Molly McGrane v. Culver Military Academy

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 23 2026, 9:17 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Molly McGrane, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Culver Military Academy and Culver Girls Academy, Appellees-Defendants October 23, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CT-1090 Appeal from the Marshall Superior Court The Honorable Matthew J. Buehler, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50D03-2203-CT-000007 Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Foley and DeBoer concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 1 of 24  Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] While Molly McGrane was a student at Culver Military Academy and Culver Girls Academy (collectively, “Culver”), she was allegedly sexually assaulted by a fellow student. McGrane eventually disclosed the alleged assault to Culver, and she later sued Culver for negligence and emotional distress related to her disclosure. Culver filed a motion for summary judgment on McGrane’s claims, which the trial court granted. McGrane now appeals and raises three issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred by striking McGrane’s response to Culver’s summary judgment motion; 2. Whether the trial court erred by denying McGrane’s motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings; and 3. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Culver. [2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. Facts and Procedural History [3] On February 23, 2019, McGrane’s then-boyfriend and fellow Culver student John Wilkins allegedly sexually assaulted McGrane at an off-campus location. Within a few weeks, McGrane and Wilkins ended their relationship. In an undated Snapchat message that appears to have been sent that same month, McGrane told Wilkins that he is “a sexual predator that I didn[’]t report[.] I’m scared for whoever is with you.” Defs.’ Designated Evid. - Ex. G at 2, McGrane Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 2 of 24  v. Culver Mil. Acad., No. 50D03-2203-CT-000007 (Ind. Marshall Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2025). 1 [4] In late January 2020, McGrane emailed Culver Mental Health Counselor Dana Clevering, “Could I maybe meet with you this week to talk through my options if I want to report a sexual assault that happened about a year ago.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 65. McGrane scheduled a meeting with Clevering within a few days. [5] In mid-February, Culver’s Commandant of Cadets Colonel Michael Squires “issued a No Contact Order” (the “Order”) to Wilkins because the two “were having issues due to a recently terminated consensual relationship between them.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 67. The Order provided that Wilkins “was to give [McGrane] ten (10) feet of personal space whenever possible”; “was not to attempt to communicate with [McGrane] by any means, whether electronic or verbal”; and “was not permitted to utilize other students to communicate with” McGrane. Id. at 68. Colonel Squires “explained the terms . . . to [Wilkins] at length.” Id. Thereafter, McGrane reported two incidents of Wilkins coming within ten feet of her—once while in the dining hall and once while leaving a class. Regarding the post-class incident, Colonel Squires 1 McGrane failed to include in her Appendix and Supplemental Appendix several of Culver’s designated exhibits. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). Culver also failed to submit an Appendix containing these documents. See id. 50(A)(3). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of the missing designated evidence. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1162 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 3 of 24  indicated that he would speak with Wilkins and told McGrane, “Like we discussed, it’s inevitable that these little minor situations will occur on occasion.” Id. at 84. [6] On February 24, Culver’s Dean of Girls Lynn Rasch emailed McGrane’s mother that McGrane had met with Rasch and Colonel Squires but had not “share[d] the details” of “a situation [that] had taken place with her” and Wilkins because “she wanted to reflect upon whether the situation needed to be turned in to the authorities.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 81. Rasch represented that she and Colonel Squires did not “know any specific details about the situation with [Wilkins] other than the basics of what [McGrane] told [them] about how she broke up with [Wilkins] and that he still seemed interested in her.” Id. [7] On March 11, McGrane “came forth with formal allegations of sexual assault and battery against” Wilkins. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 68, 73. Upon McGrane’s disclosure, Culver Social Worker Darrell Knowlton contacted law enforcement, notified McGrane and certain Culver staff members that he had done so, informed McGrane that she needed to schedule an interview with law enforcement “directly” because she was an adult, and advised that Culver’s “ability to intervene [was] limited” because of her age. 2 Id. at 85. The same 2 The State did not pursue charges against Wilkins due to “insufficient” evidence that he had committed rape, sexual battery, and stalking. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 93–94. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 4 of 24  day, Culver removed Wilkins from campus. On March 12, McGrane gave a recorded statement to law enforcement. [8] On March 24, McGrane emailed Rasch and Colonel Squires in relevant part as follows: I apologize for my late response. Obviously a lot has happened since this email. Firstly, I also apologize for not giving you notice before I reported, like you requested. I didn’t report all this time, because I believed in Culver as an institution and I loved it like my home. I was told that if I reported another student for rape that I could be asked to leave campus. The weekend prior to my reporting was the distinguished scholars weekend and Col. Squires, you may remember the invocation I gave about the importance of Culver’s virtues which I hold in the highest regard. I was told by faculty that after that weekend, one of the girls who was later offered the Batten scholarship, told the committee that she wanted to be like me. . . . To imagine that my speech about the virtues of courage, duty, and service, which I had given while not reporting a threat to our community because of my fear, would lead a girl to a school in which I felt physically unsafe, that guilt made me sick. So I finally did the right thing, which is what I wish Culver had encouraged me to do from the start. After reporting I received a phone call from a cadet in Company C, who said all this time, [Wilkins] was being told by Col. Squires that if I reported, he would probably be asked to leave for about 3 months. Meanwhile when I asked what would probably Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 5 of 24  happen, I was repeatedly told by health center staff, that they had no idea what the future would hold other than the definite possibility of me being forced to leave Culver. . . . Since Culver has my complete version of the events that happened on February 23rd 2019, either you believe I am lying and should then be sent to the honor council, or Culver needs [to] consider whether or not they want a rapist and stalker graduating with a Culver diploma. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 86. [9] Two years later, McGrane sued Culver for negligence and “[n]egligent and/or [i]ntentional” infliction of emotional distress, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 32. According to her complaint, McGrane “was sexually assaulted and/or stalked by another student” and Culver “continually discouraged” her from “disclos[ing] this information.” Id. at 30. [10] On October 16, 2025, Culver filed a motion for summary judgment as to all McGrane’s claims. In support, Culver designated its answer to the complaint, both parties’ answers to interrogatories, affidavits from three of its employees, a law enforcement incident report documenting Knowlton’s and McGrane’s statements about the alleged assault, social media messages between McGrane and Wilkins, emails between McGrane and Culver employees, correspondence between McGrane and the Marshall County Prosecutor, an Illinois trial court order denying McGrane’s request for a no contact order against Wilkins, and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 6 of 24  filings from an Indiana lawsuit McGrane brought against Wilkins and his mother 3. [11] After receiving an extension of time, McGrane’s response was due “on or before December 8, 2025.” Order on Status Conf., McGrane v. Culver Mil. Acad., No. 50D03-2203-CT-000007 (Ind. Marshall Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2025). 4 On December 9, McGrane filed pro se her “Reply in Opposition to Defendants’ MSJ,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 95; “Brief in Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,” id. at 97; and designated evidence (collectively, the “Response”). Later that same day, Culver filed a motion to strike the Response, arguing in relevant part that McGrane did not timely file it. The trial court granted in part Culver’s motion to strike, ordering the entire Response stricken except for McGrane’s hearing request included in her brief. [12] At the start of the December 23 summary judgment hearing, McGrane, who was still pro se, made an “emergency” motion “to postpone [the] oral argument” based on allegedly newly discovered evidence she believed contradicted some of Culver’s designated evidence. Tr. Vol. II at 24. The trial 3 McGrane sued Wilkins for civil battery and his mother for negligence. The trial court in that case granted summary judgment in favor of Wilkins and his mother on those claims. 4 McGrane failed to include in her Appendix and Supplemental Appendix her motion for extension of time to respond to Culver’s summary judgment motion and the trial court’s order extending the response deadline to December 8. See App. R. 50(A)(2). Culver also failed to submit an Appendix containing these documents. See id. 50(A)(3). Pursuant to Appellate Rule 27 and Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of McGrane’s motion and the trial court’s order. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1162. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 7 of 24  court denied the motion. A few weeks later, the trial court granted summary judgment in Culver’s favor. McGrane, now represented by counsel, appealed. 