Northampton County Children, Youth and Families Division v. DHS
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledJuly 10, 2026
Docket184 C.D. 2025
JudgeWallace
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Northampton County Children, : CASE SEALED
Youth and Families Division, :
Petitioner
:
:
v. : No. 184 C.D. 2025
: Submitted: May 12, 2026
Department of Human Services, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: July 10, 2026
In this sealed child abuse expunction case, Northampton County Children,
Youth and Families Division (County) petitions for review of the January 27, 2025
order of the Department of Human Services (Department), Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals (Bureau), adopting the adjudication and recommendation
(Recommendation) of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In its Recommendation,
the ALJ recommended sustaining the alleged perpetrator’s (Father) appeal, thereby
amending the Child Protective Services Investigation Report (Report) with the
ChildLine and Abuse Registry (ChildLine)1 from founded to indicated under the
Child Protective Services Law (CPSL).2 On appeal, the County presents a very
narrow factual scenario regarding when a perpetrator has pled guilty to a criminal
offense, and additionally, has admitted that his plea related to the conduct alleged in
the Report. In this specific factual instance, the County asserts the Bureau erred in
determining a judicial adjudication must additionally include a specific finding of
child abuse. Upon review, we reverse.
I. Background
On September 26, 2019, the Department filed an indicated Report against
Father, and subsequently, notified Father he had been listed as a perpetrator of abuse
in an indicated Report in ChildLine. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 74a. Father
appealed, and, on December 13, 2022, the Bureau notified the parties of a hearing
scheduled on February 21, 2023. Id. On January 11, 2023, the Department changed
the Report from indicated to founded because Father entered a guilty plea to one
count of Simple Assault on September 1, 2020. Id. Thereafter, based upon Father’s
guilty plea, the Department filed a motion to dismiss Father’s appeal of the founded
1
“ChildLine” is defined as “[a]n organizational unit of the Department which operates a Statewide
toll-free system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse . . . , refers the reports for
investigation and maintains the reports in the appropriate file.” 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
2
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-88. A report of suspected child abuse may be either “indicated,” “founded,”
or “unfounded,” and information pertaining to “indicated” and “founded” reports is placed in the
ChildLine registry. See Sections 6337 and 6338 of the CPSL, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6337, 6338. An
“indicated report” is a report of child abuse where the Department or the county agency, after
completing its investigation into the report, “determines that substantial evidence of the alleged
abuse by a perpetrator exists.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). As discussed more fully below, a “founded
report” may be sustained with evidence of, among other things, a judicial adjudication, including
the entry of a guilty plea, based on a finding that a child who is a subject of the report has been
abused and the adjudication involves the same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of
child abuse. Id.
2
Report. Id. On February 14, 2023, the Bureau denied the Department’s motion to
dismiss. Id.
The ALJ held a hearing3 on the change of status on February 21, 2023, and
found the following facts. The subject child (Child) is a female born in 2006, and
Father is her biological father. Id. at 75a. On August 12, 2019, Father grabbed Child
by the throat, pushed her into a wall and the ground, and put her in a headlock, which
resulted in the filing of charges against Father; namely, one count of Simple Assault
and one count of Harassment – Subject Other to Physical Contact. Id. at 10a, 75a-
76a. The County received a child abuse referral report of suspected child abuse for
this incident on August 13, 2019, which alleged Father “was seen in a video grabbing
the [Child] by the neck of her shirt, throwing her to the floor and putting her in a
chokehold.” Id. at 76a. On September 26, 2019, the Department filed the underlying
indicated Report of child abuse with ChildLine, naming Father as a perpetrator of
child abuse, and the next day, mailed notice to Father.4 Id. On September 1, 2020,
Father pled guilty to one count of Simple Assault relative to the August 12, 2019
incident. Id. The Northampton County Court of Common Pleas (Common Pleas)
did not make a finding of child abuse. Id. On January 11, 2023, because of Father’s
guilty plea, the County changed the Report from indicated to founded.5 Id. The ALJ
found Father’s testimony to be credible. Id.
3
At the hearing, Father represented himself and testified telephonically. R.R. at 31a, 74a. The
County did not offer any testimony; rather, counsel presented a legal argument. Id. at 74a.
4
In its Investigation/Assessment Outcome Report (CY 48), the County identified the “Category
of Abuse/Neglect” as “Creating a Reasonable Likelihood of Bodily Injury To A Child Through
Any Recent Act/Failure to Act.” R.R. at 8a.
