Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 1 of 10 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-11227 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ RONALD D. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CHELSEA FRANKLIN, Defendant, SCHOOL BOARD OF GADSDEN COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 4:25-cv-00188-AW-MAF ____________________ Before BRANCH, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 26-11227 Ronald Jones applied for and did not receive a teaching position at Gadsden County High School. He argues that in refusing to hire him, the Gadsden County School Board discriminated against him based on his age and retaliated against him for previous complaints he filed against the Board with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and lawsuits he brought against the Board in federal court. After allowing Jones to amend his complaint four times, the district court dismissed Jones’s suit for failure to state a claim and denied his motion for leave to amend. After review, we affirm. I. Background On April 27, 2023, Ronald Jones, who was then 67 years old, applied for a position at Gadsden County High School teaching social science. Despite calling the principal and the principal’s secretary, leaving messages, and sending e-mails, he never heard back from the school district about an interview and did not get the job. On April 17, 2025, Jones, proceeding pro se, filed suit against the Gadsden County School Board (the “Board”). 1 The magistrate judge subsequently ordered Jones to amend his complaint four times to correct various deficiencies, including failing to provide specific factual allegations instead of legal conclusions and 1 Jones initially sued the principal of Gadsden County High School in addition to the Board, but his first amended complaint removed the principal as a defendant. USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 3 of 10 26-11227 Opinion of the Court 3 including his full birth date in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a). In his fourth amended complaint, Jones asserted claims for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and retaliation in violation of Title VII. As to his ADEA claim, he asserted that a school official “illegally removed the page” with his teaching experience from his resume and never passed along his application to the high school such that the principal “never even saw” his application. Although Jones admitted that he did not know the age of the person ultimately hired for the position, he alleged that this person had a criminal record. As for his retaliation claim, Jones asserted that the school official’s actions in removing a page from his resume and not passing it along to the principal were in retaliation for previous complaints of discrimination Jones filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) and federal lawsuits he brought against the Board. The Board moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the district court grant the motion. The district court adopted the recommendation, noting that Jones included “several conclusory allegations” of discrimination, and the remaining factual allegations did not plausibly support his claims. Specifically, Jones had not provided anything suggesting the alleged actions were “based on USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 4 of 10 4 Opinion of the Court 26-11227 discrimination or retaliation.” The district court also noted that “even if Jones had alleged a younger person was selected, that alone would not be sufficient” to make out a plausible claim of age discrimination. And because Jones “had sufficient opportunities to state a claim,” and “the magistrate judge . . . pointed out defects in the prior complaints,” the district court denied Jones’s motion for leave to amend his complaint a fifth time2 and dismissed his claims with prejudice. Jones timely appealed. II. Discussion Jones appeals the district court’s dismissal of his age discrimination and retaliation claims and its denial of his motion for leave to amend. We address each in turn. A. Motion to Dismiss We review a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice de novo, “accept[ing] the well-pleaded factual allegations in the [c]omplaint as true and constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to” the plaintiff. Drummond v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 177 F.4th 1076, 1086 (11th Cir. 2026). We liberally construe pro se pleadings, but we will not “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see also Timson v. 2 Jones’s motion for leave to amend was denied for the additional reason that it was not in compliance with the local rules, which require a proposed amended pleading to accompany such a motion. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1. USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 5 of 10 26-11227 Opinion of the Court 5 Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally.”). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “factual content must allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”—here, that the Board discriminated based on age or impermissibly retaliated in its hiring decision. Drummond, 177 F.4th at 1086 (quotation omitted); see also Waller v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 184 F.4th 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2026) (The claim must be “‘plausible on its face,’” meaning it contains “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (quotation omitted)). i. Age Discrimination Jones argues that the allegations in his complaint—that he was 67 years old, his application was withheld, and a page from his resume was removed—plausibly show age discrimination under the ADEA. We agree with the district court that these allegations are insufficient to state an ADEA claim. The ADEA states in relevant part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). It prohibits employers from engaging in such discrimination against individuals who are at least 40 years old. Id. § 631(a). “To establish a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that age was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)). USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 6 of 10 6 Opinion of the Court 26-11227 Here, Jones has failed to plausibly allege age discrimination by the Board because his complaint did not contain any facts indicating that age played a role in the decision not to hire him. He alleges his own age, but that fact, by itself, does little to nothing in making out an age discrimination claim without some indication his age was the reason behind the hiring decision. To be sure, Jones alleges in his brief on appeal that the Board hired someone younger. But this fact was not contained in the operative complaint, so we do not consider it. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim . . . that is plausible on its face” (quotations omitted)). And as the district court correctly noted, even if the successful applicant was younger, that fact—divorced from any suggestion that age was a factor in the decision-making process—would not be sufficient to state a plausible claim. Because Jones did not allege that the Board’s reasons for rejecting his application were based on his age, he did not plead sufficient facts to support an age discrimination claim under the ADEA. ii. Retaliation Jones argues that he stated a plausible claim of retaliation under Title VII based on his allegations that he had previously filed multiple FCHR complaints and federal lawsuits; that a school official withheld his employment application and altered his resume; and that the principal never saw his application. Again, we USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 7 of 10 26-11227 Opinion of the Court 7 conclude Jones’s allegations were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an applicant for employment “because he has made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered adverse employment action; and (3) that the adverse employment action was causally related to the protected activity.” Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998). “To establish the necessary causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that h[is] protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1135 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotations omitted). Thus, the plaintiff must necessarily show that the decisionmaker “actually knew” about the plaintiff’s protected activity. Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1053 (11th Cir. 2020). Jones’s complaint did not plausibly allege facts supporting the causation element of his Title VII claim. Indeed, Jones failed to allege that the decisionmaker—whether that be the school official, another Board employee, or the principal—had knowledge of Jones’s previous protected activity. Jones argues that his “years” of litigation and the Board’s “longstanding involvement” in that USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 8 of 10 8 Opinion of the Court 26-11227 litigation is a sufficient ground to infer knowledge. However, Jones is not clear on whose knowledge may be inferred from his voluminous record of complaints. And this gap points to the deeper problem: Jones did not make any connection between his litigation history and a decisionmaker’s knowledge in his complaint. And, as we have already noted, the complaint governs. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Based on the allegations in Jones’s fourth amended complaint, we cannot infer that his protected activity—his previous litigation against the Board—was the reason he was not hired. Thus, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a Title VII retaliation claim.4 3 We also note that Jones has not alleged details as to when he engaged in this protected activity in his complaint. See Hall v. Coal Bed Servs. Inc., 190 F.4th 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2026) (noting that one way of showing causation is by demonstrating temporal proximity between the awareness of the protected activity and the occurring of the adverse action). He attempted to do so by including his litigation history—a list of case numbers corresponding to his previous suits—in his opposition to the Board’s motion to dismiss and his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. But even assuming we took judicial notice of these extrinsic documents at the motion to dismiss stage, see Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010), Jones still cannot establish temporal proximity. The most recent suit on this list was in 2021; Jones applied for the social studies position at issue here in 2023. This nearly two-year gap is not close enough to establish temporal proximity. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere temporal proximity, without more, must be ‘very close.’”). 4 We also find unpersuasive Jones’s arguments that the district court improperly disregarded his factual allegations as conclusory and weighed his USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 9 of 10 26-11227 Opinion of the Court 9 B. Motion for Leave to Amend Jones also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint for a fifth time, because he has new testimony, new documents, new evidence, and a corrected factual timeline. We disagree. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint when that denial is based on repeated failures to cure deficiencies. Taveras v. Bank of Am., N.A., 89 F.4th 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024). “A district court will abuse its discretion if it makes an error of law or makes a clearly erroneous factual finding.” Id. (quotation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that district courts “should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court usually must allow at least one opportunity to amend “[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim,” see Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2018), but a district court need not grant leave where there has been a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1286 (11th Cir. 2025). evidence against the Board’s, which is improper at the motion to dismiss stage. These arguments mischaracterize the district court’s order and overlook that, even taking all of Jones’s allegations as true, he has not alleged sufficient facts to support his claims. USCA11 Case: 26-11227 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 10 of 10 10 Opinion of the Court 26-11227 Here, the district court permitted Jones to amend his complaint four times before it denied his motion to amend for a fifth time and dismissed with prejudice. And for each of Jones’s complaints, the magistrate judge specified where the pleading was lacking. But despite having multiple opportunities and being on notice of what needed to be fixed, Jones failed to cure the deficiencies. In addition, Jones did not specify what “new evidence” he has or include a proposed amended pleading as required by the local rules. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1; Albara v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that pro se litigants are required to follow local rules). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for leave to amend. III. Conclusion Because Jones failed to state a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA or retaliation under Title VII, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim. And because Jones repeatedly failed to cure known deficiencies in his complaint, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for leave to amend. AFFIRMED.