Latino Action Network v. the State of New Jersey
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-3471-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3471-24
LATINO ACTION NETWORK,
NAACP NEW JERSEY STATE
CONFERENCE, LATINO
COALITION, URBAN LEAGUE OF
ESSEX COUNTY, THE UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH OF
GREATER NEW JERSEY,
MACKENZIE WICKS, a minor, by her
Guardian Ad Litem, COURTNEY
WICKS, MAISON ANTIONE TYREL
TORRES, a minor, by his Guardian ad
Litem, JENNIFER TORRES, MALI
AYALA RUELFEDEE, a minor, by his
Guardian ad Litem, RACHEL RUEL,
RA'NAYAH ALSTON, a minor, by her
Guardian Ad Litem, YVETTE
ALSTON-JOHNSON, RA'YAHN
ALSTON, a minor, by his Guardian Ad
Litem, ALAYSA POWELL, a minor, by
her Guardian ad Litem, RASHEEDA
ALSTON, DASHAWN SIMMS, a
minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem,
ANDREA HAYES, and D.R.L., a
minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, M.L.,
and MICHAEL WEILL-WHITEN, a
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem,
ELIZABETH WEILL-GREENBERG, 1
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Respondents,
and
PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF
EDUCATION and WILDWOOD
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Intervenors-Plaintiffs,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW
JERSEY STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, and DR. LILY LAUX,
Commissioner, State Department of
Education,
Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
NEW JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS
ASSOCIATION, INC., BELOVED
COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL,
ANA MARIA DE LA ROCHE
ARAQUE, TAFSHIER COSBY,
DIANE GUTIERREZ, CAMDEN
PREP, INC., KIPP COOPER
1
We granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the caption to reflect the voluntary
dismissal of two minors and their guardians from the case and to anonymize one
of the minor plaintiffs and their guardian, to protect their privacy.
2 A-3471-24
NORCROSS, INC., and MASTERY
SCHOOLS OF CAMDEN, INC.,
Intervenors-Defendants.
____________________________________
Argued October 22, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Augostini.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County,
Docket No. L-1076-18.
Lawrence S. Lustberg and Michael S. Stein argued the
cause for appellants (FBT Gibbons LLP, Pashman Stein
Walder Hayden, PC, Education Law Center, and Robert
Kim (Education Law Center) of the California bar,
admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg,
Michael R. Noveck, Ruth O'Herron, Robert Kim,
Jessica Levin, Michael S. Stein, and Roger Plawker, on
the briefs).
Francesco Ferrantelli, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondents State of New Jersey,
New Jersey State Board of Education, and New Jersey
Commissioner of Education (Jennifer Davenport,
Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Weber,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the
briefs; Francesco Ferrantelli and Ryan J. Silver, Deputy
Attorneys General, on the briefs).
Paul P. Josephson argued the cause for intervenor-
respondent Public Charter School, New Jersey Charter
Schools Association, Inc., Beloved Community Charter
School, Ana Maria De La Roche Araque, Tafshier
Cosby, and Diane Gutierrez (Duane Morris LLP, and
3 A-3471-24
Lisa T. Scruggs (Duane Morris LLP) of the Illinois bar,
admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Paul P. Josephson,
Lisa T. Scruggs, and Matthew M. Caminiti, of counsel
and on the brief).
Thomas Owen Johnston argued the cause for
respondents Camden Prep, Inc., KIPP Cooper
Norcross, Inc., and Mastery Schools of Camden, Inc.
(Johnston Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Thomas Owen
Johnston, of counsel and on the brief; Jaryda A.
Gonzalez, on the brief).
Porzio Bromberg & Newman PC, attorneys for amicus
curiae New Jersey Policy Institute (Patricia C. Morgan,
of counsel and on the brief).
K&L Gates LLP, attorneys for amicus curiae Social
Science Scholars Dr. Mark J. Chin, Dr. Rucker C.
Johnson, Dr. Ann Owens, and Dr. Sean F. Reardon
(Patrick Maley, on the brief).
