazo misses the point of the reasonableness inquiry. Collazo’s purported rule implies that an officer may use force only during arrests. After all, informing a person that they are under arrest presupposes that the person is, in fact, under arrest. But force is not exclusive to arrests. Rather, officers often need to apply force while carrying out other types of seizures. Investigatory stops, for example, often require force, as Graham—the seminal excessive force case—recognizes. 490 U.S. at 396 (noting that an officer’s “right” to perform an “investigatory stop” necessitates the lawful use of “some degree of physical coercion”). When necessary, officers may even legally “draw their weapons or use handcuffs” to effectuate the stop. Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 309 (6th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, during emergency situations, officers have even more leeway in determining whether and how to detain someone. At times, officers may detain an “innocent” individual— without any “particularized reasonable suspicion”—when “necessary to secure the scene of a valid search . . . and ensure the safety of officers and others.” Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 755 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Coleman, No. 23-3924, 2025 WL 2391391, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2025). While searching a residence, for example, officers may detain the occupants, regardless of whether they have any connection to a crime. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). Likewise, officers sometimes must detain individuals during “inherently dangerous situations.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005). And critically, in either scenario, officers may use “reasonable force”—including handcuffs—“to effectuate the detention.” Id. at 98-99; see Thornton v. Fray, 429 F. App’x 504, 508-09 (6th Cir. 2011). - 10 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. At bottom, an officer often may legally use some levels of force to effectuate various non- arrest detentions. So, at no point during any of those detentions would the officer tell the person that they were under arrest before using force. They would just apply the force. And they would do so legally. Within that context, Collazo purported rule does not make sense. Nor does it make sense as applied here. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer could have detained Collazo for any of the above-mentioned reasons. Given the nature of the shots-fired call and report that a “male and female” had been yelling, they had reasonable suspicion to conclude that Collazo committed a crime. So the officers were entitled to execute an investigatory stop with reasonable force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Dorsey, 517 F.3d at 399. What’s more, given that Collazo was uncooperative during an emergency response in which the officers had not yet located a firearm, a reasonable officer could have concluded that detaining Collazo was necessary to “secure the scene” and “ensure the safety of officers.” Bletz, 641 F.3d at 755. For any of those reasons, an officer could have detained Collazo with reasonable force without arresting her and thus, without telling her that she was under arrest. Now, it’s true that Officer LaGrandeur insists he detained Collazo to initiate an arrest for obstruction. But LaGrandeur’s “subjective intent” while detaining Collazo “is irrelevant” to our objective reasonableness inquiry. Brown v. Giles, 95 F.4th 436, 440 n.2 (6th Cir. 2024). We care about only what a reasonable officer would have done. And here, a reasonable officer would have been justified in detaining Collazo for reasons unrelated to arrest. The officers, then, had no obligation to tell Collazo that she was under arrest before applying some level of force. After clearing up that misstep, let’s turn to whether the officers applied reasonable force during the encounter. After considering their actions in light of the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that they did. - 11 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. A. Officer LaGrandeur Constitutional Violation. Because Collazo has sued multiple officers, we must analyze their conduct separately. See Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). So we begin with Officer LaGrandeur, who applied the most force during this encounter. i. Severity of the Crime And we start with the first Graham factor, which favors the officers. In evaluating the severity of a crime, we do not limit ourselves to one narrow method; rather, we view Collazo’s conduct in light of all the surrounding circumstances. See Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427, 440-42 (6th Cir. 2022); see also Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 348-49 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that courts must not assess an individual’s conduct during ongoing emergencies “too narrowly”). In practice, then, we may consider a variety of factors, including whether (1) Collazo committed a felony or misdemeanor; (2) Collazo “is suspected of being involved in an underlying felony,” (3) any of the crimes being investigated have a “connotation of violence”; (4) Collazo’s actions interfered with the officers response to a “ongoing emergency,” or (5) the officers had a strong interest in “subduing” Collazo for “public safety” reasons. Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441-42; see Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley, 118 F.4th 848, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2024); Ward v. Brotzke, 178 F.4th 966, 974 (6th Cir. 2026). But, to conclude that a crime is severe, we need not find that every factor is present. See Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441-42. As applied here, those factors demonstrate that the situation, and Collazo’s conduct during it, were severe. To reasonable officers’ minds, the officers were dealing with an ongoing emergency. Given the nature of the shots-fired 911 call, they had reason to think that someone might have committed a severe—even deadly—crime. See Franke v. Janes, 168 F.4th 797, 806 (6th Cir. 2026). And what’s more, Collazo could have been involved in it. They knew, from the - 12 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. call, that a “male and female” were yelling and arguing after the gunshots went off. And some of the officers, including Officer LaGrandeur, had previously responded to multiple domestic violence incidents—involving Collazo and her husband—at their residence. Cf. Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, 821 F. App’x 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80-82. So, at that point, Collazo was a suspect in an “underlying felony” that came with a violent connotation. Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441-42. To make matters worse, Collazo’s behavior during the investigation interfered with the officer’s “ongoing emergency” response. Id.; see Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir. 2004). From the moment the officers arrived, Collazo was oppositional to their presence and uncooperative with their attempt to figure out “what was going on.” Given that the officers’ first priority was ensuring everyone’s safety, they had a strong interest in “subduing” Collazo in that moment. Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441-42. Yet when they tried to subdue her, she resisted their attempts. So, as a result, they detained and arrested her for obstruction and resisting arrest—a felony offense in Michigan. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d(1). Collazo downplays the severity of the emergency context by focusing exclusively on her short interaction with Officer LaGrandeur. Obstructing an investigation and resisting arrest, she says, are not severe offenses. True, we have, at times, concluded that disorderly or obstructive conduct alone may not be severe. See Jackson-Gibson, 118 F.4th at 854-55; Reed v. Campbell County, 80 F.4th 734, 748 (6th Cir. 2023). But that’s not true here—where the circumstances were unknown, and potentially dire. Her uncooperative actions “exacerbated” the officers’ “emergency” response and thus increased their interest in “subduing” her. Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441-42; see Ames, 846 F.3d at 348-49. So, in this context, Collazo’s disorderly and disruptive behavior was serious. - 13 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. That’s why Collazo’s reliance on Shumate is misplaced. In Shumate, we denied qualified immunity to an officer that tased the plaintiff after he interfered with the officer’s attempt to impound his daughter’s car. 44 F.4th at 433-35. As Collazo notes, we concluded that the plaintiff’s disruptive and disorderly conduct was not serious. Id. at 442-43. But we made that finding only after considering the broader circumstances. Unlike this case, we emphasized that the officer was not “responding to an emergency call.” Id. at 442. Nor was the plaintiff “suspected of being involved in an underlying crime.” Id. at 441-42. Rather, the events occurred during a routine traffic stop. Id. at 433. Thus, although the plaintiff was disruptive, his conduct did not “exacerbate[]” an “ongoing emergency” such that the officers needed to subdue him with force. Id. at 442 (quoting Ames, 846 F.3d at 348). Not so here, where the officers’ interest in subduing Collazo was greater. Yet, even considering the emergency circumstances, the officers responded to Collazo’s conduct with far less force than the officers in Shumate—rather than tase her, they grabbed her, pulled her, and handcuffed her. The officers’ response under the circumstances here, then, was more reasonable. All told, the circumstances of the investigation, and Collazo’s conduct during it, were severe. So the first factor favors the officers and their use of force. ii. Threat to the Officers The second Graham factor also favors the officers. And, like the first factor, context drives our analysis. Again, we reiterate that the officers were at Collazo’s residence because they received a shots-fired call. At that point, the situation was full of unknowns. The officers had not yet ruled out an active shooter situation. Nor had they located any firearm. Nor had they determined whether anyone was injured. As far as they knew, someone on the premises could have been armed and dangerous. See Walters v. Stafford, 317 F. App’x 479, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing the danger - 14 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. in a situation where “[s]hots had recently been fired” and a “gun had not been found”). And that person could have been Collazo. As previously discussed, based on Officer LaGrandeur’s knowledge at the time, Collazo was a suspect. The situation, on the whole, was threatening. With those circumstances in mind, a reasonable officer could have concluded that Collazo was a threat. Her hostility, uncooperative attitude, and evasive responses to Officer LaGrandeur’s investigative attempts would have amplified any prior suspicions. And given her position on the deck, she could have retreated inside her house to retrieve the gun that had not yet been found. But perhaps most importantly, if there was an active shooter somewhere on the premises, Collazo’s behavior could have hampered Officer LaGrandeur’s ability to deal with that situation, thus threatening his and the other officers’ safety. Under those circumstances, then, a reasonable officer would have concluded that Collazo’s behavior—and presence at the scene of a “tense” and “rapidly evolving situation”—posed a threat. See Dunigan, 390 F.3d at 494 (concluding that the plaintiff’s “presence in the midst” of the officer’s emergency response to “a chaotic, tense, and rapidly evolving situation” “posed a risk” to the officers involved). As with the first factor, Collazo would have us ignore the broader context and focus solely on her behavior. True, disruptive or hostile behavior, on its own, is often not threatening. See Lustig v. Mondeau, 211 F. App’x 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding in a non-emergency situation that the suspect’s disruptiveness “posed no threat to safety”). But here, a reasonable officer in LaGrandeur’s position wouldn’t have taken any chances during an emergency response where the circumstances were unknown and no gun had been found. See Walters, 317 F. App’x at 492. Again, this emergency context highlights how Collazo’s primary case on this factor, Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2016), does not help her. There, we denied qualified immunity to officers that tased an individual after they were called to his house in a non-emergency - 15 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. capacity. Id. at 387. In that non-emergency context, we emphasized