Streever v. Mullin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID STREEVER, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 26-2356 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 9, 17 : MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official : capacity as Secretary of the Department of : Homeland Security, et al. : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER VENUE I. INTRODUCTION Americans have long voiced their displeasure with their government. The Declaration of Independence itself is a list of grievances between Americans and the British government. And Americans have not always indulged in the elevated prose of the Declaration. Government officials have long endured “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Today is no different. Plaintiff David Streever expressed his displeasure with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) by sending a three-paragraph email to the agency’s Acting Director, Defendant Todd Lyons. Mr. Streever compared Acting Director Lyons to an infamous Nazi and predicted that he would become “a sad, despised man who eats himself alive with shame at [his] own pathetic weakness.” What is different is how the government responded in this case. ICE dispatched agents to Mr. Streever’s home and delivered to him a “WARNING NOTICE.” The notice threatened him with prosecution if he did not “discontinue” his criticism of ICE. Because that notice likely violates Mr. Streever’s First Amendment right to free speech, the Court will grant, in part, Mr. Streever’s motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining Defendants from relying on the Warning Notice, issuing similar threats, or making good on the threats in the Warning Notice. 1 II. BACKGROUND Mr. Streever was outraged by the deaths of two Minnesotans, both of whom were shot by ICE officers in January 2026. See Verified Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 1. To register his anger, Mr. Streever sent ICE’s Acting Director, Todd Lyons, a three-paragraph email titled “What’s next.” Id. ¶ 68. The email read as follows: You are a monstrous human being and will go down in history as America’s Reinhard Heydrich, the butcher. The way you are protecting the obvious execution in Minnesota, even as we see the videos, will lead to your downfall. Even Trump will turn on you before the end, and you will be a sad, despised man who eats himself alive with shame at your own pathetic weakness. You will never know peace. You will seek to lose yourself, to escape the burden of knowing the truth about yourself. But wherever you go, you will find yourself. You will torment yourself until your last day on Earth. Id., Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1. Mr. Streever’s January 26, 2026, email came during an uptick in threats to ICE officers. According to the Assistant Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) Investigations within ICE, Brent Goodwin, “ICE has experienced a 946% increase in threats against ICE officials” between fiscal years 2024 and 2025. Decl. of Brent L. Goodwin 1 “Defendants” refers collectively to Defendants Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella, Jenniver M. Fenton, John Doe (identity unknown), David Brodie, Abbi Henry, and Trevor J. Pitts, all of whom are being sued in their official capacities. 2 (“Goodwin Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 20-1. “In [fiscal year] 2025, ICE OPR investigated approximately 66 potential threats against senior leaders.” Id. At some point after ICE received Mr. Streever’s email, it “was forwarded to OPR because it was determined that the email had potential threatening undertones to ICE personnel, potentially presenting a safety concern.” Id. ¶ 7. Because “ICE OPR did not have any information about Mr. Streever . . . OPR determined that it needed to conduct an ICE investigation.” Id. It is unclear who within ICE made either of these determinations. But the relevant OPR field office is located in Fairfax, Virginia. 2 The case was then assigned to Senior Special Agent Abbi Henry, who worked alongside Senior Special Agent David Brodie. Id. ¶¶ 7– 8. Both of them work in an ICE OPR office in Jersey City, New Jersey. Id. ¶ 8. As part of their investigation, now five months after Mr. Streever sent his email, Agents Henry and Brodie traveled to Mr. Streever’s home in Rochester, New York, to speak with him. Id. ¶ 10. But Mr. Streever was not home. Id. ¶ 11. He was off traveling in Europe. Id. So the agents spoke with Rev. Hilary Streever, Mr. Streever’s wife. Comp. ¶¶ 74–76. They told her that Mr. Streever “‘may or may not have’ sent an email to Todd Lyons, threatening Lyons” and that they “needed to talk to [Mr.] Streever.” Id. ¶ 76. The agents then handed Ms. Streever a “WARNING NOTICE.” Id., Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-2 (emphasis in original); id. ¶ 79. The notice stated at the top: “YOU MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW.” Id., Ex. 2. It then explained: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for protecting ICE, its employees, and its 2 See Defs.’ Combined Mot. Dismiss, Transfer Venue, Hold in Abeyance Br. on Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., & Extension Time (“Defs.’ Mot”) at 4, ECF No. 17 (“The ICE OPR office serving New York is in Fairfax, Virginia.”); see also ICE Field Offs., ICE, https://www.ice.gov/contact/field-offices?state=All&office=13&keyword= [https://perma.cc/E6W7-686R] (last visited Sep. 1, 2026). 