Kindra O'Bryant v. DCP&P

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Nos. 23-1950, 23-1951, & 23-1952 KINDRA O’BRYANT; BRIAN FLANDERS; ARTIE PEOPLES v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, FKA Division of Youth and Family Services; LISA VON PIER; ALLISON BLAKE; LISA CAPONE; CONCHITA VARGA; BRYANT ROLLS; ET AL. ARTIE PEOPLES, Appellant in 23-1950 BRIAN FLANDERS, Appellant in 23-1951 KINDRA O’BRYANT, Appellant in 23-1952 _____________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J. Judge Noel L. Hillman, No. 1:17-cv-07752 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, AND CHUNG, Circuit Judges  Argued: Oct. 21, 2025; Filed: Sept. 16, 2026 _____________________________ OPINION OF THE COURT CHUNG, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs brought claims alleging that caseworkers with New Jersey’s Division of Child Protection and Permanency (“DCPP”) violated the Fourth Amendment by entering their residence without a warrant and violated their due process rights by removing children from their parental custody without court authorization when the children did not face a risk of imminent harm. The District Court dismissed the Complaint based on qualified immunity. We will affirm the dismissal in most respects. However, because we conclude that some Plaintiffs pled plausible violations of clearly established Fourth Amendment law, we will reverse the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim and remand for further proceedings on that claim. I. BACKGROUND 1 Plaintiff Kindra O’Bryant is the mother of three children who were removed from her custody without court authorization. She is also the owner and resident of the home that was subject to warrantless entry. Plaintiff Brian Flanders is a resident of the same home and the father of the youngest 1 The facts set forth in this section are taken from the Complaint and deemed to be true for purposes of reviewing the District Court’s dismissal. In re Allergan Erisa Litig., 975 F.3d 348, 353 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020). We construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 2 of O’Bryant’s children, and Plaintiff Artie Peoples is O’Bryant’s father and the grandfather of all three children. A. The Home Entry On June 6, 2017, Flanders came to pick up O’Bryant’s children, K.E. and K.Y., from school. Although the school told him not to leave because DCPP 2 was on its way to retrieve the children, Flanders left with the children and took them back to the home he shared with O’Bryant. Later that same day, Defendant Alicia Ash, a caseworker with the DCPP, appeared unannounced at O’Bryant’s home with an unnamed colleague. Ash identified herself as a DCF employee and stated that she needed to enter the home “[n]ow!” JA66. O’Bryant was not home at the time. When Flanders pressed Ash to explain why she needed to enter the home, she stated that she was there to investigate the abuse of K.Y. and K.E., and that she had received a phone call from “someone” who reported that Flanders “was upset and agitated when he” dropped the two children off at school that morning. JA66–67. Flanders denied her entry, but Ash replied that “he had to let her in ‘right now’ and that he ‘could not refuse’ her entry.” JA67. Faced with these demands, Flanders “under duress and the coercive threats of Ash acting under color of state law, then proceeded to allow Ash into Ms. O’Bryant’s home against his will [and] involuntarily.” Id. Once Ash entered, she stated that she wanted to see the children, and was 2 DCPP is a division within New Jersey’s Division of Children and Families (“DCF”). (The Complaint refers to this division by its former name, the Division of Youth & Family Services.) 3 permitted to do so. She then stated that she wanted to inspect the home and where the children slept. Flanders told her she could not do so without O’Bryant’s permission. Ash and her colleague left without inspecting O’Bryant’s home. B. The Family Agreement and Conditions Related to O’Bryant and Her Home Also on June 6, O’Bryant, who was pregnant, attended a pre-natal care appointment and presented with symptoms of depression. She was admitted to Cooper Hospital later that day. While there, Ash and another DCPP caseworker approached O’Bryant and asked her about her relationship with Flanders. O’Bryant said that Flanders is the father of the child O’Bryant was expecting, and that while they sometimes argue, they never have physical fights and the children are not afraid of him. Ash also asked O’Bryant about her “cutting history” and asked to see “the new cut on [her] arm.” JA69. The next day, Ash called O’Bryant and told her that she could not be discharged until Ash and her colleague arrived to talk with her. When Ash arrived, she presented O’Bryant with a family plan agreement (the “Family Agreement”). Under the terms of the Family Agreement as described in the Complaint, Flanders would be required to leave O’Bryant’s home due to his “history of violence and hurting his child,” and would not be permitted to “be a caregiver to” O’Bryant’s children. JA70. O’Bryant explained to Ash that this “history” entailed an incident of Flanders “disciplin[ing]” his son from another relationship, that his related DCPP case had been closed several months before, and that Flanders had since seen his son. Id. O’Bryant reiterated that Flanders had never been violent to her or her children “in any way.” Id. Ash responded 4 that if O’Bryant “did not sign [the Family Agreement] her children were going to be taken away from her.” JA71. “[U]nder duress and the coercive threats of Ash acting under color of state law,” O’Bryant “signed the … Family Agreement involuntarily.” Id. Ash and her colleague then took O’Bryant home. They took a tour of the home and observed that the house had a roach and bed bug problem, the stove was broken, and the house needed other repairs. Ash promised that the DCPP would help ameliorate these issues, and O’Bryant accepted the