Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3471-24 LATINO ACTION NETWORK, NAACP NEW JERSEY STATE CONFERENCE, LATINO COALITION, URBAN LEAGUE OF ESSEX COUNTY, THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH OF GREATER NEW JERSEY, MACKENZIE WICKS, a minor, by her Guardian Ad Litem, COURTNEY WICKS, MAISON ANTIONE TYREL TORRES, a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, JENNIFER TORRES, MALI AYALA RUELFEDEE, a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, RACHEL RUEL, RA'NAYAH ALSTON, a minor, by her Guardian Ad Litem, YVETTE ALSTON-JOHNSON, RA'YAHN ALSTON, a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, ALAYSA POWELL, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, RASHEEDA ALSTON, DASHAWN SIMMS, a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, ANDREA HAYES, and D.R.L., a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, M.L., and MICHAEL WEILL-WHITEN, a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, ELIZABETH WEILL-GREENBERG, 1 Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents, and PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION and WILDWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, Intervenors-Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, and DR. LILY LAUX, Commissioner, State Department of Education, Defendants-Respondents/ Cross-Appellants, and NEW JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS ASSOCIATION, INC., BELOVED COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL, ANA MARIA DE LA ROCHE ARAQUE, TAFSHIER COSBY, DIANE GUTIERREZ, CAMDEN PREP, INC., KIPP COOPER 1 We granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the caption to reflect the voluntary dismissal of two minors and their guardians from the case and to anonymize one of the minor plaintiffs and their guardian, to protect their privacy. 2 A-3471-24 NORCROSS, INC., and MASTERY SCHOOLS OF CAMDEN, INC., Intervenors-Defendants. ____________________________________ Argued October 22, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Augostini. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1076-18. Lawrence S. Lustberg and Michael S. Stein argued the cause for appellants (FBT Gibbons LLP, Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, PC, Education Law Center, and Robert Kim (Education Law Center) of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg, Michael R. Noveck, Ruth O'Herron, Robert Kim, Jessica Levin, Michael S. Stein, and Roger Plawker, on the briefs). Francesco Ferrantelli, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Board of Education, and New Jersey Commissioner of Education (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs; Francesco Ferrantelli and Ryan J. Silver, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs). Paul P. Josephson argued the cause for intervenor- respondent Public Charter School, New Jersey Charter Schools Association, Inc., Beloved Community Charter School, Ana Maria De La Roche Araque, Tafshier Cosby, and Diane Gutierrez (Duane Morris LLP, and 3 A-3471-24 Lisa T. Scruggs (Duane Morris LLP) of the Illinois bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Paul P. Josephson, Lisa T. Scruggs, and Matthew M. Caminiti, of counsel and on the brief). Thomas Owen Johnston argued the cause for respondents Camden Prep, Inc., KIPP Cooper Norcross, Inc., and Mastery Schools of Camden, Inc. (Johnston Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Thomas Owen Johnston, of counsel and on the brief; Jaryda A. Gonzalez, on the brief). Porzio Bromberg & Newman PC, attorneys for amicus curiae New Jersey Policy Institute (Patricia C. Morgan, of counsel and on the brief). K&L Gates LLP, attorneys for amicus curiae Social Science Scholars Dr. Mark J. Chin, Dr. Rucker C. Johnson, Dr. Ann Owens, and Dr. Sean F. Reardon (Patrick Maley, on the brief). Micauri Vargas argued the cause for amicus curiae Salvation and Social Justice, League of Women Voters of New Jersey, and Religious Action Center of New Jersey of the Union for Reform Judaism (New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, attorneys; Micauri Vargas, Ryan Haygood, Henal Patel, and Harbani Ahuja, on the brief). Liza Weisberg argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Brown's Promise, and Georgetown Law's Racial Equity in Education Law and Policy Clinic (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, GeDá Jones Herbert (Brown's Promise at the Southern Education Foundation) of the Louisiana bar, admitted pro hac vice, Camille Pendley Hau (Brown's Promise at the Southern Education Foundation) of the Georgia bar, 4 A-3471-24 admitted pro hac vice, Titilayo Tinubu Ali (Georgetown Law's Racial Equity in Education Law and Policy Clinic) of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Sophia Tan (Georgetown Law's Racial Equity in Education Law and Policy Clinic) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Liza Weisberg, Ezra D. Rosenberg, Jeanne LoCicero, GeDá Jones Herbert, Camille Pendley Hau, Titilayo Tinubu Ali, and Sophia Tan, on the brief). Zazzali, PC, attorneys for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Raymond M. Baldino, on the brief). Katrina Feldkamp (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (Morgan Elle Humprey (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.), Katrinia Feldkamp, Kelly D. Gardner (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the District of Columbia, Georgia, and New York bars, admitted pro hac vice, R. Gary Spencer (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Florida bars, admitted pro hac vice, Donya Khadem (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, Alexandra S. Thompson (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) of the Illinois bar, attorneys; Morgan Elle Humprey, Katrinia Feldkamp, Kelly D. Gardner, R. Gary Spencer, Donya Khadem, and Alexandra S. Thompson, on the brief). Seton Hall University School