Ibrahima Dieng v. Orkin, LLC

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 1 of 28 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1221 IBRAHIMA DIENG, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ORKIN, LLC, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Lydia Kay Griggsby, District Judge. (8:21-cv-00482-LKG) Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: August 5, 2026 Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part by published opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Quattlebaum wrote a separate opinion concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part. ARGUED: Richard Allen Salzman, HELLER, HURON, CHERTKOF & SALZMAN, PLLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Charles Joseph Kresslein, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sharon T. Rogart, HELLER, HURON, CHERTKOF & SALZMAN, PLLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 2 of 28 BERNER, Circuit Judge: Over sixty-one million people in the United States contend with physical or mental disabilities that impact their lives, including their ability to engage in gainful employment. 1 Far too often, discrimination and prejudice place barriers in front of individuals with disabilities, impeding them from competing on an equal basis and pursuing opportunities that should be available to all members of our society. Through passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Congress sought to eradicate these invidious barriers that long relegated individuals with disabilities to the margins of economic and civil life. Within the employment context, the ADA not only prohibits discrimination based on disability, but absent undue hardship, specifically requires employers to provide workplace adjustments—known as “reasonable accommodations”—to allow workers with disabilities the same workplace opportunities as those without disabilities. Ibrahima Dieng worked at Orkin as a pest control technician for many years. After suffering a workplace injury, Dieng went on leave. Upon his recovery, Dieng informed Orkin that he was ready to return to work. He could no longer work as a pest control technician, however, because of a disability that resulted from his workplace injury. He repeatedly asked to be reassigned to a less physically demanding position. Such positions are known as “light-duty positions.” 1 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevalence of Disabilities and Health Care Access by Disability Status and Type Among Adults, (Apr. 11, 2025), https://www.cdc.gov/disability-and-health/articles-documents/disabilities-health-care- access.html [https://perma.cc/R7FF-KHZU]. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 3 of 28 Orkin ignored Dieng’s requests for reassignment and did not reach out to him to discuss light-duty positions. All the while, Dieng remained on unpaid leave. After sixteen months, he submitted his resignation. Dieng sued Orkin under the ADA, alleging that Orkin failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and unlawfully terminated him on the basis of his disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Orkin on both claims. On appeal, Dieng argues summary judgment was inappropriate because a reasonable jury could conclude that Orkin failed to meet its legal obligation to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. We agree. While Dieng was no longer able to work as a pest control technician because of his disability, genuine disputes of material fact remain as to whether Orkin was obligated to reassign him to a light-duty position. On Dieng’s claim of unlawful disability discrimination, we agree with the district court that summary judgment was appropriate. Dieng failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on this second claim before filing his lawsuit, and thus it was properly dismissed. Accordingly, we vacate in part and affirm in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. I. Factual Background We recount the facts from the record in the light most favorable to Dieng, the nonmovant, as is required upon review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2025). 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 4 of 28 A. Dieng’s Employment at Orkin Ibrahima Dieng worked as a pest control technician for Orkin, LLC (Orkin) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. In this role, Dieng drove to customers’ locations to inspect for pests and, when necessary, to treat the premises with pesticides. The pest control technician position is physically demanding and requires technicians to, among other tasks, kneel, climb, crawl, and lift heavy equipment often exceeding fifty pounds. As part of his work, Dieng sold pest control services to customers and was eligible to earn commissions from those sales. By all accounts, Dieng performed well in his position. Supervisors attested to Dieng’s skills and abilities and his strong customer relationships. Dieng suffered three different workplace injuries during his time at Orkin, for which he submitted claims for workers’ compensation. The last injury, which occurred in February 2016, led to the disabling condition which is at the heart of this case. While servicing a building, Dieng slipped and injured his right knee cap. He went out on leave from his work. Following a period of rehabilitation, in July 2016, Dieng’s doctor advised him that, though he would be unable to return to work as a pest control technician, he was cleared to return to work in a less physically