Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ROSELYN GALILEA MUÑOZ, No. 88824-2-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION LUCAS ANGELO MOORE, Appellant. BIRK, J. — Roselyn Muñoz and Lucas Moore were in a romantic relationship. After their relationship ended, Muñoz filed a petition for an anti- harassment protection order. Following a hearing where they both appeared pro se, the court commissioner granted the protection order. Moore moved for reconsideration and later for revision. The motion for revision was denied. On appeal, Moore argues his actions did not constitute unlawful harassment justifying the entry of the protection order. Finding no error, we affirm. I On April 21, 2025, Muñoz petitioned the court for an anti-harassment protection order against Moore. Muñoz and Moore were former romantic partners who never lived together. Their relationship ended in February 2024. In March 2024, Moore informed Muñoz that he had used her Venmo to track her location while she was on a trip. According to its website, Venmo is a payment service platform that allows users to pay others. What is Venmo?, VENMO, No. 88824-2-I/2 https://help.venmo.com/cs/articles/what-is-venmo-vhel150 (last visited Nov. 3, 2026). “At its core, Venmo provides a social way to pay” others without using cash. Id. Muñoz asserted that Moore stalking her through Venmo made her “feel surveilled, violated, and fearful.” She informed Moore that she “no longer wished to remain in contact with him” and blocked him. In September 2024, Muñoz learned from a friend that Moore had made vulgar and sexually explicit comments referring to his past intimate relationship with Muñoz to other male students, which led her to feel “degraded, humiliated, and sexually objectified.” In March 2025, Muñoz was in the hospital, she said due to the emotional distress caused by Moore’s past actions, namely, his social surveillance of her and sexually explicit comments about her. On May 5, 2025, Muñoz and Moore testified at the hearing for Muñoz’s petition before a court commissioner. The commissioner found that Moore tracked Muñoz through her Venmo transactions. When the commissioner asked Moore to respond to Muñoz’s allegations about stalking her on Venmo and making sexually explicit comments about Muñoz to other students, Moore denied both allegations. When asked specifically if he had talked to anyone else about his intimate relationship with Muñoz, he said no. The commissioner concluded that it was “more likely than not that unlawful harassment has occurred, specifically based on the Venmo tracking incident and [Moore’s] sexually explicit comments about [Muñoz] to others.” The 2 No. 88824-2-I/3 commissioner rejected other factual assertions that Muñoz had made in her petition and at the hearing. The commissioner entered an order for protection protecting Muñoz and restraining Moore, and the general restraints included (1) no harm, (2) no contact, (3) no stalking, (4) staying away by 1,000 feet, and (5) no possessing or distributing intimate images. On May 15, 2025, Moore filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On August 21, 2025, Moore filed a motion for revision, which was also denied. The superior court judge’s order denying revision adopted the “[c]ommissioner’s oral and written findings and rulings as its own.” Moore appeals the anti-harassment protection order, order denying motion for reconsideration, and order denying motion for revision. II “When an appeal is taken from an order denying revision of a court commissioner’s decision, we review the superior court’s decision, not the commissioner’s.” In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010). “We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence.” Asbach v. Couto, 36 Wn. App. 2d 902, 911, 589 P.3d 1248 (2026). “Substantial evidence is evidence ‘sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.’ ” Id. at 911-12 (quoting In re Domestic Violence Prot. Ord. for Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 678, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). “We defer to the trier of fact on the persuasiveness of evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.” In 3 No. 88824-2-I/4 re the Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). We review legal conclusions de novo. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). “We review the denial of a motion for revision for an abuse of discretion.” Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 676. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’ ” Id. at 676-77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Receivership of Applied Restoration, 28 Wn. App. 2d 881, 891, 539 P.3d 837 (2023)), review denied, 3 Wn3d 1012, 554 P.3d 1221 (2024). “A decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds ‘if it rests on facts unsupported in the record.’ ” In re Dependency of N.G., 199 Wn.2d 588, 599, 510 P.3d 335 (2022) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)). The court shall issue an anti-harassment protection order “if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the petitioner has proved that the petitioner has been subjected to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225(1)(f). RCW 7.105.010(37)(a) defines “unlawful harassment” as a “knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” A “course of conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose” and can include “any form of communication, contact, or conduct, including the sending of an electronic communication, but does not include 4 No. 88824-2-I/5 constitutionally protected free speech.” RCW 7.105.010(7)(a). To be “harassing” the course of conduct “must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). In determining whether the course of conduct serves any legitimate or lawful purpose, a court should consider whether: (i) Any current contact between the parties was initiated by the respondent only or was initiated by both parties; (ii) The respondent has been given clear notice that all further contact with the