Khan v. Jewish Women International

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Khan v. Jewish Women International SAIFULLAH KHAN v. JEWISH WOMEN INTERNATIONAL ET AL. (AC 48383) Suarez, Clark and Harper, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his action for, inter alia, defamation. While he was a student at Yale University, the plaintiff was accused of rape by J, a fellow student. The plaintiff was charged with, tried, and acquitted of sexual assault in the Superior Court, but, in subsequent disciplinary proceedings at Yale, Yale expelled the plaintiff for violating its sexual misconduct policy. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action in the United States District Court against J for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately certified questions of Connecticut state law concerning absolute immunity to the Connecticut Supreme Court, and the defendants in the present case filed an application with the Supreme Court to appear as amici curiae. In their attached proposed amicus brief, the defendants stated that the plaintiff had raped J and referred to the plaintiff as J’s rapist. The plaintiff then instituted the present action, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants’ statements constituted defamation. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly addressed the defendants’ special motions to dismiss pursuant to the anti- SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a) after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Held: The trial court properly concluded that the litigation privilege applied to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae, as the privilege protects all par- ticipants in a judicial proceeding and applies to every step of the proceeding until its final disposition, including statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with the proceeding. The trial court did not err in concluding that the statements in the proposed amicus brief were pertinent to the certified question before the Supreme Court for purposes of the litigation privilege, as J’s allegation that the plaintiff raped her and Yale’s decision to expel the plaintiff on the basis of her allega- tion were central to the issues both in the underlying federal litigation and in the proceedings before the Supreme Court, and, because the defendants’ statements referring to the plaintiff as a rapist mirrored J’s allegation, they unquestionably had some reference to the issues before the court. The trial court did not err in determining that the count of the plaintiff’s complaint purporting to assert a claim for abuse of process was barred by the litigation privilege, as the plaintiff failed to identify specific misconduct intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of private litigation and, instead, based his claim entirely on the allegation that the words used by the defendants caused him harm in a way that was ancillary to the litigation.  Khan v. Jewish Women International This court concluded that the trial court did not err in dismissing the portion of the plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the defendants’ alleged republication of the proposed amicus brief on the alternative ground that, pursuant to Kel- ley v. Bonney (221 Conn. 549), the litigation privilege barred those claims, as the proposed amicus brief was a publicly filed court record that remained accessible to the general public. The trial court improperly addressed the special motions to dismiss after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, as once the court determined that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s claims, it was required to dismiss the action without proceeding further. Argued December 3, 2025—officially released June 30, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, defama- tion, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial referee, granted the motions to dismiss and the special motions to dismiss filed by the named defendant et al. and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his appeal as against the defendant Advocates for Youth. Vacated in part; judgment directed. Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (plaintiff). Amanda S. Amert, pro hac vice, with whom were Sara Kim, pro hac vice, and Karen T. Staib and, on the brief, Nicole Lapenta and Joseph Mario Buccilli, pro hac vice, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). Joel Kurtzberg, pro hac vice, with whom were Lau- ren Perlgut, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, David G. Januszewski, for the appellee (defendant Sanctuary for Families, Inc.). Sharon Baldwin, for the appellee (defendant Advo- cates for Youth). Scott M. Harrington, for the appellee (defendant The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC).  Khan v. Jewish Women International Opinion CLARK, J. This appeal concerns the applicability of the litigation privilege, which provides litigation participants absolute immunity from suit, to persons participating in litigation as amici curiae. The plain- tiff, Saifullah Khan, brought this action against the defendants, twelve nonprofit organizations (nonprofit defendants),1 The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC (Fierberg), and Attorney Jennifer M. Becker, claiming that the defendants falsely referred to him as a “rapist” in a proposed brief they filed with an application to appear as amici curiae in a proceeding before our Supreme Court. The trial court dismissed the action as to all defendants except Sanctuary for Families (Sanctuary) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plain- tiff’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege.2 The court also dismissed the action as to all defendants pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, on the ground that the complaint is based on the defendants’ exercise of their right to petition the government and that the plaintiff could not prevail on the merits because the litigation privilege bars his claims. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp- erly (1) concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for their statements in the proposed 1 The nonprofit defendants are: Jewish Women International; Legal Momentum; Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation; Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Inc.; Futures Without Violence; National Alliance to End Sexual Violence; National Crime Victim Law Institute; National Network to End Domestic Violence, Inc.; National Women’s Law Center; Network for Victim Recovery of the District of Columbia; Sanctuary for Families, Inc.; and Women’s Law Project. The plaintiff also named National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as a defendant in his complaint, but it did not appear before the trial court and is not participating in this appeal. The plaintiff withdrew his appeal as to one additional defendant, Advocates for Youth, after oral argument before this court. Accordingly, all references in this opinion to the defendants include only the nonprofit defendants, The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC, and Attorney Jennifer M. Becker. 2 As discussed subsequently in this opinion, Sanctuary is the only defendant that did not file or join a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See part IV of this opinion.  Khan v. Jewish Women International amicus brief, (2) concluded that the litigation privilege barred his abuse of process claim, (3) concluded that the defendants’ alleged republication of the proposed brief was protected by the fair report privilege, and (4) addressed the defendants’ special motions to dismiss after concluding that it lacked subject matter juris- diction over the action.3 We conclude that the court erred in addressing the special motions to dismiss after concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the litigation privilege. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as established by uncontested evidence in the record; see Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App. 197, 200, 247 A.3d 600 (2021), aff’d, 346 Conn. 333, 289 A.3d 1187 (2023); and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff is a former student at Yale University (Yale). After being accused of rape by a fel- low student, the plaintiff was charged with, tried, and acquitted of sexual assault.4 Yale subsequently held a disciplinary proceeding relating to the allegations and, as a result of that proceeding, expelled the plaintiff for violating its sexual misconduct policy. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Con- necticut against his accuser, identified as Jane Doe, for 3 The plaintiff also challenges the court’s dismissal of the action pursu- ant to § 52-196a on the basis that (1) the court improperly concluded that he failed to establish probable cause that he would prevail on his claims, and (2) deprived him of his right to due process by denying his request for discovery pertaining to the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions. Because we conclude that the court lacked authority to address the special motions to dismiss in the first instance, we need not address these claims. 4 As the trial court noted, although the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was acquitted of “rape” and does not identify the jurisdiction in which his trial took place, it is undisputed that the trial took place in the Superior Court and that the plaintiff was charged with and acquitted of sexual assault. See Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 13, 295 A.3d 855 (2023) (“[the plaintiff] faced trial before a jury in early 2018 for first, second, third, and [fourth degree] sexual assault during a nearly [two week] trial and was acquitted on all counts after less than [one] day of deliberations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Khan v. Jewish Women International defamation and tortious interference with business rela- tionships. See Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 16, 295 A.3d 855 (2023).5 The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against Doe, concluding that the Yale disciplinary proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature and that Doe enjoyed absolute immunity for her statements in that proceeding. Id. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, claim- ing “that the proceedings of [nongovernmental] entities cannot be quasi-judicial and, thus, Doe’s accusations of sexual assault in a private university’s disciplinary hear- ing are not shielded by absolute immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 17. The Second Circuit, concluding that the outcome of the appeal hinged on questions of Connecticut state law concerning absolute immunity, certified those questions to our Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d). See id., 17–18. The nonprofit defendants and Fierberg, represented by Becker, filed an application for permission to appear as amici curiae and to file a brief in support of Doe and attached a copy of their proposed brief to their applica- tion. The argument section of the proposed brief opened by stating: “When Jane Doe was in college, the plain- tiff raped her.” The brief also referred to the plain- tiff as “[Jane Doe’s] rapist,” stated that “Jane Doe was raped,” and referred to Doe as a “victim.” The plain- tiff objected to the defendants’ application on the basis that the statements referring to him as a rapist were “a false and vicious personal attack” that constituted an “abuse of . . . the litigation privilege,” which the plaintiff asserted “bar[red] [him] from suing [the defendants].”6 5 The plaintiff also brought claims against Yale and various Yale employees, but those claims were not at issue in the proceedings before our Supreme Court. See Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 11 n.8. 6 We take judicial notice of the relevant filings in the Supreme Court in Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 1. See, e.g., Jackson v. Drury, 191 Conn. App. 587, 590 n.4, 216 A.3d 768 (“[a]n appellate court may take judicial notice of files in the same or other cases”), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 938, 218 A.3d 1050 (2019); Norris v. Trumbull, 187  Khan v. Jewish Women International The defendants filed an application for permission to file a reply to the plaintiff’s objection to explain why they believed their statements were supported by the record and, in the alternative, requested permission to file a revised brief without the challenged language. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ application for permission to file an amicus brief “without prejudice to refiling the application . . . accompanied by a pro- posed brief that is shorn of all facts not supported by the record . . . .” The defendants filed a renewed application accompanied by a proposed brief without the challenged language, which the Supreme Court granted. The initial proposed brief, however, remains publicly available on the Judicial Branch website, and the plaintiff alleges that the defendants republished the brief on their websites and “to donors.” The plaintiff commenced the present action on May 21, 2024, alleging, against all defendants, claims sounding in defamation, false light, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. All of the defendants except Sanctuary filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims because they arise from the challenged statements in the proposed amicus brief. Additionally, all defendants, including Sanctuary, filed special motions to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a, asserting that the plaintiff’s claims are based on the defendants’ exercise of their rights to free speech and to petition the government pertaining to a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff could not establish probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his claims because, inter alia, the litigation privilege bars those claims.7 Conn. App. 201, 211, 201 A.3d 1137 (2019) (“in conducting our de novo review [of a trial court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss], we limit ourselves to the factual record as it existed before the trial court, supplemented by any additional records of which we may take judicial notice”). 7 As our Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nder [§ 52-196a] a party may file a special motion to dismiss when the opposing party’s complaint is based on the moving party’s exercise of, among other things, the right  Khan v. Jewish Women International On November 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed an omnibus memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and special motions to dismiss.8 The plain- tiff argued that the defendants did not enjoy absolute immunity for the statements in the proposed amicus brief because (1) the litigation privilege does not apply of free speech or the right to petition the government in connection with a matter of public concern.” Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636, 659, 280 A.3d 402 (2022). A claim is subject to dismissal pursuant to § 52-196a if the party filing the special motion to dismiss demonstrates that the complaint “is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the [c]onstitution of the United States or the [c]onstitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern,” and the nonmoving party fails to “[demonstrate] to the court that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of the complaint . . . .” General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3). In their special motions to dismiss, the defendants also raised other arguments in support of their contention that the plaintiff could not meet his burden under the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to estab- lish probable cause that he would prevail on the merits. On appeal, the defendants renew those arguments as alternative grounds to affirm the trial court’s decision granting the special motions to dismiss. We need not address those arguments because, as explained subsequently in this opinion, we conclude that the court should have dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to all defendants and should not have addressed the special motions to dismiss. 8 Before filing his memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and special motions to dismiss, on September 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to take limited discov- ery of Sanctuary for the purpose of responding to its special motion to dismiss. See General Statutes § 52-196a (d). On October 7, 2024, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion in part. The plaintiff, however, filed his omnibus memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and special motions to dismiss before taking the deposition of a representative of Sanctuary. The court, therefore, decided the matter as to Sanctuary on the basis of the briefing and affidavits. In his omnibus opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and special motions to dismiss, the plaintiff, for the first time, requested permission to take discovery of the remaining defendants. In its memo- randum of decision, the court denied that request on the basis that the plaintiff did not establish good cause that such discovery was warranted. As stated previously; see footnote 3 of this opinion; although the plain- tiff challenges the court’s discovery rulings on appeal, in light of our conclusion that the court lacked authority to address the merits of the special motions to dismiss, we need not address the discovery related claims because they pertain only to the special motions to dismiss.  Khan v. Jewish Women International to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae, and (2) even if it does, the privilege did not apply under the facts of this case because the challenged statements were not pertinent to the appeal before the Supreme Court. In support of the latter argument, the plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court had “necessarily determined that the statements . . . were impertinent” to the issues in the appeal “[b]y ordering the defendants to refile their brief ‘shorn of all facts not supported by the record.’ ” The plaintiff also argued that, even if the privilege did bar any claims that were based on the defendants’ fil- ing of the proposed brief, it did not bar his claims to the extent they are based on the defendants’ alleged republication of the brief. Finally, the plaintiff argued that the litigation privilege did not bar count four of the complaint, which was styled as an abuse of process claim, because the defendants “misus[ed] the amicus process” by including the statements for an improper purpose, namely, “to defame the plaintiff, discourage him from maintaining his case, and generate publicity and fundraising for their organizations.” The court, Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial ref- eree, held a combined oral argument on the defendants’ motions and special motions to dismiss on December 9, 2024. On January 9, 2025, the court issued a memoran- dum of decision dismissing the action against all defen- dants. Beginning with the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court first concluded that the litigation privilege applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae and that the statements in the proposed amicus brief were pertinent to the proceeding. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that, because count four of the complaint purportedly sounded in abuse of process, it is not barred by the litigation privilege. Although noting that the litigation privilege does not apply to well pleaded abuse of process claims, the court concluded that count four does not fall within that exception “because [it] does not properly allege an abuse of process action, but rather seeks redress solely for statements the defendants made during the litiga- tion process . . . .”  Khan v. Jewish Women International The court also disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the litigation privilege did not bar his claims to the extent they are based on the allegation that the defen- dants republished the proposed brief. Noting that the complaint alleges that the proposed brief remains avail- able on the Judicial Branch website, the court concluded that the defendants’ alleged republication of the brief was protected by the fair report privilege because it “would constitute a report of an ‘official action or proceeding . . . .’ ”9 The court further concluded that, “given the additional assistance of the fair report privilege, the defendants’ republication of their amicus brief would not negate the applicability of the litigation privilege in this case.” The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite the court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter juris- diction over the action, the court went on to address, and grant, the special motions to dismiss. The court thereafter rendered judgment dismissing the action, and the plaintiff timely filed the present appeal. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we first set forth our standard of review and the general legal prin- ciples pertaining to the litigation privilege. The liti- gation privilege implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is properly raised by way of a motion to dismiss. See Practice Book § 10-30 (a) (1); Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120, 136, 314 A.3d 583 (2024). “Whether the litigation privilege applies in a given case is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 137. 9 Under the fair report privilege, “publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elder v. 21st Century Media Newspaper, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 414, 422, 254 A.3d 344 (2021).  Khan v. Jewish Women International “The litigation privilege is a long-standing [common- law] rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The privilege “originated in response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for defamation,” but has since “developed to encompass and bar defamation claims against all participants in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, par- ties, and witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 627, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). The privilege has also evolved from its common-law origins such that it now “extends to an array of retaliatory civil actions beyond claims of defamation, including intentional interference with contractual or beneficial relations arising from statements made during a civil action, intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from statements made during judicial proceed- ings, and fraud against attorneys or party opponents for their actions during litigation. . . . This expansion is premised on the rationale that, because the privilege protects the communication, the nature of the theory [on which the challenge is based] is irrelevant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 592, 271 A.3d 53 (2022). I The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for their statements in the proposed amicus brief. Specifically, he contends that the court improp- erly concluded that (1) the litigation privilege applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae in a judicial pro- ceeding, and (2) the challenged statements referring to the plaintiff as a rapist were pertinent to the proceedings before the Supreme Court in Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 1. We disagree with both contentions.  Khan v. Jewish Women International A We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the litigation privilege applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae in a judicial proceeding. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that “[t]he applicable rule” as set forth by our Supreme Court “is that the litigation privilege applies to every step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . . including to statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with [the] proceeding,” and that it “bar[s] . . . claims against all participants in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses . . . . Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137.” (Emphasis in origi- nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court concluded that, “[u]nder this broad standard, amicus briefs surely qualify.” The court explained that, because “[o]ur appellate rules of practice specifically provide for an application for permission to appear as amicus curiae and the filing of the actual amicus brief . . . amici are certainly participants in judicial proceedings . . . amicus briefs are very much a step in the proceeding . . . and statements made in those briefs are communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings . . . all within the meaning of the litigation privilege.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further concluded that “[t]he fact that the challenged statements appeared in an attachment to an application to appear as an amicus, rather than in the actual and final version of the amicus brief itself, does not negate this conclusion.” As the court explained, “[t]he litigation privilege applies fully to documents prepared in connection with [a judicial] proceeding,” and applica- tions for permission to file a pleading accompanied by proposed pleadings “certainly constitute [steps] in the proceedings so that the litigation privilege attaches to statements made in them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We agree with the trial court that the litigation privi- lege applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae  Khan v. Jewish Women International in a judicial proceeding. As the court recognized, the litigation privilege protects “all participants in judicial proceedings”; (emphasis added) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 627; and applies “to every step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . . including to statements made in pleadings or other docu- ments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137; see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 246, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). Practice Book § 67-7A expressly allows par- ticipation by amici and sets forth specific requirements that would-be amici must follow to obtain permission to file an amicus curiae brief. In order to obtain such permission, a person seeking to appear and file a brief as amicus curiae must file an application for permission that “state[s] concisely the nature of the applicant’s interest and the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae should be allowed.” Practice Book § 67-7A (b). The proposed amicus brief that contains the challenged statements was attached to the defendants’ application for permission that the defendants filed in accordance with § 67-7A. Thus, the defendants were participants in Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 1, in accordance with the rules governing that proceeding, and their application to appear was a step in the proceeding expressly required by the rules of practice. Moreover, the policy concerns underlying the litigation privilege support extending the privilege to proposed amici. “The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial pro- cess must be able to testify or otherwise take part without being hampered by fear of defamation [or other retalia- tory litigation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137–38. If attorneys were “hobbled by the fear of reprisal by actions for defamation . . . [it] may tend to lessen [counsel’s]  Khan v. Jewish Women International efforts on behalf of clients.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 535, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). Thus, the litigation privilege “pro- tects the rights of clients who should not be imperiled by subjecting their legal advisors to the constant fear of lawsuits arising out of their conduct in the course of legal representation.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id. “Put simply, absolute immunity furthers the public policy of encouraging participation and candor in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those persons whom the common- law doctrine [of absolute immunity] was intended to protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chamerda v. Opie, 185 Conn. App. 627, 641–42, 197 A.3d 982, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 953, 197 A.3d 893 (2018). These concerns apply equally to amici and their attor- neys. Like judges, parties, and witnesses, persons par- ticipating as amici and the attorneys representing them should “do so with [their] mind[s] uninfluenced by the fear of an action for defamation or a prosecution for libel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 538. As the court explained in Simms, because questions concerning whether a state- ment is true and whether it was spoken with malice “are, and always will be . . . questions . . . upon which opinions may differ . . . which can only be resolved by the exercise of human judgment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.; even the threat of a retaliatory defamation action may cause would-be amici or their attorneys either to self-censor or to refrain from seeking to participate as amici curiae at all. See id., 538–39 (noting importance of providing litigation participants with absolute immu- nity “because of the simple and obvious reasons that a witness free from malice could be judged otherwise and that the expense and distress of . . . harassing litigation might cause a witness not to speak openly and freely” (internal quotation marks omitted)).10 10 For this reason, we disagree with the plaintiff’s characterization of the chilling effect that retaliatory litigation would have on amici  Khan v. Jewish Women International As the trial court recognized, “[a]micus briefs are an important part of the appellate process.” Amicus briefs aid judicial decision making by providing valuable infor- mation about broader implications of the legal issues before the court that the parties themselves may not address in their briefs. See 3B C.J.S., Amicus Curiae § 12 (2026) (“[a]micus curiae presentations assist the court by broadening its perspective on the issues raised by the parties; among other services, they facilitate informed judicial consideration of a wide variety of information and points of view