Johnson v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PAMELA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 22-3814 (CKK) v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (October 27, 2026) This case arises from disputes about the circumstances under which the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) decided not to offer Plaintiff Pamela Johnson a position after interviewing her for a role as an Economic Development Program Specialist. Ms. Johnson alleges that DHCD’s decision not to offer her a position constituted age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., as well as retaliation for filing a previous lawsuit alleging hiring discrimination at DHCD. The District of Columbia (“the District”) moves for summary judgment, claiming that DHCD did not discriminate or retaliate against Ms. Johnson, but rather followed its policy of offering the job vacancies to the applicants with the highest combined score from (1) a prescreening questionnaire on the online platform PeopleSoft, which generated automatic scores for candidates; and (2) an interview with DHCD employees. The District’s [32] Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for decision. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the 1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto: • The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 32; • The Plaintiff’s Amended Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. 1 relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court concludes that the District is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT the District’s [32] Motion for Summary Judgment. I. BACKGROUND The facts below are either undisputed or not genuinely disputed because Ms. Johnson, the non-movant, has not shown the existence of such a dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” that would be admissible in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). A. Ms. Johnson’s Prior Lawsuit In 2016, Ms. Johnson filed an administrative complaint against the District of Columbia (“the District”) after she applied for a position with the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) but did not receive an interview. District’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.’s Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 32, ¶ 86. Ms. Johnson later filed a lawsuit against the District for age discrimination in February 2018, and the parties settled the case in 2020. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 86–87; Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 43–47. B. The Job Vacancies In August 2020, DHCD posted two new vacancies for positions as an Economic Development Program Specialist. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1. The job posting stated that the position involved “prepar[ing] and implement[ing] plans for [the] Neighborhood Based Activities program area, which includes the coordination of loan/grant programs, storefront improvement programs, housing counseling, small business technical assistance and working with community-based groups.” Ex. A, Job Description, Dkt. No. 32-1. The job posting required “at least one . . . year No. 37-1, 40; • The Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 43. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f). 2 of specialized experience” that is “directly related to the line of work of the position.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 23–30. This experience could be “case management, records keeping and data tracking principles”; “[k]nowledge of cost principles for federal grants and uniform administrative requirements for federal grants”; “[skills] in preparing status reports, presentation documents and the ability to convey information both orally and in writing”; and “[t]ask management and continuous quality improvement.” Id. ¶ 23–27. Ms. Johnson, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, applied to both vacancies. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Compl. ¶ 26. The application process had two steps. First, applicants completed an online questionnaire, on the website PeopleSoft, about their background and professional experience. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4–6. Before the application process began, DHCD pre-loaded the questions, possible answers, and respective point values for the possible answers into PeopleSoft. Id. ¶ 4; see also Exhibit D, Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs., Dkt. No. 32-4, at 4. After applicants completed the questionnaire, PeopleSoft automatically generated a ranking of the applicants, based on the point values that DHCD had pre-loaded in the system to correspond to possible responses to the questions. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6. DHCD provided the eleven top-scoring applications to its Human Resources Department, who then submitted the list to its hiring manager. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Johnson’s application was one of the top eleven applicants that were given to the hiring manager, but, of these top eleven applications, Ms. Johnson’s application had the lowest score from PeopleSoft’s automatic scoring system. Id. ¶ 8; see also Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Dkt. 35-1, ¶ 8. Second, DHCD employees interviewed the top eleven applicants. On September 17, 2020, Edward Davis (“the Hiring Manager”) and Ernest Merchant (“the Economic Development Specialist”) interviewed Ms. Johnson for the position over the telephone. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; Compl. 3 ¶ 38. However, after the telephone interview, DHCD employees informed Ms. Johnson that she would need to interview a second time because not all candidates had been interviewed by the same panel members during the first round of interviews. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11–12. At least one DHCD employee, Lesley Edmond, had participated in interviews with other candidates, but not with Ms. Johnson. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6; Def.’s Reply at 11. Ms. Johnson alleges that Ms. Edmond “was the management official accused of discrimination” in Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit, Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, and the District does not dispute this fact. DHCD conducted a second round of interviews with the candidates, including Ms. Johnson. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11. During the second round of interviews, Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant were the only interviewers for each candidate; Ms. Edmond did not participate in any interviews. Id. ¶ 13. The interviewers asked each applicant the same questions in each interview. Id. ¶ 14. After each interview, the panel members gave the applicant a score for their response to each question. Id. ¶ 15–16; see also Exhibit D, Dkt. No. 32-4, at 6. Then, the panel members tallied the applicant’s scores to each question to create a total interview score. Id. Finally, the panel members combined the applicant’s interview score to their score from the PeopleSoft questionnaire. Id. ¶ 16. After this scoring was completed, Ms. Johnson’s total score tied with one other candidate for the lowest score of all eleven candidates who received an interview. Id. ¶ 16. The District offered positions to the top two scoring candidates. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17–18; Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 17–18. However, both candidates declined the positions, so the District offered the positions to the next highest scoring candidates, Remarno Chambers and Paul Stanford, who accepted the positions. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17–21. The remaining candidates, including Ms. Johnson, were not offered a position. Id. At the time of the interviews, Mr. Chambers and Mr. Stanford were both less than forty-years-old. Compl. ¶ 60. 4  C. Ms. Johnson’s Lawsuit On December 23, 2022, Ms. Johnson filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Ms. Johnson alleged that the District’s decision not to hire her constituted age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Id. ¶ 54–70. In addition, Ms. Johnson alleged that the District’s decision not to hire her constituted retaliation for her previous lawsuit against the District, also in violation of the ADEA. Id. ¶ 64–70. After the conclusion of discovery, the District moved for summary judgment. See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 32. This motion is ripe for decision. II. LEGAL STANDARD A court must grant a motion for summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on any disagreement as to the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id. In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to specific parts of the record—including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or declarations, or other competent evidence—in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the materials relied upon by the opposing party “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or 5 fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in her favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. In the end, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–252. III. ANALYSIS A. Ms. Johnson’s Age Discrimination Claim (Count I) Ms. Johnson first alleges that the District did not hire her because of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. The District is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age,” and includes persons forty years of age or older in the class protected by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), 631(a); see Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual over 40 years of age.”) (citation modified). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement than an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). Accordingly, to prevail on a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or 6 circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Id. at 177– 178. Where, as here, the plaintiff brings claims of employment discrimination under the ADEA that are based on circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence of intentional discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the employee must first make out a prima facie case of . . . discrimination.” Hall, 175 F.3d at 1077. The employer must then come forward with a legitimate reason for the challenged action. Id. If the employer meets that burden, then the question of whether the proffered non-discriminatory explanation was pretextual merges with plaintiff’s “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). When the employer properly presents a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action at the summary judgment stage, the district court “need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Rather, the court can proceed to the central inquiry of whether the plaintiff “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the” plaintiff. Id. 1. The District’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring Ms. Johnson Here, the District has met its initial burden of producing “admissible evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, clear, and reasonably specific explanation for its actions.” Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2019). According to the District, the District offered 7 the positions to candidates who had the highest combined score from (1) PeopleSoft’s automatic scoring of candidates based on their responses to the questionnaire, and (2) the interview with Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4–7. With respect to the first part of the application process, the District explained that Ms. Johnson had the lowest score (of the eleven candidates interviewed) on the PeopleSoft questionnaire, according to the “calculations [that were] done automatically through the Peoplesoft administrative platform.