Jones v. District of Columbia Office of Unified Communications
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-1129
JudgeJudge Rudolph Contreras
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALEXANDRIA JONES, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 1:25-cv-1129
:
v. : Re Document No.: 25, 26, 27
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE :
OF UNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Alexandria Jones, a former Assistant Watch Commander in the District of
Columbia’s Office of Unified Communications (“Defendant” or “OUC”), brings this action
against her former employer, alleging that OUC violated her rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”); as well as interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”). See Compl. ¶¶ 74–128, ECF No. 2. Ms. Jones alleges OUC subjected her
to discriminatory acts based on her disability once she began taking intermittent medical leave,
culminating in her eventual termination. Id. ¶¶ 17–72.
Before the Court is Ms. Jones’s motion to compel certain discovery, including responses
to interrogatories and document requests. Pl.’s Mot. Compel Disc. (“Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 25-1.
OUC filed a response objecting to Ms. Jones’s motion, reasoning that the information Ms. Jones
seeks has already been provided by OUC, and that anything further could not be found, does not
exist, or is not relevant. See Def.’s Opp. Mot. Compel Disc. (“Opp.”) at 1, ECF No. 26-1. For
the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Ms. Jones’s motion to compel
discovery.1
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The parties in an action may pursue discovery by submitting requests for document
production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 or by requesting answers to interrogatories
under Rule 33. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Iowa Values, 710 F. Supp. 3d 35, 46 (D.D.C. 2024).
When a party “fails to answer an interrogatory” or “fails to produce documents,” Rule 37 allows
the opposing party to file a motion to compel discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (a)(3)(B)(iii)–
(iv).
A motion to compel is subject to a burden-shifting framework. Iowa Values, 710 F.
Supp. 3d at 46. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the information
requested is relevant and that the opposing party’s response is inadequate or incomplete. Id.
“Relevance is construed broadly in the discovery context as ‘any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on’ any party’s claim or defense.” Id.
(citation omitted). If the movant has established relevance and incompleteness, “the burden
shifts to the party opposing discovery to show why the discovery should not be permitted.” Id.
(citation omitted). “The party opposing discovery must ‘show that the movant’s request is
burdensome, overly broad, vague, or outside the scope of discovery.’” Id. at 46–47 (citation
omitted).
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Before the Court is also Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File its Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Under Seal (ECF No. 26) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Seal
Confidential Exhibit (ECF No. 27. The Court grants both motions.
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In evaluating the motion, courts consider the parties’ efforts to resolve the dispute, the
relevance of the information sought, and whether the information sought is unreasonably
duplicative or can be obtained from a more convenient source. Barnes v. District of Columbia,
289 F.R.D. 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2012). “A trial court has considerable discretion over discovery
matters.” Bruch v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc., No. CV 11-1101 (TFH/AK), 2014 WL
12799160, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2014) (citing United States v. Krizek, 192 F.3d 1024, 1029
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
III. ANALYSIS
At issue here are OUC’s responses to multiple interrogatory requests and requests for
production that Ms. Jones alleges are deficient or missing wholly from OUC’s discovery
production. See generally Mot. During discovery, Ms. Jones sent OUC a deficiency notice
identifying categories of deficient responses. Id. at 3. Following that notice, OUC made a
supplemental production of documents. Id. at 4. Nevertheless, Ms. Jones contends that the
production partially addressed only two of the categories but left the remaining categories
untouched. Id. Ms. Jones now moves to compel a response from OUC that fully addresses her
discovery requests. See id. at 1. Further, Ms. Jones requests a sworn declaration from a records
custodian detailing the searches conducted by OUC in its efforts to respond to Jones’s request for
documents. Id. at 17. Finally, Ms. Jones requests her reasonable fees and expenses under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Id. at 18. The Court addresses each allegedly deficient or missing category
in turn.
