Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0729-25 H.B.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. B.S., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted October 28, 2026 – Decided November 6, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FV-07-0265-22. Almasy Law, attorney for appellant (James M. Almasy, on the brief). Borenstein, McConnell & Calpin, PC, attorneys for respondent (Abraham Borenstein and Bradley M. Arlen, on the brief). 1 We refer to the parties by their initials. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM Defendant B.S. appeals from a September 16, 2025 order awarding $788,293.54 in fees to plaintiff H.B. following a lengthy domestic violence trial and the entry of a final restraining order (FRO). We affirm. Defendant is not appealing the entry of the FRO in favor of plaintiff. She only challenges the fees awarded to plaintiff by the trial judge. Thus, we need not recite the facts leading to the issuance of the FRO. The domestic violence trial took place over a three-year period and spanned fifty trial days. Upon completion of the domestic violence trial and the entry of the FRO, plaintiff moved for an award of fees supported by a certification of legal services submitted by plaintiff's attorney. In the fee application, plaintiff requested the sum of $1,071,670.78. This amount included attorney's fees, expert fees, and costs. After considering plaintiff's fee application and defendant's opposition to that application, in a September 16, 2025 order with an attached written decision, the judge awarded fees to plaintiff. In his decision, the judge "incorporate[d] by reference the prior statements of facts and procedural history detailed in the multiple prior opinions" issued during the domestic violence trial. The judge conducted a detailed line-by-line review of the certification of A-0729-25 2 services provided by plaintiff's attorney. The certification set forth each task related to the prosecution of plaintiff's domestic violence claims against defendant, the hourly rate for each task, the attorney who performed the task, and the attorney's hourly rate. The judge also considered the complexity and volume of legal work conducted by plaintiff's counsel, which included "substantial court appearances, discovery, and trial preparation." Defendant argued the amount requested was grossly excessive, included work unrelated to the domestic violence litigation, and failed to meet the procedural and substantive requirements for a fee award. Defendant claimed the requested fees included other litigation between the parties and expert fees "disguised as legal fees." Defendant asked the judge to deny plaintiff's fee application in its entirety. In his detailed and meticulous review of the requested fees, the judge concluded the amount requested was excessive. After analyzing the factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4), the judge awarded the sum of $788,293.54. The judge found that amount represented reasonable fees as compensatory damages for losses plaintiff suffered due to defendant's act of domestic violence. In determining the reasonableness of the requested attorney's fees, the judge considered the factors under the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) A-0729-25 3 1.5(a). The judge concluded plaintiff proved the attorney's fees were reasonable based on work performed. He further found the hourly rates were in accordance amounts customarily charged by attorneys with comparable skill sets and experience in the area of family law. Additionally, the judge determined the fees were incurred as a direct result of defendant's acts of domestic violence. In a comprehensive review of the certification of services, the judge reduced or eliminated entries which were redundant or "excess consistent with prior case dispositions." The judge rejected defendant's argument that certain requested attorney fees were disguised as expert fees simply because the expert happened to be an attorney. 2 The judge provided three single-spaced pages of bullet points thoroughly explaining why he reduced or rejected certain expenses. In all, the judge reduced the fee application by $20,612.73, decreasing the amount demanded by plaintiff to $1,051,058.05. The judge found this reduced fee was "based upon the totality of the circumstances in th[e] matter [and was] reasonable in a macro evaluation under the Rules, case law, and facts of this case." 2 In his September 16, 2025 written decision, the judge stated he previously "resolved" the expert's status. Neither party provided a copy of the judge's prior decision regarding the status of the attorney expert. A-0729-25 4 Additionally, the judge engaged in a "micro evaluation" of the reasonableness of the reduced fees. Although not obligated to do so, the judge considered defendant's financial circumstances and found a "marked difference" between the parties' finances. See Wine v. Quezada, 379 N.J. Super. 