Perez v. Kipp Dc Supporting Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHANIQUE PEREZ, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 21-929 (RC) : : Re Document Nos.: 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, v. : 89, 95, 97, 100, : 101, 102, 103, : 106, 113, 132, KIPP DC SUPPORTING CORP. et al, : 133, 145, 146, : 158, 168, 169, Defendant. : 181, 184, 185 MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING KIPP DC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING CAPITAL CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Shanique Perez brings claims for gross negligence; grossly negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and premises liability against two District of Columbia schools—KIPP DC Public Charter Schools and Capital City Public Charter School (collectively, “Defendants”)—for failing to prevent a teacher, Alan Coleman, from subjecting her to years of sexual abuse and harassment. Coleman first taught middle school at KIPP DC, where Ms. Perez was his student during the 2003–2004 and 2004– 2005 school years. After the summer of 2005, Coleman began teaching at Capital City and Ms. Perez left KIPP DC to begin high school at another school, the Madeira School. Over a decade later, Ms. Perez confided in another former teacher that Coleman began sexually abusing her while she was his student at KIPP DC and continued doing so while he was employed at Capital City. Criminal proceedings commenced against Coleman in Maryland and the District of Columbia, and in 2017, Coleman pleaded guilty to sex abuse of a minor in Maryland and to first- degree child sex abuse in the District of Columbia. Ms. Perez’s case against Defendants proceeded to discovery, which concluded on March 19, 2025. In the summer of 2025, KIPP DC and Capital City both filed motions for summary judgment on all claims and motions to limit or exclude as inadmissible certain opinions offered by Ms. Perez’s standard-of-care expert, Dr. Billie-Jo Grant, and her psychological expert, Dr. Melissa Blackwell. At that point, Ms. Perez was represented by Ketterer, Browne & Associates, PLLC. However, as Ms. Perez’s responses to Defendants’ motions became due, Ms. Perez argued that she was receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and filed a motion to dismiss Ketterer, Browne & Associates as her counsel. The Court then stayed all proceedings in this case and allowed Ms. Perez to continue pursuing her claims pro se. In the past year, while the stay has been in place, Ms. Perez has filed various motions seeking diverse forms of relief, including to amend her complaint, impose sanctions on current Defendants, add new defendants, and re-open discovery. She has also filed pro se responses to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. However, she has declined to respond to Defendants’ motions to exclude or limit her experts’ opinions. Defendants oppose all forms of relief sought by Ms. Perez. In the present motion, the Court resolves all pending dispositive and non-dispositive motions. Beginning with the non-dispositive motions, the Court denies all relief sought by Ms. Perez and enjoins her from making direct communications with KIPP DC’s former President and CEO, Susan Schaeffler, as well as harassing or threatening communications with any other KIPP DC employee or potential witness for the remainder of this lawsuit. The Court then turns to Defendants’ motions to limit or exclude certain opinions by Ms. Perez’s standard-of-care and 2 psychological experts, and grants those as conceded. Finally, the Court considers Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants KIPP DC and Capital City summary judgment as to all claims.1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Ms. Perez first brought suit in 2018, alleging that starting when she was a middle-school student at KIPP DC, she suffered sexual abuse at the hands of her teacher, Alan Coleman. See Doe v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2019). In her complaint, she named as defendants the corporation that owned the KIPP DC school; Alan Coleman; Capital City Public Charter School, which employed Coleman after he left KIPP DC in 2005; former KIPP DC President and CEO Susan Schaeffler; and unnamed KIPP DC employees. Id. at 5. Ms. Perez asserted claims under § 1983 and Title IX, as well as state-law claims of gross negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 6. The Court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the District of Columbia’s relevant statutory limitations period had expired. Id. at 15. Four months later, the District of Columbia enacted the Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018, which extended the relevant statute of limitations for civil actions arising out of sexual abuse. Perez v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp. (“Perez I”), 590 F. Supp. 3d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2022). Ms. Perez then filed the present action in 2021, reasserting many of the same claims against the same defendants. Id. at 156. Eventually, she voluntarily 1 The Court also denies as moot or unavailing the following two motions: (1) Ms. Perez’s motion to compel the Clerk of Court to administer an oath to facilitate her filing of documents in this case, ECF No. 158; and (2) Ms. Perez’s motion for clarification of the Court’s February 3, 2025 Minute Order granting in part her motion for religious accommodation, ECF No. 185. 