demanding position. Specifically, Dieng’s treating physician determined that Dieng would be able to lift up to twenty pounds and directed 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 5 of 28 him to avoid “repetitive stopping, bending, twisting, prolonged sitting or standing.” Parties’ Joint Appendix (J.A) 916. Dieng submitted copies of his physician’s notes to Orkin. Eager to return to work, on August 18, 2016, Dieng sent a text message to his Orkin branch manager, Blake Hunter. Dieng wrote that he had been cleared by his treating physician to return to work in a light-duty position. Recalling that Hunter had once told him that no light-duty positions were available, Dieng asked him whether anything had changed. Hunter never responded to Dieng’s text message. Four days after he sent this text message, Dieng emailed Hunter to inquire whether he had received the text. Dieng told Hunter that he had called Orkin’s main office and was informed that Hunter was unavailable. This time, Hunter wrote back, but he said nothing about Dieng’s injury, his request to return to work, or his need for a light-duty assignment. Hunter simply replied that he would ask someone from Orkin’s “[r]isk department” to contact Dieng. J.A. 912. In his deposition, Hunter testified that he could not recall whether he had ever, in fact, contacted Orkin’s “risk department,” nor could he remember whether he ever followed up with Dieng after their email exchange. While Hunter testified that he spoke with a representative of Orkin’s human resources department about Dieng’s request, he acknowledged that he never received a response and that he never followed up. No one from Orkin ever reached out to Dieng to discuss his physical limitations, the type of light-duty work he might be able to perform, or whether such positions were available. In late August 2016, Dieng underwent a functional capacity evaluation with a physician to determine the extent of his physical capabilities and limitations following his 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 6 of 28 workplace injury. The report from this evaluation, which was provided to Orkin, concluded that Dieng would be able to hold a position with light to medium physical demands. In early October 2016, Dieng’s counsel sent Orkin a letter notifying the company that Dieng, who was still on unpaid leave, was “eager to return to gainful employment” and asking to be advised “in writing when light duty bec[a]me[] available.” J.A. 41. The following week, Dieng’s counsel again informed Orkin, this time by email, that Dieng’s physician had given his approval for Dieng to engage in light-duty work. One month after these communications from his counsel, Dieng emailed Hunter asking for updates about possible light-duty positions. Dieng informed Hunter that Orkin’s risk department never followed up with him after their previous email exchange. Hunter’s response was terse, stating only that he was unaware of any light-duty positions. Through discovery in this case, however, Dieng was able to identify two categories of light-duty positions at Orkin he contends he could have performed: customer service roles and sales representative roles. During his years of experience as a pest control technician, Dieng had become skilled at sales and customer relations and acquired deep knowledge of Orkin’s customers, operations, and products. Dieng contends these skills and knowledge made him a suitable candidate for both categories of light-duty positions. Orkin customer service workers provide administrative and customer support. They respond to customer calls, manage customer accounts, and record customer payments. In his deposition, Hunter acknowledged that Dieng would have been able to perform the tasks required for a customer service position and knew of no reason he was not suitable for such a role. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 7 of 28 Orkin sales representatives solicit sales opportunities with prospective customers, inspect prospective customers’ properties for pest control needs, and propose pest control treatment plans. While the job description for the sales representative position states that sales representatives are frequently required to carry up to twenty pounds and must occasionally carry up to sixty, the physical requirements for sales representatives vary. Dieng was knowledgeable about the requirements of the sales position and the duties of the position. He attested that he could have handled the amount of physical labor required for the sales position, which was less physically rigorous than his previous position as a pest control technician. After Dieng asked to return to light-duty work and before he submitted his resignation, Orkin filled several vacant customer service and sales representative positions in the greater metropolitan region near the Orkin branch where Dieng was based. Yet no one from Orkin contacted Dieng about any of these vacancies. On March 13, 2017, Dieng filed a charge with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (MCCR), which was cross-filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Dieng filed an amended charge on May 25, 2017. In both charges, Dieng alleges that Orkin discriminated against him by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability. After filing these charges with the MCCR, Dieng remained on unpaid leave. In the summer of 2017, he settled his outstanding workers’ compensation claims against Orkin. The settlement did not require Dieng to release claims beyond his workers’ compensation claims. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 8 of 28 All told, Dieng remained on leave for sixteen months before he submitted his resignation on June 7, 2017. Dieng contends that during this “time Orkin refused to provide [him] with a light duty accommodation, [he] had seven mouths to feed, and [his] family relied upon [his] employment to meet [their] basic needs and expenses.” J.A. 850. Dieng stated unequivocally in his sworn declaration that he “would have taken any less physically onerous job that Orkin offered [him].” Id. II. Procedural Background Dieng filed this civil action in February 2021 in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Dieng amended his complaint in July 2021. The amended complaint contains two claims of disability discrimination under the ADA: that Orkin failed to accommodate his disability and that Orkin unlawfully terminated him because of his disability. After the parties completed discovery, Orkin moved for summary judgment on both of Dieng’s claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The district court granted Orkin’s motion in its entirety. Dieng v. Orkin, LLC, No. 21-cv-0482-LKG, 2025 WL 403794, at *11 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2025). The district court concluded that Dieng’s failure to accommodate claim could not succeed because the “unrebutted evidence show[ed] that [Dieng] could not perform the essential duties of his po[si]tion with a reasonable accommodation[.]” Id. at *7. The district court further found that Orkin reasonably accommodated Dieng’s disability by placing him on indefinite unpaid leave. Id. at *9. As to Dieng’s claim of unlawful termination, the district court found that Dieng voluntarily 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 9 of 28 resigned from his position and, therefore, his unlawful termination claim failed. Id. at *10. Dieng timely appealed. III. Analysis We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Wannamaker- Amos, 126 F.4th at 254. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Offs. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The ADA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA differs from other laws that prohibit workplace discrimination in that it creates an affirmative obligation on the part of employers. The term “discriminate,” as it is used in the ADA, includes the failure to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is . . . an employee,” absent undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). Thus, an employer must take proactive action in the form of workplace adjustments, known as “reasonable accommodations,” to allow its employees to “obtain the same workplace opportunities that 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 10 of 28 those without disabilities automatically enjoy.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002). When an employee seeks an accommodation for his disability, the employer is expected to take steps to determine whether an accommodation can reasonably be made. This process—which has come to be known as the “interactive process”—is the practical mechanism by which the promise of reasonable accommodation becomes a workplace reality. The interactive process “giv[es] employers and employees a chance to work together to figure out what accommodation, if any, would be reasonable and not unduly burdensome.” Tarquinio v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab, 141 F.4th 568, 574 (4th Cir. 2025). At its core, the interactive process is a good-faith, collaborative dialogue between the employer and the employee aimed at identifying effective accommodations for an employee’s known limitations—even if such limitations were not initially present at the outset of employment. Sometimes, these accommodations may include “the provision of qualified readers or interpreters;” sometimes, the accommodations may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules;” and sometimes, as in this case, the accommodations may include “reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). The type of accommodation depends on the circumstances of each employee and employer. This case requires us to consider whether it is consistent with the ADA for an employer to decline to reassign a disabled employee to an available position he would be able to perform, and instead to keep the employee on indefinite, unpaid leave. We hold that it is not. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 11 of 28 A. Failure to Accommodate We first consider whether genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Orkin failed to accommodate Dieng’s disability. To make out a failure to accommodate claim, Dieng must show: 1) that he was disabled; 2) that Orkin was on notice of his disability; 3) that he was able to perform the essential functions of his position (or his desired position) with or without a reasonable accommodation; and 4) that Orkin failed to make such an accommodation. See Tarquinio, 141 F.4th at 573; Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234, 238–39 (4th Cir. 2021); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Dieng readily meets his burden on the first and second elements, as the parties agree. Dieng was disabled, and Orkin was on notice of his disability. The parties contest whether material facts remain in dispute regarding the third and fourth elements: whether Dieng was able to perform the essential functions of his desired position with a reasonable accommodation; and whether Orkin refused to provide such an accommodation. We address these two elements in turn. i. Essential Functions The district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because, even with reasonable accommodation, Dieng could no longer perform the essential functions of his former position as a pest control technician. Dieng, 2025 WL 403794, at *9. A position’s “function is essential as long as it ‘bears more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue.’” Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1009 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 279 (4th Cir. 2004)). The district 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 12 of 28 court did not consider whether Dieng could perform the essential functions of the light-duty positions he desired. Where a disabled employee seeks an accommodation of reassignment, the employee must be able to show that he can perform the essential functions of the position he desires, not the essential functions of the job he holds. See EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016). That Dieng could no longer perform all the duties of a pest control technician is, therefore, beside the point. We must examine whether Dieng produced evidence that he could perform the essential job functions of either the customer service or the sales representative position, the light-duty positions he requested. We hold that he did. The record evidence supports the conclusion that Dieng could have performed the essential functions of customer service roles. Dieng’s manager Blake Hunter testified in his deposition that he could think of no reason Dieng would not have been a suitable customer service representative. Notably, Orkin does not dispute this important fact. As for the sales positions, there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Dieng could have performed the essential functions of these roles. Orkin points to the relevant job descriptions to argue that sales representatives are often called upon to carry out “heavy work,” including frequent heavy lifting. Though job descriptions may be evidence of the essential functions of a position, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), “[n]ot all job requirements or functions are essential.” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 579. In conducting the essential functions analysis, we must consider what the work actually entails, including the 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 13 of 28 amount of time individuals in the desired positions actually spend on purportedly essential tasks. See id. at 580. The record evidence suggests that not all sales representative positions require the same level of physical exertion. Dieng submitted a sworn declaration, based on his personal knowledge of the sales role and his firsthand experience, stating that “[s]ales duties were far less physically rigorous and only occasionally required carrying heavy equipment, a difference and decrease in frequency that would have made the physical requirements more manageable for me.” J.A. 845. He affirmed that he was “confident that [he] could have handled the amount of physical labor required for [a] sales position.” Id. at 846. He further attested that “[a]t the point at which I was cleared for light duty, I could have performed the types of tasks that were required all day of the pest control technician on a much more occasional basis during the week as a salesperson.” Id. In addition to Dieng’s sworn declaration, Hunter testified that, while some Orkin sales representatives were “expected to get up inside the attics [and] get into crawl spaces,” others were primarily responsible for “building long-term relationships with clients.” Id. at 322. This assessment was confirmed by the testimony of another Orkin employee who stated that the frequency with which a salesperson was expected to carry heavy equipment depended on the skill of the salesperson and “on the scope of the job.” Id. at 730–31. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dieng, as we must, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the essential functions of the desired positions and whether Dieng would have been able to perform them. Thus, Dieng met his 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 14 of 28 burden at summary judgment as to the third element of his ADA failure to accommodate claim. In reaching a contrary result with regard to the sales role, our colleague ignores record evidence and improperly views the facts in the light most favorable to Orkin. Viewed properly, the record evidence shows that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Dieng could have performed in this role. Our colleague rejects Dieng’s sworn testimony as “self-serving opinion” and credits Orkin’s testimony that the sales role required a level of physical exertion Dieng could not perform. Separate Op. at 24–25. Our colleague then concludes that Dieng’s statements in his sworn declaration cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Our caselaw is clear, however, that “[s]elf-serving affidavits offered by the non-movant can be used as evidence to defeat summary judgment, . . . when they are based on personal knowledge or firsthand experience.” Jones v. Solomon, 90 F.4th 198, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). One would expect testimony submitted by a non-movant to oppose a motion for summary judgment to indeed be “self-serving.” It can nevertheless be powerful evidence. So long as the testimony is, like the statements in Dieng’s sworn affidavit, “based on personal knowledge or firsthand experience” it can create a dispute of material fact. Id. Of course, a jury will ultimately weigh this testimony, along with all other evidence adduced at trial, and assess what the essential functions of the desired positions are and whether 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 15 of 28 Dieng would have been able to perform them. See Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383 n.8 (4th Cir. 2022). 