3  facilities against internal and external threats. OPR is responsible for enforcing crimes against the United States as authorized under Title 19 of the U.S. Code and as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, including criminal investigations into threats made against ICE personnel. OPR has identified an email sent to Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons, which it has reason to believe may constitute a violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Accordingly, OPR is requesting that you promptly remove and/or discontinue the aforementioned behavior. This Notice officially informs you that it is unlawful to threaten to assault, kidnap, and/or murder a federal official or that federal official’s immediate family member with the intent to impede, intimidate, and/or interfere with the federal official’s duties or retaliate against a federal official due to the performance of their duties. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a). You are further advised that knowingly making restricted personal information about a covered person, or their immediate family member, publicly available with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or incite the commission of a crime of violence against the person; or with the intent and knowledge that the restricted personal information will be used to threaten, or intimidate, or facilitate the commission of a crime of violence against that person violates federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 119. Violations of these or related laws could subject you to both federal and state prosecution. OPR has documented the delivery of this Notice to you. Receipt of this Notice will be taken into consideration, should you continue to be involved in any criminal activities described above. If you wish to discuss this Notice and its contents further, please contact the undersigned Special Agent who served you with this Warning Notice or the local OPR field office. Id. (emphasis in original). The notice then provided a place for Mr. Streever to acknowledge receipt, which he did not do because he was not there. Id.; id. ¶ 78. Unable to find Mr. Streever in Rochester, Agent Henry, now joined by Special Agent Trevor Pitts, tried to speak with Mr. Streever at a hotel in New York City on his return journey from Europe. See id. ¶¶ 90–93; Goodwin Decl. ¶¶ 11–12. It appears that the agents were unable to meet with Mr. Streever that night, or indeed at any point thereafter. The agents called Mr. Streever twice, but they never spoke with him. See Compl. ¶ 95; Goodwin Decl. ¶ 12. At the end of the month, Agent Henry “wrote a report of investigation to serve as a closing report summarizing the investigation.” Goodwin Decl. ¶ 13. “With its investigation 4 closed,” OPR represents that it “does not contemplate any further investigation into Mr. Streever regarding his January 2026 email to Lyons.” Id. ¶ 15. But no one told Mr. Streever that the investigation was closed. Assuming he was still under investigation, Mr. Streever sued Defendants on July 6, 2026. See Compl. at 25. The organization representing Mr. Streever then posted on social media touting Mr. Streever’s lawsuit. Homeland Security (@DHSgov), X (July 6, 2026, 3:06 p.m.). 3 A DHS social-media account responded, explaining that “ICE investigates all credible threats towards its employees and officers, including threats to the ICE Director. As a matter of policy, we do not comment on any ongoing investigations.” Id. The post closed by emphasizing that “ANYONE who assaults or threatens our law enforcement officers will face the consequences.” Id. A DHS spokesperson gave the same answer to a reporter for National Public Radio, although without the threat of future consequences. See Jude Joffe-Block, He Sent a Harsh Email to ICE’s Top Official. 5 Months Later, Federal Agents Tracked Him Down, NPR (July 1, 2026, at 5:00 ET). 4 III. ANALYSIS There are two motions before the Court. Mr. Streever asks for a preliminary injunction, while Defendants move to dismiss or transfer. The Court addresses, and denies, the motion to dismiss or transfer before it considers, and partially grants, the motion for a preliminary injunction. 5 3 Available at x.com/DHSgov/status/2074208454974267678 [https://perma.cc/GN39- 352E] (last visited Sep. 1, 2026). 4 Available at www.npr.org/2026/07/01/nx-s1-5874124/dhs-tracks-ice-critic [https://perma.cc/Y3RH-3QJ5] (last visited Sep. 1, 2026). 5 Mr. Streever initially requested a hearing on his motion. Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1, ECF No. 9. But in an email to the Court on August 20, 2026, he withdrew that request in the hopes that it would yield a faster resolution of his motion. Defendants gave no indicational that they wished for a hearing. 5  A. Venue The Court starts with venue. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 45 F.4th 380, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (holding that courts may consider venue before other threshold issues, including jurisdictional ones). Defendants’ venue motion involves two distinct parts. First, Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss or transfer Mr. Streever’s case because the District of Columbia is not a permissible venue. That argument is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which prescribes the permissible venues for “[a]ctions where [the] defendant is [an] officer or employee of the United States.” Second, Defendants argue that even if venue is proper in this District, the Court should still transfer the case to the Western District of New York because that is the more appropriate venue. That argument is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states that “a district court may transfer any civil action” “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” (emphasis added). 1. Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 Venue is appropriate here because at least one federal defendant resides in the District of Columbia. The general federal venue statute provides venue for suits against “officer[s] or employee[s] of the United States” in, among other places, “any judicial district in which . . . a defendant in the action resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). As Mr. Streever points out, and Defendants do not contest, Defendants Mullin, Venturella, and Fenton all reside within this District for purposes of venue. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Combined Mot. Dismiss & Transfer (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 3, ECF No. 19; Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1128 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding residence of “federal defendants” determined for purposes of venue by their “official residence . . . where the official duties are performed”). 6  Defendants argue that Section 1391 does not mean what it says. Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1993), they argue that Mr. Streever has attempted to “manufacture” venue in the District and that naming high-ranking government officials is not enough to secure venue. Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (quoting Cameron, 983 F.2d at 256). As Plaintiffs point out, however, Cameron confirms that Section 1391(e) confers venue in the District of Columbia where, as here, the plaintiff names a high-ranking government official residing in the District as a defendant. The D.C. Circuit explained that “Section 1391(e) makes venue proper for a suit against government officials in any district in which one defendant resides. Because Attorney General Thornburgh lived in the District of Columbia, the court correctly concluded that venue would have been proper in this district for the injunctive claim.” Cameron, 983 F.2d at 256 n.2 (emphasis removed). The only reason that ultimately did not suffice in Cameron was because the injunctive claim was moot. Id. at 257. The court went on to explain that the remaining claims were not claims against officers in their official capacity; therefore Section 1391(e) did not apply, and the plaintiff “could not fit his claim under the general venue provisions for federal question cases set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).” Id. at 256– 57 Here, Mr. Streever seeks injunctive relief against three government officials in their official capacity who reside in this District. And unlike in Cameron, that claim for injunctive relief is not moot. Cameron therefore confirms that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). See Cameron, 983 F.2d at 256 n.2. To be sure, the court in Cameron advised that “[c]ourts in this circuit must examine challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff 7 might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 256. Otherwise, “[b]y naming high government officials as defendants, a plaintiff could bring a suit here that properly should be pursued elsewhere.” Id. But the Court does not understand the D.C. Circuit to have dispensed with the clear text of Section 1391(e)(1) through this admonition. Instead, courts in this district heed the Circuit’s warning through a careful analysis of discretionary transfer under Section 1404(a). See, e.g., Simpson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:19-CV-03173 (CJN), 2020 WL 95814, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2020) (finding venue proper in D.C. but nonetheless citing Cameron and transferring the case under Section 1404(a)). Indeed, every case Defendants cite as purportedly having “rejected Streever’s attempt to distinguish Cameron,” discusses Cameron while analyzing discretionary transfer under Section 1404(a), not proper venue under Section 1391, with one expressly rejecting its application to Section 1391. Defs.’ Reply in Supp. Mot. Dismiss or Transfer (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 5–6, ECF No. 21; see Abusadeh v. Chertoff, No. CIV.A.06 2014 CKK, 2007 WL 2111036, at *5 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007) (“The principle that Defendants advocate is an important one. However, it is one ordinarily considered by courts in determining whether to transfer an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and not the sole principle relied upon in finding a lack of venue in the District of Columbia . . . .”); Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2009); Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y, 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 304, 306 (D.D.C. 2017). 6 6 The Court is aware of at least one case in this District where a court has applied Cameron to the question of whether venue is proper in the way Defendants advocate. See Su v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 1:25-CV-03412 (TNM), 2026 WL 904997, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2026). For the reasons explained above, and in line with most cases in this district, this Court respectfully disagrees with that analysis. 