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A. OUC’s allegedly deficient responses to interrogatories and requests for production
1. Decision-Maker Communications and Termination-Decision Documents
Ms. Jones moves to compel additional documents responsive to Request for Production
(RFP) Nos. 3, 9, and 19. Mot. at 8–9. RFP No. 3 requested all communications among OUC
employees concerning Ms. Jones’s FMLA leave. Id. RFP No. 9 sought all documents
concerning the termination decision. Id. at 9. RFP No. 19 requested all communications,
including emails, texts messages, and instant messages, among named OUC employees that
mentioned Ms. Jones by name during the relevant time period. Id. at 8–9. Because OUC
maintains that it has produced additional documents since Ms. Jones filed her motion, rendering
Ms. Jones’s motion moot, see Opp. at 7–8, the Court considers whether OUC conduced an
adequate search or whether additional searches and production are warranted. The Court
concludes that although the additional production OUC made after Ms. Jones filed her motion
has rendered some of her requests moot, limited additional discovery is still warranted.
Ms. Jones asserts OUC “has produced no emails, text messages, or Teams messages
among the decision-makers for the period spanning the August 29 termination request, the
September 7 internal complaint, the September 12 DCHR approval, and the September 14
termination letter.” Mot. at 9. Under the burden-shifting framework, Ms. Jones bears the initial
burden of demonstrating that the information requested is relevant and that OUC’s response is
inadequate or incomplete. See Iowa Values, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 46. Communications among
decision-makers in the days surrounding an adverse action are core causation and pretext
evidence. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001); Saint-Jean v.
District of Columbia, 844 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2012). Moreover, Ms. Jones points to
OUC’s interrogatory answers in which OUC acknowledges that “McGaffin, Williams, Jackson,
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and Glover may have discussed Plaintiff’s behavior and termination with one another in August
2023.” Mot. at 9. Therefore, Ms. Jones has demonstrated the relevance of the information
requested.
Ms. Jones has not demonstrated that OUC’s response is inadequate regarding the email
communications. After Ms. Jones filed her motion, OUC represented that those communications
have since been searched and produced. Opp. at 7–8. Ms. Jones did not file a reply, so OUC’s
representation remains unrebutted. Accordingly, the Court will not require OUC to conduct a
second search. However, Ms. Jones has demonstrated that OUC’s response is inadequate
regarding her requests for text messages and Teams communications. Ms. Jones asserts that,
despite her specific requests for these categories of information, OUC has provided no “text
messages, or Teams messages among the decision-makers,” and that this information is still
missing even after OUC’s response and supplemental productions. Mot. at 9.
As Ms. Jones has met her burden regarding her request for production of text messages
and Teams communications, the burden shifts to OUC to prove the discovery request is
burdensome or should otherwise not be permitted. See Iowa Values, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 46–47.
In response, OUC states that “[d]ue to technological limitations, searching texts and Teams is far
more difficult than searching email.” Opp. at 8. However, OUC does not explain the nature of
those limitations, what a search would entail, or the burden such a search would impose. Courts
considering similar objections have required more. See Tangle Inc. v. Aritzia LP, No. 23-CV-
01196-JSW (KAW), 2025 WL 3687906, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (rejecting an
insufficiently explained burden objection to producing non-email communications); cf. Harper v.
FirstKey Homes, LLC, No. 3:25-CV-642-L-BW, 2025 WL 3204729, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17,
2024) (limiting Teams discovery after considering a chief information officer’s affidavit
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concerning the burden of additional production). Accordingly, the Court concludes that OUC
must conduct a search for text messages and Teams communications among the relevant
decisionmakers leading up to Jones’s termination, comprised of the time period of August 29,
2023, through September 14, 2023.2
Additionally, Ms. Jones asserts OUC has not produced any of the “supporting
documentation from 911 leadership” referenced in Director McGaffin’s August 29, 2023,
memorandum requesting authorization to terminate Ms. Jones’s employment. Mot. at 6, 9. The
requested information is relevant because, as Ms. Jones explains, the memorandum states that
McGaffin reviewed “supporting documentation from 911 leadership” before requesting
authorization to terminate Ms. Jones’s employment. Id. Because the documentation informed
the decision to terminate Ms. Jones, it bears directly on the reasons underlying that decision.
OUC does not specifically address whether its more recent production includes these documents.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a limited search for any unproduced documentation
responsive to this request is warranted.