2 It is not this court’s role to resolve factual disputes. ii. Reasonable Accommodation On the fourth element, we must determine whether factual disputes remain as to whether Orkin failed to provide Dieng with a reasonable accommodation. As we have explained, a reasonable accommodation refers to changes in a workplace an employer may make to provide meaningful equal employment opportunity to a disabled employee. See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407, 416 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court noted that, while Dieng sought an accommodation of reassignment to light-duty work, Orkin was not obliged to provide Dieng’s requested accommodation. Dieng, 2025 WL 403794, at *9. The district court concluded that Orkin provided Dieng with a reasonable accommodation of his disability “by permitting him to take unpaid leave for several months.” Id. We disagree. While keeping an employee on indefinite unpaid leave may be a reasonable accommodation under certain circumstances, it was not here. An accommodation that an employer ultimately selects must be effective. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400. This effectiveness requirement is a crucial component of the reasonable accommodation analysis. See Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness.”). “An ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not 2 Our colleague’s positions regarding the relevant time period during which Orkin’s obligation to accommodate Dieng applied, in addition to the appropriate geographic range for reassignment positions, are also factual disputes that must be presented to the jury. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 16 of 28 accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400. As such, a futile or ineffective accommodation is no accommodation at all. Orkin maintains that it kept Dieng on indefinite unpaid leave up until his termination anticipating that Dieng would (and could) return to his prior position. 3 Such an “accommodation” would be ineffective and, therefore, not an accommodation at all. By placing Dieng on indefinite unpaid leave, Orkin maintained Dieng in professional purgatory—not yet terminated but not working either. Ignoring the requirement that an accommodation be an effective one, Orkin argues that this court’s decision in Hannah v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supports the proposition that maintaining an employee on indefinite unpaid leave can be a reasonable accommodation. 72 F.4th 630, 636–37 (4th Cir. 2023). Orkin’s reliance on Hannah is misplaced. In Hannah, a package delivery driver with hip and buttocks injuries requested a temporary accommodation, either in the form of driving a smaller truck or being placed in an indoor position. Id. at 633–34. Rather than providing either requested accommodation, the employer instead placed the driver on unpaid leave until he was able to recover from his injuries. Id. at 634. In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, this court held that under the circumstances placing the driver 3 Orkin also maintains that it was reasonable to keep Dieng on indefinite unpaid leave because the parties were engaged in negotiations over Dieng’s workers’ compensation claims. This argument is unsupported by the ADA and the caselaw, and for good reason. While an employer and an employee may agree that the employee will take unpaid leave to avoid the uncomfortable dynamic of an employee going to work while engaging in negotiations to resolve a workplace dispute, such leave would need to be mutually agreed upon and would not otherwise absolve an employer from complying with the ADA. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 17 of 28 on unpaid leave was a reasonable accommodation of his disability. Id. at 636–37. This was so because the driver’s disability was temporary and the driver was expected to return to full-time employment in the same position. Id. at 637. Neither is true here. The record is replete with evidence that Orkin was on notice that Dieng’s disability was not temporary and that he was unable to return to his position as a pest control technician. To begin, Dieng submitted to Orkin documentation from his treating physician stating that he could return to work, but only to a position that was less physically demanding. Dieng notified Hunter that his “doctor said that [he could] only do light duty [ ] from now on.” J.A. 920. Separately, Dieng’s counsel reminded Orkin that Dieng was “eager to return to gainful employment” and requested that Orkin notify him when light-duty work became available. Id. at 41. Dieng once again emailed Hunter inquiring about the availability of light-duty positions. On the element of the employer’s failure to provide reasonable accommodation, we must also consider whether the employer engaged in good faith in the “interactive process” described in the ADA’s implementing regulations. Tarquinio, 141 F.4th at 573 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). Through this informal, collaborative process, an employer can understand the limitations caused by the employee’s disability and can identify potential accommodations. The employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process “is triggered when an employee communicates [his] disability and desire for an accommodation—even if the employee fails to identify a specific, reasonable accommodation.” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 581 (citing Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d, 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2013)). “[A]n 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 18 of 28 employer who doesn’t engage in good faith with the interactive process violates the ADA so long as a reasonable accommodation was possible.” Tarquinio, 141 F.4th at 574. Dieng provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Orkin did not engage in the interactive process at all, let alone engaging in good faith. No one at Orkin made any attempt to speak with Dieng about his physical limitations or his request for light-duty work. Similarly, although Dieng provided Orkin updates from his physicians regarding his recovery, no one from the company made any effort to speak with Dieng’s physicians regarding his disabling condition or his need for light-duty work. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that anyone at Orkin ever responded to communications from Dieng’s counsel requesting that his client be returned to work in a light-duty position. On this record, a reasonable jury could readily conclude that Orkin ignored Dieng’s repeated requests to return to work in a light-duty position rather than engaging in the interactive process. The record viewed in the light most favorable to Dieng also shows that a reasonable accommodation was possible. Dieng put forward evidence that light-duty positions came open at Orkin following his request for reassignment. While Orkin argues that Dieng could not perform the essential functions of several of the positions because they were located some distance away from Dieng’s branch location in Gaithersburg, Maryland, Dieng never suggested that his disability required that he be reassigned to a location near his home. Nor did Orkin ask Dieng whether he had any such restrictions. Orkin also contends that some of the vacant positions paid less than Dieng’s prior position as a pest control technician. Dieng, however, presented evidence that he would have been willing to accept a 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 19 of 28 lesser-paying role. Regardless, these are the types of issues that the interactive process is designed to address. Finally, relying on Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, the district court reasoned that Orkin was under no obligation to reassign Dieng to a light-duty position because “reassignment is an accommodation of ‘last resort.’” Dieng, 2025 WL 403794, at *6 (quoting Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1014). The district court’s ruling misapprehends this court’s holding in Elledge. To be sure, it is generally preferable for an employer to provide an accommodation that allows a disabled employee to remain in his current position. Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1014; see also Wirtes, 996 F.3d at 240–41. Where an employee can no longer remain in his current position because of disability, however, the ADA requires the employer to determine whether the employee can work in a different position without creating an undue burden for the employer. The parties do not dispute that Dieng was not able to perform the essential functions of his prior position because of his disability. Thus, the only question was whether Orkin was able to reassign Dieng to a different position without an undue burden. Because we conclude that are genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether Orkin failed to accommodate Dieng’s disability, summary judgment is not appropriate. Dieng is entitled to have a jury decide whether Orkin violated his right to a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA. 19 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1221 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 20 of 28 B. Unlawful Termination on the Basis of Disability We next turn to Dieng’s claim that Orkin engaged in unlawful discrimination by terminating him because of his disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Orkin on this claim, concluding that Orkin did not terminate Dieng, but rather that he resigned voluntarily as a condition of settlement of his workers’ compensation claims. Dieng, 2025 WL 403794, at *10. In reaching this conclusion, the district court ignored the evidence supporting Dieng’s contention that he had been constructively discharged, meaning that the workplace conditions forced him to resign. Dieng argues this was so because Orkin ignored his repeated requests to return to work in a light-duty position and instead kept him on indefinite unpaid leave. Certainly, keeping an employee on a lengthy and indefinite unpaid leave may support a claim of constructive discharge. See White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1279 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee who resigned after “suffer[ing] a forced unpaid medical leave of absence” may have been constructively discharged). We need not decide whether Dieng produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his unlawful ter