Ronald D. Jones v. School Board of Gadsden County
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-11227
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-11227
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RONALD D. JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHELSEA FRANKLIN,
Defendant,
SCHOOL BOARD OF GADSDEN COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:25-cv-00188-AW-MAF
____________________
Before BRANCH, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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2 Opinion of the Court 26-11227
Ronald Jones applied for and did not receive a teaching
position at Gadsden County High School. He argues that in
refusing to hire him, the Gadsden County School Board
discriminated against him based on his age and retaliated against
him for previous complaints he filed against the Board with the
Florida Commission on Human Relations and lawsuits he brought
against the Board in federal court. After allowing Jones to amend
his complaint four times, the district court dismissed Jones’s suit
for failure to state a claim and denied his motion for leave to
amend. After review, we affirm.
I. Background
On April 27, 2023, Ronald Jones, who was then 67 years old,
applied for a position at Gadsden County High School teaching
social science. Despite calling the principal and the principal’s
secretary, leaving messages, and sending e-mails, he never heard
back from the school district about an interview and did not get the
job.
On April 17, 2025, Jones, proceeding pro se, filed suit against
the Gadsden County School Board (the “Board”). 1 The magistrate
judge subsequently ordered Jones to amend his complaint four
times to correct various deficiencies, including failing to provide
specific factual allegations instead of legal conclusions and
1 Jones initially sued the principal of Gadsden County High School in addition
to the Board, but his first amended complaint removed the principal as a
defendant.
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including his full birth date in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.2(a).
In his fourth amended complaint, Jones asserted claims for
age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and retaliation in violation of Title VII.
As to his ADEA claim, he asserted that a school official “illegally
removed the page” with his teaching experience from his resume
and never passed along his application to the high school such that
the principal “never even saw” his application. Although Jones
admitted that he did not know the age of the person ultimately
hired for the position, he alleged that this person had a criminal
record. As for his retaliation claim, Jones asserted that the school
official’s actions in removing a page from his resume and not
passing it along to the principal were in retaliation for previous
complaints of discrimination Jones filed with the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) and federal lawsuits
he brought against the Board.
The Board moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim, and the magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation, recommending that the district court grant the
motion. The district court adopted the recommendation, noting
that Jones included “several conclusory allegations” of
discrimination, and the remaining factual allegations did not
plausibly support his claims. Specifically, Jones had not provided
anything suggesting the alleged actions were “based on
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4 Opinion of the Court 26-11227
discrimination or retaliation.” The district court also noted that
“even if Jones had alleged a younger person was selected, that alone
would not be sufficient” to make out a plausible claim of age
discrimination. And because Jones “had sufficient opportunities to
state a claim,” and “the magistrate judge . . . pointed out defects in
the prior complaints,” the district court denied Jones’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint a fifth time2 and dismissed his claims
with prejudice.
Jones timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Jones appeals the district court’s dismissal of his age
discrimination and retaliation claims and its denial of his motion
for leave to amend. We address each in turn.
A. Motion to Dismiss
We review a district court’s order granting a motion to
dismiss with prejudice de novo, “accept[ing] the well-pleaded factual
allegations in the [c]omplaint as true and constru[ing] them in the
light most favorable to” the plaintiff. Drummond v. S. Co. Servs., Inc.,
177 F.4th 1076, 1086 (11th Cir. 2026). We liberally construe pro se
pleadings, but we will not “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading
in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d
1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see also Timson v.
2 Jones’s motion for leave to amend was denied for the additional reason that
it was not in compliance with the local rules, which require a proposed
amended pleading to accompany such a motion. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1.
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Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e read briefs filed
by pro se litigants liberally.”).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “factual
content must allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”—here, that the
Board discriminated based on age or impermissibly retaliated in its
hiring decision. Drummond, 177 F.4th at 1086 (quotation omitted);
see also Waller v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 184 F.4th 1327,
1333 (11th Cir. 2026) (The claim must be “‘plausible on its face,’”
meaning it contains “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” (quotation omitted)).
i. Age Discrimination
Jones argues that the allegations in his complaint—that he
was 67 years old, his application was withheld, and a page from his
resume was removed—plausibly show age discrimination under
the ADEA. We agree with the district court that these allegations
are insufficient to state an ADEA claim.
The ADEA states in relevant part that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . any
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1). It prohibits employers from engaging in such
discrimination against individuals who are at least 40 years old. Id.
§ 631(a). “To establish a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must
prove that age was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse
decision.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir.