promise of these services. O’Bryant also advised the caseworkers that the children were about to go to Ohio for the summer to be with their father. Thereafter, O’Bryant tried contacting Ash multiple times to explain that the Family Agreement was not working for her because living alone made her depressed. Weeks later, Ash returned to O’Bryant’s home and presented her with an updated family plan agreement (the “Amended Family Agreement”), which O’Bryant signed. JA73. The Amended Family Agreement “does not mention anything about [Flanders] not being able to live in the house,” and only states that “he cannot be a caregiver alone with the children.” JA76. As to the conditions at O’Bryant’s home, the DCPP failed to act on their promise to help. C. The Removal of the Children On August 12, 2017, K.E. and K.Y. returned from Ohio and were brought to O’Bryant’s home. On August 15, O’Bryant gave birth to her and Flanders’s child at a hospital. The next 5 day, Defendants Bryant Rolls and Conchita Vargas, both DCPP caseworkers, entered O’Bryant’s hospital room. Flanders was not present at that time. Rolls called Peoples and told him that he had to come to the hospital to pick up K.E. and K.Y. When Peoples arrived, Rolls and Vargas explained that they were there to talk with Flanders regarding his presence around the newborn, K.E., and K.Y. Rolls left his contact information and said that Flanders must call him when he returned to the hospital. Flanders called as instructed, and Rolls and Vargas returned. Rolls advised that he was the caseworker newly assigned to the case. He further advised that under the terms of the Family Agreement, Flanders was not permitted to be at the hospital if O’Bryant’s children were present and could not live at O’Bryant’s home with the children until he completed a domestic violence program. Flanders responded that his case involving his son was closed and he was permitted to interact with him, but the caseworkers emphasized the terms of the Family Agreement. O’Bryant noted that the Amended Family Agreement “does not mention anything about [Flanders] not being able to live in the house, it states he cannot be a caregiver alone with the children.” JA76. A short while later, Peoples arrived at the hospital and the exchange continued. A hospital security guard and deputies of the Camden County Sheriff’s Office, led by Deputy T. Nichols, responded. Vargas told Deputy Nichols that Flanders was previously charged with endangering the welfare of a child, aggravated assault on a police officer, and an offense related to weapons, and that he had pending warrants for his arrest. Deputy Nichols ran a check for warrants and found none outstanding. 6  Vargas then stated that she wanted to talk with K.E. and K.Y. alone. Peoples replied that she needed a warrant to do so. Vargas then presented “Dodd” removal papers to Deputy Nichols and Peoples and said that the papers authorize the DCPP “to talk with” O’Bryant’s children. 3 JA84. Although Vargas never showed the papers to O’Bryant or Flanders, Deputy Nichols brought K.E. and K.Y. across the street to the DCPP building, joined by Vargas, Rolls, Peoples, and Flanders. Flanders and Peoples were directed to wait outside while the children were brought inside. About two hours later, Deputy Nichols returned with an arrest warrant for Flanders and arrested him, removing him from the property. Three hours thereafter, Peoples was still waiting outside for his grandchildren. A security guard exited and advised Peoples that no one was going to come talk to him and that he could call the DCPP office the next day to inquire about the children. 3 The Complaint alleges that “yellow papers” were issued pursuant to N.J. Rev. Stat. § 9:6-8.29 to effect a “Dodd” removal of the children. The statute permits the state to “remove a child from the place where the child is residing … and without the consent of the parent or guardian … if the child is in such condition that the child’s continuance in the place or residence or in the care and custody of the parent … presents an imminent danger to the child’s life, safety, or health, and there is insufficient time to apply for a court order[.]” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 9:6-8.29. It could be that the children were formally removed at this point in time. However, the Complaint includes some indication that K.E. and K.Y. might be released to Peoples who waited outside for them. In any case, the exact timing of their removal on this date does not matter for purposes of our decision. 7  The next day, August 17, Defendant Jonathan Garrett, a DCPP caseworker, arrived unannounced at O’Bryant’s hospital room to tell her she was to appear at a Superior Court hearing the next day and that he was there to seize her newborn child. Garrett said that his supervisor was Lisa Capone and provided her phone number to O’Bryant and Peoples. They called Capone and asked her how she had the jurisdiction to seize the children. She responded that she “kn[ew] the law” and would be in their lives forever. JA89. The newborn was not seized at this time. O’Bryant could not attend the hearing on August 18 because of medical concerns that kept her in the hospital. Flanders, still in Sheriff’s custody, was produced by that office. The court postponed the hearing given O’Bryant’s inability to appear. Later that day, Garrett returned to the hospital to seize O’Bryant’s and Flanders’s newborn. He did not present a warrant or court order. On August 21, both O’Bryant and Flanders appeared for a hearing in family court. D. Procedural History On October 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint (the “Complaint”) in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. On September 6, 2018, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. On June 16, 2020, we vacated the dismissal in part, 4 concluding that the 4 We affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages against the DCPP and its employees in their official 8 District Court improperly applied the domestic relations exception to subject matter jurisdiction and Younger abstention, and remanded. See O’Bryant v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 818 F. App’x 143, 147 (3d Cir. June 16, 2020). On July 20, 2020, the DCPP Defendants 5 filed a renewed motion to dismiss the Complaint, which the District Court granted on February 22, 2021, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. On June 12, 2021, the Sheriff Defendants 6 filed their own renewed motion to dismiss, which capacity. O’Bryant v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 818 F. App’x. 143, 147 (3d Cir. June 16, 2020). 