Anderson v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket5-25-0268
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 250268-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/19/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0268 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ANTHONY ANDERSON, ) Petition for Review of an Order
) of the Illinois Human Rights
Petitioner, ) Commission.
)
v. ) Charge No. 2020-SF-1724
) EEOC No. 21-BA-00888
ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ) ALS No. 21-0345
COMMISSION, ILLINOIS )
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN )
SERVICES, and CHESTER MENTAL )
HEALTH SERVICES, )
)
Respondents. )
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McHaney and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the Illinois Human Rights Commission’s summary decision where
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
¶2 On June 7, 2020, petitioner, Anthony Anderson, filed a “Charge of Discrimination” with
the Illinois Department of Human Rights (DHR) alleging civil rights violations by respondent, the
Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) and Chester Mental Health Center (Chester).
Petitioner alleged that, because of his race (Black), he was (1) subjected to unequal terms and
conditions of employment, (2) harassed, and (3) placed on indefinite suspension. On July 8, 2021,
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the DHR issued a “Notice of Substantial Evidence” as to the first and third allegations but found a
lack of substantial evidence regarding petitioner’s second claim.
¶3 On September 29, 2021, the DHR filed a two-count complaint against respondent with the
Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission). Count I alleged that respondent subjected
petitioner to unequal terms and conditions of employment due to his race, in violation of section
2-102(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act). 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2020). Count II
alleged that respondent first suspended and ultimately discharged petitioner because of his race,
also in violation of section 2-102(A) of the Act. Id. Following discovery, respondent filed a motion
for summary decision. On March 18, 2025, the Commission entered an order granting respondent’s
motion for a summary decision and dismissing petitioner’s complaint with prejudice.
¶4 On appeal, petitioner contends the Commission erroneously granted respondent’s motion
for summary decision, arguing that he presented a triable issue of fact regarding the criminal
prosecution that stemmed from the incident at the center of the controversy. Petitioner also argues
that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in determining that count II was subject to dismissal
and by declining to consider count II on its merits. We affirm the Commission’s decision.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 The following background is taken from the complaint, respondent’s motion for summary
decision, petitioner’s response, and attachments to the parties’ filings. Those attachments include
affidavits, depositions of petitioner and two DHS employees, and the investigative reports of the
Illinois Department of Human Services’ Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
¶7 Petitioner began working at Chester in 2015. He was employed as a Security Therapy Aid
I (STA-I). Chester had a Code Red Policy for when an employee needs assistance with a patient.
The employee calls for help, and help is sent to that location. On January 21, 2019, another STA-
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I, Tracy Apple, was bitten by a patient and called for help. Petitioner, along with Kevin Hayman
and Shawn Plumlee (both Security Therapy Aid-II (STA-II)), responded and helped gain control
of the patient. Apple was subsequently treated at a hospital. According to the complaint, Apple,
Hayman and Plumlee are all “non-black.”
¶8 Later that same day, there was an incident during which a different patient, R.M., was “play
fighting” with another patient. According to the complaint, R.M. started telling petitioner he
“ ‘could kick [petitioner’s] ass’ ”, that “ ‘his penis was bigger than [petitioner’s]’ ”, and that “ ‘he
didn’t like all these n*** working here.’ ” Petitioner claimed that he tried to de-escalate the
situation and to direct R.M. back to his room, but R.M. kept threatening petitioner. Another staffer,
Erin Stauffer (STA-I, non-white) was present at this time. Per the complaint, R.M. told Stauffer,
“ ‘Ms. Erin, I would fuck this n*** up if you weren’t standing there.’ ” Petitioner stated that he
told Stauffer that they needed to put R.M. in a “hold” but that Stauffer did not assist him in
restraining R.M. Instead, Stauffer “just stood in the middle” between the two men. Petitioner also
stated that he saw Kevin Hayman (STA-II) observing the incident while looking through a
window, but that Hayman did not come to his assistance.
¶9 The OIG’s Investigative Report of the incident included summaries of statements provided
to both the OIG and the Illinois State Police (ISP). The record reflects that petitioner gave varying
accounts of what occurred. Petitioner initially denied striking R.M. or that he contacted R.M.’s
face and shoulder area. Petitioner’s statements were consistent, however, in that he maintained that
the contact with R.M. was both accidental and incidental to defending himself against R.M.