2. Promotional Selection Materials
Ms. Jones moves to compel production of documents responsive to RFP Nos. 5, 6, 7, 15,
which relate to her unsuccessful application for two positions within OUC: a 311 Operations
Division supervisory position (the 311 position), and a Watch Commander position. Mot. at
9–10. RFP Nos. 5 and 6 request all documents concerning Ms. Jones’s application for the 311
position and the Watch Commander position, respectively, as well as information relating to
candidate evaluations. Def.’s Reponses to Pl.’s First Request for Production of Documents
2
Before OUC conducts its search, the parties shall meet-and-confer in good faith to
negotiate search terms and custodians.
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(“Def.’s Response to RFP”) at 3–4, ECF No. 26-4. RFP No. 7 requests all communications
between hiring decision-makers concerning the decision not to interview Ms. Jones for either
position. Id. at 4. RFP No. 15 requests application materials for individuals selected for the 311
position and the Watch Commander position in 2023. Id. at 7.
Ms. Jones asserts OUC “has produced only conclusory interview notes.” Mot. at 10. Ms.
Jones suggests that the requested materials could illuminate OUC’s selection criteria, how that
criteria was applied across candidates, and the reasons for Jones’s non-selection. Id. at 10. The
information requested is thus relevant. See Cruz v. McAleenan, 931 F.3d 1186, 1192–93 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). OUC represents that it has produced responsive materials on February 20, July 22,
and August 3, 2026.3 Opp. at 8. It therefore maintains that its production is complete and the
motion is moot. Id. at 9. Because Ms. Jones did not file a reply, the OUC’s response is again
unrebutted. The Court therefore concludes that OUC’s subsequent production renders the
request moot.
3. FMLA, ADA Interactive-Process and Accommodation Records
Ms. Jones moves to compel the production of documents relating to her FMLA leave and
ADA accommodation requests. RFP Nos. 2 and 3 concern Ms. Jones’s application and approval
for FMLA leave. Def.’s Response to RFP at 2. RFP No. 12 concerns Ms. Jones’s ADA
3
OUC acknowledges that Jones’s counsel notified him that some of the documents OUC
produced appeared to concern a different position not at issue in this litigation. Opp. at 8 n.1.
Jones provided the correct posting number, and OUC stated in its August 4, 2026, opposition that
it would “promptly confirm whether any additional responsive documents exist and produce
them accordingly.” Id. The Court has no basis to question OUC’s initial assertion that it would
provide all relevant documents. See Jefferson v. Austin, 345 F.R.D. 249, 260 (D.D.C. 2024)
(“The Department stated that it would provide the responsive documents and, absent any
explanation or justification for withholding any such documents, the Court will hold the
Department to its statement that it has done so.”). To the extent that OUC has not produced this
information, Ms. Jones should promptly bring it to the Court’s attention.
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complaints and requests for accommodation. Id. at 6. Ms. Jones asserts OUC has not produced
documents reflecting what it describes in its interrogatory as its “standard practice of assessing
an employee’s condition and limitations, exploring and implementing accommodations, and
communicating with the employee at each step. . . .” Mot. at 10–11. Because these documents
“go directly to liability,” id. at 11, Ms. Jones has met her initial burden.
OUC responds that it has completed a reasonable search for all nonprivileged responsive
materials and has produced all responsive documents. Opp. at 9. Therefore, OUC maintains that
Ms. Jones’s motion is moot. Id. However, Ms. Jones states that on June 30, 2026, OUC
confirmed that “it received these records and would produce them promptly.” Mot. at 11.
Although OUC’s opposition identifies documents it produced in February, Opp. at 9, it fails to
explain whether the subsequently received records OUC referred to on June 30 were also
produced. OUC’s opposition does not resolve the apparent discrepancy, and OUC has not
identified any burden or basis for withholding responsive materials. Accordingly, the Court
directs OUC to produce any previously unproduced documents responsive to RFP Nos. 2, 3, 12
that it acknowledged it received in June 2026.
4. Privilege Log
Ms. Jones moves to compel OUC to serve a compliant privilege log or to certify that no
responsive documents are withheld on any claim of privilege or protection. Mot. at 11.
Subsequent to Ms. Jones’s motion, OUC served a privilege log. Opp. at 12. Again, because Ms.
Jones failed to file any reply rebutting OUC’s assertion, Ms. Jones’s motion to compel on this
issue is moot.