that may bear on important legal questions”). The importance of amicus briefs is under- scored by the fact that our Supreme Court regularly solicits participation by amici curiae to address specific legal issues presented in pending appeals. See, e.g., Supreme Court Notices, Connecticut Judicial Branch, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/supremecourt (last visited June 18, 2026) (inviting amici to file briefs for specific appeals on August 15 and December 5, 2025, and January 30, 2026). Moreover, the court frequently cites or discusses arguments raised by amici; indeed, as the trial court noted, our Supreme Court cited informa- tion presented by the defendants in their amicus brief, ultimately concluding that “the public policy of this state supports providing a qualified privilege for state- ments made by individuals alleging sexual assault to proper authorities at institutions of higher education.” Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 52; see id., 8 (“[s]upporting Doe’s position, the amici indicate that as “speculative” and “dubious.” He argues that “denying absolute immunity to proposed amici in no way silences or chills legitimate advocacy” because “[t]he only ‘speech’ that would be deterred by with- holding immunity is false and defamatory factual allegations” which is “not protected speech in any event . . . .” As the court recognized in Simms, however, the very purpose of the litigation privilege is to avoid the chilling effect that would result from having to predict in advance whether a statement could be later construed as false or defamatory. “[I]f absolute immunity is not available, attorneys may feel constrained in advocating for their clients because of fears that their legitimate conduct may be misinterpreted as wrongful by dissatisfied parties and thus give rise to future lawsuits.” (Emphasis in original.) Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 563 n.25.  Khan v. Jewish Women International one in four women, and one in fifteen men, will experi- ence sexual assault while attending college” (footnote omitted)); id., 52 (“As the amici explain, sexual assault remains a serious and vastly underreported crime. The hesitation of victims to report such crimes is, in no small part, due to a fear of retaliation.” (Footnote omitted.)). The value of amici depends on their ability to be candid in their arguments. If amici and their attorneys had to worry about the prospect of retaliatory litigation from disaffected litigants, it would chill their participation and diminish the usefulness of their contributions to the litigation process. The plaintiff argues that persons seeking to appear as amici curiae are not participants in the proceeding because they require permission to appear and that, “[u]ntil such permission is granted, a proposed amicus is literally a nonparticipant.” (Emphasis in original.) As the trial court correctly observed, however, this distinc- tion is both inconsistent with our case law concerning the litigation privilege and unworkable as a matter of practice. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege applies not just to formal pleadings, but to all “documents prepared in connection with a court proceed- ing . . . [including] those preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 28–29, 266 A.3d 127 (2021). For that reason, the litigation privilege applies to statements made prior to the formal commencement of litigation, as long as those statements are prepared in connection with a contemplated proceeding and are directed toward the goal of the proceeding. See, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 841, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (statement contained in police report that officer was required to prepare in order to commence proceedings before Probate Court for commitment of person with psychiatric disabilities); Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 95, 856 A.2d 372 (2004) (citizen complaint that led to police department internal affairs investigation); Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549,  Khan v. Jewish Women International 574, 606 A.2d 693 (1992) (discussion with potential wit- ness aimed at marshaling evidence to support prospective administrative complaint to state board of education). Thus, the fact that the defendants’ statements were contained in a filing made before they were granted per- mission to appear and file their brief does not preclude the application of the litigation privilege. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be illogical to withhold the protections of the litigation privilege until after proposed amici receive permission to appear, as doing so would effectively dissuade participation in the amicus process to the same extent as if the litiga- tion privilege did not apply at all. Because our rules of practice generally require persons interested in filing an amicus brief to obtain permission before doing so, under the plaintiff’s proposed rule, prospective amici would have to file their applications for permission and proposed briefs under a cloud of uncertainty, not knowing whether the statements in their filings were protected by the litigation privilege until after the court ruled on their applications. It would defeat the prophylactic purpose of the privilege to require the person seeking its protection to speak before knowing whether they could be held liable for their words. Relying on case law from our Supreme Court address- ing the distinct doctrine of judicial immunity, the plain- tiff also argues that the protections of the litigation privilege should be limited to “essential participants” in judicial proceedings that are “directly involved in the core functions of the judicial process.”11 He argues that, unlike judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses, the role of amici is “that of an impartial advisor offer- ing perspective” and is not “intrinsically linked to the 11 The doctrine of judicial immunity provides judges and certain other judicial officers immunity from suit “for judicial acts [a judge] under- takes in his capacity as a