Micauri Vargas argued the cause for amicus curiae
Salvation and Social Justice, League of Women Voters
of New Jersey, and Religious Action Center of New
Jersey of the Union for Reform Judaism (New Jersey
Institute for Social Justice, attorneys; Micauri Vargas,
Ryan Haygood, Henal Patel, and Harbani Ahuja, on the
brief).
Liza Weisberg argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey,
Brown's Promise, and Georgetown Law's Racial Equity
in Education Law and Policy Clinic (American Civil
Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, GeDá Jones
Herbert (Brown's Promise at the Southern Education
Foundation) of the Louisiana bar, admitted pro hac
vice, Camille Pendley Hau (Brown's Promise at the
Southern Education Foundation) of the Georgia bar,
4 A-3471-24
admitted pro hac vice, Titilayo Tinubu Ali
(Georgetown Law's Racial Equity in Education Law
and Policy Clinic) of the California bar, admitted pro
hac vice, and Sophia Tan (Georgetown Law's Racial
Equity in Education Law and Policy Clinic) of the
District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice,
attorneys; Liza Weisberg, Ezra D. Rosenberg, Jeanne
LoCicero, GeDá Jones Herbert, Camille Pendley Hau,
Titilayo Tinubu Ali, and Sophia Tan, on the brief).
Zazzali, PC, attorneys for amicus curiae New Jersey
Education Association (Raymond M. Baldino, on the
brief).
Katrina Feldkamp (NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.) of the New York bar, admitted
pro hac vice, argued the cause for amicus curiae
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
(Morgan Elle Humprey (NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.), Katrinia Feldkamp, Kelly D.
Gardner (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.) of the District of Columbia, Georgia, and
New York bars, admitted pro hac vice, R. Gary Spencer
(NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of
the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Florida bars,
admitted pro hac vice, Donya Khadem (NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the District of
Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, Alexandra S.
Thompson (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.) of the Illinois bar, attorneys; Morgan Elle
Humprey, Katrinia Feldkamp, Kelly D. Gardner, R.
Gary Spencer, Donya Khadem, and Alexandra S.
Thompson, on the brief).
Seton Hall University School of Law, Center for Social
Justice, Center for Social Justice, attorneys for amicus
curiae Poverty & Race Research Action Council,
National Coalition on School Diversity, Fair Share
5 A-3471-24
Housing Center, the National Housing Law Project, and
The Redress Movement (Jonathan Romberg, Lori Outzs
Borgen, Rishi Zutshi, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-
3(c), Aarushi Kaul, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-
3(c), Ryken T. Kreps, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-
3(c), Anne McAtee, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-
3(c), and Emma Valiante, appearing pursuant to Rule
1:21-3(c), on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
We granted plaintiffs, comprised of five non-profit organizations, five
public school students, and their guardians, as well as defendants State of New
Jersey, New Jersey Board of Education, and the Commissioner of the State
Department of Education (DOE) leave to appeal and cross-appeal, respectively,
from an October 6, 2023 order adjudicating their competing motions for
summary judgment. Having considered the parties' arguments and the record,
we affirm as modified for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
By way of background, the State public school education system is the
product of legislation and the New Jersey Constitution. Generally, "[e]ach
municipality shall be a separate local school district," N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1 to -51,
although there are exceptions, such as consolidation or regionalization. Each
school district is governed by a board of education. N.J.S.A. 18A:10-1. Every
person in New Jersey between the ages of five and twenty is entitled to a free
public school education if that person "is domiciled within the school district[.]"
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N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. "No child between the ages of four and [twenty] years shall
be excluded from any public school on account of [their] race, creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, or other protected category under subsection f of
section 11 of P.L. 1945, c. 169 (C.10:5-12), or immigration status." N.J.S.A.
18A:38-5.1. Each school district is primarily funded through a mix of local
property taxes and state aid. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4.1 to -71. A school district's
budget is determined by local governance as well as citizen participation. See
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5; N.J.S.A. 18A:22-13.
The Constitution guarantees the State will provide "a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children . . .
between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1.
Also, "[n]o person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right,
nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be
segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles,
race, color, ancestry or national origin." N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 5.