petitioner is unwanted; (iii) The respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner; (iv) The respondent is acting pursuant to any statutory authority . . . . (v) The respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living environment for the petitioner; or (vi) Contact by the respondent with the petitioner or the petitioner’s family has been limited in any manner by any previous court order. RCW 7.105.010(7)(b). “In issuing any type of protection order,” except for certain exceptions not applicable here, “the court shall have broad discretion to grant such relief as the court deems proper.” RCW 7.105.310(1). III Moore argues that the anti-harassment protection order was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. A First, Moore argues that his singular act, referring to his Venmo tracking of Muñoz, does not constitute a “pattern” as required by the statutory definition of unlawful harassment. Tracking on Venmo supports the inference that Moore 5 No. 88824-2-I/6 looked at Muñoz’s transactions more than one time, which a trier of fact could reasonably find to meet the statutory requirement of “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time.” See RCW 7.105.010(7a). Moore cites the commissioner’s oral ruling that “the Venmo incident did not meet the definition of harassment because it was not a ‘pattern’ ” as support for this argument. However, “[a] superior court’s oral ruling ‘has no final or binding effect, unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.’ ” In re Detention of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 84, 432 P.3d 459 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re De Facto Parentage & Custody of M.J.M., 173 Wn. App. 227, 242 n.13, 294 P.3d 746 (2013)). The specific passage of the commissioner’s ruling that Moore cites does not appear in the protection order. Instead, the protection order shows the commissioner’s finding that Muñoz was credible about the Venmo tracking. The whole context of the commissioner’s ruling indicates that the commissioner took the view that the Venmo tracking by itself would not have supported the order, but that the Venmo tracking together with and as informed by Moore’s sexual comments raised the level of Moore’s conduct to a qualifying course of conduct. B Moore argues that his sexual comments about Muñoz cannot serve as a basis for the anti-harassment order because his comments were not “ ‘directed at’ ” Muñoz. He asserts that the record contained no evidence that his comments were directed at Muñoz. Further, he contends that his comments could not have been directed at Muñoz because there was no evidence that she was present 6 No. 88824-2-I/7 when he made those comments. However, substantial evidence supports that Moore’s course of conduct—consisting of the Venmo tracking as informed by his sexual comments—was directed at Muñoz. The statute does not require every discrete aspect of the conduct to be directed at her. See RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). Rather, the combination of his conduct from tracking her on Venmo and making sexual comments about her was directed at Muñoz. C Moore argues that his sexual comment about Muñoz was constitutionally protected speech. Additionally, he argues that imposing an anti-harassment order based on his private conversations “is effectively a content-based restriction.” Assuming without deciding that his comments were constitutionally protected speech, the superior court could properly conclude that Moore’s behavior of Venmo tracking together with and as informed by his comments fell within the definition of unlawful harassment under RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). “[A] protection order that is based solely on constitutionally protected free speech is invalid.” Catlett v. Teel, 15 Wn. App. 2d 689, 699, 477 P.3d 50 (2020). But, “ ‘it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.’ ” Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S. Ct. 476, 13 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1965) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949)); see Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 668, 131 P.3d 305 (2006) (holding the protection order did not violate Trummel’s 7 No. 88824-2-I/8 First Amendment rights because the order focused on the “speaker’s conduct and not the message” when Trummel put newsletters on neighbors’ doors and engaged in other hostile behaviors). Moore cites Catlett, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 689, to assert that the content-based restriction from the anti-harassment order violates Washington law. But Catlett is distinguishable. The order in Catlett was based exclusively on protected speech, id. at 696, but in this case the superior court’s order focused on Moore’s conduct of Venmo tracking together with his sexual comments. Moreover, in Catlett, this court viewed the order as necessarily addressed to the basis on which it had been issued, exclusively First Amendment speech, and held that the protection order violated the First Amendment because the order “restricting Teel from publishing public records” was “not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.” Id. at 703. But in this case, the order proscribed no speech, but restrained only future behavior consisting of harming, contacting, stalking, approaching, or possessing images of Muñoz. Because the order was based on stalking behavior, and prohibited only future stalking behavior, it was not a content-based restriction of any speech even though the court interpreted the stalking behavior in light of Moore’s sexual comments. After a review of the record, the superior court found that Moore tracked Muñoz using her Venmo transactions. Additionally, the superior court found that Moore made sexually explicit comments about Muñoz to others. Taken together, 8 No. 88824-2-I/9 Moore’s behavior interpreted in light of his comments permitted the superior court to find a course of conduct amounting to unlawful harassment. Affirmed. WE CONCUR: 9