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5. FMLA Comparator Information
Ms. Jones moves to compel a supplemental, complete answer to Interrogatory No. 11,
which requests the names, positions, FMLA leave dates, termination dates, and stated reasons for
termination of OUC employees “who used FMLA leave during 2023 and were subsequently
terminated within 180 days of using such leave.” Def.’s Answer to Pl.’s First Interrogatories
(“Def.’s Response to Interrogatories”) at 7, ECF No. 26-5. Ms. Jones alleges that OUC
improperly considered her FMLA leave in deciding to terminate her employment. Mot. at 12.
So, Ms. Jones argues, information concerning other employees terminated after using FMLA
leave could shed light on OUC’s treatment of employees who exercised those rights and whether
such leave factored into termination decisions. See id. “Comparative information concerning an
employer’s treatment of [protected groups] is relevant evidence in an individual discrimination
claim against that employer. Such evidence can be used…to show that the employer’s stated
reasons for the challenged actions are a pretext for discrimination.” Cruz, 931 F.3d at 1192
(citation omitted). In addition to the requested information being relevant, OUC’s response to
the request is incomplete because it has declined to provide the information requested.
In its objection to providing this information, OUC raises proportionality and privacy
concerns. As OUC explains, employees may take FMLA leave for different reasons and be
terminated under different circumstances, limiting the value of the requested information. See
Opp. at 15–16. Whether discovery is proportional is determined by weighing six factors: “(1)
the importance of the issues at stake in the action; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’
relative access to relevant information; (4) the parties’ resources; (5) the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues; and (6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Oxbow Carbon & Mins. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
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322 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “No single factor is designed to
outweigh the other factors in determining whether the discovery sought is proportional.” Oxbow,
322 F.R.D. at 6 (citation omitted). To satisfy the burden of showing that a discovery request is
not proportional, “the refusing party must make a specific, detailed showing.” Lamaute v.
Power, 339 F.R.D. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2021).
The Court finds this request proportional because, amongst other reasons, it is limited to a
class of employees (those with FMLA leave) and narrowly tailored to the year in which Ms.
Jones was terminated. See Nuskey v. Lambright, 251 F.R.D. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[D]iscovery
should be reasonably related to the circumstances involved in the alleged discrimination and to a
time frame involving the alleged discriminatory conduct and the individuals who are allegedly
involved in that conduct.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, in weighing the six factors to be
assessed in determining whether a request is proportionate, the Court finds factors one, three,
five, and six weigh greatly in favor of granting Ms. Jones’s requests. While the Court finds the
other factors (two and four) are insignificant they nonetheless also favor the granting of the
discovery request.
First, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, weighs in favor of granting Ms.
Jones’s request. Cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, “may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note to 1983 amendment. Second, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information further weighs in favor of granting Ms. Jones’s request. The burden of responding
to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The Court finds Ms. Jones lacks access to the comparator
information she requests, while OUC is in possession of the relevant information. As such, this
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“information asymmetry,” id., weighs in favor of granting the discovery request. See Lamaute,
339 F.R.D. at 36.
Third, the District of Columbia’s resources far outweigh those of an individual plaintiff.
Fourth, the importance of discovery in resolving the issues is high because the requested
discovery goes to a central issue at the “very heart of the litigation”—Ms. Jones’s discrimination
claim. Oxbow, 322 F.R.D. at 8. Comparator information is relevant evidence in an individual’s
discrimination claim. Cruz, 931 F.3d at 1192. Such evidence can be used to show pretext for
discrimination. Id. Although OUC argues the information requested does not meet the standard
for appropriate comparator evidence, that is not the standard during discovery. See Waters v.
U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 216 F.R.D. 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2003). It is enough that the requested
information could lead to the development of appropriate comparator evidence. Id. Fifth and
finally, OUC has failed to demonstrate a significant burden or expense in producing the
requested information. Accordingly, the likely benefit of the requested discovery is greater than
any perceived burden on OUC, thus the Court finds the requested discovery proportional and not
unduly burdensome.
With respect to OUC’s asserted privacy concerns, Ms. Jones agreed to receive the
information with “names replaced by unique identifiers, together with limited additional fields
needed to evaluate whether the comparators are meaningful, such as supervisor, deciding
official, and job duties or title.” Mot. at 13. Additionally, a protective order is in place. Id.
