Reynolds v. Quiros

25-1133-pr Reynolds v. Quiros United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit August Term, 2025 (Argued: May 14, 2026 Decided: November 13, 2026) Docket No. 25-1133-pr _____________________________________ RICHARD REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGEL QUIROS, REGIONAL WARDEN N.C.I., OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, EDWARD MALDONADO, WARDEN N.C.I., INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, SCOTT SEMPLE, COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, Defendants-Appellants. * Before: LOHIER, Chief Judge, KEARSE and WESLEY, Circuit Judges. * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.  Richard Reynolds, a prisoner now serving a sentence of life imprisonment after years on death row, sued current and former prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement violate the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Defendants appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Underhill, J.) denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity and granting Reynolds’s motion for a new trial. We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity as to the Eighth Amendment claim because the prison officials’ entitlement to immunity turns on disputed facts. But we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity as to the due process claim because no relevant factual disputes exist as to that claim. As to whether the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim, we conclude that the Defendants did not violate clearly established law. The appeal is DISMISSED in part, the order is REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JAMES M. BELFORTI (Terrence M. O’Neill, on the brief), Assistant Attorneys General, for William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, for Defendants- Appellants. TYLER M. FINN, Dynamis LLP, New York, NY (David N. Rosen, David Rosen & Associates, P.C., New Haven, CT, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. LOHIER, Chief Judge: Richard Reynolds, an inmate now serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release after years on death row, sued current and former Connecticut Department of Correction officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the conditions of his solitary confinement violate his rights under 2 the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a jury trial, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Underhill, J.) denied the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted Reynolds’s motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Defendants challenge the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity on Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment and due process claims. 1 We lack appellate jurisdiction to review and therefore DISMISS the appeal of the District Court’s order insofar as it denied qualified immunity for Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment claim because there remain unresolved factual issues as to that claim. By contrast, we review the denial of qualified immunity for Reynolds’s due process claim relating to his confinement from 2017 onward because no relevant factual disputes exist as to that claim. We REVERSE the order insofar as it denied qualified immunity for Reynolds’s post-2017 due process claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 The parties have since stipulated to the dismissal of Reynolds’s due process claim to the extent it concerns conduct occurring between October 2010 and April 2017. D. Ct. Dkt. No. 353. To the extent the Defendants appeal the District Court’s order denying qualified immunity on that part of the claim, we dismiss it as moot. See United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 479 (2d Cir. 2007). 3  I We assume the parties’ familiarity with our earlier opinion in this matter, which discusses at length the underlying facts and procedural history. See Reynolds v. Quiros, 990 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Reynolds I”). We repeat them only to the extent we think it necessary to explain the discussion that follows. Reynolds was convicted of the aggravated murder of a police officer and was sentenced to death in 1995. The Connecticut Legislature later enacted Public Act 12–5 (subsequently codified as section 18-10b of the Connecticut General Statutes (§ 18-10b)), which, for crimes committed on or after the effective date of the legislation, abolished the death penalty and in its place provided terms and conditions of imprisonment, including confinement in a Special Circumstances Unit, for capital convictions. In 2015 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the state constitution as applied to capital sentences already imposed. See State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 10 (2015). Reynolds was accordingly resentenced under § 18-10b to life imprisonment without the possibility of release and subject to the conditions of confinement mandated by the statute. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Corr., 321 Conn. 750, 765 (2016). 4  Reynolds spent twenty-six years in solitary confinement in the same Connecticut high-security facility, the Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”). See Joint App’x 2115, 2124. His claims arise from the conditions of his confinement at Northern, both while he was on death row and after his sentence was reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. As relevant here, Reynolds alleges that the conditions of his confinement violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that the Defendants deprived him of the process required under both § 18-10b and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In an earlier appeal, we vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Reynolds on his Eighth Amendment and due process claims, concluding that the District Court had improperly resolved disputed issues of material fact. Reynolds I, 990 F.3d at 294–95, 302. We held that those claims required additional factfinding and remanded for further proceedings. Id. We left intact the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Reynolds on his other claims, including for denials of equal protection, and did not consider any assertions of qualified immunity. See id. at 302. 