Tuttle v. Gallegos

Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 29, 2026 No. 25-20132 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Clifford F. Tuttle, Jr., as Representative of the Estate of Dennis W. Tuttle, Deceased; Robert Tuttle; Ryan Tuttle; Jo Ann Nicholas; John Nicholas, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus Felipe Gallegos, Defendant—Appellant, ______________________________ Jo Ann Nicholas, individually and as an heir of the Estate of Rhogena Nicholas; John Nicholas, as temporary administrator of the Estate of Rhogena Nicholas, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus Felipe Gallegos, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC Nos. 4:21-CV-270, 4:21-CV-272 ______________________________ Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 Before Jones, Clement, and Richman, Circuit Judges. Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge: This is a high-profile qualified immunity case that involves a police officer, Felipe Gallegos, shooting and killing Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas, after a squad of officers from the Houston Police Department (“HPD”) executed a no-knock search warrant at their 7815 Harding Street residence on January 28, 2019. Plaintiffs, the estates of Tuttle and Nicholas, sued the officers and the City of Houston for several state and federal claims, including a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Gallegos. Gallegos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion because it held that materially disputed facts precluded summary judgment. Gallegos appealed, arguing there were no constitutional violations, and that, even if there were, the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident. The facts of this case are tragic. But tragic facts alone do not establish liability under the Constitution. Because Gallegos did not violate Tuttle’s or Nicholas’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE. I A The following facts are undisputed. The Search Warrant. This case’s genesis began on January 8, 2019, when Patricia Garcia, Tuttle and Nicholas’s neighbor, repeatedly called 911 and falsely claimed that her daughter was doing drugs inside Tuttle and Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 Nicholas’s house. Garcia also claimed there were guns inside the house, 1 so HPD Officers Richard Morales and Nichole Blankenship-Reeves went to investigate the scene outside the house. Neither officer observed any criminal activity, or anyone entering or exiting the home. Blankenship-Reeves relayed a note about the house to Lieutenant Marsha Todd in the Narcotics Division. Todd then passed the tip to Squad 15 Officer Gerald Goines. The falsehoods did not end with Garcia. To secure a no-knock warrant to search the house, Goines falsely claimed in an affidavit that, on January 27, 2019, a confidential informant purchased heroin and observed a firearm at the house. He also falsely claimed that fellow Squad 15 Officer Stephen Bryant observed the drug purchase. With the search warrant in hand, Goines and his Squad 15 supervisors, Sergeants Clemente Reyna and Thomas Wood, reviewed the warrant and the tactical execution plan. Once Wood approved the plan, he joined Squad 15 Officers Frank Medina and Gallegos on a tactical “drive-by” of the house. Goines later led the pre-raid briefing with the officers who would later help execute the search warrant. He described the property and communicated to the officers that they should expect a female resident, a male resident known to carry a gun, and an aggressive dog. The Raid. After the briefing, eighteen officers were dispatched to the house to execute the search warrant. The “entry team” consisted of Squad 15 Officers Medina, Bryant, Gallegos, Goines, Cedell Lovings, Manuel Salazar, Oscar Pardo, Eric Sepolio, and Nadeem Ashraf, as well as Sergeants Reyna and Wood. Six other HPD Officers—Morales, Blankenship-Reeves, Joseph Arechiga, Samuel Garza, Valeriano Rios, and Yvette Ortiz—assisted _____________________ 1 Garcia pleaded guilty to one count of false information and hoaxes for making these false reports and was sentenced to forty months of imprisonment. Her sentence was affirmed by this court. See United States v. Garcia, No. 21-20309, 2022 WL 1014146 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 2022) (per curiam). 3 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 with “perimeter security.” While Morales, Blankenship-Reeves, Rios, Ortiz, and Garza wore body-worn cameras (“BWC”), they failed to activate them before the raid, in violation of HPD policy. They instead activated their BWC at different times during and after the raid. On arrival, the entry team organized into a “stack” and breached the front door while announcing themselves as HPD officers. Medina, the first to enter the house, broke left after entering through the front door. According to Medina, he saw Nicholas standing to his left and told her to put her hands on her face and get down. Nicholas did not comply, and she continued to yell and “flail” her hands. Medina then heard a gunshot to his right. He also saw and shot an “angry” dog. Moments later, Medina was shot in the shoulder and fell back against a couch. There, Medina first saw Tuttle behind a wall in the dining room area. Medina then fell unconscious. Bullet fragments consistent with a .223-caliber gun were later found in Medina’s wound. Lovings, the second officer to enter the house, broke right. He saw a dog running toward him and then saw a “muzzle flash.” 