OUC does not explain why these measures are insufficient to alleviate any purported privacy
concern. The Court therefore directs OUC to provide a supplemental answer to the information
requested in Interrogatory No. 11. In doing so, it may use unique anonymous identifiers as
agreed to by the parties.
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6. Cancelled Performance Evaluations
Ms. Jones seeks additional document discovery concerning the cancellation of her
performance evaluations. RFP No. 1 requests her complete personnel file, including
performance evaluations and related records. Mot. at 13. Specifically, Ms. Jones contends that
although OUC produced a “performance history log confirming that Plaintiff’s evaluations for
three consecutive cycles were marked ‘Cancelled,’” the records do not show “who cancelled the
evaluations, when, or why.” Mot. at 13–14.
The Court assumes without deciding that the documents requested are relevant.
However, Ms. Jones has not demonstrated that OUC’s production is inadequate or incomplete.
Although the cancellation of several evaluations raises questions, it does not necessarily establish
that additional documents explaining those cancellations exist. See Hubbard v. Potter, 247
F.R.D. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[S]peculation that there is more will not suffice; if the theoretical
possibility that more documents exist sufficed to justify additional discovery, discovery would
never end”). Consequently, Ms. Jones has not met her burden to establish that OUC’s response
is inadequate and the Court, therefore, denies Ms. Jones’s motion with respect to RFP No. 1.
7. Internal-Complaint Investigation Records
Ms. Jones seeks additional documents concerning her September 7, 2023, internal
discrimination complaint. RFP No. 8 requests documents relating to that complaint, including
“any investigation file, notes, or records.” Def.’s Response to RFP at 4. Specifically, Ms. Jones
contends that OUC produced only her complaint email and Director McGaffin’s September 8,
2023, acknowledgement, which referred Ms. Jones to an EEO coordinator. Mot. at 14. Ms.
Jones says the record “reflects no investigative step of any kind.” Id.
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The Court assumes without deciding that the documents requested are relevant.
However, Ms. Jones has not demonstrated that OUC’s production is inadequate or incomplete.
As the court explained in Hubbard, the mere possibility that additional documents exist does not
justify further discovery. See 247 F.R.D. at 29. Rather, the evidence must permit a reasonable
deduction that other responsive documents exist. Id. Here, Director McGaffin’s
acknowledgement and referral to an EEO coordinator does not by itself support a reasonable
inference that OUC conducted an investigation. Furthermore, OUC represents that it has
completed a reasonable search and produced all the responsive documents. Opp. at 11.
Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Jones’s motion with respect to RFP No. 8.
8. The Calvin Williams Statement
Ms. Jones moves to compel additional discovery concerning an alleged August 12, 2023,
statement by Operations Manager Calvin Williams that Jones was “using FMLA as an excuse to
get out of work.” Mot. at 15. RFP No. 4 requests documents concerning the purported
statement. Id. Interrogatory No. 7 further asked OUC to identify individuals who witnessed it.
Id. Additionally, Interrogatory No. 8 asked OUC to indicate whether it responded to reports of
the statement and, if so, to describe what actions it took. Id. Ms. Jones contends that, although
OUC produced a complaint email documenting the statement and an audio recording, it produced
no records reflecting an investigation or witness interviews; instead, OUC simply responded that
“it does not believe” the statement was made. Id.
The Court assumes without deciding that the information and documents requested are
relevant. However, Ms. Jones has not demonstrated that OUC’s production is inadequate or
incomplete. In response to RFP No. 4, OUC represents that it searched for these documents and
did not find anything. Def.’s Response to RFP at 3. “[T]he Court cannot compel [the non-
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movant] to produce materials that it does not possess or information it does not have.” Steele v.
United States, No. 1:14-CV-01523-RCL, 2022 WL 2817835, at *5 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022).
In response to Interrogatory No. 7, OUC responded that it does not believe Mr. Williams
made this statement. Def.’s Response to Interrogatories at 5. And in response to Interrogatory
No. 8, OUC responded that it “did not receive any reports concerning the alleged statement Mr.