8  2. Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Having concluded that venue in the District of Columbia is permissible, the Court now considers whether it should nonetheless transfer the case to the Western District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “The district court has discretion to adjudicate motions to transfer according to an ‘individualized case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Chauhan v. Napolitano, 746 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). The first step in this analysis is to determine whether venue would also be permissible in the Western District of New York. See Porfirio v. Mullin, No. CV 25-4055 (RC), 2026 WL 2123251, at *2 (D.D.C. July 23, 2026). The parties appear to agree, however, that it is—which makes sense because Mr. Streever is a resident there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (allowing venue where “the plaintiff resides”). Next, the court must balance a series of private- and public-interest factors. See Chauhan, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 103. The private-interest factors generally include (1) the parties’ choices of forum, (2) the district where the claims arose, (3) the convenience of the parties, (4) the convenience of witnesses, and (4) the ease of access to proof. See id. at 102. The public- interest factors encompass “(1) the transferee court’s familiarity with the applicable law; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home.” Porfirio, 2026 WL 2123251, at *3. The Court addresses the factors in turn. a. The parties’ choice of forum The parties’ respective choices of forum favor venue in the District of Columbia. “[F]ederal courts have developed a bewildering variety of verbal formulations to describe the weight to be accorded the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum in transfer motions.” 8 Wright & 9 Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure (“Wright & Miller”) § 3848 (4th ed.). In this District, courts have said that they afford plaintiff’s choice of forum “substantial deference” over the defendant’s choice and treat it as a “paramount consideration.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, No. CV 12-1833 (ABJ), 2013 WL 12316872, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2013) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court, for its part, has described it not as deference but as “plaintiff’s venue privilege.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013) (quotation omitted). Whatever the articulation, as with most things in life, “context is important.” Wright & Miller § 3848. The deference afforded a plaintiff is diminished where, as here, the plaintiff sues outside his home forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981); Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 905 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (D.D.C. 2012). But it still retains some force. “Even if the plaintiff resides outside of the forum, [ ] courts have understood the Supreme Court’s reasoning to instruct that they give greater deference to a plaintiff’s forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by legitimate reasons . . . .” Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Tr., 918 F.3d 944, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Deference to the plaintiff’s choice is therefore minimized only if it is both outside his home and there is “no meaningful connection to or interest in the controversy” in the forum the plaintiff chose. Amalgamated Transit Union, Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 832 F. Supp. 3d 78, 83 (D.D.C. 2026) (quoting Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 58 F. Supp. 3d 2, 5 (D.D.C. 2013)). Requiring at least a meaningful connection to the chosen forum is part of how courts give effect to the D.C. Circuit’s warning in Cameron to guard against manufactured venue. See 983 F.2d at 256. Here, Mr. Streever’s choice receives deference because the Court cannot conclude that the case bears no meaningful connection to the District of Columbia. The incipient event for this 10 case was a message sent to Acting Director Lyons, who resides in the District of Columbia. That message was not a generalized petition or request made to an agency, which might have been processed anywhere. Cf., e.g., Porfirio, 2026 WL 2123251, at *3 (transferring case involving visa petition that was ultimately processed in Texas). It was a personalized message sent to Acting Director Lyons, albeit regarding conduct undertaken in his official capacity, with language that spoke to the Acting Director as an individual. See, e.g., Compl., Ex. 1 (“Even Trump will turn on you before the end, and you will be a sad, despised man who eats himself alive with shame at your own pathetic weakness.” (emphases added)). Defendants’ reaction to that message, and their apparent desire to protect Acting Director Lyons, a D.C. resident, sparked this case. That the event which spawned this litigation has a strong connection to this district is no trifling consideration. True, that message was sent from the Western District of New York, and other important events occurred there as well, such as the officers arriving at Mr. Streever’s home and issuing the Warning Notice. But for purposes of determining whether Mr. Streever’s choice of forum is entitled to deference over Defendant’s preference, the question is not whether the case has the strongest connection to the District of Columbia, only whether it has a meaningful one. It does. The Court therefore finds that the parties’ choices of forum weigh against transfer, but not with the full weight of the deference ordinarily afforded a plaintiff suing in his home forum. 