2 He fired his M6 .223-caliber rifle at the dog “several” times. He then saw another muzzle flash from the dining room area, where he saw Tuttle standing with a gun. Tuttle and Lovings exchanged fire. Tuttle shot Lovings in the neck with a .357-caliber revolver gun, leaving Lovings paralyzed from the neck down. Lovings was unsure whether any of the bullets he fired struck Tuttle, but he observed Tuttle “flinch” and hide back behind a wall. Lovings, who lay paralyzed on the floor, saw Tuttle attempt to take his gun. Salazar and Pardo were the third and fourth officers to enter the house. When Salazar stepped through the door, he saw Lovings shoot at the dog. He also saw Tuttle fire three or four shots toward Medina from behind _____________________ 2 A muzzle flash is a glimpse of light that accompanies a gunshot. 4 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 a wall, and heard Medina exclaim that he was “hit.” Salazar fired his Springfield 191 .45-caliber handgun at Tuttle around ten times. Pardo, the last of the two to enter, only made it a few steps inside before he heard someone yell “dog” and the firing of multiple gunshots. Pardo heard Medina say he was “hit” and saw him lying on the couch. Pardo was then pushed out of the house with Salazar. At this point, only Medina and Lovings remained inside the house. Both of them had sustained gunshot wounds. The following facts are disputed. Three versions are at play. 1 According to the City, Squad 15 Officers, and Robert Gonzales, Gallegos was outside the house—to the right of the front porch—during the above events. From that position, he heard several gunshots and Medina yell that he was “hit.” He observed Salazar and Pardo “fall backwards off the front porch” and saw Lovings drop in the threshold of the doorway. Gallegos then acquired a visual of the inside, observing Medina unconscious on the couch. Nicholas was standing over Medina, cursing and tugging at the gun attached to Medina’s vest. Nicholas’s hands later tested positive for gunshot residue. After seeing Nicholas tugging at Medina’s gun, Gallegos fired at Nicholas with his M6 .223-caliber rifle between one and three times. At least one of those bullets struck and killed her. Sepolio then went inside and helped extract the wounded Medina. After the fatal shot to Nicholas, Gallegos heard more gunshots inside the house. Still located along the right side of the house, he stepped back from the door and shot through the wall toward where he believed Tuttle was positioned. Gallegos broke a window so he could see inside the house. But all he saw was an empty bedroom. Gallegos then retreated to a tree and yelled for someone to extract Lovings. Goines went toward the front door but was struck in his face by a bullet or bullet fragments, so he, too, retreated. 5 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 Afterward, Reyna approached the front door, and Gallegos saw “two hands come out of the front door holding a revolver” pointed at Reyna. Tuttle and Reyna exchanged fire, with Reyna using his .40-caliber Glock. Bullet fragments from Tuttle’s gunshots struck Reyna’s face. Gallegos saw Tuttle shoot at Reyna, so Gallegos shot Tuttle in his left hand. Reyna retreated away from the house, and Tuttle retreated inside. Gallegos moved from his position near the tree to gain a visual inside the doorway. He saw Tuttle inside the house, leaning against the front door and holding a gun to his chest with his right hand. Tuttle raised his gun toward Gallegos, and Gallegos shot at him several times. Tuttle was struck at least once in the shoulder and twice in the buttocks area. Tuttle fell to the ground, out of Gallegos’s view. Pardo tried to retrieve Lovings, who was still lying paralyzed inside the doorway. Pardo also saw Tuttle sitting on the floor near Lovings with a gun in his hand, so he shot at Tuttle once and fell back to Gallegos’s position. Gallegos walked up the front porch stairs and saw Tuttle through the doorway. Tuttle was in a seated position on the floor with a gun in his right hand, resting on his thigh. Tuttle yelled at Gallegos, asking what he wanted and stating there were “no drugs.” When Gallegos told Tuttle to stop moving, Tuttle “looked directly at Gallegos” and “began to raise the weapon.” Gallegos raised his own weapon, and Tuttle “flinched.” So, Gallegos shot Tuttle one more time, fatally striking him in his upper back and neck area. The full episode—from Squad 15’s initial entry into the house to Gallegos’s final shot at Tuttle—lasted eighty seconds. 2 According to Plaintiffs, the story is different. Four problems, they say, exist with the version offered by the City, Squad 15 Officers, and Gonzales. 