3 dismissed Ms. Schaeffler,2 the unnamed KIPP DC employees, and Coleman, leaving as sole defendants (1) KIPP DC Public Charter Schools and KIPP DC Supporting Corporation (collectively, “KIPP DC”), and (2) Capital City Public Charter School (“Capital City”). See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 57. The Court dismissed Ms. Perez’s 2021 complaint on the ground of res judicata, Perez I, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 159, but on appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corp. (“Perez II”), 70 F.4th 570, 571–72 (D.C. Cir. 2023). On remand, this Court dismissed Ms. Perez’s Title IX claim as being untimely filed3 and her claims sounding in simple negligence, from which public charter schools are immune under District of Columbia law. Perez v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp. (“Perez III”), No. 21-cv-929, 2024 WL 3534769, at *10–11, 14 (D.D.C. July 25, 2024). However, the Court allowed her other claims to proceed. Id. at *14. Accordingly, on July 31, 2024, Ms. Perez filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting claims against KIPP DC and Capital City for gross negligence; grossly negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; and intentional infliction of emotion distress; and against KIPP DC only for premises liability. FAC ¶¶ 125–97. 2 In September of 2025, Ms. Perez wrote an email to opposing counsel indicating her intent to file a motion to strike or set aside her former counsel’s voluntary dismissal of Ms. Schaeffler and to reinstate her as a defendant. KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at Ex. B, ECF No. 131-2. Ms. Perez claims that “[her] former counsel filed/consented to the dismissal of Ms. Schaeffler without conferring with [her] and without [her] authorization or consent” and that she has “since terminated/withdrawn prior counsel for negligence, and [is] proceeding pro se.” Id. However, Ms. Perez never filed a motion to reinstate Ms. Schaeffler as a defendant. 3 Ms. Perez, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), requesting that the Court vacate its dismissal of her Title IX claim. Pl.’s Mot. Relief from J., ECF No. 168. Ms. Perez claims that the Court dismissed this claim on an undeveloped record, and that subsequent discovery has allowed her to plead new facts regarding “notice and institutional response” that warrant reinstatement of the claim. Id. at 1. However, the Court dismissed Ms. Perez’s Title IX claim because it was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, not because she failed to plead actual notice. Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s motion for relief from judgment is denied. 4  Over the next nine months, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, including depositions of Ms. Schaeffler and other KIPP DC and Capital City personnel. In July 2025, KIPP DC and Capital City moved for summary judgment on all counts. See KIPP DC’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 86; Capital City’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 87. Defendants also moved to exclude or limit certain opinions by Ms. Perez’s experts. See KIPP DC’s Mot. Exclude Test. of Dr. Grant (“KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 84; KIPP DC’s Mot. Exclude Certain Opinions of Dr. Blackwell (“KIPP DC’s 2d Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 85; Capital City’s Mot. Exclude Dr. Grant (“Capital City’s 1st Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 88; Capital City’s Mot. Partially Exclude Dr. Blackwell (“Capital City’s 2d Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 89. Below, the Court first addresses several non-dispositive motions filed by Defendants and Ms. Perez, starting with KIPP DC’s motion to enjoin Ms. Perez from making direct communications with KIPP DC personnel and concluding with Ms. Perez’s various motions. The Court then turns to Defendants’ motions to limit or exclude Ms. Perez’s experts and finally Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. III. ANALYSIS A. KIPP DC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 95); Ms. Perez’s Motion for a Protective Injunction (ECF No. 101) KIPP DC seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ms. Perez from personally communicating with represented parties and witnesses outside of formal communications through counsel while this litigation is pending. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1, ECF No. 95. In the summer of 2025, Ms. Perez began directly contacting KIPP DC personnel and board members regarding their involvement in her lawsuit. KIPP DC then attempted to resolve the issue without court intervention by requesting that she cease these communications. Id. at 5. 5 When those efforts proved unsuccessful, KIPP DC filed this motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. In response, Ms. Perez filed a motion for a “protective injunction,” asking the Court to prohibit KIPP DC from filing its injunction. Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 2–3, ECF No. 101. She argues that KIPP DC is infringing on her First Amendment rights and is using the litigation process as a “tool for intimidation.” Id. Finding that KIPP DC has satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the Court grants its motion in part. However, the Court declines to impose a total ban on Ms. Perez’s communications with all KIPP DC personnel. Instead, as a narrower remedy, Ms. Perez is prohibited from making any direct communications with former KIPP DC President and CEO Susan Schaeffler and from making harassing or threatening communications with any KIPP DC personnel or potential witnesses for the remainder of this lawsuit, including any appeal. And because Ms. Perez has not demonstrated that the relief that she seeks is warranted, the Court denies her motion for a protective injunction. 1. Background On or around June 30, 2025, with this action pending, Ms. Perez stood outside two KIPP DC campuses where Ms. Schaeffler was scheduled to be present and held up signs that referenced her and the school. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 2. One sign stated, “I WAS SEX TRAFFICKED BY SUSAN SCHAFFLER [sic].” Id. Another sign stated, “SUSAN SCHAEFFLER GHISLANE MAXWELL.” 4 Id. At the time, Ms. Perez was represented by counsel, so KIPP DC’s counsel contacted her counsel directly about the situation. They sent a 4 Ms. Perez appeared to be comparing Ms. Schaeffler to Ghislaine Maxwell, who is widely known for being criminally convicted and sentenced to federal prison for her role in a scheme to sexually exploit and abuse multiple minor girls with Jeffrey Epstein. See, e.g., Ghislaine Maxwell Sentenced To 20 Years In Prison For Conspiring With Jeffrey Epstein to Sexually Abuse Minors, Dep’t of Just. (June 28, 2022). 6 formal cease-and-desist letter that same day, claiming that Ms. Perez’s conduct constituted slander, libel, defamation, and business disparagement. Id. at Ex. F, ECF No. 95-6. The letter demanded that Ms. Perez (1) stop making any false, defamatory, or disparaging statements about KIPP DC and its employees, (2) remove all related social media posts and publications, and (3) preserve all physical and electronic evidence—including records, correspondence, social media content, and protest signs—related to the matter. Id. Ms. Perez’s behavior did not change. During July and August 2025, Ms. Perez made several posts on social media disparaging KIPP DC and Ms. Schaeffler. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3. In one post, she wrote: “Mistress of the Market Susan Schaeffler is a human trafficker. #GhislaneMaxwell of education. KIPP: KIDS IN PEDOPHILE PROGRAM.” Id. On or about August 12, 2025, Ms. Perez began contacting KIPP DC personnel directly through Instagram and text message. Id. at 3–4. Via text message, Perez used language that indicated she was willing to fight Ms. Schaeffler. Id. at 4. Specifically, Ms. Perez used the phrase “on sight,” which Ms. Schaeffler is aware is a slang term meaning wanting to fight or injure someone upon seeing them. Id. at 4–5. Based on these communications, Ms. Schaeffler expressed concern for her personal safety. Id. at 5. On August 22, 2025, KIPP DC filed the present motion for a preliminary injunction against Ms. Perez, requesting that the Court enjoin her from personally communicating with KIPP DC employees and board members outside of formal communications through counsel while this litigation is pending. Id. at 1. KIPP DC claims that Ms. Perez has attempted to intimidate and threaten its personnel who may be witnesses and that she has not been deterred by KIPP DC’s attempts to stop her conduct without court intervention. Id. 7  On September 5, 2025, Ms. Perez dismissed her counsel and decided to pursue her claims pro se. Pl.’s Mot. Dismiss Counsel at 2, ECF No. 99. Ms. Perez then filed an opposition to KIPP DC’s motion, arguing that its preliminary injunction seeks to restrain her First Amendment activity and “chill [] prosecution of her claims.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 2–3, ECF No. 112.5 KIPP DC replied, explaining that Ms. Perez’s threats and intimidation are not protected speech. KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 4–5, ECF No. 131. Ms. Perez filed her own motion for a “protective injunction” against KIPP DC, requesting that the Court (1) “prohibit[] Defendants from filing preliminary injunctions or similar motions aimed at penalizing or chilling Plaintiff’s exercise of her constitutional rights,” (2) “[o]rder that Defendants’ August 22, 2025 Notice of Preliminary Injunction be stricken as frivolous and harassing,” and (3) “[a]dmonish or sanction Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) for misuse of litigation filings.”6 Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 3. 2. Legal Standard a. Preliminary Injunction A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To establish entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that 5 Plaintiff’s motions are not paginated. Citations to those filings therefore refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system. 