that the plaintiff was not a safety risk because he was unarmed, made no evasive movements, and stood with his arms in the air and his back against the wall, indicating submission. Id. at 391. Here, however, the officers came to Collazo’s residence for an entirely different reason—to investigate a potential shooting in which Collazo was a suspect. Unlike Kent, Officer LaGrandeur did not know whether she was armed. And, unlike Kent, Collazo’s attitude and body movements did not indicate submission. Even so, instead of tasing Collazo, like the officers in Kent, the officers here merely grabbed and pulled on her arm while escorting her to the police car. As she admits, they did not push or shove her. So, even considering the potentially dangerous circumstances, the officers’ response here was more reasonable than the officers’ actions in Kent. iii. Resisting Arrest or Opportunity for Flight Turning to the last factor, we conclude that it, too, favors Officer LaGrandeur. When assessing this factor, we distinguish between two types of resistance: passive and active. See Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 867 (6th Cir. 2020); Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1005-07. Generally, an officer’s level of force must match the individual’s level of resistance. On the one hand, when an individual passively resists—for instance, by refusing to comply or showing verbal resistance—an officer may use some level force to effectuate the seizure. See Chaney-Snell v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 715 (6th Cir. 2024) (noting that use of “gratuitous” force on a person who has surrendered and poses no threat is unlawful) (collecting cases); Jackson v. Washtenaw County, 678 F. App’x 302, 306 (6th Cir. 2017). They may, for example, pull or grab the individual. See Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2008); Robinson v. City of Knoxville, No. 24-5159, 2025 WL 621451, at *8-9 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 2025). But they may not resort to more drastic measures, like “tasing, pepper-spraying, or beating.” Moore v. Oakland - 16 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1168 (6th Cir. 2025); see Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). On the other hand, when an individual actively resists—put simply, by “physically struggling with police”—an officer may then use greater levels of force, like a taser or pepper spray, to restrain them depending on the circumstances. Moore, 126 F.4th at 1168; see Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012). As the district court recognized, Collazo’s level of resistance fluctuated throughout the encounter. At first, she passively resisted Officer LaGrandeur verbally by repeatedly ordering him and the other officers off her property; arguing with him even though he instructed her to “be quiet”; failing to tell Officer LaGrandeur what had happened; and remaining argumentative throughout the encounter. See Jackson, 678 F. App’x at 306. In response to Collazo’s passive resistance during their emergency response, Officer LaGrandeur took the “modest step of grabbing her [wrist]” to steer her off the deck. Moore, 126 F.4th at 1169. And he lawfully pulled her arm when trying to get her there. See Slusher, 540 F.3d at 455-56; Robinson, 2025 WL 621451, at *8- 9. But when he did so, Collazo’s resistance escalated. She grabbed the deck railing and held on, preventing Officer LaGrandeur from steering her off the deck to handcuff her. At that point, Collazo was no longer merely verbally or physically noncompliant—she was “physically struggling with” Officer LaGrandeur. Moore, 126 F.4th at 1168. But even with this active resistance, Officer LaGrandeur did not resort to greater levels of force to restrain her, like takedown maneuvers, batons, or tasers. Rather, he pulled on Collazo’s arm hard enough to remove her from the deck railing and ensure compliance. All told, the record shows that Officer LaGrandeur used reasonable force in response to Collazo’s varying levels of resistance. - 17 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. Collazo disagrees with this conclusion. To her mind, she held the railing not to resist but rather to “keep herself steady” and prevent further injury to her knee. And, along those same lines, she says that the officers should have used less force because of her recent knee injury. In her view, those facts warranted less force. Yet, both are immaterial to our analysis. Remember, we assess the Graham factors from the officer’s perspective—not the arrestee’s—and consider only facts that they would have known about at the time. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97; Reich, 945 F.3d at 979. In this instance, everyone—including Collazo—agrees that she grabbed and held onto the railing after Officer LaGrandeur took her wrist. And, as the video evidence shows, by holding onto the railing, she prevented Officer LaGrandeur from removing her from the deck. Even if Collazo didn’t intend to resist, a reasonable officer could have interpreted her actions as active resistance, especially after she was verbally uncooperative just moments before. Similarly, Collazo acknowledges that she mentioned her emergency room visit and knee injury only after Officer LaGrandeur had removed her from the railing—by which time the greatest level of force had already been applied. Collazo does not contend that she told the officers about her knee injury at any point before they used force on her. A reasonable officer, then, wouldn’t have had reason to accommodate Collazo’s recent injury. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2002) (declining to hold officer liable for aggravating a pre-existing elbow injury that he did not know about at the time of the act). And, once informed of Collazo’s knee injury, Officer LaGrandeur took reasonable steps to effectuate her detention. He escorted her off the deck by pulling her arm—a lawful measure under the circumstances. See Slusher, 540 F.3d at 455-56; Robinson, 2025 WL 621451, at *8-9. Then, once she was off the deck, he put her in handcuffs—another lawful step. See Neague v. Cynkar, - 18 - No. 25-1899, Collazo v. Otsego County, et al. 258 F.3d 504, 508 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Dorsey, 517 F.3d at 399; Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-99. And finally, once Collazo was subdued, he didn’t apply any “gratuitous” force. Chaney-Snell, 98 F.