Full Opinion

FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE JASON A. MILLER and KIMBERLY L. ) MILLER, ) No. 41231-8-III ) Respondents, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION SALLIE ANN MILES, ) ) Appellant. ) COONEY, J. — Kimberly and Jason Miller are neighbors of Sallie Miles. The Millers obtained an anti-harassment protection order based on Ms. Miles’ harassing conduct toward them. Ms. Miles appeals the issuance of that order. We affirm. BACKGROUND Ms. Miles and the Millers are neighbors who share a driveway pursuant to an easement. In November 2024, the Millers obtained a temporary protection order against Ms. Miles and alleged that she “damages [their] property” and “steals [their] belongings,” among other conduct. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3. In February 2025, Ms. Miles filed a complaint in superior court against the Millers, asserting claims for “quiet title, ejectment and trespass.” CP at 117-27 (capitalization omitted). No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles In April, the superior court entered an anti-harassment protection order restraining Ms. Miles and protecting the Millers. 1 In its written findings of fact, the court found that Ms. Miles was not credible. The court further found that Ms. Miles had previously disconnected the power to the Millers’ floodlight security cameras, turned off the Millers’ water spigot, threw “windfall debris” into the Millers’ yard, “peel[ed] out and create[d] ruts and scatter[ed] gravel” on the shared driveway, and “park[ed] her vehicles across the easement blocking the [Millers’] departure from their home.” CP at 171; Verbatim Tr. of Audio Proc. at 51. The court ordered Ms. Miles to “not enter, return to, knowingly come within, or knowingly remain upon [the Millers’] real property, nor interfere with [their] use and enjoyment of the shared easements, nor their use/enjoyment of their own property and utilities.” CP at 172. Ms. Miles appeals. ANALYSIS Ms. Miles argues the court erred in issuing an anti-harassment protection order against her. We disagree. We review a court’s decision to grant an anti-harassment protection order for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). A court abuses its discretion when its “‘decision is manifestly unreasonable or 1 An anti-harassment protection order was issued in January 2025 but was later vacated because Ms. Miles did not receive notice of the show cause hearings. 2 No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’” In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014) (quoting In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012)). “We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.” In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). Instead, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d 822 (2023). RCW 7.105.050(1)(c) grants the superior court jurisdiction to enter anti- harassment protection orders that “affect the use or enjoyment of real property for which the respondent has a cognizable claim.” Under RCW 7.105.225(1)(f), the court must “issue a protection order if it finds by the preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proved . . . that the petitioner has been subjected to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” “‘Unlawful harassment’ means . . . [a] knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). On appeal, Ms. Miles contends that (1) the superior court misapplied RCW 7.105.050, (2) the Millers failed to prove unlawful harassment by a preponderance of the evidence, (3) the court erred by admitting a self-transcribed police report into evidence, 3 No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles and (4) the protection order contravenes the statutory purpose of chapter 7.105 RCW. We address each contention in turn. First, Ms. Miles contends the superior court improperly used an anti-harassment protection order to address an ongoing real property dispute between the parties. She argues the order “does not resolve the issue” but instead “limits [her] right to use her property without a determination regarding the actual underlying dispute.” Am. Appellant’s Br. at 11. She posits the proper forum for resolving the real property issues is the separate civil action she filed against the Millers. Ms. Miles’ argument fails because the protection order did not adjudicate—and is not a substitute for—the parties’ ongoing real property dispute. Ms. Miles points to pending charges for alleged violations of the order as proof that the order affects the use and enjoyment of her property. But the order does not bar Ms. Miles from using her property or the shared easements. It prohibits her from “interfer[ing] with [the Millers’] use and enjoyment of the shared easements, [or] their use/enjoyment of their own property and utilities.” CP at 172. Ms. Miles has failed to show that any of the pending charges are based on the use of her property as opposed to alleged violations of the order. Ms. Miles has not established that the superior court improperly used an anti-harassment protection order to resolve a real property dispute. Second, Ms. Miles argues the Millers failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she engaged in unlawful harassment and the superior court therefore abused 4 No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles its discretion by entering the protection order. She contends the superior court “was swayed by the volumes of patently false and inflammatory evidence” the Millers submitted. Am. Appellant’s Br. at 14. But we do not reweigh the evidence to come to a different conclusion than the trial court. The superior court expressly found Ms. Miles was not credible, and we will not disturb credibility determinations on appeal. Moreover, Ms. Miles does not assign error to any specific finding supporting the order. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Specifically, Ms. Miles argues the court disregarded that the Millers’ security cameras were aimed at her property and were triggered even when she was on her own property. The record does not support that characterization. The court expressly found it was reasonable for the Millers to place security cameras along their property line and the shared roadway given the size of their property and prior intrusions. Moreover, the court relied on multiple acts supporting unlawful harassment—not merely conduct captured on the cameras. Ms. Miles also contends video evidence depicting her “screaming” at the Millers was an “unfair portrayal” and should not have been treated as unlawful harassment. 2 Am. Appellant’s Br. at 15. But this argument asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do on appeal. The superior court did not abuse its discretion 2 It does not appear this alleged video was designated for our review. 5 No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles in finding that Ms. Miles unlawfully harassed the Millers by a preponderance of the evidence. Third, Ms. Miles argues the superior court erred by considering a police report the Millers transcribed. She contends the document was not authenticated under ER 901, constituted inadmissible hearsay under ER 801, and should have been excluded under ER 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. As an initial matter, Ms. Miles provides no citation to the record identifying where the challenged exhibit appears. Under RAP 10.3(a)(6), we will not search the record to locate support for an appellant’s claims. In any event, the argument fails on the merits. The rules of evidence “need not be applied” in proceedings on petitions for protection orders under chapter 7.105 RCW. ER 1101(c)(4); see also Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn. App. 715, 722, 230 P.3d 233 (2010). Accordingly, even assuming the transcribed report would not satisfy ER 901 or would otherwise be objectionable under the evidence rules, Ms. Miles has not shown the court abused its discretion by considering it. Lastly, Ms. Miles argues the protection order contravenes the statutory purpose of chapter 7.105 RCW because it is punitive rather than remedial. Specifically, she contends the order operates punitively because the Millers contact law enforcement for each perceived violation and because the order allegedly interferes with the use and enjoyment of her property. 6 No. 41231-8-III Miller v. Miles The record does not support Ms. Miles’ characterization. Nothing indicates the superior court entered the order as a punitive sanction. Rather, the court was clear that the order’s purpose was to prevent Ms. Miles from continuing her harassing behavior, not to punish Ms. Miles for past conduct. To the extent Ms. Miles argues the order improperly restricts the use and enjoyment of her property, that issue is addressed above and fails. The superior court did not err in granting the Millers’ petition for an anti- harassment order. Ms. Miles requests attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1 and RCW 7.105.310. Because Ms. Miles does not prevail on appeal, we deny her request. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. Cooney, J. WE CONCUR: Staab, C.J. Hill, J. 7