In 2018, plaintiffs commenced this litigation, alleging New Jersey's public
schools were unconstitutionally segregated based on race and socioeconomic
status. In 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which became the subject
of the motions for summary judgment.
7 A-3471-24
Utilizing public data collected by defendants for the 2016-17 school year,
the amended complaint alleged: unconstitutional segregation based on race and
ethnicity in violation of the anti-segregation clause of the New Jersey
Constitution, article I, paragraph 5 (count one); unconstitutional segregation
based on race, ethnicity, and poverty in violation of the equal protection clause
of the New Jersey Constitution, article I, paragraph 1 (count two); the
segregation of New Jersey public schools along the lines of race, ethnicity, and
poverty unconstitutionally deprived students of a thorough and efficient
education in violation of article VIII, paragraph 4, of the New Jersey
Constitution (count three); the three constitutional provisions cited in counts
one, two, and three, "together and collectively," were violated by the "racial and
socioeconomic segregation in New Jersey public schools" (count four); the
racial segregation of the public schools violated N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1, which
requires the Commissioner of Education to ensure "[n]o child between the ages
of four and [twenty] years shall be excluded from any public school on account
of [their] race, creed, color, national origin, [or] ancestry" (count five); charter
schools also segregated students by race and poverty in violation of the Charter
School Program Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7 (count six); and the constitutional
8 A-3471-24
violations also violated the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2
(NJCRA) (count seven).
The complaint provided separate data for the public and charter schools
for the 2016-17 school year. We focus on the public-school data because
plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of count six. The data showed New
Jersey had 674 school districts, 2,514 public schools, and 1,373,267 public
school students. White students comprised 45.3% of the public-school student
population, followed by: Latino students, 27.1%; Black students, 15.5%; Asian
students, 9.9%; and Native American, Pacific Islander, or students with two or
more racial groups, 2.1%.
During the same school year, 24.8% of Black public-school students
attended schools, which were 99% non-White. 24.4% of Black students
attended public schools, which were between 90 and 99% non-White. In the
aggregate, 61.7% of Black students attended schools that were more than 80%
non-White and 66% of Black students attended schools, which were more than
75% non-White.
The data was similar for Latinos and showed 14.3% attended schools,
which were 99% non-White; and 30.2% attended schools where the non-White
enrollment was between 90 and 99%. Overall, 58.6% of Latino students
9 A-3471-24
attended schools, which were more than 80% non-White, and 61.9% attended
schools that were more than 75% non-White.
Together, the complaint noted approximately 63% of all Black and Latino
public-school students attend schools where the non-White population is more
than 75%. Further, 46.2% of Black and Latino students attend schools, which
are more than 90% non-White. Plaintiffs alleged these figures showed a
worsening trend because the number of students who attend schools that were
99% non-White increased from 7% to 7.8% between the 2010-11 and 2016-17
school years.
The complaint alleged the causes for the segregation of New Jersey's
public schools were: "residential segregation, the design of school districts to
be almost entirely contiguous with the boundaries of residentially segregated
municipalities[,] and State law assigning students to public schools by
residency, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1." Plaintiffs provided charts containing data from
twenty-three municipalities: four municipalities each from Essex, Hudson, and
Union counties; three municipalities each from Passaic and Camden counties;
two municipalities each from Middlesex and Monmouth counties; and one from
Mercer County; showing the racial breakdown of students from those
10 A-3471-24
municipalities and the percentage of students with family incomes below the
poverty level.
The complaint alleged it was common knowledge "[t]he fact of residential
segregation, combined with district boundaries that track such segregation, and
the attendance requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1 yield segregation on the basis
of race and socioeconomic class in the public school system." Defendants knew
about the segregation because the State "collected student enrollment data,
including data that is analyzed by race." The data was "published in numerous
reports specifically addressed to the issue of racial segregation." Plaintiffs also
cited "a number of lawsuits [which] have raised the issue of segregation in the
State's public school system," including the landmark Hedgepeth v. Board of
Education of Trenton, 131 N.J.L. 153 (1944).