5  On remand, Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment and due process claims were tried to a jury. 2 The District Court divided the liability period for Reynolds’s due process claim into two periods: first, his conditions of confinement while on death row before 2017, and second, his confinement in the Special Circumstances Unit from 2017 onward. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding the Defendants not liable on Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment and pre-2017 due process claims but liable on his due process claim for 2017 onward. The jury was also asked to answer special interrogatories with respect to the Defendants’ understanding of § 18-10b. In response to these questions, the jury found that each Defendant “reasonably believed” that the statute “required Mr. Reynolds to be housed under the conditions of confinement at Northern.” Joint App’x 1839. The Defendants, who had earlier moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence, renewed their motion after the verdict, arguing that they 2 We understand that the Defendants do not ask that we disturb the denial of their post- trial qualified-immunity-based motion for judgment dismissing Reynolds’s equal protection claims. “Defendants do not contest the findings of liability and damages for the Equal Protection claim [sic].” Appellants’ Br. 6 n.2. Instead, “[t]hrough this appeal, Defendants seek to vindicate their right to qualified immunity from both liability and further litigation on the Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims.” Appellants’ Br. 6. The Defendants’ brief contains no arguments as to why it was error to deny their qualified immunity defense with respect to equal protection. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005) (arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are generally deemed abandoned). 6 were entitled to qualified immunity on Reynolds’s Equal Protection and post- 2017 due process claims. Reynolds, for his part, moved for a new trial on his pre- 2017 due process claim. The District Court granted Reynolds’s motion for a new trial on the pre-2017 due process claim, ordered a new trial on his Eighth Amendment claim, and denied the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The verdict rejecting Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment claim, the court explained, was against the weight of the evidence, while certain evidentiary rulings and jury instructions had prejudiced Reynolds. The Defendants then filed this interlocutory appeal, limited to the issues of qualified immunity. II We review the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. See Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 2006). “Generally, we . . . lack jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immunity if resolution of the immunity defense depends upon disputed factual issues.” Jok v. City of Burlington, 96 F.4th 291, 295 (2d Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). “[A]s the part[ies] seeking to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction,” the Defendants “bear[] the burden of establishing it.” Id. at 294. 7  A As a threshold matter, the Defendants ask us to review the District Court’s order granting a new trial. We lack jurisdiction to review that order, however, because it is not a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ortiz-Del Valle v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190 F.3d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1999). Nor is the District Court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law immediately appealable “to the extent that the denial involve[d] only a question of evidence sufficiency.” Taylor v. Rogich, 781 F.3d 647, 649 (2d Cir. 2015). But we can review denials of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal “to the narrow extent they turn on questions of law,” Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2010), or “undisputed facts adduced at . . . [or] resolved by [a] trial,” Bryant v. Egan, 890 F.3d 382, 386 (2d Cir. 2018). The Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law based on undisputed facts established at trial concerning Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment claim. We disagree. In fact, as the Defendants’ argument makes clear, their immunity defense as to that claim depends on unresolved and disputed factual issues. In that regard, not much has changed since we last considered this case on appeal. We held then that “disputed issues 8 of material facts,” including the conditions of Reynolds’s confinement, precluded resolution of his Eighth Amendment and due process claims at summary judgment “because if the imposed conditions did constitute solitary confinement, Reynolds could arguably prevail on his claims . . . .” Reynolds I, 990 F.3d at 294– 95. We accordingly vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to those claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 302. As the case returns to us, the same unresolved issues relating to Reynolds’s Eighth Amendment claim persist. Before trial, the District Court “ruled that evidence concerning whether Reynolds’[s] conditions of confinement fit the definition of ‘solitary confinement’ was not relevant.” Joint App’x 2170. The District