Willaims made” and “Ms. Jones is the only individual who claims to have heard Mr. Williams
make any statements about Ms. Jones’s use of FMLA leave.” Id. at 6. Ms. Jones identifies no
basis for concluding that OUC has additional information concerning potential witnesses.
Further, Ms. Jones identifies no basis for concluding that OUC received any reports or that its
answers were otherwise incomplete. The Court therefore denies Ms. Jones’s motion with respect
to RFP No. 4, Interrogatory No. 7 and Interrogatory No. 8.
9. Complete Sworn Interrogatory Answers
Ms. Jones moves to compel supplemental sworn answers to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 5, 14,
and 16. Mot. at 16. Interrogatory No. 2 asks OUC to identify all reasons for its decision and the
facts supporting each reason. Def.’s Response to Interrogatories at 2. Interrogatory No. 3 asks
OUC to identify, for each reason, the supporting documents, persons with knowledge of the
relevant facts, and the date on which OUC became aware of those facts. Id. at 3. This
information is directly relevant to Ms. Jones’s claims. Instead of providing complete answers to
these interrogatories, Ms. Jones contends that OUC improperly relied on FRCP 33(d) by simply
referring to produced documents. Mot. at 16.
Although Rule 33(d) permits a responding party to identify business records in lieu of an
answer, that option is only available when (1) the requested information can be ascertained from
those records and (2) the burden of doing so is substantially the same for either party. See Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 33(d). The responding party must also specify the relevant records “in sufficient detail
to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party
could.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). Here, although OUC’s identified documents may contain
evidence responsive to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, it does not explain how the information
sought can be ascertained from those documents. Nor has OUC explained whether the
referenced documents identify all persons with knowledge of the relevant facts supporting each
termination reason. And OUC has not shown that Ms. Jones could derive the requested answers
from those documents with substantially the same effort as OUC. Accordingly, the Court grants
Ms. Jones’s motion with respect to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3.
Interrogatory No. 5 asked OUC to “state whether any person at OUC recommended,
suggested, or discussed terminating Alexandria Jones prior to September 7, 2023, and if so,
identify each such person, the date, and the substance of the recommendation or discussion.”
Def.’s Response to Interrogatories at 4. The Court assumes without deciding that the
information requested is relevant. OUC responded to this interrogatory with objections rather
than responsive information. OUC bases its objection on its claim that this “interrogatory is
unduly burdensome, as it would require canvassing the many OUC employees who were
offended by Ms. Jones’s conduct to determine whether any of them opined (prior to September
7, 2023) that she should be fired,” and further objects that the interrogatory is duplicative of
other interrogatories. Id. at 4–5. Because the Court finds that this request seeks the same
information sought by Interrogatory No. 4, it denies Ms. Jones’s motion with respect to
Interrogatory No. 5.
Interrogatory No. 14 asks OUC to “identify each person who participated in the decision
not to interview Alexandria Jones for either the 311 Operations Division supervisory position or
15
the Watch Commander position, including their name, title, role in the decision, and whether
they were aware of Jones’s FMLA status or her medical condition at the time of the decision.”
Id. at 8. OUC objects “to the extent it misstates facts and is otherwise duplicative,” stating Ms.
Jones “was interviewed for the Watch Commander role and was not chosen due to her lack of
experience.” Id. OUC further responds by referring Ms. Jones to the location of documents by
the associated Bates numbers and to its answer to Interrogatory No. 12. Id.
As to the 311 position, the interrogatory is completely answered by reference to
interrogatory answer 12: “Ms. Jones was not selected for an interview for the 311 Operations
Division supervisory position because that role was extinguished at the agency. Nobody filled
that role because the role no longer existed.” Id. at 7. As to the Watch Commander position,
OUC’s response that Ms. Jones was interviewed for the Watch Commander role logically
indicates that no individuals participated in the decision not to interview Ms. Jones for the
position because she was, in fact, interviewed for that position. Therefore, the interrogatory is
completely answered. The Court denies Ms. Jones’s motion with respect to Interrogatory No.
14.