Petitioner also told investigators that he did not call for help because fellow staff members were
watching and did nothing to assist him. R.M. told investigators that he and petitioner were in each
other’s faces and that petitioner backed him up and hit him in the chin with his left hand.
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¶ 10 According to Stauffer, she heard petitioner and R.M. arguing loudly, so she went over to
them. She attempted to redirect R.M. to his room when petitioner shoved R.M. in the chest and
then slapped R.M. in the “cheek/head/neck” area. She believed it was open-handed, but that it was
not a soft slap. She then stepped between the two men and told petitioner to calm down. While
both men were arguing and R.M. acted like he was going to hit petitioner, Stauffer told
investigators that R.M. never threw a punch. Stauffer told petitioner that what he did was “not
right.”
¶ 11 Hayman told investigators that he heard yelling and looked through a window on a door to
unit B-1. He saw petitioner “up in a patient’s face.” Petitioner walked toward the patient, and the
patient walked backwards. Hayman saw petitioner push R.M. before the two men moved out of
his sight.
¶ 12 Shawn Plumlee (STA-II) told investigators that he heard yelling coming from unit B-1 and
looked through a window and saw petitioner and R.M. arguing. The two men were within arm’s
reach of one another. Plumlee saw petitioner strike R.M. but could not see whether petitioner’s
hand was open or closed. Plumlee told investigators that R.M.’s head and body twisted as though
he had been struck in the jaw. Plumlee also told investigators that he could see the anger on
petitioner’s face.
¶ 13 Anne Kracht was a registered nurse working at Chester. She was in the nurse’s cage
preparing medication for patients when a commotion caused her to look up. She saw petitioner hit
R.M. “upside the head.” She did not know whether it was an open or closed hand strike.
Afterwards, she conducted an exam of R.M. and found no injuries. Following the incident,
petitioner was sent home.
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¶ 14 Incident reports were filed by Stauffer, Hayman, Plumlee and Kracht. The incident reports
were forwarded to Barry Smoot, the Chief of Security at Chester. Smoot notified the OIG of the
incident that same day. The OIG Intake Form suggested that Smoot notified the ISP as well,
although the OIG Investigative Report states that “OIG referred this allegation to the Illinois State
Police *** Division of Internal Investigation” on January 23, 2019. Both the OIG Investigative
Report and the ISP report stated that videos of the incident were recovered.
¶ 15 In March 2019, petitioner was charged with misdemeanor battery for his conduct.
Petitioner was placed on administrative leave and was subsequently placed on “Suspension
Pending Judicial Verdict”. Petitioner was convicted of the battery charge in March 2021.
¶ 16 The OIG issued its Amended Investigative Report on September 13, 2021. The report
concluded that petitioner “made non-accidental and inappropriate contact with [R.M.] when he
pushed [R.M.] backward, slapped [R.M.] in the face, and smacked [R.M.’s] hands.” The report
further found that “[a]lthough [petitioner] minimized the nature of this conduct, the video footage
of the incident shows that [petitioner] aggressively approached and assaulted [R.M.], and that the
video evidence *** corroborated *** the statements of multiple credible witnesses.” Finally, the
report found that, by failing to act, Hayman and Plumlee failed to provide R.M. with “adequate
personal care and failed to maintain [R.M.]’s safety.”
¶ 17 Based upon the criminal conviction and the OIG investigative report, Jessica Lawson, a
Human Resources Specialist for DHS, recommended that petitioner be discharged from
employment. DHS’s Director of Labor Relations, Edward Jackson, likewise recommended
discharge, and on September 30, 2021, Central Management Services (CMS) discharged
petitioner.
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¶ 18 In June 2020 petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the DHR alleging civil rights
violations by respondent. Petitioner alleged that, because of his race, he was (1) subjected
to unequal terms and conditions of employment, (2) harassed, and (3) placed on indefinite
suspension. As noted above, on July 8, 2021, the DHR issued a “Notice of Substantial Evidence”
as to the first and third allegations but found a lack of substantial evidence regarding petitioner’s
second claim.