5 The “DCPP Defendants” are: (1) the DCPP; (2) Allison Blake, who was the Commissioner of DCF; (3) Lisa Von Pier, who was the Director of DCPP; and (4) DCPP employees Conchita Vargas, Bryant Rolls, Alicia Ash, Jonathan Garrett, and Lisa Capone. The Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of the DCPP. While they apparently appeal the dismissal of their due process claims as to Von Pier and Blake, the Complaint does not plead any allegations as to these two defendants, so we will affirm the order dismissing claims as to those defendants. When we use the term “DCPP Defendants,” we exclude the DCPP, Von Pier, and Blake. 6 The Sheriff Defendants are: (1) Gilbert “Whip Wilson,” who was Sheriff of Camden County, N.J. and (2) Camden County, N.J. Deputy Sheriffs T. Nichols and Gurkin. Plaintiffs stated at oral argument that they are challenging the order dismissing the Sheriff Defendants, but failed to develop any argument to that effect in their Opening Brief and so have forfeited this challenge. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 9 the District Court granted on August 11, 2022, also on the basis of qualified immunity. This timely appeal followed. 7 After filing their opening brief, Plaintiffs moved for the appointment of pro bono counsel. We granted their motion and set a new briefing schedule. Plaintiffs, through appointed 2017). Consequently, we will affirm the dismissal of the Sheriff Defendants. 7 Plaintiffs do not meaningfully challenge the District Court’s dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Five, so we will affirm dismissal of those Counts. See Barna, 877 F.3d at 145– 46. With regard to Count Four, they only present arguments regarding defendant Ash. Flanders clarified at Oral Argument that he only asserts a right to the care, custody, and management of his own biological child, and that his claim does not relate to the removal of K.E. and K.Y. from O’Bryant’s custody. Therefore, to the extent that the District Court dismissed Flanders’ claims related to the two older children, we will affirm. We also affirm the District Court’s order dismissing all counts asserted by Peoples on the independent basis that he lacks Article III standing. The Complaint does not allege that Peoples had any privacy interest in O’Bryant’s home, nor does it plausibly allege he has a cognizable constitutional interest in the care, custody, and management of his grandchildren. He has therefore not shown the “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 10 counsel, 8 filed a corrected brief (the “Opening Brief”) and appendix, which did not adopt the pro se brief or appendix originally filed pro se. In their Response Brief, Defendants assert a number of additional facts by citing a complaint of child abuse included in the pro se appendix. II. DISCUSSION 9 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Allergan Erisa Litig., 975 F.3d 348, 353 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020). “‘In conducting such a review, we take as true all the factual allegations of the ... Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, but we disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Id. (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Township., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). We confine our review to the 8 The attorneys representing Appellants appeared pro bono. We thank them for taking this case on a pro bono basis and for the very able and professional way in which they handled the representation and argument before the Court. 9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 11 complaint and the exhibits attached thereto without reference to other materials, with limited exceptions not applicable here, Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010), and we construe pro se complaints liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s order dismissing on qualified immunity grounds (1) Count Four, their § 1983 claim that Ash violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, and (2) Count Three, their § 1983 claim that the DCPP Defendants violated their substantive and procedural due process rights in the care, custody, and management of their children. In considering whether an official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity, we determine if (1) the facts in the Complaint state a claim that the official violated a constitutional right that was (2) clearly established at the time of their alleged misconduct. Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 85 (3d Cir. 2025). If the specific right was not clearly established, the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. A. Defendants’ Reliance Upon the Pro Se Appendix is Misplaced, and the District Court Improperly Considered Facts Outside of the Complaint in its Opinion 1. Defendants May Not Rely Upon the Child Abuse Complaint The DCPP Defendants rely upon factual allegations contained in a child abuse complaint included in the pro se appendix to argue that the District Court’s order should be 12 affirmed. The DCPP Defendants posit that because Plaintiffs filed the child abuse complaint in this Court, we can and should consider the document and the allegations therein. Our dissenting colleague agrees and also asserts that we should take judicial notice of the child abuse complaint as a public record. 