7 7 Some courts separately analyze and afford deference to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s choice of forum, and this Court has done so in the past. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 20-CV-00855 (APM), 2020 WL 12674077, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 2020). The Court finds this framing unilluminating given that, faced with a motion to transfer, the parties have necessarily chosen different fora. It is counterintuitive to simultaneously defer to both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s conflicting choices. Moreover, whether a defendant’s choice of forum receives any deference turns on the degree of deference afforded to the plaintiff and 11  b. Where the claims arose On the other hand, consideration of where Mr. Streever’s claims arose slightly favors transfer. As Defendants point out, Mr. Streever presumably sent the email from his home in the Western District of New York, and federal agents delivered the warning notice to his home in that district. Even so, many events occurred elsewhere. To start, as discussed above, Mr. Streever’s message was directed at and received in the District of Columbia. Afterward, DHS made an initial determination that Mr. Streever’s “email had potential threatening undertones to ICE personnel, potentially presenting a safety concern.” Goodwin Decl. ¶ 7. It is not clear who made this critical decision, or where that person was, but there is no indication it was in the Western District of New York. Whoever made the decision then forwarded the email to OPR, which is based in the District of Columbia. Id. The case was then given to Agent Henry, who worked alongside Agent Brodie, both in the District of New Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Eventually, “OPR determined that it needed to conduct an ICE investigation.” Id. ¶ 7. Once again, it is unclear exactly where that decision was made—by the agents in New Jersey, at OPR’s office in the District of Columbia, or at the field office in Virginia—but whichever way, whether “the added convenience and justice of litigating in [the defendant’s] chosen forum overcomes the deference given to the plaintiff’s forum choice.” Amalgamated Transit Union, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 83 (cleaned up). That analysis is therefore both derivative of the analysis for deference to the plaintiff’s forum and duplicative of the analysis of the remaining factors, such as, convenience to the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. The Court therefore focuses its analysis on the relative deference afforded to either plaintiff or defendant’s choice of forum—in other words, who actually gets deference. At any rate, the difference is semantic because the Court still considers all the factors analyzed by others (whether the plaintiff sued in their own forum, the connection of the suit to the chosen forum, and the convenience of the parties, etc.). 12 the decision was not made in the Western District of New York where OPR has no office. 8 Even after the trip to Mr. Streever’s home in the Western District of New York, the federal agents followed Mr. Streever to his hotel in the Southern District of New York. Compl. ¶ 8 Taken together, most of the relevant events did not occur in the Western District of New York, but a plurality of the events did. The Court therefore finds that the Western District of New York has a slightly stronger nexus to the claims, but not enough to tip heavily in favor of transfer. See Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2009) (“When the events occur in more than one district, a court can consider which jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus to the claims.”). Mr. Streever counters that the events primarily arose in Washington, D.C., because the “lawsuit challenges agency-level decision-making and continuing conduct.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13; see also id. at 3 (“Th[e] campaign could emanate only from DHS’s command in this district.”). Mr. Streever, however, has not alleged that any of the D.C. Defendants, or agents in the District, participated themselves in the decision to investigate his email. c. Convenience of the parties Turning to the convenience of the parties, the Court concludes that this factor militates against transfer. The convenience of Mr. Streever favors transfer because he resides in the Western District of New York, and a “plaintiff cannot reasonably claim to be inconvenienced by litigating in his home forum.” Wolfram Alpha LLC v. Cuccinelli, 490 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up). Ironically, however, he is the only party (out of eight) for whom 8 See ICE Field Offs., ICE, https://www.ice.gov/contact/field- offices?state=All&office=13&keyword= [https://perma.cc/E6W7-686R] (last visited Sep. 1, 2026). “The Court may take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government agencies.” Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022). 13 litigation in the Western District of New York would be more convenient. As Mr. Streever emphasizes, three Defendants reside in the District of Columbia, although the Court assigns less weight to the residence of high-ranking agency officials because they are unlikely to testify at trial or sit for a deposition. See Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec'y of Lab., 766 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]op executive department officials should not, absent extraordinary circumstances, be called to testify regarding their reasons for taking official actions.”). Defendants insist that the convenience of the other parties’ favor transfer because the parties in New Jersey and New York City “reside far closer to the Western District of New York than” the District of Columbia. Defs.’ Reply at 4. Despite their apparent affinity for New York, however, Defendants appear to underestimate the state’s size. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the District of Columbia is over a hundred miles closer to New York City and New Jersey than the federal courthouses in the Western District of New York (in Buffalo and Rochester), and unsurprisingly the travel time by car to the District of Columbia is much shorter. Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 n.2 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The court has the authority to take judicial notice of information contained within the public domain, such as the distance between two locations.”). It would therefore be more convenient for even these Defendants to litigate in the District of Columbia. It is not lost on the Court that both parties seek to litigate in fora that appear to be less convenient for them. Nonetheless, because two play at that game, the Court is left to weigh where on balance would be convenient for most parties. Accordingly, this factor militates against transfer. 9 9 Some courts have reasoned that a plaintiff cannot be considered inconvenienced by litigation in their chosen forum, even if it is not their home forum. See Wright & Miller § 3849 (“That the plaintiff may suffer some inconvenience in the district it chose is not an argument that 14  d. Convenience of the witnesses Convenience to the witnesses holds little sway in this case. The parties agree that this factor “matters ‘only to the extent the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora.’” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14, (quoting Ctr. for Env’t Sci., Accuracy & Reliability v. Nat’l Park Serv., 75 F. Supp. 3d 353, 357 (D.D.C. 2014)); Defs.’ Mot. at 11, 16 (similar). Many courts have said as much, but count this one skeptical. The statute instructs courts to consider “the convenience of parties and witnesses” without imposing any such qualification. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Atl. Marine Const. Co., 571 U.S. at 63 n.6 (“[P]rivate interests include . . . [the] ‘availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)); Wright & Miller § 3851 (“Courts may also take into account . . . the cost to ‘willing witnesses’ of attending trial in a particular forum.”). Although if a witness would be unavailable in a particular forum, that presumably matters more. See Wright & Miller § 3851 (“[T]he fact that important nonparty witnesses may be within the subpoena power of one court but not the other is a significant issue.”). Nonetheless, because the parties agree that the Court should only consider those who may actually be unavailable, as a matter of discretion, the Court will not challenge their consensus and deems any argument that available a defendant can make successfully in support of its transfer motion.”). That same logic might extend to defendants as well, who could be assumed to find their preferred location convenient. If that were the case, then the Court would be required to presume the Western District of New York convenient for all Defendants and the District of Columbia convenient for only Mr. Streever, in which case this factor would come out the opposite way. Neither party has made this argument, however, so the Court considers it forfeited. See Morrissey v. Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Furthermore, the Court wonders whether this approach simply repeats consideration of deference to the parties’ respective choice of forum. 15 witnesses would be inconvenienced forfeited. See Morrissey v. Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Defendants identify four sets of unavailable witnesses. They point to “neighbors, who may have seen the agents visit [the Streever’s] house” and a “Syracuse resident” who allegedly also received a warning notice. Defs.’ Mot. at 16; see Compl. ¶¶ 100–01. (Syracuse is within 100 miles of the Western District of New York courthouse in Rochester, but not Buffalo.) Defendants also identify Ms. Streever, who resides in Rochester, and “other witnesses to those events in New York.” Defs. Mot. at 16. None of these witnesses favors transfer. Starting with potential neighbors, there is no evidence that any neighbors saw the agents visit to the Streever’s residence, and given that there is camera footage of the visit, they would have needed to be within earshot to add much value through corroboration of the conversation. Compl. ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, whether either party would call such witnesses is, as Mr. Streever puts it, “purely speculative.