¶ 19 The DHR filed the complaint herein in September 2021. Count I alleged that respondent
subjected petitioner to unequal terms and conditions of employment due to his race, in violation
of section 2-102(A) of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2020). Specifically, petitioner alleged
that neither Stauffer, Hayman nor Plumlee came to assist him with restraining R.M., but that other
“similarly situated non-black [STA-Is], such as Apple” received assistance, thereby subjecting
petitioner to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Count II alleged that respondent first
suspended and ultimately discharged petitioner because of his race, also in violation of section 2-
102(A) of the Act. Id. Specifically, petitioner alleged that three other STA-Is had engaged in more
egregious conduct, breaking a patient’s arm and breaking a patient’s foot. Petitioner contended
that (1) while one of the STA-Is was suspended, he was not charged criminally, (2) the two others
were not suspended pending an investigation, and (3) none of the other STA-Is were discharged.
¶ 20 Following discovery, respondent filed a motion for summary decision. With regard to
count I, respondent argued that petitioner’s claim that he was subjected to unequal terms and
conditions of employment failed both as a matter of law and fact.
¶ 21 First, respondent argued that, although both Hayman and Plumlee were STA-IIs and
worked as “lead workers” for STA-Is, neither Hayman nor Plumlee were petitioner’s supervisors
or managerial staff at Chester. In this role, they could not hire, fire or discipline petitioner, they
6
could not approve time off for petitioner, and they lacked the ability to change petitioner’s job
duties or assignments. Instead, petitioner’s supervisor was an STA-IV, Scott Koon. An STA-IV is
responsible for “assigning and reviewing work; preparing, conducting and signing performance
evaluations; *** recommending and imposing disciplinary action and adjusting grievances for the
incumbent of this position.” Consequently, respondent argued, even if Hayman and Plumlee were
motivated by racial animus, the DHS as their employer is not strictly liable for their actions.
¶ 22 Second, respondent argued that petitioner failed to identify a similarly situated individual
who was treated differently from petitioner. Petitioner’s complaint referred to the incident earlier
that day during which petitioner, Hayman and Plumlee provided assistance to Apple, and
respondent argued that Apple’s incident was not comparable in that (1) it was a far more violent
situation, (2) Apple needed to seek medical attention as a result of the incident, and (3) Apple
called out for assistance. By contrast, petitioner’s involvement with R.M. was far less violent and
did not involve serious injury. Further, respondent argued, petitioner did not call for help and that
the incident was largely of petitioner’s own creation in that he was the aggressor.
¶ 23 Regarding count II, respondent argued that petitioner’s claim failed because he had not
identified any similarly situated comparators outside of his protected class who were subjected to
less discipline. According to respondent, in order to prevail, petitioner would have needed to find
“a non-Black employee who had both a substantiated finding of abusing a patient from OIG and a
conviction for that abuse” who was not discharged from employment. (Emphasis in original.)
Concurrent with its motion for summary decision, respondent filed a motion for leave to file the
video exhibits in support of its motion for summary decision.
¶ 24 The ALJ entered a written order, filed April 8, 2024, denying respondent’s request to file
the video exhibits. The order then contained the following:
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“Additionally, I note that Respondent’s summary judgement [sic] motion
contains arguments that address [petitioner’s] discharge. While that is
understandable given that the [DHR’s] attorney makes that allegation in Count II
of the instant complaint, a close reading of the Complaint indicates that
[petitioner’s] termination, which occurred on September 30, 2021, was never a part
of the Charge of Discrimination that forms a part of the instant complaint. And
indeed, [petitioner] filed a separate charge of discrimination that did allege a
discriminatory discharge and formed a basis of an unsuccessful Request for
Review. As such, he cannot allege a discriminatory discharge in this Complaint,
where the Commission has already disposed of the Charge of Discrimination that
contained [petitioner’s] discharge. (See, Anderson and SOI Department of Human
Services, IHRC, ALS No, 23-0032 (5/16/2023).) Hence, the only claim that is
properly before the Commission in this Complaint is [petitioner’s] unequal terms
and conditions claim. Accordingly, [petitioner] shall file a response only with
respect to that aspect of Respondent’s motion seeking issuance of a summary
decision.”
¶ 25 On May 24, 2024, petitioner filed his response to respondent’s motion for summary
decision. Petitioner argued that the discovery disclosed that there were several other employees
who engaged in conduct that should have been disciplined, but that were “either not reported at
all, or received a significantly smaller sanction. [Petitioner] was the only employee who was
referred out for prosecution, and as a result [he] was convicted and was barred from future state
employment.” The list of other employees provided in discovery was identified as Exhibit D.
