John Doe A v. Gretchen Whitmer

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0303p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ MARY DOE; JOHN DOE A; JOHN DOE B; JOHN DOE C; │ JOHN DOE D; JOHN DOE E; JOHN DOE G; JOHN DOE H; │ MARY ROE, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, │ > Nos. 25-1413/1414 │ v. │ │ GRETCHEN WHITMER, Governor of the State of │ Michigan; JAMES GRADY, II, Colonel, │ Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 2:22-cv-10209—Mark A. Goldsmith, District Judge. Argued: July 21, 2026 Decided and Filed: November 13, 2026 Before: MOORE, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Miriam Aukerman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Eric Jamison, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees/Cross- Appellants. ON BRIEF: Miriam Aukerman, Ewurama Appiagyei-Dankah, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Bonsitu Kitaba- Gaviglio, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Detroit, Michigan, Allison Frankel, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND, New York, New York, Paul D. Reingold, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Sarah Prescott, SALVATORE PRESCOTT PORTER & PORTER, PLLC, Northville, Michigan, Richard D. Snyder, FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, Drew O. Walbeck, WOLFE LAW PLLC, Hazel Park,  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 2 Michigan, Melissa M. Salinas, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Amici Curiae. MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MATHIS, J., concurred. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 27–30), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. _________________ OPINION _________________ KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Ten years ago, in Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Does I”), we concluded that the 2011 version of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (“SORA 2011”) imposed punishment, and consequently, we held that its retroactive application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. In 2021, Michigan amended SORA in an effort to remove the features of the scheme that led to its invalidation. The plaintiffs and class members are convicted sex offenders required to register under the current iteration of the scheme (“SORA 2021”). They brought this suit shortly after SORA 2021’s enactment, claiming that it continued to impose retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and that it violated the Constitution on myriad other grounds. As relevant here, the district court found that SORA 2021’s retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and that the Michigan State Police’s (“MSP”) treatment of individuals with non-Michigan convictions violates their procedural-due-process rights. But the district court rejected substantive-due-process and equal-protection challenges to the scheme’s reliance on offense-based tiers, an equal-protection challenge to limits on some registrants’ abilities to petition for removal from the scheme’s requirements, and void-for-vagueness challenges to certain reporting obligations. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 3 I. BACKGROUND A. Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 2038, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 et seq. (repealed 2006), which tied states’ eligibilities for certain federal funds to their adoption of sex-offender registries. Michigan responded that year, enacting SORA. See Pub. Act No. 295, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 1522. SORA created “a non-public registry maintained solely for law enforcement use.” Does I, 834 F.3d at 697. The statute required registrants to provide law enforcement with their names, social security numbers, addresses, and photographs, and assigned registrants to either twenty-five-year terms (for one qualifying offense) or lifelong registration (for two or more qualifying offenses). Pub. Act No. 295, §§ 5(1), (3)–(4), 7, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1524–26. Willful violations were subject to criminal penalties. Id. § 9(1), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1526. Since enactment, Michigan has amended SORA over twenty times.1 In the late 1990s, Michigan made the registry public, first allowing the public to inspect the registry in person at police stations, Act of Jan. 7, 1997, Pub. Act No. 494, § 10(2), 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 2283, 2285, and then creating a public website, Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 8(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 271, 279–80. Michigan, moreover, added both periodic and episodic reporting requirements. The periodic-reporting requirements compelled registrants to verify their information in person either annually or quarterly, depending on their offenses of conviction. Id. § 5a(4), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 277. The episodic-reporting requirements obligated registrants to provide notice within ten days (and not necessarily in person) of changes to their residences, places of work, or schools. Id. § 5(1), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 275. Before Michigan enacted SORA 2021, two sets of amendments stood apart from the rest. First, in 2006, Michigan created “[s]tudent safety zone[s].” Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.733(f) (2006) (repealed 2021). These zones subjected most registrants to criminal penalties if they 1Alexander William Furtaw, Note, Sex Offender Legislation Ex Post Facto: The History and Constitutionality of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act, 48 J. Legis. 301, 303 (2022).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 4 lived, worked, or loitered within 1,000 feet of a school. Id. §§ 28.734, 28.735 (2006) (repealed 2021). SORA 2011 retained the student safety zones. Second, in 2011, Michigan overhauled SORA in response to shifting federal requirements. Five years earlier, Congress had enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590, 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. SORNA accomplishes two objectives: it both regulates state and federal sex offenders directly and “set[s] forth comprehensive registration-system standards.” Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 435 (2012). States that fail to “substantially implement” SORNA’s standards lose out on federal funds. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20927(a), 20912(a). Broadly speaking, to access those funds, states must adopt public, offense-based sex- offender registries. Per SORNA, states must create public websites that allow users to search by zip code or within a set “geographic radius” for registrants. Id. § 20920(a). States must also allow “individual[s]” to receive notice when registrants update their registrations. Id. § 20923(b)(7). Registrants themselves must be sorted into three tiers based on their offenses of conviction. Id. § 20911(2)–(4). Tier assignments, in turn, set the length of time that registrants must remain on the registry (fifteen years at tier I, twenty-five years at tier II, and life at tier III), id. § 20915(a); periodic in-person reporting obligations (annual reporting at tier I, biannual reporting at tier II, and quarterly reporting at tier III), id. § 20918; eligibility for exclusion from online registries, see id. § 20920(c)(1); and eligibility to petition for early removal from registries, id. § 20915(b). States must collect a plethora of information about registrants (including their names; social security numbers; home, work, and school addresses; license plate numbers; photographs; fingerprints; DNA samples; “[r]emote communication identifiers”; and passport information). See id. § 20914(a)–(b); 28 C.F.R. § 72.6. States must oblige registrants to report episodic occurrences (such as changes to names, addresses, employment, or student status) in person and within three days. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(c); see 28 C.F.R. § 72.7(c)–(f). SORNA, moreover, requires states to criminalize registrants’ noncompliance. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(e).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 5 As Michigan’s deadline to comply with SORNA approached,2 the state enacted amendments that restructured the scheme. SORA 2011 authorized a public website that allowed users to search for registrants by zip code, municipality, and geographic area. Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.728(2), (7) (2011). Via the website, Michigan allowed the public to sign up to be notified whenever a registrant, within a set geographic radius, was added to the online registry or updated their information. Id. § 28.730(3) (2011). SORA 2011 adopted three offense-based tiers, id. § 28.722(r)–(w) (2011), and imposed the same registration durations and periodic in- person reporting requirements as SORNA, id. §§ 28.725(10)–(13), 28.725a(3) (2011). Tier designation further determined registrants’ presence in the online registry, id. § 28.728(4)(c) (2011) (excluding tier I registrants), and ability to petition for removal, id. § 28.728c(1)–(3), (12)–(15) (2011) (permitting tier I registrants to petition for removal five years early but generally barring tier II and III offenders from petitioning for removal). Michigan collected a set of information from registrants that was substantially identical to that required by SORNA, id. § 28.727(1) (2011), and required registrants to report episodic occurrences, including those required by SORNA, in person and within three business days, id. §§ 28.722(g), 28.725(1)–(2), (6)–(7) (2011). SORA 2011, furthermore, criminalized registrants’ violations of its reporting requirements. Id. § 28.729 (2011). SORA 2011 did not align perfectly with SORNA, however. Most notably, SORNA required nothing like the student safety zones that SORA 2011 retained. See id. §§ 28.734, 28.735 (2006) (repealed 2021). SORA 2011’s episodic reporting requirements exceeded those set by SORNA. Compare id. § 28.725(1)–(2), (6)–(7) (2011) (requiring, for example, registrants to report changes to internet identifiers, temporary residences, and vehicle information in person) with 34 U.S.C. § 20913(c) and 28 C.F.R. § 72.7(c)–(f) (allowing jurisdictions to collect these updates by “whatever means”). Although not mandated by SORNA, Michigan charged registrants a one-time registration fee. Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725a(6) (2011). And SORA 2011 published more information about registrants online than SORNA required. Compare id. § 28.728(2)(l) (2011) (publishing tier designations) with 34 U.S.C. § 20920(a)–(c) and National 2SORNA set an initial compliance deadline in 2009, see 34 U.S.C. § 20926(a)(1), but the Attorney General granted Michigan two extensions, pushing its deadline to 2011, see id. § 20926(b); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SORNA EXTENSIONS GRANTED (2010).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 6 Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38059 (July 2, 2008) (excluding tier designations from the list of information that jurisdictions must publish on their websites). Notwithstanding these differences, Michigan decided to apply both the 2006 and 2011 amendments retroactively, Does I, 834 F.3d at 698, as SORNA requires, see 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. Retroactive application of the 2011 amendments altered the status of thousands of registrants. Before the 2011 amendments, roughly a quarter of registrants were required to register for life; after, roughly three quarters of registrants received life terms. See R. 128-15 (Does I Joint Statement of Facts ¶¶ 289–90) (Page ID #6756). All told, SORA 2011 extended roughly 17,000 registrants’ registration terms to life. Id. ¶ 288 (Page ID #6756). In Does I, six plaintiffs, all tier III registrants convicted of sex offenses before 2006, challenged the retroactive application of SORA 2011 pursuant to the Ex Post Facto Clause. 834 F.3d at 698. Although we determined that the legislature did not intend SORA 2011 to impose punishment, we concluded that its actual effect was punitive. Id. at 700–06. As a result, we held that “[t]he retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments to Plaintiffs [was] unconstitutional,” and ordered Michigan to “cease” applying them to the plaintiffs. Id. at 706. On the heels of Does I, six new plaintiffs filed a class-action suit seeking relief for all registrants convicted before 2011. Doe v. Snyder (“Does II”), 449 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2020). The Does II court read Does I as invalidating the 2006 and 2011 amendments in their entirety, found that the amendments were not severable, and permanently enjoined the retroactive application of SORA 2011. Does II, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 728–29, 731–35. Litigation concerning SORA 2011 proceeded in parallel in Michigan state court. About one month before the entry of final judgment in Does II, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2021). Betts agreed with Does I and Does II, holding that “the retroactive imposition of the 2011 SORA increases registrants’ punishment for their committed offenses in violation of federal and state constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws.” Id. at 515. The Michigan Supreme Court further concluded that the 2006 and 2011  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 7 amendments were not severable. Id. at 516–21. Accordingly, the court invalidated SORA 2011’s retroactive application. Id. at 521. Michigan amended SORA in 2021. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.721 et seq. Altogether, SORA 2021 included three major amendments. First, SORA 2021 jettisoned the student safety zones introduced in the 2006 amendments. Id. §§ 28.733–28.735 (2006) (repealed 2021). Second, it removed registrants’ tier designations from display in the online registry. Id. § 28.728(3)(e). Third, it tinkered with the scheme’s episodic reporting requirements. Under SORA 2021, the Michigan State Police (“MSP”) may eschew in-person reporting requirements when registrants update their names, addresses, places of work, schools, vehicle information, email addresses, internet identifiers,3 or temporary residences. Id. § 28.725(1), (2). SORA 2021 retained most other aspects of SORA 2011. SORA 2021 mandates the creation of a publicly accessible online registry with the same search and notification features as SORA 2011 required. See id. §§ 28.728(2), (7), 28.730(3). The website continues to publish large quantities of information about registrants. Id. § 28.728(2). It now, however, allows the public to “submit . . . tip[s]” about registrants. R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶ 250) (Page ID #7359–60). SORA 2021 still divides registrants into three tiers based on their offenses of conviction, id. § 28.722(q)–(v),4 and for each tier, imposes the same registration durations, periodic-reporting frequencies, and removal-petition limitations as SORA 2011, id. 3“The requirement to report any change in electronic mail addresses and internet identifiers applies only to an individual required to be registered under [SORA 2021] after July 1, 2011.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725(2)(a). 