6 Ms. Perez filed this motion against both KIPP DC and Capital City Public Charter School, Inc. (“Capital City”). Capital City responded, noting that KIPP DC filed its motion for a preliminary injunction only on behalf of itself, and not on behalf of Capital City. As such, Capital City claims that Ms. Perez’s inclusion of Capital City in her motion was improper. Capital City Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 1–2, ECF No. 124. The Court agrees. To the extent that Ms. Perez’s motion for a protective injunction includes Capital City, the Court also denies it. 8 it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. Eng., 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing” as to each element. Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024). Nevertheless, “[t]he first two factors,” likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, “are the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). b. Rule 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows the court to sanction a party for advancing an argument that is frivolous, baseless, legally untenable, brought with intent to vexatiously multiply the proceedings, or presented for any other improper purpose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(1)–(4), (c); Cobell v. Norton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 n.8 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 11 is intended to “discourage . . . abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment. It is within the Court’s discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions if an objective, “reasonable inquiry discloses the pleading, motion, or paper is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or (3) interposed for any improper purpose such as harassment or delay.” Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “[T]he imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is not something courts take lightly; instead, Rule 11 sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial proceedings.” Intelsat USA Sales LLC v. Juch–Tech, Inc., 305 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2014). Justifying sanctions 9 requires “clear and convincing evidence . . . of the predicate misconduct” and “of bad faith.” Pinson v. United States Dep’t of Just., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting 3E Mobile, LLC v. Glob. Cellular, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2016)). 3. Analysis KIPP DC’s principal claim is that Ms. Perez threatened and intimidated its potential witnesses, including Ms. Schaeffler. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 6–7. As a remedy, it seeks an order preventing Ms. Perez from communicating directly with KIPP DC’s represented parties and witnesses and instead requiring that she communicate with them solely through KIPP DC’s counsel. Id. at 1. For the reasons explained below, KIPP DC has satisfied the conditions justifying a preliminary injunction. However, the Court grants KIPP DC’s motion only in part so as not to let the injunction sweep too broadly. Specifically, the Court prohibits Ms. Perez from directly contacting only Ms. Schaeffler and otherwise simply from engaging in harassing or threatening communications with any other KIPP DC personnel. a. KIPP DC’s Request for a Preliminary Injunction Federal courts are vested with the inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control the conduct of those who appear before them. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991). “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.” Id. at 43 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)). This power includes the ability to regulate litigants’ behavior, particularly when such behavior includes harassing or intimidating communications. Yates v. Belli Deli, No. C 07-01405 WHA, 2007 WL 2318923, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[A] district court has the inherent power to issue an injunction against litigants who harass their opponents.”); Palmer v. Milnor, No. 19- 10 0961-LK, 2022 WL 407389, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2022), aff’d, 22-35214, 2023 WL 6458652 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023) (prohibiting pro se plaintiff from communicating directly with named defendants after plaintiff threatened to “beat [him] up” and stated that he was “coming for” him); Murphy v. Wilhelm, No. 3:19-CV-01733- AC, 2021 WL 799307, at *2–4 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2021) (ordering that plaintiff communicate only with opposing parties’ counsel after finding plaintiff’s repeated emails to be “accusatory, sometimes threatening, and always couched in an inappropriate and unprofessional tone”); Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 6:20-CV-00253-AA, 2020 WL 2301312, at *1 (D. Or. May 8, 2020) (prohibiting plaintiff from communicating directly with defendant parties after finding that “plaintiff’s communications have been vexatious and disruptive to this litigation and to the work of defendants and those not involved in this case”).7 Although the Court has “inherent authority to . . . prevent a pro se litigant from communicating with a represented party,” Murphy, 2021 WL 799307, at *3, it must also