5
In its Change of Status Report (CY 49), the County noted: “On 9/1/20, the [Father pled] guilty
to simple assault. This case was given a founded status with the same factual circumstances
involved in the allegation of child abuse.” R.R. at 23a.
3
The ALJ framed the issue as “whether the Department is properly maintaining
a founded report of child abuse against [Father].” Id. at 79a. Because Father pled
guilty to Simple Assault based upon the August 12, 2019 incident, the ALJ explained
the Department’s burden for maintaining a founded report under the CPSL as
follows:
[T]he Department must provide substantial evidence (1) the [Child]
meets the definition of a child, (2) the [Father] meets the definition of
a perpetrator, (3) there has been a judicial adjudication where there is
an entry of a plea of guilty, (4) the guilty plea contains a finding that
the subject child has been abused, and (5) the finding of abuse pertains
to the same factual circumstances as those involved in the instant
appeal.
Id. at 79a-80a. The ALJ found the Department satisfied the first and second prongs
because the Child was 12 years old6 at the time of the alleged incident, and because
as her biological father, Father satisfied the definition of “perpetrator.”7 Id. at 80a.
Regarding the third prong, the ALJ determined “[a]lthough the Department did not
get into the specifics of the incident, [Father] agreed in his testimony that his guilty
plea was for the same incident in the [R]eport.” Id. Additionally, the ALJ compared
the allegations of the Report with the allegations of the criminal information. Id.
Consequently, the ALJ determined “the Department provided substantial evidence
[Father] entered a guilty plea to the charge of Simple Assault, which was related to
the same factual circumstances as those involved in the instant appeal.” Id.
6
The CPSL defines “child” as “[a]n individual under 18 years of age.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a).
7
The CPSL identifies multiple classes of people who qualify as a “perpetrator,” including “[a]
parent of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). The CPSL defines “parent” as “[a] biological parent,
adoptive parent or legal guardian.” Id.
4
Regarding the fourth and fifth prongs, the ALJ provided the following
analysis:
[Father] testified that [Common Pleas] did not charge him or [make]
any findings that he committed child abuse because of the August 12,
2019 incident. The Department also failed to provide any evidence of
any finding of abuse by [Common Pleas]. As a matter of fact, counsel
for the Department argued a finding of abuse was not required as long
as the guilty plea was related to the same factual circumstances as those
involved in the instant appeal. However, despite counsel’s arguments,
the law is very specific about what is required for the Department to
maintain a founded report. The [CPSL] is very clear in that a founded
report requires that “there has been a judicial adjudication based on a
finding that a child who is a subject of the report has been abused
and the adjudication involves the same factual circumstances involved
in the allegation of child abuse.[”] (Emphasis added). In other words,
the judicial adjudication must not only involve the same factual
circumstances involved in the allegation of child abuse, but it must also
be based on a finding that the subject child has been abused.
Id. at 80a-81a. Thus, the ALJ concluded “because the Department did not provide
substantial evidence the judicial adjudication contained a finding of child abuse by
[Father], it also failed to prove by substantial evidence that they are correctly
maintaining a founded report of child abuse against [Father].” Id. at 81a. The ALJ
recommended the Bureau sustain Father’s appeal, and the Department be directed to
change the Report status from founded to indicated. Id. The Bureau, by order dated
January 27, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Recommendation in its entirety. Id. at 72a.
The County timely petitioned this Court for review. On appeal, the County
raises the sole issue of whether, in a case involving the same factual circumstances
in the criminal case and the Report, the Department committed an error of law by
requiring a specific finding of child abuse as part of the guilty plea to serve as the
basis for changing the Report status from indicated to founded. County’s Br. at 4.
5
II. Analysis
In expunction cases, our review is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the necessary findings of fact, whether the Department committed
any errors of law, or whether the Department violated a party’s constitutional rights.
See G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 91 A.3d 667, 672 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Because the issue before us concerns a question of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. at 670 n.5. “In other words, we do not
defer to the [Bureau’s] conclusions of law, and we reassess the record with a fresh
pair of eyes.” Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Health v. Wilkerson, 329 A.3d 111, 117 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024).