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. For the Syracuse resident, Defendant say only that “Plaintiff may offer this Syracuse resident as a witness . . . .” Defs.’ Mot. at 16. Mr. Streever, for his part, appears ambivalent about calling the Syracuse resident, describing her testimony as “cumulative of [his] wife’s testimony.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. It is therefore also speculative that she will be called to testify. And Defendants’ invocation of unnamed “other witnesses” in New York is too vague to count. See Gubarev v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (finding that a party’s “speculation regarding their ‘potential witnesses’ is not entitled to any weight”). That leaves Ms. Streever, and the Court is hard pressed to conclude that she would not be willing to testify at trial in support of her husband who chose the District of Columbia as his forum. It is unlikely that 16 Defendants would call her to testify because they themselves can testify to what happened in Rochester. The Court therefore finds that this factor does not move the needle. e. Access to the evidence The parties identify no evidence that would be easier to use in either district. Defendants suggest that because the case arose “primarily” in the Western District of New York that “District likely will be more convenient for potential witnesses and evidence.” Defs.’ Mot. at 16 (quoting McAfee, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 19-cv-2981 (DLF), 2019 WL 6051559, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2019)). The Court has already addressed witnesses. As for other evidence, although McAfee’s presumption may be a good rule of thumb, Defendants identify no particular evidence that would be in Rochester. And given the agents’ fleeting excursion there, it is unlikely that significant relevant evidence lies there. Mr. Streever, meanwhile, argues that “notice templates, investigate records, supervisory communications, records showing how agents located Streever, and DHS’s public-response materials” are “electronic” records within Defendants’ control and not in Rochester. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. Maybe so, but given his acknowledgment that the evidence is electronic, and thus easily transportable, that does not favor venue in the District of Columbia either. See Wolfram, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 333–34 (“The weight of the location of evidence is limited by modern technology that allows most documentary evidence to be easily transferred and therefore the location of documents is less important than it once was.” (cleaned up)). f. Public-interest factors Most of the public interest factors are neutral. The parties agree that familiarity with applicable law is neutral because the case presents only issues of federal law. Defs.’ Mot. at 17; Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. 17  The Court also concludes that the “perhaps most important” public-interest factor—a forum’s interest in deciding local issues—is neutral, over both parties’ objection. Wolfram, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 338. Defendants cast this case as a local affair confined to New York. Defs. Mot. at 18. On the other end of the spectrum, Mr. Streever boasts of a case with national importance. Pl.’s Opp’n at 16–17. The Court finds that the case falls between these two extremes. The parties represent different interests in this case. Mr. Streever sues because he wants to vindicate his rights to free speech and to petition his government. See Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 13–14. Defendants resist in an effort to protect the ability of law enforcement to investigate and deter criminal threats or crimes that follow less-than-criminal threats. Defs.’ Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n) at 1, ECF No. 20. Those interests apply to both fora. No doubt, the Western District of New York has an interest in safeguarding its residents’ right to speak freely and an interest in deterring its residents from engaging in unlawful activity such as uttering criminal threats. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” (quotation omitted)); cf. Fairbanks v. Roller, 314 F. Supp. 3d 85 (D.D.C. 2018) (recognizing that anti-SLAPP laws represent a jurisdiction’s interest in protecting residents’ exercise of free speech). At the same time, the District of Columbia retains an interest in ensuring its residents hear political speech and that law enforcement can protect residents from criminal threats and deter even non-criminal threats from developing into criminal acts through investigations. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 264; cf. Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1498 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding, as part of a conflicts-of-law analysis, that the state where allegedly false speech was received retained “a greater interest in protecting free speech”). 18  The Court is therefore unpersuaded by both parties’ positions. Because of the nature of cross-border communications, the Court cannot agree with Defendants that this is a purely local dispute where the communication was made. Cf. United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In considering challenges to venue for other criminal acts, we have held that ven