2024) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
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Here, Jones has failed to plausibly allege age discrimination
by the Board because his complaint did not contain any facts
indicating that age played a role in the decision not to hire him. He
alleges his own age, but that fact, by itself, does little to nothing in
making out an age discrimination claim without some indication
his age was the reason behind the hiring decision. To be sure, Jones
alleges in his brief on appeal that the Board hired someone
younger. But this fact was not contained in the operative
complaint, so we do not consider it. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (noting that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a
claim . . . that is plausible on its face” (quotations omitted)). And
as the district court correctly noted, even if the successful applicant
was younger, that fact—divorced from any suggestion that age was
a factor in the decision-making process—would not be sufficient to
state a plausible claim.
Because Jones did not allege that the Board’s reasons for
rejecting his application were based on his age, he did not plead
sufficient facts to support an age discrimination claim under the
ADEA.
ii. Retaliation
Jones argues that he stated a plausible claim of retaliation
under Title VII based on his allegations that he had previously filed
multiple FCHR complaints and federal lawsuits; that a school
official withheld his employment application and altered his
resume; and that the principal never saw his application. Again, we
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conclude Jones’s allegations were insufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
an applicant for employment “because he has made a charge . . . or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. “To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity;
(2) that he suffered adverse employment action; and (3) that the
adverse employment action was causally related to the protected
activity.” Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th
Cir. 1998).
“To establish the necessary causation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that h[is] protected activity was a but-for cause of the
alleged adverse action by the employer.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of
Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1135 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotations
omitted). Thus, the plaintiff must necessarily show that the
decisionmaker “actually knew” about the plaintiff’s protected
activity. Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1053
(11th Cir. 2020).
Jones’s complaint did not plausibly allege facts supporting
the causation element of his Title VII claim. Indeed, Jones failed to
allege that the decisionmaker—whether that be the school official,
another Board employee, or the principal—had knowledge of
Jones’s previous protected activity. Jones argues that his “years” of
litigation and the Board’s “longstanding involvement” in that
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litigation is a sufficient ground to infer knowledge. However,
Jones is not clear on whose knowledge may be inferred from his
voluminous record of complaints. And this gap points to the
deeper problem: Jones did not make any connection between his
litigation history and a decisionmaker’s knowledge in his
complaint. And, as we have already noted, the complaint governs.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3
Based on the allegations in Jones’s fourth amended
complaint, we cannot infer that his protected activity—his
previous litigation against the Board—was the reason he was not
hired. Thus, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a Title
VII retaliation claim.4
3 We also note that Jones has not alleged details as to when he engaged in this
protected activity in his complaint. See Hall v. Coal Bed Servs. Inc., 190 F.4th
1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2026) (noting that one way of showing causation is by
demonstrating temporal proximity between the awareness of the protected
activity and the occurring of the adverse action). He attempted to do so by
including his litigation history—a list of case numbers corresponding to his
previous suits—in his opposition to the Board’s motion to dismiss and his
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. But even
assuming we took judicial notice of these extrinsic documents at the motion
to dismiss stage, see Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010), Jones still cannot
establish temporal proximity. The most recent suit on this list was in 2021;
Jones applied for the social studies position at issue here in 2023. This nearly
two-year gap is not close enough to establish temporal proximity. See Thomas
v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere temporal
proximity, without more, must be ‘very close.’”).
4 We also find unpersuasive Jones’s arguments that the district court
improperly disregarded his factual allegations as conclusory and weighed his
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B. Motion for Leave to Amend
Jones also argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for leave to amend his complaint for a fifth time, because
he has new testimony, new documents, new evidence, and a
corrected factual timeline. We disagree.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
a motion for leave to amend a complaint when that denial is based
on repeated failures to cure deficiencies. Taveras v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 89 F.4th 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024). “A district court will
abuse its discretion if it makes an error of law or makes a clearly
erroneous factual finding.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that district
courts “should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court usually must allow
at least one opportunity to amend “[w]here a more carefully
drafted complaint might state a claim,” see Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2018), but a district
court need not grant leave where there has been a “repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Huggins
v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1286 (11th Cir. 2025).
evidence against the Board’s, which is improper at the motion to dismiss stage.
These arguments mischaracterize the district court’s order and overlook that,
even taking all of Jones’s allegations as true, he has not alleged sufficient facts
to support his claims.
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Here, the district court permitted Jones to amend his
complaint four times before it denied his motion to amend for a
fifth time and dismissed with prejudice. And for each of Jones’s
complaints, the magistrate judge specified where the pleading was
lacking. But despite having multiple opportunities and being on
notice of what needed to be fixed, Jones failed to cure the
deficiencies. In addition, Jones did not specify what “new
evidence” he has or include a proposed amended pleading as
required by the local rules. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1; Albara v.
Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that pro se
litigants are required to follow local rules). Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for leave to amend.
III. Conclusion
Because Jones failed to state a claim for age discrimination
under the ADEA or retaliation under Title VII, the district court
did not err in dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim.
And because Jones repeatedly failed to cure known deficiencies in
his complaint, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Jones’s motion for leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.