of Law, Center for Social Justice, Center for Social Justice, attorneys for amicus curiae Poverty & Race Research Action Council, National Coalition on School Diversity, Fair Share 5 A-3471-24 Housing Center, the National Housing Law Project, and The Redress Movement (Jonathan Romberg, Lori Outzs Borgen, Rishi Zutshi, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21- 3(c), Aarushi Kaul, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21- 3(c), Ryken T. Kreps, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21- 3(c), Anne McAtee, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21- 3(c), and Emma Valiante, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(c), on the briefs). PER CURIAM We granted plaintiffs, comprised of five non-profit organizations, five public school students, and their guardians, as well as defendants State of New Jersey, New Jersey Board of Education, and the Commissioner of the State Department of Education (DOE) leave to appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, from an October 6, 2023 order adjudicating their competing motions for summary judgment. Having considered the parties' arguments and the record, we affirm as modified for the reasons expressed in this opinion. By way of background, the State public school education system is the product of legislation and the New Jersey Constitution. Generally, "[e]ach municipality shall be a separate local school district," N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1 to -51, although there are exceptions, such as consolidation or regionalization. Each school district is governed by a board of education. N.J.S.A. 18A:10-1. Every person in New Jersey between the ages of five and twenty is entitled to a free public school education if that person "is domiciled within the school district[.]" 6 A-3471-24 N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. "No child between the ages of four and [twenty] years shall be excluded from any public school on account of [their] race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, or other protected category under subsection f of section 11 of P.L. 1945, c. 169 (C.10:5-12), or immigration status." N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1. Each school district is primarily funded through a mix of local property taxes and state aid. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4.1 to -71. A school district's budget is determined by local governance as well as citizen participation. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5; N.J.S.A. 18A:22-13. The Constitution guarantees the State will provide "a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children . . . between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. Also, "[n]o person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin." N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 5. In 2018, plaintiffs commenced this litigation, alleging New Jersey's public schools were unconstitutionally segregated based on race and socioeconomic status. In 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which became the subject of the motions for summary judgment. 7 A-3471-24 Utilizing public data collected by defendants for the 2016-17 school year, the amended complaint alleged: unconstitutional segregation based on race and ethnicity in violation of the anti-segregation clause of the New Jersey Constitution, article I, paragraph 5 (count one); unconstitutional segregation based on race, ethnicity, and poverty in violation of the equal protection clause of the New Jersey Constitution, article I, paragraph 1 (count two); the segregation of New Jersey public schools along the lines of race, ethnicity, and poverty unconstitutionally deprived students of a thorough and efficient education in violation of article VIII, paragraph 4, of the New Jersey Constitution (count three); the three constitutional provisions cited in counts one, two, and three, "together and collectively," were violated by the "racial and socioeconomic segregation in New Jersey public schools" (count four); the racial segregation of the public schools violated N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1, which requires the Commissioner of Education to ensure "[n]o child between the ages of four and [twenty] years shall be excluded from any public school on account of [their] race, creed, color, national origin, [or] ancestry" (count five); charter schools also segregated students by race and poverty in violation of the Charter School Program Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7 (count six); and the constitutional 8 A-3471-24 violations also violated the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (NJCRA) (count seven). The complaint provided separate data for the public and charter schools for the 2016-17 school year. We focus on the public-school data because plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of count six. The data showed New Jersey had 674 school districts, 2,514 public schools, and 1,373,267 public school students. White students comprised 45.3% of the public-school student population, followed by: Latino students, 27.1%; Black students, 15.5%; Asian students, 9.9%; and Native American, Pacific Islander, or students with two or more racial groups, 2.1%. During the same school year, 24.8% of Black public-school students attended schools, which were 99% non-White. 