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. Then, during the live interviews, the panel “asked each candidate the same questions.” Id. After the District added applicants’ scores from the PeopleSoft questionnaire to the scores from the live interviews, Ms. Johnson was tied for the lowest score of the eleven interviewed candidates. Id. Given that it is the District’s “policy to send out a job offer to the candidate with the highest combined score,” the District did not offer Ms. Johnson a position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 18–21. The District has proffered admissible evidence in support of this nondiscriminatory explanation, including deposition testimony of the employees who conducted the interviews, the applicant scores, documents relating to the applicant scoring criteria, and testimony relating to applicant interview processes. See Job Posting, Exhibit A, Dkt. No. 32-1; Davis Dep. Tr., Dkt. No. 32-6; Merchant Dep. Tr., Dkt. No 32-11; District’s Interrog. Resp. (Second Set), Dkt. No. 32- 5. Ms. Johnson does not contest the admissibility of the District’s evidence, and she admits that “[i]t is DCHR policy to send out a job offer to the candidate with the highest combined score” and she was the lowest scoring candidate interviewed. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 17–22; see Smith v. Napolitano, 626 F. Supp. 2d 81, 90 (D.D.C. 2009) (RMU) (“[T]he defendant has articulated a legitimate, non- discriminatory and non-retaliatory justification for the plaintiff’s non-selection—namely, that the plaintiff was passed over because he was not the most qualified candidate for either of the two positions.”). 8  Because the District has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the Court “need not . . . decide whether [Ms. Johnson] actually made out a prima facie case” of discrimination. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Instead, the summary judgment analysis turns on whether Ms. Johnson’s evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the District’s stated reason for not extending an offer to her—that she was tied for the lowest scoring candidate of the eleven candidates interviewed—was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. At this stage, courts ask “whether the jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 2. Ms. Johnson’s arguments for pretext Ms. Johnson raises two arguments that District’s stated reasons for not hiring her were pretext for age discrimination: (1) she was substantially more qualified than the chosen candidates, who were both under forty-years-old, thereby raising the inference that DHCD’s hiring decision was based on age discrimination; and (2) other defects in the hiring process support an inference of age discrimination. However, Ms. Johnson fails to offer sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the District’s stated reasons for not hiring her were pretext and “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” DeJesus v. WP Co. LLC, 841 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). a. Whether Ms. Johnson was significantly more qualified than the chosen candidates First, Ms. Johnson argues that the District “treated other employees of a different group more favorably.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. Ms. Johnson argues that she was more qualified than the two 9 candidates the District hired, and the fact that both hired candidates were under forty, whereas she was fifty-eight, could lead a jury to conclude that she was subjected to age discrimination. Id. “Employers have discretion to select among equally qualified candidates as long as their decisions are based on lawful criteria.” Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, 77 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (CRC) (citing Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)). But a jury may infer pretext if “a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1296. Nevertheless, because courts do not serve as “super-personnel departments that reexamine an entity’s business decisions, a plaintiff asserting that an employer’s explanation is pretextual based upon comparative qualifications faces a formidable task.” Pearsall v. Holder, 610 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF) (citations and internal alterations omitted). “[I]n order to justify an inference of discrimination, the qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The D.C. Circuit’s prior cases on qualification gaps provide useful context for the Court’s analysis of this issue. In Aka, the D.C. Circuit held that a reasonable jury could infer pretext when the successful candidate for a pharmacy technician position had only “two months of part-time volunteer work” and no college degree, whereas the plaintiff had “nineteen years” of experience and a “master’s degree in business and professional administration, with a concentration in health service management.” 156 F.3d at 1296–1297. In Hamilton v. Geithner, in contrast, the person selected had “no college degree and little formal training,” but had “approximately eight years” of experience, “mostly from on-the-job training,” while the plaintiff had “nineteen years of experience,” as well as a “master’s degree” in the field. 