Interrogatory No. 16 asks OUC to “Identify the individual(s) selected for the 311
Operations Division supervisory position and the Watch Commander position in 2023, including
for each: Name and current position; Date of hire with OUC; Years of experience in supervisory
positions as of the time of selection; Whether the individual had previously acted in a Watch
Commander or supervisory capacity at OUC.” Id. at 8. OUC objects “to the extent it seeks
confidential District employee data not subject to disclosure without the consent of the District
employee(s) at issue,” and refers Ms. Jones to District of Columbia’s Department of Human
Resources Electronic District Personnel Manual (DCHR E-DPM) Chapter 31. Id. at 9. OUC
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further objects to this request as overbroad and unduly burdensome “in that it seeks information
irrelevant to the claims at issue and therefore unlikely to lead to admissible evidence.” Id.
As to the 311 position, the interrogatory is completely answered by reference to
interrogatory answer 12: “Nobody filled that role because the role no longer existed.” Id. at 7.
As to the Watch Commander position, OUC argues DCHR E-DPM bars the disclosure of this
information. However, they have not made a clear showing why the information requested falls
under this protection. See Jefferson v. Austin, 345 F.R.D. 249, 259 (D.D.C. 2024) (“The
Department cites to the statute without providing any reasoning for how the information
Jefferson seeks falls under the ambit of the statute.”). Further, under DCHR E-DPM Ch. 31 §
3102.4: “The Office of Personnel or an Independent Personnel Authority may disclose, without
prior consent of the data subject, specified information from a system of personnel records
whenever such disclosure is pursuant to an order issued by any of the following:…Court of
competent jurisdiction, including the judicial system of the United States, the District of
Columbia.” And under § 3113.1, “The following information about most present and former
government employees shall be available to the public: Name; Present and past position titles;
Present and past grades; Present and past salaries; Present and past duty stations.” It appears that
much of the information requested may permissibly be disclosed. Further, confidentiality and
privacy interests are protected by the protective order entered in this case, which allows sensitive
information to be filed under seal. Accordingly, the Court grants Ms. Jones’s motion with
respect to Interrogatory No. 16 and orders OUC to supplement the response in relation to the
Watch Commander position.
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B. Sworn Search Declaration
Ms. Jones moves to compel OUC to serve “a declaration from a knowledgeable IT or
records custodian identifying, for each category at issue, the custodians searched; the systems
and platforms searched, including email, Microsoft Teams, and text messages on District-issued
or District managed devices; the search terms and date ranges applied; whether responsive
materials were located and withheld; and, for any channel not searched, the reason.” Mot. at 17.
Ms. Jones does not cite to any authority supporting such a request. Although OUC’s
acknowledgement of difficulties obtaining some of those communications raised limited
questions concerning its searches (see e.g., supra Section 1, text messages & Teams
communications), the Court has addressed those limited concerns by ordering the targeted
additional discovery described above. Otherwise, the Court denies Ms. Jones’s request for a
sworn search declaration.
C. Reasonable Expenses
Ms. Jones requests her reasonable expenses incurred in bringing this motion under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Mot. at 18. Because the Court grants Ms. Jones’s motion in part, the Court
has discretion in deciding whether to apportion the parties’ reasonable expenses. See Jefferson,
345 F.R.D. at n.5 (citing Baylor v. Mitchelle Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 857 F.3d 939, 951
(D.C. Cir. 2017)). Courts apportion reasonable expenses by looking at each individual claim for
relief and determining whether the actions of the non-prevailing party were “substantially
justified.” Buie v. D.C., 327 F.R.D. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2018) (“A party meets the ‘substantially
justified’ standard when there is a ‘genuine dispute’ or if ‘reasonable people could differ’ as to
the appropriateness of the motion.”). Courts also look at the relative success of the parties. Id.
In this case, the Court is granting in part and denying in part Ms. Jones’s motion, and OUC
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presented no bad faith or frivolous objections to the discovery requests. These circumstances
weigh against an award of expenses. See e.g., Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, No. CV 16-1723
(RC), 2020 WL 5291982, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’
fees and expenses “because the Court cannot conclude that defendants unjustifiably withheld
certain documents…in bad faith”); Holland v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., No. 07-1050,
2008 WL 11501533, at *4 (denying fees where the parties have “legitimate disputes” about
whether certain types of evidence are relevant). Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Jones’s
request for reasonable expenses. Each party shall bear its own costs and fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART, Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File its Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Under Seal (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to Seal Confidential Exhibit (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. An order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: November 16, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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