6 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 Problem 1: While Medina, Lovings, Goines, and Reyna each suffered gunshot wounds during the raid, the evidence suggests that only Lovings was shot by Tuttle. On the other hand, Medina, Goines, and Reyna’s injuries were consistent with .223-caliber weapons, which only the officers carried. Problem 2: Gallegos shot Nicholas after Medina was extracted from the house, so Gallegos could not have seen Nicholas standing over Medina. Plaintiffs rely on BWC video, which shows Squad 15 Officers exiting a white van and moving toward the house. About seventeen seconds after their exit, the video captures a loud noise. A series of gunshots ring out ten seconds later. According to Plaintiffs, these shots were mostly fired by Salazar and Lovings, and, about two seconds later, Sepolio and Medina can be seen running from the direction of the house toward Squad 15’s white van. The video then shows a flash of light in the front of the house. According to Plaintiffs, the video also portrays Medina and Sepolio behind a van and an unidentified officer—who they say is Gallegos—to the far left of the house. Five seconds later, several more gunshots are heard. Plaintiffs assert that these shots were likely fired by Salazar and Lovings. Plaintiffs also claim that, at this point, Gallegos moved toward the house and engaged Nicholas. Problem 3: Gallegos could not have shot Nicholas if she was standing over Medina. Nicholas had been shot once on her right thigh and once on the right side of her torso. According to Dr. Michael Maloney, Plaintiffs’ scene reconstructionist expert, if Nicholas was standing over Medina while Medina was on the couch, Gallegos could not have shot Nicholas on her right side because only her left side was exposed to Gallegos. Problem 4: Tuttle’s injuries would have prevented him from holding or raising his weapon at Gallegos before Gallegos shot him the final two times. Maloney determined that Tuttle was shot a total of nine times, and the first seven shots inflicted wounds to “both” of Tuttle’s “arms and hands.” 7  Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 These wounds, according to Maloney, would have rendered Tuttle “incapable of holding a weapon.” So, when Gallegos shot Tuttle the final two times, Tuttle could not have raised or pointed his gun at Gallegos. 3 The third version of these events comes from Maloney, Plaintiffs’ own expert. According to Maloney, Gallegos shot Nicholas “after Medina [was] shot and collapse[d] on the couch.” His version, unlike Plaintiffs’ version, concluded that Medina was inside the house when Nicholas was shot. So, Plaintiffs advance a theory—with respect to Medina’s location— that differs from their own expert. Maloney’s investigation further revealed that, from Gallegos’s shooting position, he could not have seen Nicholas. Even still, Maloney opines that Gallegos shot Nicholas through the front door where Tuttle was standing, and the bullet was “destabilized by the doorframe,” grazed Tuttle’s forearm, and ultimately killed Nicholas. This conclusion was corroborated in part by the discovery of Tuttle’s and Nicholas’s DNA on a bullet recovered from the couch inside the house. B In suing the City of Houston, the Squad 15 Officers, and Gonzales, Plaintiffs asserted state law wrongful death and survival claims, and § 1983 claims flowing from unlawful search and seizure due to (1) lack of probable cause arising from obtaining the search warrant and (2) excessive force arising from the raid. Several claims have been dismissed. 3 Besides Goines, all remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment or judgment on the _____________________ 3 On January 6, 2025, the district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against Sepolio, Salazar, Wood, Pardo, Medina, Reyna, Lovings, and Ashraf. 8  Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 pleadings on all remaining claims against them. Relevant to this appeal, the district court denied Gallegos’s motion for summary judgment. 4 Gallegos timely appealed. II Our review implicates multiple standards “corresponding to qualified immunity, summary judgment, [and] interlocutory review of [a] qualified immunity denial[].” Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020). Since the interplay of these standards “gets tricky,” we take each in turn. Id. A The qualified-immunity doctrine shields public officials from suit for damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). On a theoretical level, qualified immunity seeks to “balance two competing societal interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 328 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In practice, qualified immunity adjusts “the nature of the summary-judgment burden, how and when the burden shifts, and what it _____________________ 4 The district court also granted in part Gonzales’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted Gonzales’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part Bryant’s motions for summary judgment, and granted the City’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were: (1) § 1983 excessive force claims against Gallegos, as well as derivative wrongful death and survival claims; (2) § 1983 failure to intervene claims against Bryant based on lack of probable cause for the search warrant, as well as a derivative survival claim; and (3) § 1983 excessive force and lack of probable cause claims against Goines, as well as state law wrongful death and survival claims. 9 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 takes to satisfy the burden.” Id. at 329. In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must ask: “(1) was a statutory or constitutional right violated on the facts alleged; and (2) did the defendant’s actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 172 (5th Cir. 2021). These steps may be evaluated in any order, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to show either one. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. In these cases, the plaintiff bears the burden. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). B At this stage, the burden shifting changes, too. Typically, under the summary judgment standard, the party moving for summary judgment must initially show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant satisfies this burden by showing that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmovant, based on the burdens that would apply at trial.