Roselyn Galilea Munoz, V. Lucas Angelo Moore
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket88824-2
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ROSELYN GALILEA MUÑOZ,
No. 88824-2-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LUCAS ANGELO MOORE,
Appellant.
BIRK, J. — Roselyn Muñoz and Lucas Moore were in a romantic
relationship. After their relationship ended, Muñoz filed a petition for an anti-
harassment protection order. Following a hearing where they both appeared pro
se, the court commissioner granted the protection order. Moore moved for
reconsideration and later for revision. The motion for revision was denied. On
appeal, Moore argues his actions did not constitute unlawful harassment justifying
the entry of the protection order. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
On April 21, 2025, Muñoz petitioned the court for an anti-harassment
protection order against Moore. Muñoz and Moore were former romantic partners
who never lived together. Their relationship ended in February 2024.
In March 2024, Moore informed Muñoz that he had used her Venmo to track
her location while she was on a trip. According to its website, Venmo is a payment
service platform that allows users to pay others. What is Venmo?, VENMO,
No. 88824-2-I/2
https://help.venmo.com/cs/articles/what-is-venmo-vhel150 (last visited Nov. 3,
2026). “At its core, Venmo provides a social way to pay” others without using cash.
Id. Muñoz asserted that Moore stalking her through Venmo made her “feel
surveilled, violated, and fearful.” She informed Moore that she “no longer wished
to remain in contact with him” and blocked him.
In September 2024, Muñoz learned from a friend that Moore had made
vulgar and sexually explicit comments referring to his past intimate relationship
with Muñoz to other male students, which led her to feel “degraded, humiliated,
and sexually objectified.”
In March 2025, Muñoz was in the hospital, she said due to the emotional
distress caused by Moore’s past actions, namely, his social surveillance of her and
sexually explicit comments about her.
On May 5, 2025, Muñoz and Moore testified at the hearing for Muñoz’s
petition before a court commissioner.
The commissioner found that Moore tracked Muñoz through her Venmo
transactions. When the commissioner asked Moore to respond to Muñoz’s
allegations about stalking her on Venmo and making sexually explicit comments
about Muñoz to other students, Moore denied both allegations. When asked
specifically if he had talked to anyone else about his intimate relationship with
Muñoz, he said no. The commissioner concluded that it was “more likely than not
that unlawful harassment has occurred, specifically based on the Venmo tracking
incident and [Moore’s] sexually explicit comments about [Muñoz] to others.” The
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commissioner rejected other factual assertions that Muñoz had made in her
petition and at the hearing.
The commissioner entered an order for protection protecting Muñoz and
restraining Moore, and the general restraints included (1) no harm, (2) no contact,
(3) no stalking, (4) staying away by 1,000 feet, and (5) no possessing or distributing
intimate images.
On May 15, 2025, Moore filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. On August 21, 2025, Moore filed a motion for revision, which was also
denied. The superior court judge’s order denying revision adopted the
“[c]ommissioner’s oral and written findings and rulings as its own.”
Moore appeals the anti-harassment protection order, order denying motion
for reconsideration, and order denying motion for revision.
II
“When an appeal is taken from an order denying revision of a court
commissioner’s decision, we review the superior court’s decision, not the
commissioner’s.” In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573
(2010).
“We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence.” Asbach
v. Couto, 36 Wn. App. 2d 902, 911, 589 P.3d 1248 (2026). “Substantial evidence
is evidence ‘sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter
asserted.’ ” Id. at 911-12 (quoting In re Domestic Violence Prot. Ord. for Timaeus,
34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 678, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). “We defer to the trier of fact on
the persuasiveness of evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.” In
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re the Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068
(2014). We review legal conclusions de novo. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v.
Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). “We review the denial of a motion
for revision for an abuse of discretion.” Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 676. “A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised
on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’ ” Id. at 676-77 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re Receivership of Applied Restoration, 28 Wn. App. 2d
881, 891, 539 P.3d 837 (2023)), review denied, 3 Wn3d 1012, 554 P.3d 1221
(2024). “A decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds ‘if
it rests on facts unsupported in the record.’ ” In re Dependency of N.G., 199 Wn.2d
588, 599, 510 P.3d 335 (2022) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71
P.3d 638 (2003)).
The court shall issue an anti-harassment protection order “if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . that the petitioner has proved that the petitioner
has been subjected to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” RCW
7.105.225(1)(f).
RCW 7.105.010(37)(a) defines “unlawful harassment” as a “knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate
or lawful purpose.” A “course of conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose” and can include “any form of communication, contact, or conduct,
including the sending of an electronic communication, but does not include
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No. 88824-2-I/5
constitutionally protected free speech.” RCW 7.105.010(7)(a). To be “harassing”
the course of conduct “must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional
distress to the petitioner.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). In determining whether the
course of conduct serves any legitimate or lawful purpose, a court should consider
whether:
(i) Any current contact between the parties was initiated by the
respondent only or was initiated by both parties;
(ii) The respondent has been given clear notice that all further contact
with the petitioner is unwanted;
(iii) The respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to alarm,
annoy, or harass the petitioner;
(iv) The respondent is acting pursuant to any statutory authority . . . .
