Full Opinion

Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 25-40832 November 5, 2026 Summary Calendar Thomas B. Plunkett, III ____________ Clerk Pamela Hartt, Individually, as next friend of J.H., minor; Shane Hartt, as next friend of J.H., minor, Plaintiffs—Appellants, versus Evadale Independent School District; Steve Hyden, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:24-CV-63 ______________________________ Before King, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: * Plaintiffs–Appellants Pamela Hartt and Shane Hartt, acting as next friends of minor J.H., appeal from the district court’s orders (1) granting Defendants–Appellees Evadale Independent School District’s (“Evadale”) and Steve Hyden’s motion to dismiss; (2) denying Appellants’ Rule 59(e) _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-40832 motion for reconsideration; and (3) denying Appellants leave to amend. We AFFIRM. First, Appellants argue that the district court erred by dismissing their claim for associational disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As relevant here, Appellants alleged that Plaintiff Pamela Hartt (“Hartt”) was a teacher in Evadale and had a daughter with a disability who received special education within the school district. In late 2021, Hartt .became concerned that the school district was not providing adequate special education services for her daughter, so she notified the district of her intent to file for a due process hearing with the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”). Shortly after notifying the district of her complaint, Hartt was demoted. Appellants alleged that Hartt was then sexually harassed by then- superintendent Steve Hyden, who made comments suggesting that he would resolve the issues with Hartt’s daughter if Hartt performed sexual favors for Hyden. Appellants brought a derivative claim for associational disability discrimination against Pamela Hartt under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. 1 Section 504 states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving _____________________ 1 Appellants brought several other causes of action in their complaint, including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violation of Title VII. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal. Additionally, Appellants alleged an associational disability discrimination claim under the ADA, which the district court also dismissed. While Appellants mention the ADA generally in their briefing, all of their arguments are directed at their Rehabilitation Act claim. As a result, Appellants have abandoned their ADA claim. Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 921 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that issues not briefed on appeal are abandoned). 2 Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-40832 Federal financial assistance.” Id. We have not explicitly recognized a cause of action for discrimination by virtue of an individual’s association with a person with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act (or the ADA), though many district courts have permitted such a claim to proceed. See Besser v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 834 F. App’x 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished); Grimes v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 505 F. App’x 376, 380 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). Nevertheless, we have explained that, “‘[i]f such an action were viable,’ to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff would have to show: ‘(1) [her] qualification for the job, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s disabled relative, and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the relative’s disability was a determining factor in the employer’s adverse action.’” Besser, 834 F.App’x at 886 (quoting Spencer v FEI, Inc., 725 F. App’x 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished)); Grimes, 505 F. App’x at 380 n.1. Here, the district court concluded that, to the extent this kind of claim is cognizable at all, Appellants had not adequately pleaded the fourth element, “that her employer unlawfully discriminated against her because of her relation[’s] disability.” The district court emphasized that Hartt had alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action because she filed a complaint relating to her daughter’s schooling, not because of her daughter’s underlying learning disabilities. Appellants sought reconsideration, and the district court maintained that “Hartt did not allege any facts that would create a reasonable inference that it was J.H.’s disability—rather than Hartt’s filing of her complaint with the TEA—that led to her demotion and harassment.” On appeal, Hartt argues once more that “she was a victim of retaliation because of this protected advocacy on behalf of her daughter.” 3 Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-40832 Ultimately, we agree with the district court. “We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo.” Doe 1 v. City View Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 F.4th 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2025). While Appellants’ complaint includes allegations supporting an inference that Hartt’s complaint to the TEA caused an adverse employment action, there are no factual allegations that adequately suggest that her daughter’s disability, though discussed within the TEA complaint, was the basis for the adverse employment action. Appellants do not allege, for example, that Hyden or Evadale “expressed animosity regarding [J.H.’s] condition,” Besser, 834 F.App’x at 886, or that J.H.’s disability was unknown prior to Hartt’s filing of the complaint. Instead, the allegations for this claim are general and conclusory, stating that J.H. was a “victim of retaliation,” and “Pamela Hartt has a derivative claim of what is termed associational disability discrimination.” At bottom, Appellants’ complaint suggests only one plausible inference at this stage: Hartt was subjected to an adverse employment action because she engaged in potentially protected activity, not because she was associated with her disabled daughter. That might have given rise to a different cause of action—namely, retaliation—but it is insufficient for the cause of action that Appellants alleged here. 2 As a result, the district court did not err. 3 _____________________ 2 There is an open question whether the standard articulated in Besser applies to a Rehabilitation Act claim, which normally imposes a heightened causation standard. See Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Liability can only be found when the discrimination was ‘solely by reason of her or his disability,’ not when it is simply a motivating factor.” (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a))); Longoria v. Via Metro. Transit, No. SA-21-CV-01171-JKP, 2022 WL 1445396, at *12 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2022) (imposing “solely caused by” standard for associational discrimination claim). We need not reach this question, since we agree that Appellants do not state an associational discrimination claim, even under the lower standard articulated in Besser. 3 Appellants also argue that the district court erred in denying their 59(e) motion for the same reasons. “We generally review a decision on a motion to alter or amend 4 Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-40832 Second, Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying them leave to amend. “We review denials of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.” Jack v. Evonik Corp., 79 F.4th 547, 564 (5th Cir. 2023). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend should be “freely” given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Courts should consider factors such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility. Jack, 79 F.4th at 564–65. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court initially dismissed Appellants’ claims with prejudice, despite Appellants’ brief request for leave to amend in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. But “[a] bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication of the particular grounds on which the amendment is sought— does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Appellants then formally sought leave to amend, but the district court denied the motion, holding that Appellants had already been granted one opportunity to amend their complaint and that the amendments concerned facts known at the beginning of the lawsuit. The district court thus based its denial of leave to amend on permissible considerations such as delay and past amendments. _____________________ judgment under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion.” Pioneer Nat. Res. USA, Inc. v. Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Loc. 4-487, 328 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 2003), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 338 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2003). “To the extent that a ruling was a reconsideration of a question of law, however, the standard of review is de novo.” Id. We conclude that the district court did not err for the same reasons described above. 5 Case: 25-40832 Document: 58-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-40832 We do not conclude that the district court abused its discretion on these facts. 4 We AFFIRM. _____________________ 4 Appellants argue that it was significant that, a few weeks before their complaint was dismissed, the magistrate judge had placed certain discovery rulings in abeyance given Appellants’ stated intent to file a second amended complaint consistent with the scheduling order. Appellants do not explain how this fact creates an abuse of discretion, and their waiver argument is unavailing. 6