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment on counts one through five,
specifically providing the "longstanding and intensive segregation of Black and
Latino public school students" is unlawful and violates the Constitution,
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. They also asked the court to
declare the residency statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1, which states children shall
attend the public school where they reside, unlawful and in violation of the
Constitution for furthering racial segregation in the public schools. Plaintiffs
11 A-3471-24
sought similar relief regarding N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8 and N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(l),
which mandates charter schools prioritize enrollment of students from their
district of residence. They requested the court "[e]njoin[] the continued
assignment of public school students, including those attending charter schools,
solely on the basis of municipal attendance boundaries" and mandate "the
Legislature, the Commissioner . . . and . . . [the DOE] adopt a replacement
assignment methodology that will timely address and remediate racial
segregation in" the public and charter schools. Plaintiffs sought an order
directing the Commissioner to provide the court with "a detailed remediation
plan designed to achieve comprehensive desegregation and diversification of
[the] public schools within and among school districts." And plaintiffs sought
counsel fees and costs under the NJCRA.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment as to liability only. Defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint and argued against the court bifurcating liability
and remedy because they were inextricably intertwined. They also argued
plaintiffs' motion was premature because it preceded discovery and the data
relied upon by plaintiffs was selective. Plaintiff's counsel argued the data was
not selective, but instead "overwhelmingly" showed statewide school
12 A-3471-24
segregation proving defendants are liable. The court bifurcated the case and
ordered the parties to conduct discovery on liability only.
Following discovery, the court heard the summary judgment motions.
Plaintiffs had updated the school enrollment data by providing the 2019-20
figures. Oral argument of the summary judgment motions ran the gamut of the
parties' claims, including the import of the data relied upon by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' counsel addressed defendants' claim plaintiffs were using the data to
prove there was segregation in every district. He stressed plaintiffs were
"argu[ing] no such thing[ because i]ntegrated districts exist . . . and they should
be celebrated." However, "the numbers [plaintiffs] provided establish that the
State as a whole is deeply segregated, [and] the State doesn't anywhere provide
any data to the contrary."
Counsel argued the State was liable because it was on notice for years and
failed to act, notwithstanding the Commissioner's duty and power "to rectify
segregation when [they] see[] it." The State's failure to act was "a state[-wide]
issue . . . not an issue of district-by-district action . . . because it stem[med] from
the application of . . . the residency statute, . . . N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1[.]"
The parties debated what standard the court should use to find segregation.
Plaintiffs' counsel pointed to the "severe disproportion" of children of one race
13 A-3471-24
found in school districts by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ryan W. Coughlan. Although
Dr. Coughlan's methodology was challenged by the other experts, no one
questioned the data. Counsel later reiterated: "The standard that we have
suggested is one that suggests a significant disparity between the community at
large and the schools."
The trial court issued an order accompanied by a written opinion, which
we summarize here. At the outset, the court observed no one disputed the
statistics we recounted above. Most Latino and Black students attended public
schools that were non-White.
The court recounted Dr. Coughlan analyzed the data of twenty-three
school districts and saw little average deviation between the number of Black
and Latino school-aged children living in their respective districts and the actual
number of both groups enrolled in their district's schools. He filed a
supplemental certification containing public and charter school data for 2015
through 2020. In the 2019-20 school year, 6.2% of public-school students
"attended a school comprised of at least 90% of a single race or ethnic group."
At his deposition, Dr. Coughlan testified the county-wide statistics he
reviewed showed an "extremely high degree of racial and socioeconomic
segregation." However, the court noted Dr. Coughlan conceded the statistics
14 A-3471-24
did "not provide a technical definition of when a certain degree of segregation
exists." He also did not consider educational outcomes for the school districts
he analyzed. Dr. Coughlan "agreed . . . the percentage of White students
enrolled in . . . public schools has been declining." He did not consider the
decline because the segregation persisted even as the demographics changed.
Dr. Coughlan opined schools can still be considered segregated if they do
not enroll a significant percentage of White students. This is because "schools
are segregated when there is a population of [W]hite students who are separated
or unevenly distributed from students of different races."
The trial court noted defendants' expert, Dr. Bari Anhalt Erlichson,
"agreed that [Dr.] Coughlan did not err in calculating his statistics using the
methods and assumptions he" applied. However, Dr. Erlichson pointed out the
percentage of White students enrolled in public school had been declining for
years and White students constituted only 42% of public school enrollment. She
noted in recent years the percentage of White residents statewide was declining
relative to other racial groups. Therefore, the "reliance on the presence of White
students in order for schools to be considered desegregated is problematic
presently and will only grow more problematic as the trend continues."
15 A-3471-24
Dr. Erlichson noted "only 5.9% of the [public] schools . . . were comprised
of 90% or more of a single race or ethnic group." Not only was there a
disagreement on what constituted school segregation, but focusing on the
percentage of White students enrolled was not a means to measure segregation
because it ignored the enrollment of "students of different races and/or
ethnicities in similar proportions."
Dr. Nathan Barrett served as the charter school defendants' expert. In
addition to concurring with Dr. Erlichson's critique of Dr. Coughlan's analysis,
he also defined segregation a different way. Dr. Barrett opined segregation
could be measured by considering evenness, namely, "the racial proportions in
a defined community and then assess[ing] how well each school mirrors that
underlying proportion." Exposure is also a means of measuring racial
proportions. It "considers how likely a student of one race is likely to encounter
a student of [a] different race within their school."
The court noted the experts disagreed about "whether the proportion of
school-aged children living in the districts explains the variation in student
enrollment proportions." The experts' different approaches showed "[t]here are
several ways to calculate the level of segregation within a school district or
community. . . . The parties agree[d] that experts employ at least twenty different
16 A-3471-24
ways of measuring whether segregation exists." Further, "[t]hey generally agree
. . . school demographics track community demographics in at least some places
in New Jersey." However, 75% of students attend school in a district that is not
representative of the overall demographics of the State. It was undisputed the
statewide demographics were in flux and the White population statewide
declined from 59.3% in 2010 to 51.9% in 2020.
The trial court denied plaintiffs summary judgment and granted
defendants summary judgment and dismissed counts four, five, and six. It
denied defendants summary judgment on counts one, two, three, and part of
count seven.
The court denied plaintiffs summary judgment on count one because they
did not prove the entire education system was racially or ethnically segregated.
It reasoned "the enrollment data alone, without some analysis of both
neighboring and regional enrollment data, demographic figures, and segregation
indices, does not establish constitutional infirmity."
Defendants were denied summary judgment on count one because
plaintiffs "demonstrated marked and persistent racial imbalance in numerous
school districts across the State that [d]efendant's actions, policies, programs,
and inaction have failed to remedy." Dr. Erlichson acknowledged 6% of the
17 A-3471-24
public schools were racially isolated, meaning a single race or ethnicity
comprised 90% or more of a student body. The court also found defendants'
legal arguments unpersuasive because they did not advance "their own definition
of segregation to discredit or refute [p]laintiffs' claims. Their expert offer[ed]
no definition . . . and provide[d] no expert testimony on its parameters." The
court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs' segregation theory could be
defeated by pointing to the fact plaintiffs failed to account for the cultural
diversity and differences inside the Black and Latino communities because the
State did not collect this data.
The court also denied plaintiffs summary judgment on count two.
Specifically, it granted defendants summary judgment on the violation of equal
protection based on poverty and socioeconomic status, dismissing this aspect of
the claim, but denied defendants summary judgment and dismissal of the race
and ethnicity aspects of the equal protection claim. The court rejected plaintiffs'
reliance on State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109 (1992), which used statistical
evidence to prove New Jersey's former death penalty system unconstitutionally
discriminated based on race and violated equal protection, as no evidence of
other cases applying a similar logic outside the criminal case type. The reliance
on statistics did not persuade the court because the evidence showed "schools'
18 A-3471-24
racial composition deviate[d] minimally from what would be expected based
upon the racial composition of the constituent municipalities[.]"
Even though the court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on statistics to achieve
summary judgment, it found their complaint alleged "with sufficient specificity
that [d]efendants intentionally failed to exercise their constitutional obligations
and authorities to remedy segregation." Defendants were not entitled to
summary judgment on the race-based equal protection claim because they did
not deny "in some districts, the [residency] statute contributes to racial
imbalance." The court concluded further analysis and evidence could show the
statute creates "unconstitutional impediments on students' right to education in
a diverse environment." Also, plaintiffs could prove liability without a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Plaintiffs' poverty and socioeconomic-based equal protection claim was
dismissed because no law supported such a right. The court noted decades of
school funding litigation had not led to the extension of "equal protection rights
to economic issues" outside of criminal cases.
The court denied both parties summary judgment on count three, which
alleged the segregation of the public schools deprived students of a thorough
and efficient education under the New Jersey Constitution. See N.J. Const. art.
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VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. It acknowledged the longstanding notion that "racial segregation
in the schools offends the thorough and efficient clause." Citing In re Petition
for Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on the Withdrawal of North Haledon
School District, 181 N.J. 161, 178 (2004), it noted our Supreme Court explained
"[s]tudents attending racially imbalanced schools are denied the benefits that
come from learning and associating with students from different backgrounds,
races, and cultures."
However, North Haledon did not cite funding as the reason for violation
of the thorough and efficient clause. Under the thorough and efficient clause,
defendants' duty is "to establish and maintain a constitutionally adequate
funding system and . . . ameliorate racial imbalance in our public schools." The
trial court reasoned the satisfaction of one duty did not satisfy the other because
they entailed different considerations. For these reasons, it rejected defendants'
argument the thorough and efficient clause had not been violated.
The court also found plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment
because the record had not been developed enough. It rejected plaintiffs' logic
North Haledon stood for the proposition racial imbalance constituted a per se
violation of the thorough and efficient clause. Rather, the "Court emphasized
that racial imbalance in the public schools implicates the thorough and efficient
20 A-3471-24
clause . . . but the Court did not announce a per se rule." This is because the
Court found "[n]ot every action that reduces the percentage of [W]hite students
necessarily implicates the State's policy against segregation in the public
schools." N. Haledon, 181 N.J. at 183. Also, plaintiffs here did not suggest a
workable legal standard.
The court granted defendants summary judgment on count four, which
alleged the collective violations of the anti-segregation, equal protection, and
thorough and efficient clauses entitled plaintiffs to judgment. It found no
precedent for an amalgamated cause of action for a constitutional violation.
The court also granted defendants summary judgment on count five,
which alleged the racial segregation of the public schools violated N.J.S.A.
18A:38-5.1. The statute prohibits the exclusion of any school-age child from
public school because of their race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry.
The court observed both parties argued for summary judgment in their
favor by citing the statute in tandem with the constitutional anti-segregation
clause. Aside from the obvious difference between a constitutional provision
and a statute, the court reasoned plaintiffs could not claim defendants violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 by complying with N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. The court had an
obligation to construe the statutes in a harmonious manner. It interpreted
21 A-3471-24
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 "to prohibit any official or school board from excluding a
student on the basis of race who is legally entitled to attend that school. The
race or ethnicity of the student and the mandate of the anti-exclusion statute do
not alter [d]efendant's obligations under the residency statute."
Summary judgment in defendants' favor on this count was appropriate
because plaintiffs had not argued defendants or school districts were
discriminating based on race within a district. There was no evidence to support
this claim, and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court granted defendants summary judgment on count six, which
alleged the charter schools were also segregated in violation of N.J.S.A.
18A:36A-7. The statute provides charter schools "shall be open to all students"
and cannot discriminate on any basis that would be illegal for a school district.
N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. Plaintiffs' data did not show a statutory violation, establish
a constitutional violation, or show defendants' administration of the charter
schools exacerbated the alleged segregation.
Both parties were denied summary judgment on count seven, which
alleged a violation of the NJCRA. The court reasoned this claim required
success on the underlying constitutional claims, which plaintiffs had not yet
22 A-3471-24
achieved. Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment for similar
reasons.
I.
We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo. DeSimone
v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024); see also R. 4:46-
2(c). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios
v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). A court must determine "whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
[factfinder] or . . . is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.
325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell
Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)). The court considers "whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder
to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." C.V. ex
rel. C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289, 305 (2023) (quoting
Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022)).
23 A-3471-24
"Rule 4:46-2(c)'s 'genuine issue [of] material fact' standard mandates that
the opposing party do more than 'point[] to any fact in dispute' in order to defeat
summary judgment." Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016)
(alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (first quoting R. 4:46-2(c); then
quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 529). "Summary judgment should be granted 'if the
discovery and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or
order as a matter of law.'" DeSimone, 256 N.J. at 180-81 (quoting Perez v.
Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405 (2013)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Insubstantial arguments based on assumptions or speculation are not
enough to overcome summary judgment. Brill, 142 N.J. at 529; see also Dickson
v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting
Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)) ("'[C]onclusory and self-serving
assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' a motion for
summary judgment.").
II.
Before we discuss the parties' claims, it is important to discuss the
precedent in our State and others, which informs our understanding of how
courts have addressed de facto segregation in schools. After the Court in
24 A-3471-24
Hedgepeth eliminated de jure school segregation, more than two decades later it
tackled the arguably harder issue of de facto school segregation in Booker v.
Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161 (1965). There, the Plainfield
schools suffered from a racial imbalance and the record showed the number of
Black students in the district's schools "had intensified." Id. at 166. The
plaintiffs sued to desegregate the district's schools because the local board
refused to adopt plans and procedures to eliminate racial segregation and the
denial of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 165. They argued the de facto
segregation was injurious because having schools comprised of only Black
children engendered feelings and stigma of inferiority, which adversely affected
their education. Ibid. The Commissioner took no testimony yet found there was
no deliberate segregation. Id. at 166. On appeal to the Board of Education, it
held racial imbalance in the Plainfield schools was not evidence of segregation.
Id. at 168.
The Booker Court held otherwise. Citing Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it observed de facto segregation engendered
the same racial inferiority as de jure school segregation. Id. at 168-69. Booker
held:
In a society such as ours, it is not enough that the 3 R's
are being taught properly for there are other vital
25 A-3471-24
considerations. The children must learn to respect and
live with one another in multi-racial and multi-cultural
communities and the earlier they do so the better. It is
during their formative school years that firm
foundations may be laid for good citizenship and broad
participation in the mainstream of affairs. Recognizing
this, leading educators stress the democratic and
educational advantages of heterogeneous student
populations and point to the disadvantages of
homogeneous student populations, particularly when
they are composed of a racial minority whose
separation generates feelings of inferiority.
[Id. at 170-71.]
Notably, the Court held it could not afford to stand by waiting for housing and
economic discrimination to abate to the point where "strict neighborhood school
districting will present no problem." Id. at 171.
The Court observed our State law and policy granted the Commissioner
broad powers to address segregation in schools. Id. at 173-74. It pointed to
Vetere v. Mitchell, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y. 1964), decided one year earlier, and
noted the New York Commissioner of Education had the same comprehensive
power as New Jersey's Commissioner. Id. at 174. In Vetere, the Commissioner
ordered the reorganization of three elementary schools located in one school
district because one school was comprised of 75% Black students whereas the
other two had just 14% each. 251 N.Y.S.2d at 481-83. The Booker Court noted
26 A-3471-24
while it had previously "made no attempt to define the precise extent of racial
imbalance which would require remedial action," it did
refer approvingly to Jackson v. Pasadena City School
District, [382 P.2d 878, 882 (Cal. 1963)], where the
court, after indicating that substantial racial imbalance
would call for relief, cautioned th[e] exact
apportionment of [Blacks] among the schools was not
required and that consideration must be given to all
relevant factors "including the practical necessities of
governmental operation."
[45 N.J. at 178-79.]
Although the Booker plaintiffs offered no "fixed percentage" of what
constituted racial imbalance, they argued "at some ascertainable point, the
[Black] population of a school becomes so excessively high, in contrast to the
percent of [Blacks] in