(v) The respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the purpose
or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living
environment for the petitioner; or
(vi) Contact by the respondent with the petitioner or the petitioner’s
family has been limited in any manner by any previous court order.
RCW 7.105.010(7)(b). “In issuing any type of protection order,” except for certain
exceptions not applicable here, “the court shall have broad discretion to grant such
relief as the court deems proper.” RCW 7.105.310(1).
III
Moore argues that the anti-harassment protection order was not supported
by substantial evidence. We disagree.
A
First, Moore argues that his singular act, referring to his Venmo tracking of
Muñoz, does not constitute a “pattern” as required by the statutory definition of
unlawful harassment. Tracking on Venmo supports the inference that Moore
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No. 88824-2-I/6
looked at Muñoz’s transactions more than one time, which a trier of fact could
reasonably find to meet the statutory requirement of “pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time.” See RCW 7.105.010(7a). Moore cites
the commissioner’s oral ruling that “the Venmo incident did not meet the definition
of harassment because it was not a ‘pattern’ ” as support for this argument.
However, “[a] superior court’s oral ruling ‘has no final or binding effect, unless
formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.’ ” In re
Detention of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 84, 432 P.3d 459 (2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re De Facto Parentage & Custody of M.J.M., 173 Wn.
App. 227, 242 n.13, 294 P.3d 746 (2013)). The specific passage of the
commissioner’s ruling that Moore cites does not appear in the protection order.
Instead, the protection order shows the commissioner’s finding that Muñoz was
credible about the Venmo tracking. The whole context of the commissioner’s ruling
indicates that the commissioner took the view that the Venmo tracking by itself
would not have supported the order, but that the Venmo tracking together with and
as informed by Moore’s sexual comments raised the level of Moore’s conduct to a
qualifying course of conduct.
B
Moore argues that his sexual comments about Muñoz cannot serve as a
basis for the anti-harassment order because his comments were not “ ‘directed
at’ ” Muñoz. He asserts that the record contained no evidence that his comments
were directed at Muñoz. Further, he contends that his comments could not have
been directed at Muñoz because there was no evidence that she was present
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No. 88824-2-I/7
when he made those comments. However, substantial evidence supports that
Moore’s course of conduct—consisting of the Venmo tracking as informed by his
sexual comments—was directed at Muñoz. The statute does not require every
discrete aspect of the conduct to be directed at her. See RCW 7.105.010(37)(a).
Rather, the combination of his conduct from tracking her on Venmo and making
sexual comments about her was directed at Muñoz.
C
Moore argues that his sexual comment about Muñoz was constitutionally
protected speech. Additionally, he argues that imposing an anti-harassment order
based on his private conversations “is effectively a content-based restriction.”
Assuming without deciding that his comments were constitutionally protected
speech, the superior court could properly conclude that Moore’s behavior of
Venmo tracking together with and as informed by his comments fell within the
definition of unlawful harassment under RCW 7.105.010(37)(a).
“[A] protection order that is based solely on constitutionally protected free
speech is invalid.” Catlett v. Teel, 15 Wn. App. 2d 689, 699, 477 P.3d 50 (2020).
But, “ ‘it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed.’ ” Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S. Ct. 476, 13 L. Ed.
2d 487 (1965) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502,
69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949)); see Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653,
668, 131 P.3d 305 (2006) (holding the protection order did not violate Trummel’s
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No. 88824-2-I/8
First Amendment rights because the order focused on the “speaker’s conduct and
not the message” when Trummel put newsletters on neighbors’ doors and
engaged in other hostile behaviors).
Moore cites Catlett, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 689, to assert that the content-based
restriction from the anti-harassment order violates Washington law. But Catlett is
distinguishable. The order in Catlett was based exclusively on protected speech,
id. at 696, but in this case the superior court’s order focused on Moore’s conduct
of Venmo tracking together with his sexual comments. Moreover, in Catlett, this
court viewed the order as necessarily addressed to the basis on which it had been
issued, exclusively First Amendment speech, and held that the protection order
violated the First Amendment because the order “restricting Teel from publishing
public records” was “not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.”
Id. at 703. But in this case, the order proscribed no speech, but restrained only
future behavior consisting of harming, contacting, stalking, approaching, or
possessing images of Muñoz. Because the order was based on stalking behavior,
and prohibited only future stalking behavior, it was not a content-based restriction
of any speech even though the court interpreted the stalking behavior in light of
Moore’s sexual comments.
After a review of the record, the superior court found that Moore tracked
Muñoz using her Venmo transactions. Additionally, the superior court found that
Moore made sexually explicit comments about Muñoz to others. Taken together,
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No. 88824-2-I/9
Moore’s behavior interpreted in light of his comments permitted the superior court
to find a course of conduct amounting to unlawful harassment.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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