666 F.3d 1344, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2012). While the court in Geithner acknowledged that the plaintiff was more qualified, the court found it 10 to be a “relatively close question” as to whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was so “markedly” or “significantly” more qualified than the person selected as to be “inherently indicative of discrimination.” Id. at 1352. Accordingly, the court did not “conclusively resolve” this question and reviewed factors other than the qualification gap. Id. Read in this context, it is clear that Ms. Johnson was not so significantly better qualified than the hired candidates, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers, as to be “inherently indicative of discrimination.” Id. For starters, “courts must defer to the employer’s decision as to which qualities required by the job . . . it weighs more heavily.” Barnette v. Chertoff, 453 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The District chose to begin its application process with the PeopleSoft questionnaire and chose to include applicants’ automatically generated PeopleSoft scores as part of its final applicant ranking. Ms. Johnson does not dispute that she was the lowest scoring candidate on the PeopleSoft questionnaire. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 16–21. Instead, Ms. Johnson’s only criticism of the PeopleSoft questionnaire is that the questions “relied almost entirely on self- evaluation, which is . . . arbitrary and subjective,” and “her score was off because she completed the form the evening before the deadline and marked several boxes as showing ‘intermediate’ rather than ‘expert’ experience.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. Despite this criticism, however, each applicant was given the same opportunity to answer the same questions on PeopleSoft, and the fact that Ms. Johnson did not complete the questions to her satisfaction cannot show pretext for age discrimination. Ms. Johnson chose to complete the form “the evening before the deadline,” and she chose how to respond to the questions, including marking “intermediate,” rather than “expert” experience. Id. Ms. Johnson cannot fault the PeopleSoft program for her own choices. Nor does the fact that questions were “arbitrary and subjective” demonstrate pretext, given that each applicant was required to answer the same 11 questions, and Ms. Johnson does not provide any indication that the nature of the questions systematically favored younger candidates. See Gladden v. Bolden, 802 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D.D.C. 2011) (ESH) (“[A] plaintiff cannot as a matter of law survive summary judgment given that his employment application was rejected by an automated computer system . . . that does not take race, gender, or age into consideration as an input variable when analyzing or scoring resumes.”) (collecting employment discrimination cases involving automated scoring). Accordingly, Ms. Johnson’s claim falters from the outset, given that Mr. Chambers and Mr. Stanford scored higher than she did on the first portion of the final applicant ranking: the automated PeopleSoft questionnaire. Turning to the credentials of the candidates, Ms. Johnson emphasizes that she had more years of experience working in housing than Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers did. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 (noting that Ms. Johnson had “17 years of experience in housing”). To be sure, Ms. Johnson’s resume showed “approximately eleven years of experience as a housing counselor for Marshall Heights,” as well as “three years of experience as a project manager at DHCD.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 54– 56. Ms. Johnson also had a Bachelor of Science degree. See Exhibit J, Johnson Resume, Dkt. No. 32-10, at 3. But Ms. Johnson’s experience in housing alone does not constitute a qualifications gap so “wide and inexplicable” as to support an inference of discrimination. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Here, the position in question required only one year of work experience and drew on a range of economic skills beyond housing. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 24–34; Def.’s Mot. at 14 (noting that the job description listed a variety of relevant skills, including “monitoring community-based nonprofit organizations’ performance and compliance with various requirements, identifying and correcting compliance deficiencies, having knowledge of data and 12 finance principles, performing analyses of organizations’ finances, preparing reports and presenting documents, and providing support to organizations”). The record demonstrates that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers had more varied work experiences and more pertinent credentials than Ms. Johnson. First, Mr. Stanford’s background included a Master of Science in Public Administration, as well as a bachelor’s degree and “approximately nine years of work experience,” including “three years of experience as an affordable and workforce housing program manager at another county’s own Department of Housing and Community Development”; “two additional years of experience as a housing specialist focused on a city’s affordable dwelling unit program”; and “two years of experience as a consultant and exam writer for HUD’s housing counseling certification exam and program.” Id. ¶ 47–50, 62. Given Mr. Stanford’s advanced degree and specialized and diverse housing experience, a reasonable jury would likely not conclude that any qualification gap between Ms. Johnson and Mr. Stanford was “great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added). Perhaps recognizing Mr. Stanford’s superior qualifications, Ms. Johnson centers her arguments on Mr. Chambers, claiming that “[t]he difference between Ms. Johnson’s 17 years of experience in housing, many of which dealt directly with [Community Block Development Grant work], and [Mr. Chambers’s] complete lack of experience is stark.