24.4% of Black students attended public schools, which were between 90 and 99% non-White. In the aggregate, 61.7% of Black students attended schools that were more than 80% non-White and 66% of Black students attended schools, which were more than 75% non-White. The data was similar for Latinos and showed 14.3% attended schools, which were 99% non-White; and 30.2% attended schools where the non-White enrollment was between 90 and 99%. Overall, 58.6% of Latino students 9 A-3471-24 attended schools, which were more than 80% non-White, and 61.9% attended schools that were more than 75% non-White. Together, the complaint noted approximately 63% of all Black and Latino public-school students attend schools where the non-White population is more than 75%. Further, 46.2% of Black and Latino students attend schools, which are more than 90% non-White. Plaintiffs alleged these figures showed a worsening trend because the number of students who attend schools that were 99% non-White increased from 7% to 7.8% between the 2010-11 and 2016-17 school years. The complaint alleged the causes for the segregation of New Jersey's public schools were: "residential segregation, the design of school districts to be almost entirely contiguous with the boundaries of residentially segregated municipalities[,] and State law assigning students to public schools by residency, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1." Plaintiffs provided charts containing data from twenty-three municipalities: four municipalities each from Essex, Hudson, and Union counties; three municipalities each from Passaic and Camden counties; two municipalities each from Middlesex and Monmouth counties; and one from Mercer County; showing the racial breakdown of students from those 10 A-3471-24 municipalities and the percentage of students with family incomes below the poverty level. The complaint alleged it was common knowledge "[t]he fact of residential segregation, combined with district boundaries that track such segregation, and the attendance requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1 yield segregation on the basis of race and socioeconomic class in the public school system." Defendants knew about the segregation because the State "collected student enrollment data, including data that is analyzed by race." The data was "published in numerous reports specifically addressed to the issue of racial segregation." Plaintiffs also cited "a number of lawsuits [which] have raised the issue of segregation in the State's public school system," including the landmark Hedgepeth v. Board of Education of Trenton, 131 N.J.L. 153 (1944). Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment on counts one through five, specifically providing the "longstanding and intensive segregation of Black and Latino public school students" is unlawful and violates the Constitution, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. They also asked the court to declare the residency statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1, which states children shall attend the public school where they reside, unlawful and in violation of the Constitution for furthering racial segregation in the public schools. Plaintiffs 11 A-3471-24 sought similar relief regarding N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8 and N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(l), which mandates charter schools prioritize enrollment of students from their district of residence. They requested the court "[e]njoin[] the continued assignment of public school students, including those attending charter schools, solely on the basis of municipal attendance boundaries" and mandate "the Legislature, the Commissioner . . . and . . . [the DOE] adopt a replacement assignment methodology that will timely address and remediate racial segregation in" the public and charter schools. Plaintiffs sought an order directing the Commissioner to provide the court with "a detailed remediation plan designed to achieve comprehensive desegregation and diversification of [the] public schools within and among school districts." And plaintiffs sought counsel fees and costs under the NJCRA. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment as to liability only. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and argued against the court bifurcating liability and remedy because they were inextricably intertwined. They also argued plaintiffs' motion was premature because it preceded discovery and the data relied upon by plaintiffs was selective. Plaintiff's counsel argued the data was not selective, but instead "overwhelmingly" showed statewide school 12 A-3471-24 segregation proving defendants are liable. The court bifurcated the case and ordered the parties to conduct discovery on liability only. Following discovery, the court heard the summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs had updated the school enrollment data by providing the 2019-20 figures. Oral argument of the summary judgment motions ran the gamut of the parties' claims, including the import of the data relied upon by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel addressed defendants' claim plaintiffs were using the data to prove there was segregation in every district. He stressed plaintiffs were "argu[ing] no such thing[ because i]ntegrated districts exist . . . and they should be celebrated." However, "the numbers [plaintiffs] provided establish that the State as a whole is deeply segregated, [and] the State doesn't anywhere provide any data to the contrary." Counsel argued the State was liable because it was on notice for years and failed to act, notwithstanding the Commissioner's duty and power "to rectify segregation when [they] see[] it." The State's failure to act was "a state[-wide] issue . . . not an issue of district-by-district action . . . because it stem[med] from the application of . . . the residency statute, . . . N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1[.]" The parties debated what standard the court should use to find segregation. Plaintiffs' counsel pointed to the "severe disproportion" of children of one race 13 A-3471-24 found in school districts by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ryan W. Coughlan. Although Dr. Coughlan's methodology was challenged by the other experts, no one questioned the data. Counsel later reiterated: "The standard that we have suggested is