10 We may judicially notice a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute.” Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Yet many of the allegations in the child abuse complaint are disputed by the Plaintiffs, and some are based on multiple layers of hearsay. The dissent reasons that we may consider these documents because Plaintiffs filed them when they acted pro se, Dissent at 7–8, but Plaintiffs merely acknowledged the existence of these documents. Reliance on these documents is particularly misplaced here because they are inconsistent with facts asserted by Plaintiffs in their Complaint and those inconsistencies are relevant to our legal analysis. For instance, the child abuse complaint asserts that removal is appropriate because O’Bryant violated the Family Agreement by allowing Flanders to be around the children. 11 Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint, though, that 10 Our dissenting colleague would also take judicial notice of DCPP’s 2017 determination regarding Flanders’s case and state records regarding Flanders’s charges. As we explain below, see infra n.14, Defendants have not requested that we take notice of these documents, and we decline to do so. 11 The DCPP Defendants now disavow that basis for the children’s removal, despite otherwise relying on the child abuse complaint. 13 O’Bryant was coerced into signing the Agreement. Moreover, the Complaint in this case asserts that the Family Agreement was amended so as to permit Flanders to live in the home with the children, while the child abuse complaint makes no mention of the Amended Family Agreement. These inconsistencies matter because they impact how we define the constitutional right for qualified immunity purposes. 12 We decline to take judicial notice of the Family Court documents in light of these inconsistencies. Werner, 267 F.3d at 295; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 2. The District Court Improperly Considered Factual Allegations Outside the Complaint In concluding that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the District Court erroneously relied upon factual allegations external to the Complaint, construed the Complaint’s silence on some issues against the Plaintiffs, or accepted as true statements made by various DCPP Defendants or third parties that the Complaint merely recounted. 13 We do 12 For instance, Plaintiffs assert that their substantive due process rights were violated because the children were removed based upon O’Bryant’s failure to adhere to a Family Agreement she signed under coercion and that was later amended. See Opening Br. at 38–39; Croft, 103 F.3d at 1127. 13 “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “When a District Court decides to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for 14 none of those things at this stage, though, because when evaluating a grant of dismissal made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. For example, the District Court stated that the “DCPP discovered that Flanders … had a documented history of child abuse and a violent criminal record, which included endangering the welfare of a child, weapons, and aggravated assault on a police officer.” JA25. However, the Complaint presents a different narrative. It states that Flanders’s case involving his son had been closed for months and does not state that the allegations were sustained. It also states that Flanders is permitted to interact with his son. 14 Similarly, the Complaint summary judgment, it must provide the parties ‘reasonable opportunity’ to present all material relevant to a summary judgment motion.” In re Rockefeller Cntr Props., Inc. Secs. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287–88 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). The parties must have “notice of the conversion,” and that notice must be “unambiguous.” Ross v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340–42 (3d Cir. 1989). We note this not as the basis for reversal, which was not argued by Plaintiffs, but to flag that the external factual allegations cited by the District Court are disputed in the Complaint. 14 Our dissenting colleague would take judicial notice of a letter sent to Flanders reflecting that DCF and DCPP made an administrative finding regarding a prior child abuse allegation against Flanders. The DCPP Defendants have not asked us to take judicial notice of this document, nor was it before the District Court. Moreover, while the document states that DCPP found the allegation was “Established,” it also explained 15 states that a DCPP Defendant alleged that Flanders had charges for certain crimes, without averring that Flanders in fact faced such charges, or that he was convicted of them. While we accept as a reasonable inference that Flanders had a charge or conviction of some kind, given the Complaint’s allegation that he wore an ankle monitor, we cannot construe the Complaint’s silence, coupled with its inclusion of a hearsay statement, against Plaintiffs to conclude that Flanders was convicted of a violent offense. The District Court additionally wrote that the “DCPP discovered O’Bryant had either self-mutilated or attempted suicide while pregnant due to severe depression.” JA25. Yet the Complaint is silent as to these alleged facts and contains only a hearsay statement by a DCPP Defendant asking about O’Bryant’s “cutting history.” JA69. Likewise, the District Court found that, under the Family Agreement, Flanders needed to complete certain parenting and domestic violence programing as a condition of his return to O’Bryant’s home. Neither the Complaint, nor the child abuse complaint, states that the domestic violence program was a term of the Family Agreement, just that Flanders was informed at the hospital that that Flanders’s conduct did “not warrant a finding of Substantiated.” The letter does not state what conduct Flanders engaged in to “establish” child abuse, nor does it set forth the difference between an “established” and a “substantiated” allegation. Id. The parties likewise do not brief what significance, if any, the distinction would have here. Hence, even if we were to take notice that the finding was Established as of a certain date, we could afford that finding little weight since we lack critical information to understand what it reflects. 