5 Discussion and Decision 1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Striking the Response [13] McGrane contends the trial court erred by striking the Response. “Generally, ‘a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions to strike in the summary judgment context.’” Brandon v. Caregan Transp. Inc., -- N.E.3d --, 2026 WL 2178863, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Arnett v. Est. of Beavins, 184 N.E.3d 679, 683–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), trans. not sought. But “when the nonmovant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment either within 30 days or by the trial court-imposed deadline, ‘the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to’ the relevant deadline.” Hummer v. Donathan, 231 N.E.3d 905, 911–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (emphasis in original) (quoting Andry v. Thorbecke, 218 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), reh’g denied. Here, McGrane had to file the Response on or before December 8; she did not do so until December 9. 6 5 McGrane fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact—including quoted material—in her Statement of Case, Statement of Facts, and Argument, as required by Appellate Rules 46(A)(5), (6)(a), and (8)(a), respectively. We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules— especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). 6 McGrane asserts without citation that she “timely filed her response to Culver’s MFSJ.” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 20. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 8 of 24 [14] McGrane responded to Culver’s motion to strike by filing pro se a “Motion to Accept Filing Pursuant to [Indiana] Trial Rule 87,” in which she asserted the Response was late because she experienced a problem with the e-filing system. Appellant’s Suppl. App. Vol. II at 2. Trial Rule 87(J) provides in relevant part that “an IEFS failure” 7 does not affect a party’s rights, Ind. Trial Rule 87(J)(1)(a); “[w]ith the exception of deadlines that by law cannot be extended,” if “an IEFS failure” prevents a party from e-filing, “the time allowed for the filing of any document otherwise due at the time of the IEFS failure is extended by one day for each day on which such failure occurs, unless otherwise ordered by the court,” id. 87(J)(1)(c); and if a party files a motion showing that an “IEFS failure” occurred, “the court must enter an order permitting the document to be considered timely filed and modify responsive deadlines accordingly,” id. 87(J)(1)(d). 8 An “IEFS failure” occurs when the e-filing system “is not able ‘to perform a normal function’ or has experienced ‘an abrupt cessation of normal functioning.’” Brandon, -- N.E.3d --, 2026 WL 2178863, at *8 (quoting Failure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/failure [https://perma.cc/MW46-QJZR]). 7 The “Indiana E-Filing System,” also known as “IEFS,” is “the system of networked hardware, software, and service providers approved by the Supreme Court for the filing and service of documents via the Internet, into the Case Management System(s) used by Indiana courts.” Ind. Trial Rule 86(A)(7). 8 On August 1, 2026, a new version of Indiana Trial Rule 87 became effective. Order Amending Rules Trial Proc., No. 26S-MS-8 (Ind. July 14, 2026). This amendment did not alter the substance of Subsection (J). See id. Compare T.R. 87(J) (effective Jan. 1, 2021, to July 31, 2026), with T.R. 87(J) (effective Aug. 1, 2026). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 9 of 24 [15] McGrane stated in her Trial Rule 87 motion that “[a]t 11:57 p.m., [she] attempted to e[-]file using [a paid service provider] but was unable to file her documents. . . . [T]he primary error message she received stat[ed], ‘Selected case i[s] not available for filing.’” Appellant’s Suppl. App. Vol. II at 2. The two screenshots McGrane attached to her motion allegedly show error messages on the e-filing service provider she used, but they do not bear any indicia of time and date: Appellant’s Suppl. App. Vol. II at 5. After making “a few minor corrections,” McGrane “tried again to e[-]file at 4:50 a.m.,” id. at 2, and was successful. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 10 of 24 [16] At best, McGrane demonstrated that at 11:57 p.m. on December 8, she encountered two error messages when using a paid e-filing service provider to file the Response. And by her own admission, McGrane’s Response contained errors that she was able to correct; once she did so, she did not have any trouble filing the Response. There is no indication here that the IEFS was not able to perform a normal function or experienced an abrupt cessation of normal functioning. Thus, on this record, we cannot say McGrane showed that an “IEFS failure” occurred. 9 McGrane’s failure to timely file the Response is therefore subject to the bright-line rule governing belated summary judgment responses. The trial court could not consider the Response and did not err by striking it. 2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying McGrane’s Motion to Continue the Summary Judgment Proceedings [17] McGrane next argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings. In requesting the continuance, McGrane represented that on October 1, 2025, she deposed Knowlton, and she made three attempts to contact the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to verify the information from that deposition, namely, whether Culver reported her alleged assault to DCS. It is unclear when McGrane made 9 Neither the Indiana Supreme Court nor this court has identified what evidence is required to demonstrate that an IEFS failure occurred. Documentation to meet this burden may include without limitation an affidavit from the person who experienced the IEFS failure; screenshots of the IEFS failure that include indicia of time, date, and the error encountered; or an acknowledgement from IEFS that an error occurred when the person attempted to file the particular document. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 11 of 24  those attempts. McGrane told the trial court that based on a December 22, 2025, phone call with DCS, she believed that there was a “serious issue and potentially a question of perjury regarding one of [Culver’s] witnesses” because DCS had “no records pursuant to [her] and explained that the only way they would have no records at all is if no call had every [sic] been made.” Tr. Vol. II at 24. Culver objected to the continuance, arguing there were “several reasons” that DCS may not have had information regarding McGrane’s alleged assault and McGrane did “not have a private right of action as to a failure to timely report.” Id. at 25. [18] “We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion.” In re Z.R., 272 N.E.3d 546, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243–44 (Ind. 2014)), trans. not sought. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if it misinterpreted the law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [19] On appeal, McGrane seems to argue that the trial court abused its discretion because she “quickly began to seek records to confirm or refute that” Culver had reported her alleged assault to DCS, Appellant’s Am. Br. at 28, and the allegedly newly discovered evidence that DCS had no record of such a report was “material and relevant,” id. at 29. The trial court was free to discount McGrane’s efforts, especially because she made only three undated attempts to contact DCS in the approximately three months between Knowlton’s deposition and the summary judgment hearing. We cannot say the trial court Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 12 of 24  abused its discretion by denying McGrane’s motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings. 3. The Trial Court Partially Erred by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Culver [20] McGrane contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Culver. We review summary judgment decisions de novo, Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)), which means we apply the same standard as the trial court, Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 615 (Ind. 2024) (citing Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 165 (Ind. 2024)). Summary judgment is proper only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003). [21] We resolve “[a]ll factual inferences and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue” in favor of the nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). In so doing, “we give careful scrutiny to make sure the [nonmovant]’s day in court is not improperly denied.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 13 of 24  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)). [22] “The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (emphasis in original) (citing Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 731 (Ind. 2015)). The movant “can make this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required element” of the nonmovant’s claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022) (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187–88). Only if the movant meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (citing Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003). [23] Culver filed a motion for and was granted summary judgment on McGrane’s (a) negligence claim and (b) emotional distress claim. We address each claim in turn. a. Negligence [24] According to McGrane’s complaint, Culver “negligently handled” her report, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 31, of being “sexually assaulted and/or stalked by another student,” id. at 30; “negligently maintained certain policies and procedures,” id. at 31; and negligently trained “employees regarding the handling of complaints such as those made by [McGrane] in this case,” id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 14 of 24  McGrane alleged that “[a]s a result of [Culver’s] statutory violations, and negligent acts and/or omission, [she] suffered severe and permanent injuries and impairment.” Id. [25] To succeed on her negligence claim, McGrane would have to show that (1) Culver owed McGrane a duty; (2) Culver breached that duty through conduct that fell below the appropriate level of care; and (3) Culver’s breach caused injury to McGrane. See Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024) (citing Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016)). Culver argued at summary judgment that (i) McGrane does not have a private right of action for its alleged failure to report, and (ii) its handling of McGrane’s allegations did not constitute a breach. We address each argument in turn. i. Private Right of Action [26] Indiana law requires any person “who has reason to believe that a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect” to report that information, Ind. Code § 31-33- 5-1, to DCS or law enforcement, id. §§ -2 to -5. A person has a “reason to believe” if they are presented with “evidence” that would cause “individuals of similar background and training . . . to believe that a child was abused or neglected.” I.C. § 31-9-2-101 (effective July 1, 1997, to June 30, 2026), recodified at I.C. § 31-9-2.1-197. [27] “When a civil tort action is premised upon violation of a duty imposed by statute, the initial question is whether the statute confers a private right of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 15 of 24  action.” Sprunger v. Egli, 44 N.E.3d 690, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Borne ex rel. Borne v. Nw. Allen Cnty. Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied). The “reporting statutes do not explicitly provide a private right of action,” and this court has “previously held that the legislature did not intend that a private right of action be implied.” Id. (citing C.T. v. Gammon, 928 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Consequently, “Indiana does not recognize a private right of action for failure to report [child] abuse.” Id. (citing C.T., 928 N.E.2d at 854). Predicating a failure-to-report claim on negligence will not transform it “into something other than an attempt to assert a private right of action.” Id. at 694 (citing F.D. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 143 (Ind. 2013) (Rush, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)). [28] Although not explicitly stated therein, McGrane’s negligence claim is clearly based in part on the reporting statutes—she alleges Culver “negligently handled” her report and committed “statutory violations,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 31. McGrane cannot maintain her negligence claim to the extent it asserts a private right of action against Culver based on Culver’s alleged violation of the reporting statutes. ii. Breach [29] For ordinary negligence claims, whether a defendant breached a duty “turns on the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.” Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1084 (Ind. 2017) (citing Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 403 (Ind. 2011)). For negligence-per-se claims, a breach occurs if the defendant’s violation of a statute establishes a failure to use the reasonable care required by Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 16 of 24  the applicable common-law duty. 10 Gresser v. Reliable Exterminators, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 184, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Stachowski v. Est. of Radman, 95 N.E.3d 542, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)), trans. denied. “[B]reach is usually a question of fact for the jury,” id. at 1083 (citing Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 403), but it becomes a question of law if “the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion,” Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t Nat. Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ind. 2001). [30] Here, Culver had a duty “to exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of the children under their control.” Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 974 (quoting Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 611, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974)). Culver also had a duty to exercise reasonable care to control its employees and prevent them from acting outside the scope of their employment to intentionally harm or create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to McGrane. 11 See Gue v. Triple E Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 276 N.E.3d 1277 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317), trans. denied, 280 N.E.3d 257 (Ind. 2026). 10 There is a fine—and often blurred—line between a negligence-per-se claim and a private-right-of-action claim. Gresser v. Reliable Exterminators, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 184, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Stachowski v. Est. of Radman, 95 N.E.3d 542, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)), trans. denied. A plaintiff raises a negligence-per-se claim if (1) the “defendant had an existing common-law duty of reasonable care” and (2) the plaintiff “argues the defendant’s violation of a statute or ordinance proves the breach of that existing common-law duty.” Id. at 190 (citing Stachowski, 95 N.E.3d at 543). A plaintiff raises a private-right-of-action claim if (1) “the defendant had no common law duty” and (2) “the plaintiff asserts a statute or ordinance created a duty enforceable by [the] plaintiff against [the] defendant.” Id. (citing Stachowski, 95 N.E.3d at 543). 11 Culver does not assert it did not owe either of these duties to McGrane, so we assume without deciding that it did. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 17 of 24 [31] McGrane alleged that Culver (1) negligently handled her report; (2) “continually discouraged” her from reporting the alleged assault, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 30; (3) “negligently maintained certain policies and procedures,” id. at 31, (4) was “negligent in the training of employees regarding the handling of complaints such as those made by [McGrane] in this case,” id. Culver did not meet its prima facie burden concerning these theories of liability. [32] First, Culver’s designated evidence shows that McGrane did not report the alleged assault until March 11, 2020. That same day, Knowlton contacted law enforcement; relayed what McGrane told him; and notified McGrane that she needed to contact law enforcement to give a statement, as well. But Culver’s designated evidence is silent as to whether it complied with any applicable statutes, such as the reporting statutes, see supra ¶ 26. The absence of evidence is not enough to negate an element of McGrane’s negligence claim. Culver “must demonstrate that the undisputed facts conclusively establish the absence of a required element of the [nonmovant]’s case.” Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ind. 2013). We therefore cannot say Culver has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Culver negligently handled McGrane’s report. Culver is thus not entitled to summary judgment on McGrane’s negligence claim on this basis. [33] Second, Colonel Squires, Culver Education Specialist Rachell Davis, and Knowlton averred that they and other Culver staff members did not discourage McGrane from “formally asserting allegations of sexual assault or battery against John Wilkins.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 68, 70, 72. But McGrane’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 18 of 24  March 24, 2020, email indicates that Culver did not encourage her to report the alleged assault and “health center staff” told McGrane that there was a “definite possibility” she would be “forced to leave Culver” if she did so. Id. at 86. Given our Supreme Court’s preference for “letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits,” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004, we cannot say Culver has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact whether Culver discouraged McGrane from reporting. Culver is thus not entitled to summary judgment on McGrane’s negligence claim on this basis. [34] Third, Colonel Squires and Knowlton averred that they and other Culver staff members “handled [McGrane]’s allegations giving rise to and subsequent to the issuance of the No Contact Orders, pursuant to the policies and procedures then in place.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 68, 72. Colonel Squires further averred that Culver “enforced the No Contact Orders to the best of its ability and pursuant to the then-applicable policies and procedures.” Id. at 69. Culver’s designated evidence is silent as to the policies and procedures that applied and that its staff members followed in handling McGrane’s allegations. Culver bears the burden of negating an element of McGrane’s negligent claim. See Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 676. On this record, we cannot say Culver has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Culver negligently maintained certain policies and procedures. Culver is thus not entitled to summary judgment on McGrane’s negligence claim on this basis. [35] Fourth, Culver’s designated evidence is silent concerning its alleged negligent training of its employees. Culver bears the burden of negating an element of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 19 of 24  McGrane’s negligence claim. See Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 676. On this record, we cannot say Culver has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it negligently trained its employees. Culver is not entitled to summary judgment on McGrane’s negligence claim on this basis, either. iii. Summary [36] The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Culver on McGrane’s negligence claim to the extent it asserts a private right of action against Culver based on Culver’s alleged violation of the reporting statutes. The trial court did err by granting summary judgment in favor of Culver on McGrane’s negligence claim based on Culver allegedly (1) negligently handling McGrane’s report, (2) discouraging McGrane from reporting the alleged assault, (3) negligently maintaining policies and procedures, and (4) negligently training its staff members. b. Emotional Distress [37] According to McGrane’s complaint, Culver’s “carelessness and negligence” caused her “extreme emotional pain and suffering,” and Culver “inten[ded]” to “inflict[] severe emotional distress” or “knew or should have known that [its] actions would cause [McGrane] severe emotional distress.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 32. McGrane seeks to hold Culver liable for this distress under two separate but related claims: (i) negligent infliction of emotional distress and (ii) intentional infliction of emotional distress. We address each claim in turn. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 20 of 24  i. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress [38] To succeed on her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, McGrane would have to show that (1) she sustained a direct physical impact by Culver’s negligence and because of that direct involvement sustained an emotional trauma serious enough to affect a reasonable person, Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 393 (quoting Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991)), or (2) she “actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury” to “a loved one with a relationship” to her “analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling” caused by Culver’s negligent or otherwise tortious conduct, K.G. ex rel. Ruch v. Smith, 178 N.E.3d 300, 306 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000)). [39] Culver’s designated evidence is silent as to whether McGrane (1) sustained a direct physical impact due to Culver’s alleged negligence that caused her emotional trauma or (2) witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one. Culver bears the burden of negating an element of McGrane’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 676. On this record, we cannot say Culver has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it negligently inflicted emotional distress on McGrane. Culver is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-1090 | October 23, 2026 Page 21 of 24  ii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress [40] To succeed on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, McGrane