Petitioner argued that the issue of whether these other employees were similarly situated was an
issue for a trier of fact. Petitioner concluded that “[t]his is a case about whether [petitioner] was
discriminated against because he was the only one referred to the ISP for criminal prosecution,
which subsequently resulted in him being barred from future state employment.”
¶ 26 Respondent filed a reply, arguing that petitioner’s response to its motion for summary
decision ignored the issues raised in the motion and argued allegations that were outside the scope
of the complaint. Specifically, after noting that, pursuant to the ALJ’s most recent order, count II
was no longer before the Commission, Respondent argued that petitioner “spends the entirety of
his filing arguing that he was disciplined more severely than other STA’s at Chester. Nowhere in
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Count I of the [petitioner’s] Complaint does it allege he was subjected to unequal treatment due to
discipline.”
¶ 27 On August 9, 2024, the ALJ issued a “Recommended Order and Decision”. The proposed
order began by noting that count I claimed that petitioner was subjected to unequal terms and
conditions of employment due to his race by virtue of the fact that two STA-II employees, Hayman
and Plumlee, failed to intervene on petitioner’s behalf during his conflict with R.M. The order also
noted that count II alleged that petitioner was discharged from employment based on his race. The
order then noted that count II was previously dismissed since the Commission, in a separate case,
had already rejected petitioner’s claim that he was discharged on the basis of his race.
¶ 28 The recommended order then found that petitioner, in his response to the motion for
summary decision, had “unilaterally changed the focus of Count One *** when he inaccurately
wrote: ‘This case is about whether [petitioner] was discriminated against because he was the only
one referred to ISP (Illinois State Police) for criminal prosecution, which subsequently resulted in
him being barred for future state employment.’ ” Instead, the ALJ characterized the case as being
“about whether Respondent directed two employees to delay in assisting [petitioner] in his
altercation with a patient because of [petitioner’s] race.” Accordingly, the ALJ declined to consider
whether respondent’s referral of petitioner to the ISP was based on his race.
¶ 29 The order then found that petitioner “decided not to show supportive evidence that
discriminatory behavior existed when two STA-IIs failed to intervene between [petitioner] and a
patient during a physical confrontation.” For this reason, the order found that “Respondent is
exculpated from any associated liability as pled in Count One, as there is no evidence of any
material fact requiring a trial.” Notwithstanding this conclusion, the ALJ continued his analysis
“to demonstrate that this case could not proceed even where [petitioner] had offered evidence on
9
his claims as pled.” The ALJ found that petitioner failed to show that Hayman and Plumlee were
supervisors, noting that even the complaint failed to allege supervisory status for the two men. The
ALJ found that petitioner used “the generic term ‘supervisor’ interchangeably with a legal term of
art[,]” whereas the facts demonstrated that Haywood and Plumlee were “charge aides” who did
not have decision-making duties concerning the terms and conditions of petitioner’s employment.
Rather, STA-IIs were responsible “for directing where the staff and patients are going” and “for
all the counts.” The immediate supervisor for STA-IIs were STA-IVs, and Scott Koon was
petitioner’s immediate supervisor. The ALJ noted that, in responding to the incident in question,
the STA-IIs called the STA-IVs seeking guidance on how to proceed.
¶ 30 In further analyzing the motion for summary decision, the ALJ noted the prima facie case
for disparate treatment for race discrimination where unequal terms and conditions of employment
are alleged: (1) petitioner is a member of a protected class, (2) petitioner was subjected to adverse
treatment by respondent, and (3) similarly situated persons who are not members of the petitioner’s
protected class were treated better than petitioner. While noting that petitioner’s status as a member
of a protected class was undisputed, the ALJ found that petitioner failed to provide adequate
admissible evidence as to the last two elements of a prima facie case.
¶ 31 With regard to the second element, whether petitioner was subjected to adverse treatment
by respondent, the ALJ considered the nature of the investigations conducted by the OIG and the
ISP. The ALJ noted that the issue before the Commission was whether Hayman’s and Plumlee’s
delays in intervening during the incident somehow constituted disparate treatment that would
support a race discrimination claim. Because the investigation concluded that Hayman’s and
Plumlee’s delays failed to provide R.M. with adequate personal care and protection, the ALJ stated
10
that petitioner was, in essence, requesting the Commission conduct a de novo review of the
investigation, something it was prohibited from doing. The ALJ concluded:
“The issue before the investigative bodies was whether cause existed to
support discipline against the employees; here, the issue is whether the
investigations were discriminatory and whether the provisions of the Act have been
violated.
Therefore, I find that there is no evidence that creates a dispute over whether
the Respondent honestly believed the results and the content of the third-party
investigations, or the subsequent conviction of [petitioner]. Thus, [petitioner] failed
to show evidence that any of the inquiry was racially discriminatory or that he ever
claimed the investigations were racially skewed.”
¶ 32 The ALJ next considered whether petitioner suffered an adverse employment action. The
ALJ first noted that the investigation revealed that it was R.M., and not petitioner, who suffered
the adverse consequences of the assault and the delay. The ALJ found that petitioner “offered no
evidence to show that any delay by Haywood [sic] and Plumlee caused material harm to him, or
that such delays rose to the level of an adverse or race-based action.” Finding no genuine issue of
a material fact, the ALJ concluded that petitioner had not established the second prong of a
prima facie case for racial discrimination.
¶ 33 Finally, the ALJ considered the third prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment
for race discrimination where unequal terms and conditions of employment, specifically whether
similarly situated persons who are not members of the petitioner’s protected class were treated
better than him. The ALJ noted that petitioner “flagged a situation in which a different patient
became violent and physically struggled with STA-I Tracy Apple ***, who is not Black, which
resulted in Hayman and Plumlee assisting Apple.” The ALJ found that the Apple incident was not
“similarly situated” to petitioner’s incident the same day, concluding:
“Here, [petitioner] offers no evidence that would enable this administrative
court to conclude that timing, logistics, and sequence of the conflict between the
patient and Apple were sufficiently the same as the conditions prevailing at the time
that he assaulted a patient on January 21, 2019. Such deficiencies and differences
11
between [petitioner’s] and Apple’s situations have long been recognized as a means
of disrupting the potential comparison between two (or more) similarly situated
employees.”
¶ 34 The ALJ concluded that petitioner failed to show that respondent harbored any race-based
animus against him. The ALJ further found that, by failing to identify viable similarly situated
employees, petitioner failed to show a pretext for any unequal terms and conditions of employment
based on race.
¶ 35 Petitioner filed an objection to the proposed decision, arguing that he claimed that the
referral to the ISP and the consequences thereof had caused him damages. He cited his affidavit
and exhibits which demonstrated that other similarly situated employees who engaged in
inappropriate conduct had not been referred out for ISP investigation. Petitioner also noted that
Smoot, “who conducted the investigation of the Petitioner, had previously made a false claim
against Petitioner” in that Smoot told others that petitioner had circulated nude photos of
petitioner’s white girlfriend. Petitioner also noted that he submitted a report from an expert who
stated that the video of the incident was missing 80 frames of footage, and that the video did not
show the entire incident.
¶ 36 Petitioner’s objection also argued that the ALJ misconstrued the complaint and erroneously
concluded that count II had been dismissed. According to petitioner, he should be able to proceed
on both counts I and II because the allegations therein “do not exclusively claim discrimination
because of being terminated from employment.” Petitioner noted that count I alleged that petitioner
was criminally charged. With regard to count II, petitioner noted that he alleged that the OIG
investigated the incident and notified the ISP, and that petitioner was arrested for battery.
According to petitioner, the ALJ erred in concluding that he was required to amend his complaint
to seek recovery under a new legal theory. In support of his argument, petitioner noted that “[b]oth
12
Counts I and II complain that [petitioner] was investigated and subsequently charged based on
Barry Smoot’s referral. Clearly, he was the one who did the investigations and made the decisions
as to criminal referrals.” Petitioner then noted that Smoot would be considered a supervisor under
Title VII and that a criminal charge is an adverse act.
¶ 37 Respondent filed a reply, arguing that petitioner’s exception focused on Smoot, who was
not mentioned in the complaint. Respondent also argued that petitioner’s “issue with his criminal
prosecution lies with the Randolph County State’s Attorney’s Office since it decides whom to
prosecute. Smoot, nor anyone else at Chester, can refer matters for criminal prosecution; those
referrals must come from law enforcement.”
¶ 38 On March 18, 2025, the Commission entered an order adopting the ALJ’s recommended
order and granting respondent’s motion for a summary decision. This matter is before this court
on direct appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. July 1, 2017), and section 3-113
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2022)). See 775 ILCS 5/8-111 (West
2018). On appeal, the Illinois Human Rights Commission was named as a respondent pursuant to
section 3-113(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 2022)).
¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 40 On appeal before this court, petitioner contends that the Commission erred in granting
respondent’s motion for summary decision, arguing that he presented a triable issue of fact
regarding the criminal prosecution that stemmed from the incident involving R.M. Petitioner
contends that (1) both counts I and II allege that he was investigated and subsequently charged
based upon Smoot’s decision to make a criminal referral, (2) that other similarly situated
employees were not referred out for criminal referral, and (3) that he was convicted and barred
from future state employment as a consequence of the referral and his criminal conviction.
13
Petitioner claims the decision to refer him for criminal prosecution was based upon his race.
Petitioner also argues that count II had not been dismissed and that the ALJ improperly declined
to consider it on the merits. We address each claim in turn.
¶ 41 The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination against a person on the basis of,
inter alia, his or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection
status, marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual orientation, or
unfavorable discharge from miliary service. 775 ILCS 5/1-102 (West 2022). In assessing claims
brought under the Act, courts “are guided not only by Illinois case law but also by (1) federal case
law relating to federal anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
and national origin, among other things.” Lau v. Abbott Laboratories, 2019 IL App (2d) 180456,
¶ 38 (2019) (citing Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (1989)).
¶ 42 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United States Supreme
Court set out a three-part analysis for analyzing discrimination claims adopted by the Zaderaka
Court. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 178. First, “a plaintiff must produce enough evidence to establish
a prima facie case that she was a member of a protected class and that she was treated less
favorably than someone who was not in the protected class ‘under circumstances which give rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’ ” Lau, 2019 IL App (2d) 180456, ¶ 39 (quoting Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). “If the plaintiff can do
this, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for taking the action it did.” Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). “Finally, if the employer
is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff ‘must then have the opportunity to prove’ that the
14
reason offered by the employer was not its true reason, but rather was a pretext for discrimination.”
Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
¶ 43 Pursuant to the Act, either party may move for a summary decision in its favor, and the
Commission’s hearing officer “shall grant” the motion if the pleadings and the affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. See 775 ILCS 5/8-106.1 (West 2022); see also 56 Ill.
Adm. Code 5300.735 (2010). “[A] ‘summary decision is the administrative agency procedural
analogue to the motion for summary judgment in the Code of Civil Procedure.’ ” Sola v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm’n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 528, 534 (2000) (quoting Cano v. Village of Dolton, 250
Ill. App. 3d 130, 138 (1993)). Accordingly, it is appropriate to rely upon summary judgment case
law when reviewing the propriety of an order granting a motion for summary decision. Id. We
review the Commission’s grant of summary decision de novo. Sola, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 536.
¶ 44 Initially, we note that petitioner advanced one theory with the DHR and in his complaint
(that he was subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment because Hayman and
Plumlee did not come to his aid) while advancing a different theory in response to respondent’s
motion for summary decision (that he was racially discriminated against by respondent in that
Smoot referred him out for investigation and criminal charges). The ALJ found that petitioner
improperly advanced a new “legal theory that [was] not articulated in either his complaint or his
underlying charge of discrimination.” For this reason, the ALJ “decline[d] to consider
[petitioner’s] alternative theory of liability under Count One, in which he claims racial
discrimination under the [new] theory that Respondent referred his role in [the] altercation with a
patient to the Illinois State Police.” In his reply brief, petitioner notes that “[t]he parties are in sharp
dispute regarding one pivotal issue: Whether the Complaint raised the issue of whether the referral
for criminal prosecution constituted discrimination against him on the grounds of his race.”
15
Accordingly, we first address whether the ALJ erred in failing to consider petitioner’s “alternative
theory of liability.”
¶ 45 Petitioner does not dispute that this court must look to the complaint to determine what
issues have been raised in reviewing the entry of a summary decision, but argues that this court
should review the complaint with a view of doing substantial justice to the parties. Respondents
argue that, because summary judgment motions are limited to issues raised in the complaint, the
ALJ properly declined to consider petitioner’s alternative theory of liability. We agree with
respondents.
¶ 46 Petitioner contends that respondent received “ample notice that he was seeking relief for
being discriminated against for his arrest and criminal prosecution based upon his race.” In support
of his argument, petitioner points to two paragraphs in count I and two paragraphs in count II. In
count I, paragraph 23 alleges “[t]hat as a result of this January 21, 2019[,] incident [petitioner] had
an aggravated battery charge proceeding in Court.” Also, in count I, paragraph 28 alleges “[t]hat
Respondent subjected [petitioner] to unequal terms and conditions of employment due to his race,
black, in violation of Section 2-102(A) of the Act.” Count II alleges, in paragraphs 34-35, “[t]hat
the OIG investigated the January 21, 2019, incident and determined to call the Illinois State
Police;” and “[t]hat on or about March 19, 2012, the Illinois State Police arrested [petitioner] for
Battery.” Petitioner further notes that, in opposition to the motion for summary decision, he argued
that “other employees had engaged in behavior that was far less offensive than what he was
accused of but none of them were ever referred to the Illinois State Police for criminal
prosecution.”
¶ 47 Upon our review of petitioner’s complaint, we note that petitioner failed to specifically
plead a theory that the discriminatory act was Smoot’s referral of the matter to the ISP for criminal
16
prosecution. 1 Petitioner’s new theory is that Smoot was a supervisor who held racial animus
toward petitioner as evidenced by his claim that Smoot had falsely accused petitioner of circulating
nude photos of petitioner’s white girlfriend. These allegations do not appear in the complaint.
Indeed, Smoot’s name does not appear in the complaint, and the complaint does not contain a
specific allegation that the discriminatory act was the referral of the matter to the ISP. We note
that petitioner sought and received permission to depose Smoot, but that the deposition never
occurred.
¶ 48 Illinois courts have observed that “it is axiomatic that summary judgment motions are
limited to the issues raised in the complaint, and a plaintiff cannot raise new issues not previously
pled in its complaint in order to obtain, or defeat a motion for, summary judgment.” 800 South
Wells Commercial LLC v. Cadden, 2018 IL App (1st) 162882, ¶ 43. A response to a motion for
summary judgment is just not the proper vehicle to assert new factual allegations that should have
been included in the underlying complaint. Abramson v. Marderosian, 2018 IL App (1st) 180081,
¶ 55. Courts have further observed that “[w]hen ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court looks to the pleadings to determine the issues in controversy. [Citation.] If a plaintiff
desires to place issues in controversy that were not named in the complaint, the proper course of
action is to move to amend the complaint. [Citation.].” Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 51
(2008).
¶ 49 Here, petitioner could have rectified the situation, as the Act provides a limited mechanism
for expanding the scope of a complaint once it is filed. Section 8A-102(C)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS
1
The record is not clear that Smoot was the person who contacted the Illinois State Police. We note
that the OIG’s intake form (dated January 23, 2019) states, under “Caller’s Statement”, that “[i]t was also
reported that the Illinois State Police have been notified and are investigating.” By contrast, the OIG’s final
report states that the OIG referred the allegation to the ISP on January 23, 2019. Additionally, we note that
petitioner’s verified complaint states that “the OIG investigated the January 21, 2019, incident, and
determined to call in the Illinois State Police.”
17
5/8A-102(C)(1) (West 2022)) permits a complaint to be amended by leave of the presiding ALJ,
for good cause shown, upon timely written motion and reasonable notice to all interested parties,
at any time prior to the issuance of the ALJ’s recommended order. Id. Petitioner articulated this
new theory in his May 24, 2024, response to respondent’s motion for summary decision. On June
14, 2024, respondent filed its reply brief and noted that petitioner had asserted allegations that
were outside the scope of the complaint. The recommended order was entered on August 9, 2024.
Petitioner had nearly two months to request leave to amend the complaint but did not do so. For
this reason, we conclude that the ALJ did not err in declining to consider petitioner’s alternative
theory of liability.
¶ 50 We next consider whether the Commission erred by granting respondent’s motion for
summary dismissal based upon the allegations actually contained in the complaint. With regard to
count I, the Commission’s order concluded that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for
racial discrimination. A prima facie case for discrimination requires evidence that (1) the plaintiff
is a member of a protected class, (2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate employment
expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably
than a similarly situated person who is not a member of the protected class. Lau, 2019 IL App (2d)
180456, ¶ 40 (citing Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2018)).
¶ 51 In the case before us, there is no dispute that petitioner, based upon his race, is a member
of a protected class. The ALJ’s analysis focused on the allegations in count I and (1) whether
petitioner was subjected to adverse treatment by respondent and (2) whether similarly situated