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). To overcome the plaintiff’s case, the defendant must show “that the record cannot support a win for the plaintiff—either because the plaintiff has a failure of proof on an essential element of its claim or because the defendant has insurmountable proof on its affirmative defense to that claim.” Id. The defendant can achieve this by introducing undisputed evidence or by “pointing out . . . an absence of evidence to support the [plaintiff’s] case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the defendant succeeds, then “the burden shifts [back] to the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a 10 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 genuine issue of material fact and that the evidence favoring the plaintiff permits a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329. Qualified immunity modifies that typical burden-shifting framework. Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). When a public official makes “a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity,” the burden shifts back to the “plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere allegations.’” Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991)). “The plaintiff must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury could return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional injury,” which is the “same” as “if the plaintiff did not face qualified immunity.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330. Thus, “the plaintiff’s version of those disputed facts must also constitute a violation of clearly established law.” Id. C If an official unsuccessfully moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the denial of qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, falls within the ambit of a final decision” under the collateral-order doctrine “notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Wertenbroch v. Hardeman, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1583938, at *2 (5th Cir. 2026) (publication forthcoming) (cleaned up). Thus, we review the denial de novo. Maldonado v. Rodriguez, 932 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Yet our jurisdiction is limited: We may not “review a district court’s determination that a genuine factual dispute exists,” but we “may review de novo the materiality of disputed facts to the qualified immunity determination.” Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010) (first and 11 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 third emphases added). At this point, “all facts in evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movants.” Maldonado, 932 F.3d at 390. That said, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). III Four issues exist on appeal. A The first issue is whether we have jurisdiction to review fact disputes. Plaintiffs argue that we lack jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review certain fact disputes, including the video that allegedly provides evidence that Medina was not inside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas. Gallegos disagrees, arguing that we have jurisdiction under Scott v. Harris, which provides “an exception” to our “general inability to review the existence of fact disputes” when the video blatantly contradicts Plaintiffs’ version. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2021). Gallegos spills much ink explaining Scott’s application and force here. Plaintiffs, by contrast, never mention Scott at all. While we are generally limited to determining whether a fact dispute is material, Terry, 609 F.3d at 761, we may assess the genuineness of evidence, such as the video, to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ story is “blatantly contradicted” and “utterly discredited” by this record, Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81. With our jurisdiction secure, we next review the genuineness of the video and the materiality of the fact disputes identified by the district court. 12 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 B The second issue is whether the district court erred in concluding that the video and Gallegos’s inconsistent statements created a genuine issue of material fact about Medina’s location when Nicholas was shot. Tucked within this inquiry are two sub-issues: Whether the video presents a genuine fact dispute and whether Gallegos’s inconsistent testimony about when he broke the window presents a material fact dispute. 1 Two legal principles guide our analysis to determine whether the district court’s two identified fact disputes are both genuine and material. First, a dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the record. As a basic matter, we review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2015). Again, summary judgment must be awarded “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up). The “substantive law will identify which facts are material” and facts are “material” only if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Second, when reviewing a denial of qualified immunity, we may assess whether the district court correctly characterized the record as containing a genuine dispute. Once again, we cannot question the district court’s assessment of “whether there is enough evidence in the record for a jury to conclude that certain facts are true.