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. However, as the District notes, Mr. Chambers’s resume reflected “a more highly credentialed educational background” than Ms. Johnson, with a master’s degree in “Technical Management” as well as a “bachelor’s degree, an ongoing certification program,” and nine years of diverse work experience, which included “two years of compliance management experience in the District government”; “two additional years in construction compliance”; and “three years of experience as an accountant 13 and an additional two years as a financial analyst.” Def.’s Mot. at 15; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 43–45, 60; see also Exhibit H, Chambers Resume, Dkt. No. 32-8. Ms. Johnson argues that her years of housing experience should be valued more highly than Mr. Chambers’s financial experience. But “it is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of [Johnson].” Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The District argues that it sought someone with economic skills and concluded that Mr. Chambers “stood out for compliance and finance experience.” Def. Mot. at 15; see also Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 67 (listing the interviewers’ key attributes, including: “Can you read regulations. Can you translate. Can you formulate a budget. Are you accustomed to following federal regulations.”). Accordingly, the Court will not second guess the District’s decision to consider Mr. Chambers’s accounting and finance experience as important for the role. See Jackson, 496 F.3d at 708 (“We have said that courts must not second-guess an employer’s initial choice of appropriate qualifications.”). Moreover, the interviewers concluded that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers outperformed Ms. Johnson in the interview. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 69–73. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, it can be reasonable to select candidates based on their interview performance, even assuming another candidate was more qualified on paper. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183–1184 (“Selecting a pool of qualified candidates based upon their written credentials and then making a final selection based upon personal interviews is an obviously reasonable method of hiring a professional employee.”); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 897 (“In a close case, a reasonable juror would usually assume that the employer is more capable of assessing the significance of small differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or that the employer simply made a judgment call.”). 14  When considering Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers’s higher scores on the PeopleSoft questionnaire, as well as their more diverse professional experience, graduate degrees, and higher interview scores, Ms. Johnson has not presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that she was so much more qualified for the position than Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers as “to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707. b. Whether other inconsistencies in the hiring process support an inference of age discrimination. Second, Ms. Johnson argues that “there is ample evidence that the process was . . . unfair.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5. Ms. Johnson alleges that there were several defects in the interview process: (1) the District conducted two rounds of interviews of the candidates, once District staff realized that Ms. Edmond could not interview Ms. Johnson; (2) Mr. Merchant and Mr. Davis put forth “identical notes” for candidates’ first and second rounds of interviews; and (3) Ms. Edmond and Mr. Merchant had “conflicts of interest” because Ms. Edmond referred a friend for the position, and Mr. Merchant “coached” one of the candidates. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–15. An “employer’s failure to follow established procedures or criteria” in the selection process may demonstrate that the employer’s justification for not hiring someone was pretextual. Wang v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 46, 68 (D.D.C. 2016) (RC) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 n.3). However, “a finding of a failure on the part of the prospective employer to follow its own regulations and procedures, alone, may not be sufficient to support a finding of age discrimination.” Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). Rather, the plaintiff must go beyond merely identifying irregularities and instead must “establish discriminatory motive.” Glenn v. Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (RMU) (quoting Johnson, 679 F.2d at 922). In other words, even if a court suspects that a job applicant “was victimized by . . . poor selection procedures” it may not “second-guess an employer’s personnel 15 decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.” Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, none of Ms. Johnson’s arguments, even considered jointly, create a genuine dispute as to whether the explanation provided by the District for Ms. Johnson’s non-selection was pretext for discriminatory motive. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, a court reviewing summary judgment looks to whether a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination from all the evidence, including “(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Here, Ms. Johnson’s arguments fail to cast doubt on the District’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring her, and Ms. Johnson fails to connect any defects in the hiring process with age discrimination. First, Ms. Johnson argues that the District’s decision to conduct a second round of interviews, once the District realized that it could not have the same employees interview each candidate, illustrates a discriminatory motive. Ms. Johnson alleges that the reason for conducting two rounds of interviews was that Ms. Edmond “was not willing to interview Ms. Johnson,” given Ms. Johnson’s earlier lawsuit against the District. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. However, Ms. Johnson’s claim falters from the outset, as Ms. Johnson proposes no connection between Ms. Edmond’s decision not to participate in the interview and Ms. Johnson’s age. See Butler v. Ashcroft, 293 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (RJL) (granting summary judgment to the defendant where “allegations of irregularities, even if proven, do not indicate discriminatory hiring practices”). Even more directly, Ms. Johnson’s own evidence contradicts her argument that the District’s decision to hold a second round of interviews constituted discrimination against her. 16 Citing two of her exhibits, Ms. Johnson alleges that her interview score went “down” between her first and second interviews. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–11 (citing “Ex. 2, Ex. 6”). However, Exhibit 2 shows that, during her first interview, Ms. Johnson received a score of 80 from Mr. Davis and a score of 82 from Mr. Merchant, for a combined score of 162. See Exhibit 2, Dkt. No. 35-3, at 1. Exhibit 6 shows that, during her second interview, Ms. Johnson received a score of 80 from Mr. Davis and a score of 89 from Mr. Merchant, for a combined score of 169—seven points higher than her first interview score. See Exhibit 6, Dkt. No. 35-7, at 1. Accordingly, Ms. Johnson’s own cited exhibits demonstrate that the District gave her a higher score on her second interview. Nor does any other evidence in the record support Ms. Johnson’s assertion that her scores went “down” from the September 2020 interview to the October 2020 interview. Accordingly, the Court does not credit Ms. Johnson’s assertion that her scores went “down,” and no reasonable jury could conclude, from the evidence provided, that the fact that the District conducted a second round of interviews, in which it gave her a higher score, supports a finding of age discrimination. Second, Ms. Johnson faults Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant for taking “identical” notes during the first and second rounds of interviews for the candidates. After Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant conducted their interview with Ms. Johnson, the District determined that Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant needed to conduct interviews with each applicant, including Ms. Johnson, for a second time because Ms. Edmond had participated in interviews with some candidates, but could not participate in Ms. Johnson’s interview. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11–12. Here, Ms. Johnson alleges that Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant copied and pasted their notes from their first interview with each candidate into their notes for their second interview with each candidate, given that “the majority of [the] notes from the first round were identical or largely identical [to the] notes taken in the second round,” down to the “punctuation.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6, 10. 17  Ms. Johnson argues that a jury may infer pretext from the fact that (1) the interviewers’ notes were similar across the two interviews, yet (2) “Mr. Chambers’ scores went up” from his first interview to his second interview, and Ms. Johnson’s scores “went down.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6, 10. Yet Ms. Johnson’s argument again fails from the outset, because, as discussed, the record does not support her assertion that her scores went “down” between her first and second interviews. Compare Ex. 2, “September Candidate Scoring Sheet,” Dkt. No. 35-3, at 1, with Ex. 6, October 2020 scores, Exhibit 6, Dkt. No. 35-7, at 1 (showing that Ms. Johnson’s scores were seven points higher in the second round of interviews).2 Finally, Ms. Johnson alleges that Mr. Merchant and Ms. Edmond had “conflicts of interest” because Mr. Merchant “coached” one of the candidates, and Ms. Edmond referred a friend for the position. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–15. However, the candidate that Mr. Merchant allegedly “coached” did not receive a job offer, so Ms. Johnson cannot demonstrate that any impropriety on this basis was the reason she did not receive the position. While the candidate that Ms. Edmond referred for the position did receive a job offer, he turned down the job offer, and, as discussed, Ms. Edmond did not participate in the interview process. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Ms. Johnson does not allege that the candidates who ultimately accepted the positions had any prior contact with the interviewers. Therefore, Ms. Johnson again fails to propose any connection between these alleged improprieties and age discrimination. c. Conclusion In sum, no reasonable jury would find based on the facts of this case that the District’s clear non-discriminatory justification for not hiring Ms. Johnson—that the other candidates scored 2 Moreover, Ms. Johnson concedes that while much of the notes are “unaltered, word for word,” the interviewers also added “a couple of sentences” to some of the applicants’ interview responses. Id. at 11. Accordingly, the interviewers’ notes may be more consistent with form language, giving the same notes in response to the same answer by the candidates, rather than any indication of discrimination. 18 more highly on its prescreening and interview metrics—was pretext for age discrimination. Ms. Johnson fails to show any qualification gap between herself and the two selected candidates that a reasonable jury would find to be inherently indicative of age discrimination. Nor does Ms. Johnson show any evidence of irregularities in the hiring process that supports an inference of age discrimination. Indeed, Ms. Johnson’s own cited exhibits show that she benefitted from the District’s decision to conduct a second round of interviews. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT the District’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s age discrimination claims. B. Ms. Johnson’s Retaliation Claim (Count II) Ms. Johnson next alleges that the District’s decision not to offer her a position constituted unl