one that suggests a significant disparity between the community at large and the schools." The trial court issued an order accompanied by a written opinion, which we summarize here. At the outset, the court observed no one disputed the statistics we recounted above. Most Latino and Black students attended public schools that were non-White. The court recounted Dr. Coughlan analyzed the data of twenty-three school districts and saw little average deviation between the number of Black and Latino school-aged children living in their respective districts and the actual number of both groups enrolled in their district's schools. He filed a supplemental certification containing public and charter school data for 2015 through 2020. In the 2019-20 school year, 6.2% of public-school students "attended a school comprised of at least 90% of a single race or ethnic group." At his deposition, Dr. Coughlan testified the county-wide statistics he reviewed showed an "extremely high degree of racial and socioeconomic segregation." However, the court noted Dr. Coughlan conceded the statistics 14 A-3471-24 did "not provide a technical definition of when a certain degree of segregation exists." He also did not consider educational outcomes for the school districts he analyzed. Dr. Coughlan "agreed . . . the percentage of White students enrolled in . . . public schools has been declining." He did not consider the decline because the segregation persisted even as the demographics changed. Dr. Coughlan opined schools can still be considered segregated if they do not enroll a significant percentage of White students. This is because "schools are segregated when there is a population of [W]hite students who are separated or unevenly distributed from students of different races." The trial court noted defendants' expert, Dr. Bari Anhalt Erlichson, "agreed that [Dr.] Coughlan did not err in calculating his statistics using the methods and assumptions he" applied. However, Dr. Erlichson pointed out the percentage of White students enrolled in public school had been declining for years and White students constituted only 42% of public school enrollment. She noted in recent years the percentage of White residents statewide was declining relative to other racial groups. Therefore, the "reliance on the presence of White students in order for schools to be considered desegregated is problematic presently and will only grow more problematic as the trend continues." 15 A-3471-24 Dr. Erlichson noted "only 5.9% of the [public] schools . . . were comprised of 90% or more of a single race or ethnic group." Not only was there a disagreement on what constituted school segregation, but focusing on the percentage of White students enrolled was not a means to measure segregation because it ignored the enrollment of "students of different races and/or ethnicities in similar proportions." Dr. Nathan Barrett served as the charter school defendants' expert. In addition to concurring with Dr. Erlichson's critique of Dr. Coughlan's analysis, he also defined segregation a different way. Dr. Barrett opined segregation could be measured by considering evenness, namely, "the racial proportions in a defined community and then assess[ing] how well each school mirrors that underlying proportion." Exposure is also a means of measuring racial proportions. It "considers how likely a student of one race is likely to encounter a student of [a] different race within their school." The court noted the experts disagreed about "whether the proportion of school-aged children living in the districts explains the variation in student enrollment proportions." The experts' different approaches showed "[t]here are several ways to calculate the level of segregation within a school district or community. . . . The parties agree[d] that experts employ at least twenty different 16 A-3471-24 ways of measuring whether segregation exists." Further, "[t]hey generally agree . . . school demographics track community demographics in at least some places in New Jersey." However, 75% of students attend school in a district that is not representative of the overall demographics of the State. It was undisputed the statewide demographics were in flux and the White population statewide declined from 59.3% in 2010 to 51.9% in 2020. The trial court denied plaintiffs summary judgment and granted defendants summary judgment and dismissed counts four, five, and six. It denied defendants summary judgment on counts one, two, three, and part of count seven. The court denied plaintiffs summary judgment on count one because they did not prove the entire education system was racially or ethnically segregated. It reasoned "the enrollment data alone, without some analysis of both neighboring and regional enrollment data, demographic figures, and segregation indices, does not establish constitutional infirmity." Defendants were denied summary judgment on count one because plaintiffs "demonstrated marked and persistent racial imbalance in numerous school districts across the State that [d]efendant's actions, policies, programs, and inaction have failed to remedy." Dr. Erlichson acknowledged 6% of the 17 A-3471-24 public schools were racially isolated, meaning a single race or ethnicity comprised 90% or more of a student body. The court also found defendants' legal arguments unpersuasive because they did not advance "their own definition of segregation to discredit or refute [p]laintiffs' claims. Their expert offer[ed] no definition . . . and provide[d] no expert testimony on its parameters." The court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs' segregation theory could be defeated by pointing to the fact plaintiffs failed to account for the cultural diversity and differences inside the Black and Latino communities because the State did not collect this data. The court also denied plaintiffs summary judgment on count two. Specifically, it