Court later determined that both its evidentiary ruling and jury instructions were “erroneous.” Joint App’x 2170, 2177. The court reasoned that the errors rendered “the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence and a miscarriage of justice,” Joint App’x 2184 (quotation marks omitted), and entitled Reynolds to a new trial on his Eighth Amendment claim. Where, as here, the district court concludes that a jury’s verdict “was against the weight of the evidence, that verdict no longer resolves those factual disputes.” Bryant, 890 F.3d at 386. And where, as here, “a factual determination is a necessary predicate to 9 the resolution of whether . . . immunity is a bar, review is postponed and we dismiss the appeal.” State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). We accordingly dismiss the appeal insofar as it challenges the District Court’s grant of Reynolds’s motion for a new trial and its denial of the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Eighth Amendment claim. B The parties agree that the Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on Reynolds’s post-2017 due process claim does not similarly depend on a resolution of disputed facts. Nor does either party suggest on appeal that the jury verdict on that claim was marred by evidentiary or other errors. See Bryant, 890 F.3d at 386. We therefore will not disturb the jury’s finding, in response to a special interrogatory, “that the Defendants reasonably believed Connecticut General Statutes section 18-10b required . . . Reynolds to be housed under the conditions of confinement at Northern.” Joint App’x 1839. The jury having found all the facts relevant to the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense as to Reynolds’s post-2017 due process claim, our appellate jurisdiction to “make the 10 ultimate legal determination of whether qualified immunity attaches on those facts” is firmly grounded. Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Assured of our appellate jurisdiction, we turn to whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Reynolds’s post-2017 due process claim. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Id. C In evaluating the Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity with respect to Reynolds’s due process claim, we assume without deciding that § 18-10b created a protected liberty interest by requiring that the Connecticut Commissioner of Correction “assess[] the risk an inmate . . . poses to staff and other inmates,” place an inmate in “the maximum security population” upon “determin[ing] such placement is appropriate,” and “conduct an annual review 11 of such inmate’s conditions of confinement.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10(b), (c)(1)– (2); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (asserting that “a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.”); Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that a prisoner—serving a “potentially limitless” term in administrative segregation— had a “significant liberty interest for due process analysis.”). The Defendants argue that Reynolds’s asserted due process right to an individualized reclassification process and meaningful annual review was nevertheless not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Based on the extensive record before us, we agree that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). To start, an official violates clearly established law when “existing precedent” places the unlawfulness of the challenged conduct “beyond debate.” Id. at 12 (quotation marks omitted). Our prior decision in this case construed § 18-10b(a) as imposing a “permanent and unreviewable assignment to the Special Circumstances Unit.” Reynolds I, 990 F.3d at 299; see id. at 300 12 (“Section 18-10b . . . compels . . . confinement in indefinite and unreviewable isolation . . . .”). Although that construction was unnecessary to our ultimate disposition, it confirms that Connecticut’s statutory scheme could be reasonably understood to require the very conditions of confinement that Reynolds contests. See id. at 299–300. It follows, then, that not every reasonable official would have been on notice, during the post-2017 liability period, that enforcing § 18-10b(a) violated Reynolds’s due process rights. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11–12. What’s more, prior to and during the post-2017 liability period, we are not aware of any court that held that enforcing § 18-10b or an analogous statute violated a prisoner’s right to due process. Indeed, when this case was first before us on appeal, we invalidated the statute because it constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder, not because it violated due process. See Reynolds I, 990 F.3d at 295– 300, 302. We add that “enforcement of a presumptively valid statute” such as § 18- 10b “creates a heavy presumption in favor of qualified immunity,” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 104 (2d Cir. 2003)—a presumption that may be overcome only when officials are “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law,” id. at 102 (quotation marks omitted). Reynolds has not 13 overcome the presumption in favor of qualified immunity in this case because, as the Defendants state, his asserted due process right to an individualized reclassification process and meaningful annual review was not clearly established in existing precedent at the time of the challenged conduct—that is, during the liability period of Reynolds’s post-2017 due process claim. The Defendants are accordingly entitled to qualified immunity on Reynolds’s post- 2017 due process claim. III For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED in part, the judgment of the District Court is REVERSED in part, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14