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 452 (5th 13 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015)). So, we only review “whether the factual disputes identified by the district court are material to the denial of qualified immunity—that is, whether the factual disputes viewed in favor of the plaintiff make out a violation of clearly established law.” Poole, 13 F.4th at 423 (citing Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 2020)). But we may bypass that rule and assess “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape” and reject Plaintiffs’ factual version when it is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81 (emphasis added); see also Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 663–64 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing Scott as an exception to the rule). 2 BWC Video. At summary judgment, Plaintiffs provided video that depicted an unidentified officer standing away from the house while Medina and Sepolio were running out. Three features purportedly indicate that officer is Gallegos: (1) the officer appears to be wearing a short sleeve shirt, which Gallegos wore during the raid; (2) the officer appears to have a skin tone and tattoos similar to Gallegos; and (3) the Texas Rangers Report placed Gallegos at the location of the unidentified officer in the video. Gallegos submitted an affidavit disputing that he is that officer. The district court swiftly concluded that Plaintiffs presented evidence that Medina was not inside the house when Nicholas was shot. Not so. For starters, the video does not identify the officer outside the house, let alone reasonably suggest that it was Gallegos. While the video shows someone wearing a short sleeve shirt and standing on the same side of the house as Gallegos before the shooting, it does not reveal any distinguishing characteristics, like the sleeve tattoo on Gallegos’s right arm or other identifying features that would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that this 14 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 officer was Gallegos. If anything, the video suggests that this officer has no tattoos at all. At bottom, Plaintiffs offer no distinguishing basis to conclude the unidentified officer is Gallegos—as opposed to, say, Bryant or Goines, who Plaintiffs concede also wore “short sleeves” that day. More to the point, Bryant carried a tool called a “moby,” and was responsible for breaking down the door, then moving out of the way. This placed him in the same general area as the unidentified officer. Nor does the record support Plaintiffs’ identification theory. Even if the video itself did not blatantly contradict Plaintiffs’ story, Maloney’s expert testimony establishes that Medina was inside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas. 5 The Texas Rangers Report also concluded that Medina was inside the house. The Report depicted Gallegos moving from his initial position left (west) of the front door to the right (east) side of the front door shortly after the officers entered. After Tuttle shot Medina, “Gallegos yelled for someone to extract Medina and Gallegos moved up to a position on the east side of the front door.” From that position, the Texas Rangers opined, Gallegos observed Nicholas near Medina and shot her. The record as a whole blatantly contradicts Plaintiffs’ version of events to the extent that Medina was outside the house when Nicholas was shot. At most, the video shows an officer whose appearance is equally consistent with Bryant as Gallegos. Because the video does not identify Gallegos as the officer, and the remaining evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to make this inference, Plaintiffs’ theory cannot preclude summary judgment. While we must draw all reasonable inferences in their favor, those inferences must derive from evidence and not speculation. _____________________ 5 In fact, Maloney concluded that it was Gallegos—not Tuttle—who shot Medina. 15 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 For these reasons, we reject Plaintiffs’ version of events to the extent their story relies on the video to establish that Medina was outside the house. 3 Inconsistent Statements. Plaintiffs also point to inconsistencies in Gallegos’s own statements that supposedly relate to Medina’s location outside the house at the time Gallegos shot Nicholas. For example, Gallegos initially communicated to the HPD’s Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) that he broke the window before he shot Nicholas. But in the video, according to the district court, Medina is seen exiting the house “well before” the sound of glass breaking is heard. Gallegos later testified under oath that he broke the window after he shot Nicholas. The district court concluded that this dispute created a genuine issue of material fact. Not quite. This inconsistency does not undermine the video and expert testimony that Medina was inside the house when Nicholas was shot. True, Gallegos told IAD that he broke the window before shooting Nicholas before later testifying that he broke the window after doing so. This discrepancy may bear on Gallegos’s credibility as a witness, but such issues cannot defeat summary judgment alone unless they concern material facts that “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Even if accepting Gallegos’s initial statement as true, no reasonable jury could infer from it that—in light of the rest of the record, including the video and expert testimony—Medina was