287, 293 (Ch. Div. 2005) (holding "financial circumstances have no relevance whatsoever" in awarding attorney's fees as compensatory damages in a domestic violence action). The judge concluded that "to impose [$1,051,058.05] in this matter would be excessive in the eyes of court" "notwithstanding the reasonableness of [plaintiff's] counsel's actions in litigating this matter. " The judge determined the fees sought by plaintiff crossed "the line from compensatory damages to [plaintiff] to presenting as punitive [damages against defendant]." Therefore, under Rule 1:1-2(a), the judge concluded a further reduction was necessary "to effectuate justice," and further reduced the amount by twenty-five percent. The judge ordered defendant to pay reasonable fees to plaintiff totaling $788,293.54 On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in applying a twenty-five percent reduction "without a detailed analysis of the loadstar methodology." She further contends the award of $788,293.54 was unreasonable. We disagree. A-0729-25 5 In reviewing the grant or denial of a counsel fee award, we accord deference to a trial judge's determination. McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2007). Further, "fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court makes 'findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence,' utilizes 'irrelevant or inappropriate factors,' or 'fail[s] to consider controlling legal principles.'" Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 444 (App. Div. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015)). "An abuse of discretion is also demonstrated if the court fails to consider 'all relevant factors.'" Ibid. (quoting Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)). Under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 17 to -35, a trial judge may enter an order "requiring the defendant to pay to the victim monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the act of domestic violence[,]" including but not limited to "reasonable attorney's fee [and] court costs." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). We have held this "'statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning' and because [N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(b)(4)] sets forth attorney's fees as compensatory damages, 'attorneys fees are A-0729-25 6 not subject to the traditional analysis contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 [] (1971).'" McGowan, 391 N.J. Super. at 507 (quoting Schmidt v. Schmidt, 262 N.J. Super. 451, 453 (Ch. Div. 1992)). Attorney's fees in a domestic violence action are not subject to Rule 5:3-5 governing fee applications in general family law matters. Ibid. The PDVA establishes a three-part test for awarding fees. "[T]he victim must demonstrate that the fees are a direct result of the domestic violence, they are reasonable, and they are presented by affidavit pursuant to Rule 4:42-9(b)." Grandovic v. Labrie, 348 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Schmidt, 262 N.J. Super. at 454). Here, the judge correctly concluded the fees incurred by plaintiff were a direct result of defendant's acts of domestic violence. In his comprehensive review of plaintiff's fee certification, the judge determined plaintiff's legal expenses were causally connected to defendant's acts of domestic violence. The judge expressly excluded charges he found to have been associated with "collateral matters" unrelated to the domestic violence litigation. We also reject defendant's contention that the judge's global twenty-five percent reduction in fees lacked specificity. The reasonableness of an award of fees under the PDVA requires consideration of the factors specified under RPC A-0729-25 7 1.5(a). See Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 22 (2004). After applying the factors under the RPCs, the judge explained his reasons for the amount awarded and the sums rejected. Additionally, the judge was well within his discretion to reduce the fees awarded when implementing the twenty-five percent reduction. "The Family Court possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish substantial justice." Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446 (App. Div. 2000). We agree with the judge's determination that "substantial justice" was best served by a twenty-five percent reduction based on the parties' different financial circumstances. Further, we reject defendant's challenge to the judge's inclusion of expert costs in the fee award. Defendant contends the judge failed to conduct a detailed analysis awarding expert fees and the expert's fees were disguised as attorney's fees. Although we do not have the benefit of the judge's rulings throughout this protracted domestic violence litigation, the judge's September 16, 2025 decision noted he previously addressed the status of plaintiff's expert who happened to be an attorney. The PDVA provides a non-exhaustive list of "compensatory losses" to be awarded to a domestic violence victim. The statute does not exclude an award of expert fees as part of the prevailing party's compensatory A-0729-25 8 damages. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). Moreover, defendant fails to raise any specific challenge to the fee charged by the expert in the domestic violence matter. In the absence of a specific challenge to the expert's fee, we are satisfied the judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding the unrebutted expert costs incurred by plaintiff in prosecuting his domestic violence claims against defendant. Affirmed. A-0729-25 9