4Tier I offenses, among others, include:possession of child sexually abusive material, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c(4); engaging the services of a person under eighteen for prostitution, id. § 750.449a(2); surveilling or photographing nude children, id. § 750.539j; and sexual contact with a corpse, id. § 750.160d(1). See id. § 28.722(r). Tier II offenses, among others, include: accosting, enticing or soliciting a child under sixteen for immoral purposes, id. § 750.145a; producing or financing child-sex abuse activity or material, id. § 750.145c(2); sodomy of a minor, id. § 750.158; and procuring or inducing a person to engage in prostitution, id. § 750.455. See id. § 28.722(t). Tier I offenders who go on to commit a subsequent Tier I offense are designated Tier II offenders. Id. § 28.722(s)(i). Tier III offenses, among others, include: first-degree criminal sexual conduct, id. § 750.520b; second- degree criminal sexual conduct against a minor under thirteen, id. § 750.520c; third-degree criminal sexual conduct, id. § 750.520d; and sexual penetration of a corpse, id. § 750.160d(2). See id. § 28.722(v). Tier II offenders who then commit a subsequent Tier I or II offense are designated Tier III offenders. Id. § 28.722(u)(i).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 8 §§ 28.725(11)–(13), 28.725a(3), 28.728c(1)–(3), (12)–(15). Although SORA 2011 excluded all tier I offenders from the online registry, SORA 2021 excludes most, but not all, tier I offenders. Id. § 28.728(4)(c). Michigan continues to collect virtually the same information from registrants as it did under SORA 2011. Id. § 28.727(1). SORA 2021 retains some in-person reporting requirements for episodic occurrences, but the MSP has utilized its authority under SORA 2021 to allow registrants to report certain episodic occurrences by mail. See id. § 28.725(1)–(2), (7)–(8); R. 126-17 (Mich. Sex Offender Registration/Verification/Update Form at 4) (Page ID #6207). SORA 2021 still charges registration fees, but now charges annual fees on top of an initial registration fee. Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725a(6)(a)–(b). When registrants “willfully” fail to abide by SORA 2021’s requirements, they are subject to criminal liability. Id. § 28.729. Most significantly, SORA 2021 applies retroactively, extending the registration terms of thousands of registrants convicted before 2011—often to lifetime registration. R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶ 140) (Page ID #7287). Thus, as was the case under SORA 2011, the vast majority—seventy-three percent—of registrants under SORA 2021 are in tier III. Id. ¶ 76 (Page ID #7260). Tier II, by contrast, comprises twenty percent of SORA 2021 registrants, and tier I, just seven percent. Id. Most recently, and after oral argument in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that SORA 2021, like SORA 2011, violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. People v. Smith, 38 N.W.3d 736 (Mich. 2026) (mem.). SORA 2021, the court held, cannot “be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments.” Id. Further, as in Betts, the court determined that “severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.” Id.; see Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 516–21. B. Procedural History In response to SORA 2021, the plaintiffs brought a class-action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in February 2022. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 1–764) (Page ID #1–198). The operative complaint names nine plaintiffs relevant here—John Does A, B, C, D,  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 9 E, G, H, Mary Doe, and Mary Roe.5 R. 108 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–153) (Page ID #2780–2802). All committed registerable offenses before July 1, 2011 (save for John Doe H, who committed his in 2015), and none have been convicted of another registerable offense since committing their original offenses. R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶¶ 3–71) (Page ID #7234–59). Nearly all saw their registration terms extended under SORA 2021 to life. See id. All were assigned to their tiers without receiving individualized risk assessments, and nearly all can never petition for removal from the registry. See id. The district court certified a class of all “people who are or will be subject to registration under” SORA 2021. R. 35 (5/18/2022 Order Grant’g Class Certification ¶ 2) (Page ID #1116– 17). In addition to this primary class, the district court certified seven subclasses, including subclasses of individuals who committed their registerable offenses before SORA 2011’s enactment (the “pre-2011 ex post facto subclass”), individuals required to register for life as a result of SORA amendments (the “retroactive extension of registration subclass”), individuals mandated to register because they pleaded guilty to a registerable offense before SORA 2011 (the “plea bargain subclass”), individuals unable to petition for removal from the registry (the 5Another plaintiff named in the operative complaint, John Doe F, is not involved in this appeal. John Doe F had his underlying conviction expunged and was removed from the registry after this suit was filed. R. 156 (Expungement Notice at 1) (Page ID #8657). The district court, accordingly, dismissed him from the case in the final judgment, and he did not file a notice of appeal. See R. 177 (Am. Judgment at 14) (Page ID #9390); R. 181 (Pls.’ Notice of Appeal at 1) (Page ID #9405). Two named plaintiffs, moreover, have been—or appear to have been—removed from the registry. John Doe H was removed from the registry while this appeal was pending and is thus no longer subject to SORA 2021. See D. 84 (Pls.’ Notice Regarding John Doe H’s Removal from the Mich. Registry at 1). He is one of several representatives of the primary class, as well as the sole representative of a subclass of individuals convicted of registerable offenses after 2011. R. 35 (5/18/2022 Order Grant’g Class Certification ¶¶ 2, 8) (Page ID #1116–18). The defendants, in addition, claimed below that John Doe A was removed from the registry in light of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lymon, 29 N.W.3d 58 (Mich. 2024). R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶¶ 3, 6, 8) (Page ID #7234–37). John Doe A is also a representative of the primary class and the sole representative of a subclass of registrants who have never committed an offense with “a sexual component.” R. 35 (5/18/2022 Order Grant’g Class Certification ¶¶ 2, 6) (Page ID #1116–18). The claims involving John Doe H’s and A’s subclasses are not at issue on appeal. And although they have (or may have) been removed from the registry, they may continue to serve as representatives of the primary class. The primary class was certified well before their claims were (or appear to have been) mooted. See id. ¶ 6 (Page ID #1116–17). “Once a class is certified, the mooting of the named plaintiff’s claim does not moot the action, the court continues to have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the action if a controversy between any class member and the defendant exists.” Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). The controversy between the primary class and the defendants persists, so John Does H and A remain viable class representatives. See, e.g., id.; Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608, 619 (6th Cir. 2013).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 10 “barred from petitioning subclass”), and individuals covered by SORA 2021 as a result of non- Michigan convictions (the “non-Michigan offense subclass”). R. 35 (5/18/2022 Order Grant’g Class Certification ¶¶ 3–8) (Page ID #1117–18); R. 109 (5/9/2023 Order Grant’g Class Certification ¶ 1) (Page ID #3128). The operative complaint challenges SORA 2021’s constitutionality in eleven counts brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. R. 108 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 727–840) (Page ID #2780, 2956–80). Seven counts are relevant here: Counts I and II, ex post facto challenges to SORA 2021’s retroactive application, id. ¶¶ 727–45 (Page ID #2956–59); Count III, due-process and equal-protection challenges to SORA 2021’s reliance on offense-based tiers, id. ¶¶ 746–56 (Page ID #2959–61); Count IV, an equal-protection challenge to tier II and III registrants’ general inability to petition for removal, id. ¶¶ 757–72 (Page ID #2962–66); Count VI, a due-process challenge to SORA 2021’s retroactive alteration of plea agreements, id. ¶¶ 789–97 (Page ID #2969–71); Count VIII, void-for-vagueness challenges to certain of SORA 2021’s reporting requirements, id. ¶¶ 809–12 (Page ID #2974); and Count XI, challenges to SORA 2021’s registration process and requirements for those convicted of non-Michigan offenses under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, id. ¶¶ 833–40 (Page ID #2978–80). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, R. 7 (Pls.’ Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 1–67) (Page ID #857–946), and the defendants moved to dismiss, R. 41 (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1– 57) (Page ID #1327–83). The district court denied both motions. R. 54 (D. Ct. Order Deny’g Pls.’ Prelim. Inj. Mot. & Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1–6) (Page ID #1847–52). Following extensive discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. R. 123 (Pls.’ MSJ at 1–73) (Page ID #3621–93); R. 129 (Defs.’ MSJ at 1–77) (Page ID #7128–7204). The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their ex post facto claims (Counts I and II) and their challenges to SORA 2021’s non-Michigan-convictions provisions (Count XI), partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs and the defendants on the void-for-vagueness claims (Count VIII), and summary judgment to the defendants on the challenges to SORA 2021’s offense-based tiers (Count III) and petitioning restrictions (Count IV). Does v. Whitmer (“Does III”), 751 F. Supp. 3d 761, 784–815, 818–21 (E.D. Mich. 2024); Does v. Whitmer (“Does IV”), 773 F. Supp.  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 11 3d 380, 394–400 (E.D. Mich. 2025). The district court did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ due-process claim regarding the retroactive alteration of plea agreements (Count VI), finding that claim moot in light of the plaintiffs’ success on their ex post facto counts. Does III, 751 F. Supp. 3d at 814. The district court then entered judgment, R. 177 (Am. Judgment at 1–16) (Page ID #9377–92), and the parties cross-appealed, R. 180 (Defs.’ Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #9404); R. 181 (Pls.’ Notice of Appeal at 1–2) (Page ID #9405–06). The defendants moved for a stay pending appeal, R. 173 (Defs.’ D. Ct. Stay Mot. at 1–23) (Page ID #9206–28), which the district court denied, Does v. Whitmer, No. 22-CV-10209, 2025 WL 1428243, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2025). The defendants then moved this court for a stay, D. 21 (Defs.’ Emergency Stay Mot. at 1–32), which we granted, Doe v. Whitmer, No. 25-1413, 2025 LX 164483, at *9 (6th Cir. June 20, 2025) (order). II. ANALYSIS On appeal, the parties contest the district court’s judgment on six counts. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s judgment with respect to their challenges to SORA 2021’s offense- based tiers (Count III), petitioning provisions (Count IV), and episodic reporting requirements pertaining to education, employment, and vehicles (Count VII). D. 67 (Pls.’ Corr. First Br. at 28–62). The defendants’ appeal concerns three different counts: the ex post facto challenges (Counts I and II) and the non-Michigan-offense challenges (Count XI). D. 70 (Defs.’ Second Br. at 13–50). We address the parties’ arguments in turn. A. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Nelson v. MillerKnoll, Inc., 181 F.4th 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2026). Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Nelson, 181 F.4th at 660. A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 12 B. Ex Post Facto Clause Challenges We begin with the plaintiffs’ ex post facto claims. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10. Among other types of retroactive laws, the Clause has long been understood to prohibit “[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). In Counts I and II, plaintiffs argue that SORA 2021 does just that, punishing registrants for offenses they were convicted of before 2011. See, e.g., D. 74 (Pls.’ Corr. Third Br. at 4–5). Recently, in Smith, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that SORA 2021 constitutes “an ex post facto punishment, in violation of” the federal and state constitutions, and therefore “may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments.” 38 N.W.3d at 736. Following this decision, the plaintiffs moved to remand Counts I and II for the district court to consider whether Smith mooted those claims. D. 92-1 (Pls.’ Mot. to Remand Counts I & II at 1– 3). The plaintiffs argue that the MSP has already begun to remove registrants “who committed their relevant crime prior to” the enactment of SORA 2011 to comply with the Michigan Supreme Court’s order. Id. at 1–2. The defendants oppose this motion, arguing that Counts I and II are not moot because Smith may still be reconsidered or reviewed through a petition for certiorari and therefore is not final, and because the district court below required different relief on Counts I and II than was granted in Smith.6 See D. 94 (Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. to Remand at 2– 6). The plaintiffs respond that “neither [c]lass [c]ounsel nor this [c]ourt currently has the facts necessary to . . . outright” dismiss Counts I and II as moot. D. 95-1 (Pls.’ Reply Br. Supp. Mot. to Remand at 2). The plaintiffs also note that the district court’s relief has been stayed pending this appeal and would not bind the defendants if Counts I and II were mooted. Id. at 7 (citing Doe v. Whitmer, 2025 LX 164483, at *8–9; D. 36 (Order Clarifying Stay)). If we determine that Counts I and II are mooted ourselves, the defendants suggest in the alternative that we remand 6The district court below granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on Counts I and II and required the defendants to “provide written notice to all members of the pre-2011 ex post facto subclass.” R. 177 (Am. Judgment at 3) (Page ID #9379).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 13 those counts to the district court with instructions to vacate and dismiss them. D. 94 (Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. to Remand at 7–8). On balance, we agree with the plaintiffs. While we are not bound by the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution, see WCI, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 774 F. App’x 959, 967 (6th Cir. 2019), we generally defer to a state supreme court’s interpretation of that state’s own statutes, Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000); see also Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1932) (a state supreme court opinion “construing and applying [the state’s] own [c]onstitution and laws generally is binding” on federal courts); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983) (similar). Although Counts I and II do not raise claims under the Michigan Constitution, see R. 108 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 727, 741) (Page ID #2956, 2958), mootness is a jurisdictional question, and “we must assure ourselves of our own jurisdiction to hear” the plaintiffs’ claims. Fouts v. Warren City Council, 97 F.4th 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2024); see also Ford v. Wilder, 469 F.3d 500, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We have] no authority to render a decision upon moot questions” (quoting United States v. City of Detroit, 401 F.3d 448, 450 (6th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, as the plaintiffs suggest, we must determine whether Smith moots any of the plaintiffs’ claims in this action before opining on their merits. A question is mooted “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). We have recognized “that an intervening state supreme court decision on a particular issue may render an appeal to this court on the same issue moot.” Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 878 F.2d 906, 910 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). In this instance, the intervening decision “arose after appellate briefing was completed and implicates unsettled facts and law that were not addressed by the district court below.” FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Williams, 83 F.4th 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2023). As MSP continues to adjust its practices in light of Smith, the facts underlying Counts I and II present “a moving target.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 977 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (remanding to the district court to consider mootness in the first instance); see D. 92-2 (Official Statement of MSP) (indicating that, in September, MSP “removed more than 20,000  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 14 offenders” from the registry but noting that “these numbers could change.”); D. 95-2 (MSP Legal Update No. 172 at 1) (indicating that registrants covered by Smith “will be permanently removed from Michigan’s Sex Offender Registry”). Under these circumstances, “[t]he district court is best positioned to resolve . . . factual disputes,” and any later review by our court “will benefit from a more complete factual record.” FemHealth USA, 83 F.4th at 557–58. Accordingly, we vacate and remand Counts I and II for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Smith moots those claims. We also note that the district court declined to address the merits of Count VI, the plaintiffs’ retroactive-alteration-of-plea-agreements due-process claim, finding it moot in light of the court’s ruling on Counts I and II that SORA 2021 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Does III, 751 F. Supp. 3d at 814. The ex post facto ruling, the district court determined, would also prohibit the retroactive modification or nullification of plea agreements, the basis for Count VI. Id. Because we vacate and remand Counts I and II for the district court’s consideration in light of Smith, we also vacate and remand Count VI. In Smith, the Michigan Supreme Court determined only that SORA 2021 constituted an ex post facto violation under the federal and state constitutions when applied retroactively. 38 N.W.3d at 736. Smith, therefore, does not moot or otherwise impact the other four counts at issue on appeal. C. Substantive-Due-Process and Equal-Protection Challenges to SORA 2021’s Reliance on Offense-based Tiers The plaintiffs next raise broad, amorphous Due Process and Equal Protection Clause challenges to SORA 2021. D. 67 (Pls.’ Corr. First Br. at 28–50). In essence, the plaintiffs argue that SORA 2021’s tiering, reporting, and notice provisions are insufficiently related to recidivism reduction because the scheme relies on offense-based (not individualized) risk assessments. See id. “To qualify as having a rational basis, the challenged law need only be rationally related to legitimate government interests.” Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 262 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Rational-basis review is a “highly deferential” standard that statutes fail “only in rare or exceptional circumstances.” Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2007).  Nos. 25-1413/1414 Doe et al. v. Whitmer et al. Page 15 The plaintiffs raise three buckets of empirical evidence to support their irrationality argument: (1) data showing that registrants with the longest reporting periods, tier II and III offenders, present a lower recidivism risk than those with the shortest, tier I offenders, R. 123-6 (Rep. on Class Data ¶¶ 99–103) (Page ID #3980–81); (2) data calling into question the wisdom of decades-long or lifelong registration periods and prohibiting tier II and III registrants from petitioning for removal, id. ¶¶ 7–8, 61–62 (Page ID #3952–53, 3967–68); R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶¶ 189–94) (Page ID #7321–24); and (3) evidence that offense-based public registration schemes like SORA 2021 not only fail to reduce recidivism, but may actually increase it, R. 123-9 (Letourneau Rep. ¶ 23) (Page ID #4240); R. 123-10 (Prescott Rep. ¶ 13) (Page ID #4282); R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶ 158) (Page ID #7302). Even so, the district court found that SORA 2021 was rationally related to recidivism reduction. Does III, 751 F. Supp. 3d at 792–95. We agree. To start, the plaintiffs’ evidence to the contrary rests on the rates at which registrants are rearrested or reconvicted of sexual offenses—not the rates at which they reoffend. See R. 129-2 (Defs.’ SOMF Resp. ¶ 574) (Page ID #7553). Thus, the plaintiffs rely on data that “necessarily understates the actual number of offenses committed, both by registrants (who have been convicted of sexual offenses in the past) and by non-registrants (who have not).” Id. ¶ 577 (Page ID #7554–55). This is no concern, the plaintiffs claim, because although “[t]he extent of unreported sexual crime is unknown,” “the rate of detected and undetected sexual offending should be roughly the same for registrants and non-registrants.” Id. ¶¶ 578, 583 (Page ID #7555, 7557). To be sure, the plaintiffs present evidence suggesting that this might be true. See R. 123-8 (Hanson Rebuttal Rep. ¶¶ 38–41) (Page ID #4193–94). At the same ti