The CPSL permits an indicated report to be converted into a founded report
in certain circumstances, including a “judicial adjudication based on a finding that
[the] child who is a subject of the report has been abused and the adjudication
involves the same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of child
abuse.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (emphasis added). Such judicial adjudication may
include a guilty plea. Id. We have previously held:
[P]ursuant to this statutory paradigm, [the County] must demonstrate
that the factual circumstances of the judicial adjudication and the
indicated report are identical, and, if it does, the report is properly
designated as a founded report. This is so because the adjudication, in
and of itself, normally encompasses “not only a judicial finding that the
child has been abused, but that the perpetrator has been found guilty of
abuse . . . .” Consequently, “[w]here a founded report is based upon
such an adjudication, an appeal would, in most instances, constitute a
collateral attack of the adjudication itself, which is not allowed.”
C.F., IV v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 174 A.3d 683, 688 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citation
and quotations omitted and emphasis added).
6
In D.M. v. Department of Public Welfare, 122 A.3d 1151, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015), we determined the trial court’s transcript of the petitioner’s plea colloquy
established the underlying factual basis for his conviction of the crime of
harassment. We held that for a report to be “founded,” there must be a judicial
adjudication, and the judicial adjudication must involve “the
same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of child abuse.” Id. (quoting
23 Pa.C.S. § 6303). “[O]nce [the Department] has demonstrated that the factual
circumstances of the judicial adjudication and the report are the same, the report
becomes a ‘founded’ report.” Id. (emphasis added). “In short, the facts adduced in
the process of adjudicating the underlying criminal charge of harassment in D.M.,
i.e., the guilty plea colloquy, factually corroborated the child abuse report with
respect to ‘who, what, where, and when.’” M.O. v. Dept. of Hum. Servs. (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 1347 C.D. 2018, filed June 27, 2019)8 (citing D.M. and comparing
G.M. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 957 A.2d 377, 380 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), finding child
sexual abuse report was founded based upon factual circumstances admitted during
plea of nolo contendere to corruption of minors, and R.F. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
845 A.2d 214, 218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), finding child sexual abuse could not be
inferred from guilty plea for endangering the welfare of a child when facts adduced
during colloquy did not support such a finding).
Here, as in D.M., the factual circumstances of the judicial adjudication and
the Report are identical. See D.M., 122 A.3d at 1155. At the ALJ hearing, Father
agreed “that his guilty plea was for the same incident in the [R]eport.” R.R. at 80a.
Further, the ALJ compared the allegations of the Report (“[Father] was seen on video
8
This unreported opinion is cited for its persuasive value pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
7
grabbing [the Child] by the neck of her shirt, throwing her to the floor, and putting
her in a chokehold. [The Child] had significant pain to her neck and jaw.”) to the
allegations of the criminal information (“[Father] grabbed [the Child] . . . by her
throat area, pushing her into a wall from a seated position, grabbed her by the shirt,
pushed her to the ground, put her in a headlock, and pushed her to the ground,
repeatedly going around a third party, trying to keep them apart, causing pain in her
jaw and redness on her [g]ums under her front teeth.”). Id. The comparison yielded
identity of “who, what, where, and when.” See M.O. v. Dep’t. of Hum. Servs.
Additionally, the CPSL defines “child abuse,” in pertinent part, as
“intentionally, knowingly or recklessly . . . [c]reating a reasonable likelihood of
bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.”
23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(5). Here, Father pled guilty to, among other things, the crime
of simple assault, which is defined as “attempt[ing] to cause, or intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another.”
18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Thus, the facts for which Father pled guilty plainly align
with the CPSL’s definition of child abuse. Moreover, it was precisely this subsection
of the CPSL’s child abuse definition for which the County advanced its case from
indicated to founded. R.R. at 8a, 23a. Thus, because of the factual corroboration
and definitional alignment, the Department properly changed the status of the Report
from indicated to founded upon entry of Father’s guilty plea. We conclude the ALJ
erred in determining the Department additionally needed to provide substantial
evidence that the judicial adjudication contained a specified reference to child abuse.
8
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the Bureau’s January 27, 2025
order sustaining Father’s appeal, and remand the case to the Department with the
direction that the Department, within 30 days, amend the status of the Report from
indicated to founded.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
9
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Northampton County Children, : CASE SEALED
Youth and Families Division, :
Petitioner
:
:
v. : No. 184 C.D. 2025
:
Department of Human Services, :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of July 2026, the Department of Human Services
(Department), Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ January 27, 2025 order is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the Department with the direction
that the Department, within 30 days, amend the status of the Child Protective
Services Investigation Report from indicated to founded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge