Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-2804 _____________________________ KATHY RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK MANAGEMENT, LLC d/b/a CAMP GULF, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Jeffrey E. Lewis, Circuit Judge. October 27, 2021 PER CURIAM. Kathy Richardson appeals the summary final judgment order entered in her Florida Civil Rights Act-derived employment discrimination case on timeliness grounds. Richardson makes two arguments for reversing the order entered in favor of her former employer Recreational Vehicle Park Management, LLC. We affirm as to both arguments because Richardson filed her administrative complaint after the statutory time limit expired for raising her constructive termination claims and because she failed to plead an actual termination-based discrimination claim in her lawsuit. Richardson worked at a campground in Florida’s Panhandle for almost three years until giving two-weeks’ notice on April 25, 2015 that she was resigning effective May 8, 2015. It turned out that Richardson’s final day at work came just one week later when she was told that her services were no longer needed. Slightly over one year later—on May 2, 2016—Richardson filed an administrative charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which she followed up with a lawsuit filed in circuit court. Tracking her administrative charge, Richardson’s operative (fourth-amended) complaint describes how she worked for Appellee until giving two- weeks’ notice and then was terminated a week later. The complaint’s four counts asserted under the Florida Civil Rights Act, chapter 760, Florida Statutes, alleged gender, religious, and marital status discrimination, as well as retaliation for having voiced opposition to unlawful practices. Each count culminated with allegations that her former employer’s discrimination led or partly led to her “constructive termination.” Appellee ultimately responded to the lawsuit by seeking summary judgment on grounds that the administrative complaint had been untimely filed. Appellee contended that Richardson’s constructive termination claims accrued on the date that she was allegedly forced to resign, which did not fall within the 365-day period preceding the administrative complaint as required by the FCRA, section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court agreed with Appellee concluding that Richardson submitted her resignation on April 25, 2015 and failed to file her administrative charge until May 2, 2016. And so, because the administrative charge was filed more than one year after Richardson’s resignation, her claims were untimely. We review orders granting summary judgment and issues involving the application of time-deadline statutes de novo. See, e.g., State v. City of Weston, 316 So. 3d 398, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852, 853–54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Richardson argues that the circuit court erred by finding her complaint to be time-barred. Before a plaintiff may bring suit under the FCRA, she must exhaust her administrative remedies. § 760.11(1)–(4), Fla. Stat.; Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 156 So. 3d 2 563, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). A plaintiff initiates the administrative process by timely filing a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations “within 365 days of the alleged violation.” § 760.11(1), Fla. Stat.; Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing the 365-day timeliness requirement). After filing the charge administratively, a claim must also be alleged in a civil complaint to move forward in circuit court. See Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A. v. Bowmar Instrument Corp., 537 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1988) (“[L]itigants at the outset of a suit must be compelled to state their pleadings with sufficient particularity for a defense to be prepared.”); cf., Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) (“determining the timeliness of [an administrative complaint], and [the] ensuing lawsuit, requires us to identify precisely the ‘unlawful employment practice’ of which [the plaintiff] complains.”). Richardson argues that she alleged an actual termination- based civil claim that was administratively filed on the last possible date and which renders timely the claims alleged in her civil suit. The problem with this argument is that Richardson’s civil complaint does not allege an actual termination-based claim. Richardson’s only allusion to actual termination in her Complaint is in the facts section where she describes being “told to leave immediately” in May 2015 just before her two-weeks’ notice period ended. But this sentence is immediately followed by allegations of constructive discharge that dominate her complaint: “No reasonable person would have remained employed under these circumstances and Plaintiff was forced to resign.” Later, in the claims section of her complaint, Richardson alleges only four unlawful discrimination counts based on “constructive termination.” There is no actual termination-based count alleged. To be clear, constructive termination contemplates a situation in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point that her “working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 3 129, 141 (2004). * Under such circumstances where the employee resigns in the face of intolerable discrimination, the clock for filing an administrative complaint begins to run “only after a plaintiff resigns.” Green v. Brennan, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016). In other words, the time of resignation is understood to be the point when a reasonable person in a plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to leave due to the employer’s precipitating conduct. Id. (referring to resignation as the point when a plaintiff can file a constructive discharge suit with a “complete and present” cause of action, which is when limitations periods ordinarily begin to run). Applying this limitations-period principle here, the intolerable discrimination allegedly leading to Richardson’s resignation reached its complete and present point on April 25, 2015, when Richardson gave her two-weeks’ notice. This date was more than 365 days before her constructive discharge claims were filed with the EEOC. Conversely, we recognize that Richardson’s employment actually ended one week later, before her two-weeks’ notice expired. But none of the counts in her complaint assert unlawful discrimination arising from an actual termination. Actual termination-based discrimination claims are distinctly different from constructive termination-based claims. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-115 (2002) (describing that hostile work environment claims are “easy to identify” and “different in kind” from discrete act-based claims like “termination, failure to promote, [etc.]”); Maggio v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp. Sec., 910 So. 2d 876, 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (distinguishing work environment-type discrimination claims that occur over time and are based on the cumulative effect of several individually discriminatory acts from “discrete act”-related claims). Thus, we cannot conclude that Richardson alleged an actual termination claim that should have survived summary * As noted in other FCRA cases, we often find guidance from federal decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in cases like this one because the FCRA is patterned after Title VII. See Champion Int’l Corp. v. Wideman, 733 So. 2d 559, 563 fn. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). 4 judgment. Nor can we find fault with the trial court’s conclusion that the constructive termination claims that Richardson actually alleged were time-barred. We therefore AFFIRM the circuit court’s final order granting summary judgment. LEWIS, ROBERTS, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Marie A. Mattox and Ashley N. Richardson of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant. Julia K. Maddalena of Hand Arendall Harrison Sale, Panama City, for Appellee. 5