16 he needed to complete programs before he could be with the children. See JA75-80; ECF 15, ex.2 at 5. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that the Amended Family Agreement superseded the Family Agreement and allowed Flanders to be in the home so long as he was not acting as “a caregiver alone with the children.” JA76. Against this backdrop, we now turn to the legal analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims. 15 B. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Fourth Amendment Claim 1. The Complaint States a Plausible Violation of the Fourth Amendment 15 Discovery may, of course, resolve disputes about the existence of an Amended Family Agreement or indicators of danger that Flanders may have posed. We merely remand so that such discovery can be conducted, particularly given that the Plaintiffs sought discovery, and had no opportunity to respond with additional evidence to facts external to their Complaint. It is unsurprising that our dissenting colleague reaches different conclusions as he considers an entirely different set of facts, akin to those which might be revealed by limited discovery for qualified immunity purposes. See Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86–87. As our opinion draws only upon those facts set forth in the Complaint taken as true, it should not be read as taking any position with regard to the legal conclusions contained in the Dissent. 17  Plaintiffs first challenge the District Court’s order dismissing their Fourth Amendment claim as to Defendant Ash. 16 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ … that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)). Indeed, “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the … Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[W]hen it 16 The District Court did not analyze the Fourth Amendment claim in its opinion. This is unsurprising as Ash’s brief supporting the motion to dismiss failed to develop any argument related to the Fourth Amendment claim. While this constitutes forfeiture, DirecTV, Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007), “[w]e may decide a question not addressed by the District Court when ‘the record has been sufficiently developed for us to resolve the legal issue,’” Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 140 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, at oral argument, Plaintiffs urged us to resolve the matter, and Defendants did not argue otherwise. Given the adequacy of the record before us, the fact that this case has already been considered on remand once, and its long pendency, we will assess the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the dismissal of their Fourth Amendment claim. 18 comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.”). This warrant requirement, however, is subject to exceptions because “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). The Complaint alleges that Defendant Ash “and another woman” appeared in their capacity as state officials at O’Bryant’s home, after receiving a phone call from an unidentified source who reported that Flanders “was upset and agitated” when he dropped off the children at school. JA66– 67. Ash did not have a warrant and was refused entry by Flanders. After she repeatedly insisted on entering and stated that Flanders “could not refuse” her request, Flanders relented and let her inside. JA67. To determine whether the Complaint plausibly alleges that the search was unreasonable, we look at “‘all of the circumstances surrounding the search … and the nature of the search … itself,’” Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)), “assessing on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests,” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). Because this case involves the search of a home, we start with the principle that warrantless searches of a home “are presumptively unreasonable,” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, and assess whether there is a legitimate government interest to overcome this presumption, Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19. For example, a warrantless search of a home may be justified where officers need to render “emergency aid.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 19 452, 460 (2011). Ash contends that her entry was necessary to protect O’Bryant’s children, which we construe to be an assertion that the imminent danger exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Child. & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1093 (3d Cir. 1989); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. This exception only applies at this stage when it is plain from the Complaint that (1) entry into a home was made to protect children within from imminent danger of abuse and (2) it was objectively reasonable to believe that the intrusion was necessary to avert that imminent harm to the children. See Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009). The Complaint alleges that Ash was in receipt of a report made by an unknown person that Flanders was “upset and agitated” when he dropped the children off at school that morning. JA67. That report is plainly insufficient to allow us to conclude that the children were in imminent danger of abuse or other harm, and no other facts are alleged in the Complaint as to the information Ash relied upon at the time of her search. Ash also argues that the warrantless entry was reasonable pursuant to the “special needs doctrine.” We disagree. That doctrine allows for warrantless searches unsupported by individualized suspicion, like searches at border checkpoints or drug testing of certain categories of employees. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (collecting cases). It applies in “instances when a search furthers a ‘special governmental need’ beyond that of normal law enforcement such that the search, although not supported by the typical quantum of individualized suspicion, can nonetheless still be 20 found constitutionally ‘reasonable.’” Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2005). The doctrine has been applied when a policy routinely allows for warrantless searches if certain circumstances are present, without further assessment of individualized suspicion, and when such factors reflect reasonableness and a valid state interest in the search apart from law enforcement needs. 17 Because the search here was not conducted pursuant to such a policy, and instead was expressly based on individualized suspicion, the special needs doctrine is not implicated. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a violation of the Fourth Amendment with respect to Ash’s warrantless entry. 2. Ash Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Fourth Amendment Claim Though Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation, we must consider if Ash is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions, even if 17 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (drug and alcohol testing for employees upon the occurrence of a train accident); Nat. Treas. Emps. Union, 489 U.S. at 667–68 (drug testing of employees as a condition of placement or employment for positions that met certain criteria, such as a job requirement to carry a firearm); Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664– 65 (1995) (random drug testing for student athletes); Neumeyer, 421 F.3d at 213–14 (requiring that prison visitors consent to searches of their vehicles as a precondition for entry). 21 unconstitutional, do not violate clearly established law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009). The inquiry “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, addressed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). This means that “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In these cases, “a plaintiff can demonstrate that the right was clearly established by presenting a closely analogous case that establishes that the Defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional or by presenting evidence that the Defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court.’’ Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). “‘[Q]ualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.’” Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 300 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001)). Being that defendants have no hand in drafting complaints and are unable to insert facts that may weigh in favor of finding qualified immunity, we have noted that it may be difficult for defendants to successfully claim qualified immunity on the pleadings. See Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86. We begin by defining “the right ‘in light of the specific 22 context of the case,’ with all reasonable inferences drawn in the nonmovant’s favor.” Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2021)) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the right at issue is freedom from warrantless entry of a home by state child welfare workers conducting a child safety investigation upon a report from an unidentified source that one of the children’s caregivers appeared upset and agitated earlier that day. Next, we must determine if that right was sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official would have understood that their conduct violated that right. Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165. It was. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children & Youth provided “fair warning” to Ash that the entry of O’Bryant’s home was unconstitutional absent corroborating evidence that the children were in imminent danger. There, we addressed a similar set of facts and explained that, as of at least the incident’s occurrence in 1987, “the decided case law made it clear that the state may not, consistent with the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, conduct a search of a home or strip search of a person’s body in the absence of consent, a valid search warrant, or exigent circumstances.” 891 F.2d at 1092. 18 18 Supreme Court authority from before Good makes clear that it must be “objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported by . . . exigent circumstances.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 23 In Good, state social services received a report that a seven- year-old child said certain bruises on her body were caused by a fight with her mother. Id. at 1089. According to the state officers, the child was not in school the next morning and a caseworker unsuccessfully tried contacting her mother by phone. Id. As a result, a caseworker entered the family’s home without a warrant and performed a non-consensual strip search of the child. Id. We held that the entry and the strip search were unconstitutional because the caseworker lacked reason to believe the child “was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the[] intrusions were reasonably necessary to avert that injury.” Id. at 1095. Good and the present case are “closely analogous” because both involve warrantless searches based on a single uncorroborated statement about a child’s welfare. Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 330. And any inference of imminent danger that DCPP officials here could have drawn from the facts was weaker than in Good because the uncorroborated statement from the unidentified source here does not even suggest that Flanders physically injured the children. It therefore “would have been apparent to a reasonable official” that Ash’s conduct was unlawful. Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).