granted defendants summary judgment on the violation of equal protection based on poverty and socioeconomic status, dismissing this aspect of the claim, but denied defendants summary judgment and dismissal of the race and ethnicity aspects of the equal protection claim. The court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109 (1992), which used statistical evidence to prove New Jersey's former death penalty system unconstitutionally discriminated based on race and violated equal protection, as no evidence of other cases applying a similar logic outside the criminal case type. The reliance on statistics did not persuade the court because the evidence showed "schools' 18 A-3471-24 racial composition deviate[d] minimally from what would be expected based upon the racial composition of the constituent municipalities[.]" Even though the court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on statistics to achieve summary judgment, it found their complaint alleged "with sufficient specificity that [d]efendants intentionally failed to exercise their constitutional obligations and authorities to remedy segregation." Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the race-based equal protection claim because they did not deny "in some districts, the [residency] statute contributes to racial imbalance." The court concluded further analysis and evidence could show the statute creates "unconstitutional impediments on students' right to education in a diverse environment." Also, plaintiffs could prove liability without a declaration of unconstitutionality. Plaintiffs' poverty and socioeconomic-based equal protection claim was dismissed because no law supported such a right. The court noted decades of school funding litigation had not led to the extension of "equal protection rights to economic issues" outside of criminal cases. The court denied both parties summary judgment on count three, which alleged the segregation of the public schools deprived students of a thorough and efficient education under the New Jersey Constitution. See N.J. Const. art. 19 A-3471-24 VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. It acknowledged the longstanding notion that "racial segregation in the schools offends the thorough and efficient clause." Citing In re Petition for Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on the Withdrawal of North Haledon School District, 181 N.J. 161, 178 (2004), it noted our Supreme Court explained "[s]tudents attending racially imbalanced schools are denied the benefits that come from learning and associating with students from different backgrounds, races, and cultures." However, North Haledon did not cite funding as the reason for violation of the thorough and efficient clause. Under the thorough and efficient clause, defendants' duty is "to establish and maintain a constitutionally adequate funding system and . . . ameliorate racial imbalance in our public schools." The trial court reasoned the satisfaction of one duty did not satisfy the other because they entailed different considerations. For these reasons, it rejected defendants' argument the thorough and efficient clause had not been violated. The court also found plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment because the record had not been developed enough. It rejected plaintiffs' logic North Haledon stood for the proposition racial imbalance constituted a per se violation of the thorough and efficient clause. Rather, the "Court emphasized that racial imbalance in the public schools implicates the thorough and efficient 20 A-3471-24 clause . . . but the Court did not announce a per se rule." This is because the Court found "[n]ot every action that reduces the percentage of [W]hite students necessarily implicates the State's policy against segregation in the public schools." N. Haledon, 181 N.J. at 183. Also, plaintiffs here did not suggest a workable legal standard. The court granted defendants summary judgment on count four, which alleged the collective violations of the anti-segregation, equal protection, and thorough and efficient clauses entitled plaintiffs to judgment. It found no precedent for an amalgamated cause of action for a constitutional violation. The court also granted defendants summary judgment on count five, which alleged the racial segregation of the public schools violated N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1. The statute prohibits the exclusion of any school-age child from public school because of their race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. The court observed both parties argued for summary judgment in their favor by citing the statute in tandem with the constitutional anti-segregation clause. Aside from the obvious difference between a constitutional provision and a statute, the court reasoned plaintiffs could not claim defendants violated N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 by complying with N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. The court had an obligation to construe the statutes in a harmonious manner. It interpreted 21 A-3471-24 N.J.S.A. 18A:38-5.1 "to prohibit any official or school board from excluding a student on the basis of race who is legally entitled to attend that school. The race or ethnicity of the student and the mandate of the anti-exclusion statute do not alter [d]efendant's obligations under the residency statute." Summary judgment in defendants' favor on this count was appropriate because plaintiffs had not argued defendants or school districts were discriminating based on race within a district. There was no evidence to support this claim, and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted defendants summary judgment on count six, which alleged the charter schools were also segregated in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. The statute provides charter schools "shall be open to all students" and cannot discriminate on any basis that would be illegal for a school district. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. Plaintiffs' data did not show a statutory violation, establish a constitutional violation, or show defendants' administration of the charter schools exacerbated the alleged segregation. Both parties were denied summary judgment on count seven, which alleged a violation of the NJCRA. The court reasoned this claim required success on the underlying constitutional claims, which plaintiffs had not yet 22 A-3471-24 achieved. Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment for similar reasons. I. We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo. DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024); see also R. 4:46- 2(c). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). A court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [factfinder] or . . . is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)). The court considers "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." C.V. ex rel. C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289, 305 (2023) (quoting Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022)). 23 A-3471-24 "Rule 4:46-2(c)'s 'genuine issue [of] material fact' standard mandates that the opposing party do more than 'point[] to any fact in dispute' in order to defeat summary judgment." Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (first quoting R. 4:46-2(c); then quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 529). "Summary judgment should be granted 'if the discovery and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" DeSimone, 256 N.J. at 180-81 (quoting Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Insubstantial arguments based on assumptions or speculation are not enough to overcome summary judgment. Brill, 142 N.J. at 529; see also Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)) ("'[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' a motion for summary judgment."). II. Before we discuss the parties' claims, it is important to discuss the precedent in our State and others, which informs our understanding of how courts have addressed de facto segregation in schools. After the Court in 24 A-3471-24 Hedgepeth eliminated de jure school segregation, more than two decades later it tackled the arguably harder issue of de facto school segregation in Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161 (1965). There, the Plainfield schools suffered from a racial imbalance and the record showed the number of Black students in the district's schools "had intensified." Id. at 166. The plaintiffs sued to desegregate the district's schools because the local board refused to adopt plans and procedures to eliminate racial segregation and the denial of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 165. They argued the de facto segregation was injurious because having schools comprised of only Black children engendered feelings and stigma of inferiority, which adversely affected their education. Ibid. The Commissioner took no testimony yet found there was no deliberate segregation. Id. at 166. On appeal to the Board of Education, it held racial imbalance in the Plainfield schools was not evidence of segregation. Id. at 168. The Booker Court held otherwise. Citing Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it observed de facto segregation engendered the same racial inferiority as de jure school segregation. Id. at 168-69. Booker held: In a society such as ours, it is not enough that the 3 R's are being taught properly for there are other vital 25 A-3471-24 considerations. The children must learn to respect and live with one another in multi-racial and multi-cultural communities and the earlier they do so the better. It is during their formative school years that firm foundations may be laid for good citizenship and broad participation in the mainstream of affairs. Recognizing this, leading educators stress the democratic and educational advantages of heterogeneous student populations and point to the disadvantages of homogeneous student populations, particularly when they are composed of a racial minority whose separation generates feelings of inferiority. [Id. at 170-71.] Notably, the Court held it could not afford to stand by waiting for housing and economic discrimination to abate to the point where "strict neighborhood school districting will present no problem." Id. at 171. The Court observed our State law and policy granted the Commissioner broad powers to address segregation in schools. Id. at 173-74. It pointed to Vetere v. Mitchell, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y. 1964), decided one year earlier, and noted the New York Commissioner of Education had the same comprehensive power as New Jersey's Commissioner. Id. at 174. In Vetere, the Commissioner ordered the reorganization of three elementary schools located in one school district because one school was comprised of 75% Black students whereas the other two had just 14% each. 251 N.Y.S.2d at 481-83. The Booker Court noted 26 A-3471-24 while it had previously "made no attempt to define the precise extent of racial imbalance which would require remedial action," it did refer approvingly to Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, [382 P.2d 878, 882 (Cal. 1963)], where the court, after indicating that substantial racial imbalance would call for relief, cautioned th[e] exact apportionment of [Blacks] among the schools was not required and that consideration must be given to all relevant factors "including the practical necessities of governmental operation." [45 N.J. at 178-79.] Although the Booker plaintiffs offered no "fixed percentage" of what constituted racial imbalance, they argued "at some ascertainable point, the [Black] population of a school becomes so excessively high, in contrast to the percent of [Blacks] in