outside when Gallegos shot Nicholas. Plaintiffs’ theory that Gallegos’s initial statement permits a reasonable inference that Medina was outside when Nicholas was shot is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81. The video does not show that Medina was outside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas. At most, it indicates that Medina was outside before the sound of 16 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 glass breaking is heard. Since the video does not establish when Gallegos shot Nicholas relative to Medina’s exit, Gallegos’s initial statement does not materially undermine that Medina was inside when Gallegos shot Nicholas. All in all, the video and expert testimony blatantly contradict Plaintiffs’ story that Medina was outside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas under Scott, and Gallegos’s inconsistent testimony about the window does not materially undermine that fact. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that these two fact disputes were genuine and material. We now proceed under the assumption that Medina was inside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas. C The third issue is whether the district court erred in denying Gallegos’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Nicholas’s claims. To answer that question, we must review the third fact dispute identified by the district court: Whether Nicholas was standing over Medina and reaching for Medina’s gun on the couch. Maloney’s investigation determined that Nicholas “was not over the body of Officer Medina, as reported by several officers, where he had collapsed on the couch.” Rather, Nicholas “was physically removed by at least [eight] feet from his location.” According to Maloney, were Nicholas over Medina “attempting to gain control of his shotgun,” only “her left side would have been exposed to Gallegos[’s] shooting position.” Thus, “she could not have been shot on her right side.” This conclusion was based on the house layout, location of the couch, and Gallegos’s position when he shot Nicholas. Gallegos told IAD that Nicholas was “standing directly over and facing Officer Medina,” yelling profanities at him, before she “appeared to be lunging or reaching towards” Medina’s gun. He later testified that Nicholas “was grabbing with 17 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 both hands [and] tugging at the shotgun.” The district court deemed this fact dispute material because there is no constitutional violation where an officer uses deadly force on a suspect that appears to be reaching for a weapon. At this stage, we must construe this conflicting evidence in favor of Plaintiffs. We therefore proceed under the following factual baseline for purposes of our analysis: Medina, who had been shot, was inside the house when Gallegos shot Nicholas. Further, Nicholas was not standing over Medina and reaching for his weapon while Medina was lying injured on the couch. In our analysis, we consider these facts together in their context—in this case, an intense and dangerous firefight that left multiple officers injured. 1 Turning to the constitutional analysis, we must consider, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Nicholas, whether Gallegos’s actions violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment fashions a “right to be free from excessive force during a seizure,” and that right is clearly established. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012); U.S. Const. amend. IV. “To establish a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment,” plaintiffs must show an “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005)). As to the third element, we consider three factors when determining whether force was excessive or unreasonable: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 167 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “The test used to determine whether a 18 Case: 25-20132 Document: 91-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/29/2026 No. 25-20132 use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment ‘is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.’” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Instead, it “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case” to assess “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. To determine reasonableness, courts must assess actions from the objective view “of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. “The intent or motivation of the officer is irrelevant; the question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force.” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). At this stage, while all disputed facts are construed in the light most favorable to nonmovants, courts “evaluating the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force [must consider] how a reasonable officer would have perceived those facts.” Tucker, 998 F.3d at 171–72 (citing Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2016)). In other words, qualified immunity requires courts to “consider[] only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam). In the specific context of an officer employing deadly force, such force is excessive and unreasonable “unless ‘the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.’” Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). “An officer’s use of deadly force is not excessive, and thus no constitutional violation occurs, when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009). “The th