consider Ms. Perez’s First Amendment protections in considering the extent of any restrictions imposed on her ability to communicate with represented parties. The First Amendment generally prevents government actors, including courts, “from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (internal citations omitted). These protections for speech are especially strong with 7 American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 is also instructive. The rule states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.” Courts in some jurisdictions have extended this rule even to pro se litigants. See e.g. Pistolis v. Ameren, No. 3:19 -CV-001185-MAB, 2022 WL 2159291, at *8 (S.D. Ill. June 15, 2022); Clark, 2020 WL 3038072, at *4 (sanctioning plaintiff for violating court order prohibiting him from directly contacting represented defendants in the case). 11 regard to prior restraints, or “judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, 4–14 (1984)). However, “[c]ourts have made a distinction between communication and harassment,” the latter of which can be enjoined without running afoul of constitutional protections. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 580 (5th Cir. 2005). Where “restrictions based upon conduct . . . incidentally restrict speech,” such restrictions have been found to “pose[ ] only a minimal burden on speech.” Id. Accordingly, “courts do have the power to enjoin harassing communication.” Id.; see also United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his speech was protected when he “engaged in a course of conduct with the intent . . . to harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress to [the victim]” by sending threatening text messages, designing a false Facebook page, and sending emails to the victim’s coworkers containing nude photographs of the victim); Myart v. Taylor, No. SA: 5:16-CV-736-DAE, 2016 WL 5376227, at *4–6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2016) (enjoining plaintiff from contacting, threatening, or harassing defendants for the pendency of the suit). Having set forth the basis for its power to restrict litigants’ harassing speech, the Court proceeds to analyze KIPP DC’s request for a preliminary injunction under the traditional factors. The Court finds that the balance of the four factors supports granting KIPP DC’s request for a preliminary injunction in part, as set forth below. First, KIPP DC has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Ms. Perez’s communications constitute harassment, at least with respect to Ms. Schaeffler. Specifically, Ms. Perez’s text messages to Ms. Schaeffler—including her insults and use of a 12 slang term indicating that she would fight Ms. Schaeffler during their next encounter—crossed the line from civil communications to harassment. As a result of these communications, Schaeffler has expressed concern for her personal safety. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 5. This concern is reasonable. Cf. Beyond Blond Prods., LLC v. Heldman, No. CV205581DSFGJSX, 2022 WL 2784404, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2022) (finding that the defendant’s “harassing and threatening emails” and use of personal insults against the plaintiff would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress). The text messages thus constitute reliable evidence to support KIPP DC’s contention that Ms. Perez threatened Ms. Schaeffler, and because such communications are not protected First Amendment speech, they fall within the Court’s power to restrict. Osinger, 753 F.3d at 945. Second, KIPP DC has shown that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. To demonstrate irreparable harm, “the injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (citation modified). The Court agrees with KIPP DC that the concern Ms. Schaeffler has for her personal safety as a result of Ms. Perez’s communications constitutes irreparable harm. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 8. Although some of Ms. Perez’s conduct—such as protesting outside KIPP DC campuses and posting her opinions on her own Instagram—does not constitute unlawful harassment, the escalation to threatening text messages does. Cf. United Artists Corp. v. United Artist Studios LLC, No. CV 19-828-MWF (MAAx), 2019 WL 6917918, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2019) (finding that plaintiff demonstrated that irreparable injury is likely and imminent because defendant’s “behavior has escalated over time, and he has threatened future harassment”). Ms. Perez failed to change her behavior after receiving KIPP DC’s cease-and- desist letter. In fact, she sent multiple text messages to Ms. Schaeffler following the issuance of 13 the letter, ultimately culminating in the threat of violence. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3–4; KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at Ex. C, ECF No. 131-3. The record thus demonstrates that the potential for future harm is actual. Intimidating or threatening communications that make a witness fear for their safety may dissuade them or others from fully participating in a lawsuit. See United Artists Corp., 2019 WL 6917918, at *11. Ms. Schaeffler has expressed such a fear, and the Court is thus inclined to take action to prevent a scenario that would negatively impact KIPP DC’s ability to litigate this case or that could cause irreparable harm to its interests.8 Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6 (finding plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm because defendant’s “threatening and harassing emails increased in frequency over the pendency of this lawsuit, and may prevent [plaintiff’s counsel and officer] from participating fully in this lawsuit or may interfere with their attorney-client relationship”). Third, a modified preliminary junction—prohibiting Ms. Perez from communicating directly with Ms. Schaeffler and from engaging in harassing or threatening communications with KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses—does not substantially injure Ms. Perez. The Court is mindful that where an injunction’s “scope and meaning are unclear,” the concern over prohibiting speech is heightened. Watson v. McGuire, No. 15-cv-1043, 2016 WL 7839114, at *3 (D.D.C. June 2, 2016) (quoting Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, KIPP DC’s initial request that the Court prohibit all of Ms. Perez’s communications with KIPP DC personnel goes too far. See Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 580 8 Although the Court is granting KIPP DC’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims, the possibility that this action will remain pending through an appeal warrants the imposition of a modified preliminary injunction addressing Ms. Perez’s ability to communicate with Ms. Schaeffler and other potential KIPP DC witnesses. 14 (finding that the district court’s order “swept too broadly when it prohibited all communication” between defendant and plaintiff and plaintiff’s employees); Rissman, Hendricks & Oliverio, LLP v. MIV Therapeutics, Inc., CIV.A. 11-10791-MLW, 2011 WL 5025206, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2011) (rejecting proposed restriction on plaintiff’s communication with other witnesses absent evidence of his attempt to contact them); see also LaRue v. Johnson, No. CV 16-00504 (EGS/RMM), 2018 WL 1967128, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 16-504 (EGS), 2018 WL 2561036 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2018) (finding that injunction barring defendant from engaging in any contact and communication with plaintiff was “too broad” and “[sought] to enjoin communications that [had] not yet been found defamatory”). However, a preliminary injunction prohibiting harassment and intimidation toward KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses is justified. See Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6 (specifically prohibiting defendant from making “threatening and harassing” communications aimed at plaintiff and related personnel (emphasis added)); Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 580 (highlighting distinction between prohibiting defendant from “generally communicating” with plaintiff and prohibiting him from “threatening or harassing” plaintiff, finding the former too restrictive). Furthermore, an order prohibiting Ms. Perez from making any direct communication, threatening or not, toward Ms. Schaeffler specifically is also justified. See Murphy, 2021 WL 799307, at *3 (granting order that plaintiff not directly communicate with any party that is represented by counsel following ample evidence of plaintiff’s harassment and intimidation); Palmer, 2022 WL 407389, at *7 (allowing prohibition on pro se plaintiff’s communication with individually-named defendants following evidence of plaintiff’s threatening conduct). Because KIPP DC provided sufficient evidence that Ms. Perez previously threatened Ms. Schaeffler, such a blanket restriction is warranted. 15  To be clear, the Court’s order granting in part KIPP DC’s request for a preliminary injunction does not bar all of Ms. Perez’s communication or speech with KIPP DC personnel, but only her direct contact with Ms. Schaeffler and any harassing or intimidating contact with KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses. By specifying to whom the restriction applies and the type of communication that is prohibited, this order avoids sweeping in restrictions on communications with unrelated persons, which could threaten Ms. Perez’s protected speech. See Rissman, 2011 WL 5025206, at *7 (narrowing no-contact order to specific individuals whom plaintiff had previously threatened). Furthermore, Ms. Perez is still free to communicate with opposing counsel, which the Court recognizes as necessary to allow her to continue pursuing her claims. Myart, 2016 WL 5376227, at *5 (noting that “[i]mportantly, enjoining [plaintiff] from harassing the Defendants named in this lawsuit does not prevent him from effectively prosecuting this case [or] communicating with Defense counsel”). Ms. Perez is likewise not prevented from voicing her opinions about the school and its personnel in other contexts; she just may not do so in a manner that constitutes personal harassment. See Myart, 2016 WL 5376227, at *5 (“[A]n injunction does not prevent Mr. Myart from expressing his views about the named Defendants, so long as he does so in a manner that does not constitute personal harassment.”). Fourth, a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest because it would help ensure the fair administration of justice. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). The order contemplated here protects KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses so that they can fully participate in this lawsuit without fear of receiving harassing communications from Ms. Perez. 16 See Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6. Therefore, the balance of equities also tips in favor of granting KIPP DC’s preliminary injunction request in part. b. Ms. Perez’s Request for a Protective Injunction Ms. Perez asks this Court to enter a “protective injunction” forbidding KIPP DC from “filing preliminary injunctions or similar motions aimed at penalizing or chilling Plaintiff’s exercise of her constitutional rights.” Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 3. She argues that she requires the Court’s intervention because KIPP DC is using its motion as a tool to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1). Id. at 2–3. She also argues that KIPP DC seeks to chill her First Amendment right to peacefully protest. Id. at 3. Finally, she contends that absent Court action, KIPP DC will continue to use the litigation process as a means of intimidation. Id. For several reasons, the Court denies Ms. Perez’s request. First, Ms. Perez misreads KIPP DC’s motion. As discussed, KIPP DC narrowly requests that Ms. Perez cease communication directly with represented parties. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1. It does not seek to prevent her from protesting on public property or voicing her opinions through other media. Nor could it. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (“[T]raditional public fora are areas that have historically been open to the public for speech activities.”); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 105 (2017) (“[S]ocial media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity . . . .”). Second, Ms. Perez’s request that the Court restrict KIPP DC’s ability to file motions for preliminary injunction is unjustified. Undoubtedly, federal courts “may employ injunctive remedies”—such as filing restrictions—“to protect the integrity of courts and the orderly and 17 expeditious administration of justice.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 46 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Urb. v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), aff’d, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL 13710107 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015). However, such action is not necessary or proper here. KIPP DC has not demonstrated that it intends to abuse the judicial system by making repeated harassing or frivolous filings. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing the court’s authority to enter injunctive relief against a “recalcitrant litigant” (emphasis added)). Similarly, the Court does not find that KIPP DC’s motion for a preliminary injunction is a violation of Rule 11. Ms. Perez has not presented any evidence that KIPP DC filed its motion for “any improper purpose” or that its filing is legally or factually untenable or sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions. See Pinson, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 13–14 (denying sanctions because plaintiff “has presented no evidence of bad faith, much less clear and convincing evidence”); see also Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR Vantage, Inc., No. 21-CV-00592 (APM), 2022 WL 834095, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022) (finding that “conclusory statements” are “unpersuasive” to substantiate a claim for sanctions); Robertson v. McCloskey, No. CIV. A. 86-2877, 1988 WL 90115, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1988) (merely labeling defendant’s motion as “frivolous and harassing,” without further explanation, is insufficient to warrant sanctions). Accordingly, there is no reason for the Court to believe that KIPP DC is filing frivolous or vexatious motions. Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 must therefore be denied. 18  B. Ms. Perez’s Motions to Impose Sanctions on Defendants and to Re-Depose Susan Schaeffler (ECF Nos. 102, 106); Ms. Perez’s Motion to Impose Sanctions on Defendants and to Re-Depose Karen Dresden (ECF No. 103); Ms. Perez’s Motion to Compel a Psychological Examination of Susan Schaeffler (ECF No. 113) While proceeding pro se, Ms. Perez petitioned the Court for several forms of relief against Defendants based on allegedly perjured testimony given by former KIPP DC President and CEO Susan Schaeffler and allegedly incomplete testimony given by former Head of School of Capital City Karen Dresden. First, she requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from relying on such testimony, strike the testimony from the record, permit her to re-depose Ms. Schaeffler and Ms. Dresden, refer the matters to the Department of Justice for investigation, and impose additional sanctions on Defendants as appropriate. See Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and S