John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 1 of 173 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1569 JOHN DOE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, Defendant - Appellant, and STATE OF MARYLAND; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenors. ------------------------ GENERAL CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS; CARDINAL NEWMAN SOCIETY; ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS INTERNATIONAL; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS; ASSOCIATION OF CLASSICAL CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS; ASSOCIATION FOR BIBLICAL HIGHER EDUCATION; INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS; PROFESSOR HELEN M. ALVARE; MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE; CATHOLIC BENEFITS ASSOCIATION, Amici Supporting Appellant. RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL-RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER AND FOURTEEN ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.; THE PUBLIC JUSTICE USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 2 of 173 CENTER; FREESTATE JUSTICE; EQUALITY CALIFORNIA; JUSTICE IN AGING; LEGAL AID AT WORK; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT; NATIONAL LGBTQ+ BAR ASSOCIATION; SERVICES AND ADVOCACY FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER ELDERS, INC.; SILVER SPRING UNITED METHODIST CHURCH; CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE, Amici Supporting Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:20-cv-01815-JRR) Argued: March 17, 2026 Decided: October 16, 2026 __________________ Before WYNN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wynn wrote a separate concurring opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Joseph Christian Dugan, GALLAGHER LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Anthony Jovi May, NUSINOV SMITH, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Joshua Morris Segal, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Lowell Vernon Sturgill, Jr., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Intervenors. ON BRIEF: Brandon K. Wharton, GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Eve L. Hill, Lauren DiMartino, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Shannon C. Leary, James A. Hill, GILBERT EMPLOYMENT LAW, P.C., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellee. Todd McFarland, GENERAL CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, Silver Spring, Maryland; Christopher Mills, SPERO LAW LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Amicus General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists. John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C., Rory T. Gray, Lawrenceville, Georgia, Daniel J. Grabowski, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Lansdowne, Virginia, for Amici Cardinal Newman Society, Association of Christian Schools International, American Association of Christian Schools, Association of Classical Christian Schools, Association for Biblical Higher Education, and International Alliance for Christian Education. Gene C. Schaerr, James C. Phillips, SCHAERR | JAFFE 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 3 of 173 LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Andrew Nussbaum, FIRST & FOURTEENTH PLLC, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Helen M. Alvaré, The Robert A. Levy Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus Helen M. Alvaré. Andrew Nussbaum, Martin Nussbaum, Colorado Springs, Colorado, James Compton, FIRST & FOURTEENTH PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici Maryland Catholic Conference and Catholic Benefits Association. Aditi Fruitwala, Daniel Mach, Washington, D.C., Louise Melling, Arijeet Sensharma, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Jenny Samuels, Alex J. Luchenitser, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Religious and Civil-Rights Organizations. Carolyn L. Wheeler, Jessica Westerman, Susanna Barron, KATZ BANKS KUMIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association and National Employment Lawyers Association. Auden Perino, Rachel Smith, Elizabeth E. Theran, Brian Diettmeier, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth J. Bower, Erica L. Ross, Serena Lau, Washington, D.C., Jill K. Grant, Ciara Sisco, Dylan Evans, Rachel Pester, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, New York, New York, for Amici National Women’s Law Center and Fourteen Additional Organizations. Gregory R. Nevins, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., Decatur, Georgia, for Amicus Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. Sarah Miller, Murnaghan Appellate Advocacy Fellow, PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER, Baltimore, Maryland; Lauren Pruitt, Legal Director, FREESTATE JUSTICE, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Public Justice Center; FreeState Justice; Equality California; Justice in Aging; Legal Aid at Work; National Employment Law Project; National LGBTQ+ Bar Association; Services and Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Elders, Inc.; and Silver Spring United Methodist Church. Robin B. Wagner, ROBIN B. WAGNER, PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Adam Farra, FARRA & WANG PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici Current and Former Employees of Catholic Relief Services. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 4 of 173 FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge: This appeal represents the collision of employment nondiscrimination statutes with statutory and constitutional protections for religiously affiliated employers. Appellee John Doe 1 initiated this suit for damages, claiming he received unequal compensation because of sex when his employer, Appellant Catholic Relief Services (CRS), terminated his dependent health insurance benefits. There is no dispute at this point that CRS compensated Doe unequally based on sex or that Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act apply to his claims. A straightforward application of each statute Doe invokes establishes his prima facie case—Doe is gay, and because he is married to a man, CRS refused to provide equal compensation via its employee benefits program. The issues presented on appeal are questions of law regarding CRS’s affirmative defenses. CRS asks that we create a rule, sounding either in statute or in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, that it may be shielded from liability because its discriminatory action is rooted in its sincerely held religious beliefs. But we find that neither the statutes at issue nor the First Amendment provide such broad immunity, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the district court. 1 Upon filing his complaint, Doe filed a motion to proceed pseudonymously, which the district court granted. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 5 of 173 I. A. The district court enumerated all facts relevant to this case in its factual findings following a bench trial. See generally Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. (Doe IV), 779 F. Supp. 3d 545, 549–56 (D. Md. 2025). Specifically relevant to this appeal, we discuss CRS’s mission and operations as well as information relevant to Doe’s employment relationship with the organization and his various roles. 1. CRS Mission and Operations Catholic Relief Services is a nonprofit social services agency affiliated with the Catholic Church and governed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Its mission is “to assist the poor and vulnerable overseas.” Id. at 549. CRS has over 8,000 employees, and the organization does not require its employees to “adhere to the Catholic faith” except for “representational” positions. Id. at 550. CRS works with overseas local partners where available but “also provides services that local partners are unable to provide.” Id. at 551. This work is undertaken by CRS’s Overseas Operations Department. Like any large organization, CRS relies on IT infrastructure to go about its work. One part of this infrastructure is Gateway, CRS’s “agency-wide business pipeline and project portfolio system.” Id. at 552. Gateway’s pipeline and projects application “houses the agency’s data relating to funding awards, solicitations, and trends, as well as project- level data and information relevant to program compliance and monitoring.” Opening Br. at 7. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 6 of 173 All of CRS’s overseas projects utilize a management strategy called Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL). MEAL creates a “standardized monitoring and evaluation framework” for CRS’s projects. Doe IV, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 554. 2. Doe’s Relationship with and Roles at CRS John Doe, an IT analyst, encountered CRS at a job fair in 2016. CRS needed a data analyst and Doe fit the bill. At this first meeting, Doe told the CRS recruiter that he is gay, that he is married, and asked if his husband would be covered by CRS’s dependent health benefits. The recruiter said unequivocally that he would. Doe joined CRS and enrolled his husband in CRS’s dependent benefits program. But five months later, CRS informed Doe that his husband’s enrollment was a mistake, because providing dependent benefits to Doe’s husband is contrary to its religious values. Doe declined to accept an alternative compensation arrangement, and CRS eventually terminated his husband’s benefits. Doe worked at CRS from 2016 until he resigned in 2024. For most of his time at CRS, Doe worked with the Gateway application—managing a team, advising on strategy, and hiring and onboarding employees. Doe also served as a MEAL advisor with one of CRS’s programs focused on ending youth institutionalization and promoting family-based care. In this role, Doe was responsible for managing data and databases he created to facilitate decision making and analysis. Finally, Doe held several temporary positions in which he worked overseas in Nigeria for up to six weeks. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 7 of 173 B. In his complaint, Doe brought ten causes of action under state and federal law. Relevant to this appeal, following dispositive motions, the district court granted summary judgment to Doe for liability only on his discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act and certified to the Maryland Supreme Court several questions related to Doe’s claim under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA). See Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. (Doe I), 529 F. Supp. 3d 440 (D. Md. 2021); Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. (Doe II), 618 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Md. 2022), vacated in part, No. CCB-20-1815, 2023 WL 155243 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2023). The Maryland Supreme Court issued a decision on the certified questions, Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. (Doe III), 300 A.3d 116 (Md. 2023), after which the parties resolved two outstanding claims and proceeded to trial on the final claim, sexual-orientation discrimination under MFEPA, Doe IV, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 549, 567. After the bench trial, the district court entered judgment on the MFEPA claim in favor of Doe. Id. at 548. The parties stipulated to $60,000 compensatory damages in the event CRS was found liable for any claims, subject to its reservation of rights to seek appellate review on liability. Id. at 549. CRS now appeals the district court’s judgments on Doe’s Title VII, Equal Pay Act, and MFEPA claims. II. CRS appeals both the summary judgment granted to Doe and the district court’s entry of judgment in Doe’s favor following bench trial. We review the summary judgment de novo, interpreting facts and making inferences in the light most favorable to the 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 8 of 173 nonmovant. Plyler v. Cox, 145 F.4th 501, 508 (4th Cir. 2025). As to judgment after bench trial, we review conclusions of law de novo, but we may only reverse factual findings if clearly erroneous. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 502 (4th Cir. 2016). III. CRS raises defenses grounded in various statutes as well as under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. CRS challenges the district court’s interpretation of the exemption for religious employers in both Title VII and MFEPA, and it argues that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act bars enforcement of the federal statutes here. On constitutional grounds, CRS raises the church autonomy doctrine as an immunity to liability 2 and argues that the Free Exercise Clause renders the three statutes unconstitutional as applied in this case. 2 In its brief, CRS attempts to invoke the church autonomy doctrine as a jurisdictional issue, contending that we “cannot wade into this dispute, as civil courts may ‘exercise no jurisdiction’ over the subject matter of a ‘dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,’ including ‘a matter which concerns theological controversy.’” Opening Br. at 17 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1872)). The Supreme Court has concluded that the ministerial exception—a component of the church autonomy doctrine—is an affirmative defense rather than a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4 (2012). But the church autonomy doctrine may still be jurisdictional in a “broad, colloquial sense,” in that “matters falling within its ambit are beyond the power and cognizance of civil courts.” McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 157 F.4th 627, 644 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1674, 224 L. Ed. 2d 16 (2026). We can imagine possible cases where church autonomy may create a jurisdictional issue in that sense—for example if Doe asked us to require the Catholic Church to recognize his marriage—but in our view this case does not present such a question. CRS fails to show how this case raises strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions such that we cannot even consider it, and thus it does not sufficiently develop 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 9 of 173 Before we address each issue independently, we pause to observe the full landscape of statutory anti-discrimination laws, statutory exemptions for religious employers, and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Generally speaking, Title VII and MFEPA prohibit employment decisions based on, inter alia, race, sex, religion, and national origin. Both statutes exempt some employment decisions made by religiously affiliated employers. For example, the decision of a Catholic nursing home to terminate a nurse because her religiously motivated attire did not conform to the employer’s religious doctrine is immune from liability for religious discrimination under Title VII, which exempts “religious organizations . . . from [plaintiffs’] claims of religious discrimination.” See Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 190–91, 196 (4th Cir. 2011). The ministerial exception under the Religion Clauses separately shields an employment decision from scrutiny on any basis—including race, sex, religion, and national origin— when the affected employee performs a function that qualifies as “ministerial” under the case law. 3 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012). And even for non-ministerial employees, the Religion Clauses, through the broader church autonomy doctrine, effectively bar certain other actions that require resolution of questions “about discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, the argument that church autonomy has jurisdictional implications here. Accordingly, we will address these arguments as possible affirmative defenses after considering CRS’s statutory defenses. 3 The ministerial exception is not limited to cases “involv[ing] ‘ministers’ or even members of the clergy.” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732, 747 (2020). Instead, “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.” Id. at 753. 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 10 of 173 custom or law.” See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). Here, CRS asks us to expand both statutory and constitutional protections for religious employers. CRS argues that either Title VII’s exemption or the Religion Clauses should immunize all employment decisions by religious organizations so long as the decision is based on the employer’s religious belief, regardless of whether race, sex, or national origin is a but-for cause of the decision or whether the employee plays a ministerial role. We will not. The extremely broad and nearly unbounded immunity CRS seeks is not required by any statute or constitutional provision. Title VII and MFEPA provide significant statutory exemptions above and beyond the constitutional minimum: that government cannot “interfer[e] with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181, and courts cannot otherwise resolve disputes that hinge on the correctness “of faith and doctrine,” see infra Section V.B. That none of these defenses applies in this case is not a reason for this Court to invent new protections for religious employers over what Congress and the Constitution require. IV. We begin with CRS’s defenses grounded in statutes. First, as to Doe’s Title VII claim, CRS contends that the exemption for religious employers in section 702 shields it from liability for the employment decision at issue. Second, as to Doe’s MFEPA claim, CRS argues that the district court imposed too narrow an interpretation of that statute’s religious-employer exemption. Third, CRS urges us to find that the Religious Freedom 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 11 of 173 Restoration Act bars enforcement of the federal statutes because such enforcement would substantially burden its religious exercise. We address each argument in turn. A. CRS says that its employment decision here follows from its sincerely held religious beliefs. Therefore, CRS argues it is protected by Title VII’s exemption for religiously affiliated employers. The specific application of the exemption that CRS seeks in this case presents a question of first impression for our Court. We begin by reviewing the statutory text and our prior cases applying the exemption before concluding that our precedent does not answer the question at hand. We proceed to interpret the statute to discern whether the exemption applies here and we find that Title VII, considering its remedial purpose, does not shield religious employers from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin even if the employment decision is also motivated by religious belief. Finally, we address CRS’s specific arguments for its proposed rule. 1. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). CRS’s discriminatory decision based on Doe’s sexual orientation “is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’” because “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being [gay] or transgender without discriminating against 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 12 of 173 that individual based on sex.” Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 660 (2020)). Nevertheless, Title VII “has long included an exemption for religious organizations in certain circumstances.” Kennedy, 657 F.3d at 192. Specifically, section 702 of Title VII, as amended and codified at § 2000e-1(a), provides in relevant part as follows: This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. CRS seeks to invoke this exemption to excuse its discriminatory employment decision in this case. Specifically, CRS argues that section 702 applies “when a religious employer takes an adverse employment action because an employee’s conduct is incompatible with some aspect of the employer’s religion” such that “the employer is exempt from liability that might otherwise attach under Title VII.” Opening Br. at 21. Doe responds that this reading is overly broad and not supported by our case law, which provides that section 702 “does not exempt religious organizations from Title VII’s provisions barring discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or national origin.” Resp. Br. at 21 (quoting Kennedy, 657 F.3d at 192). Section 702 “exempts religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion.” Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987). We have previously found that the reach of section 702 is limited “to one particular reason for employment decision—that based upon religious preference,” and that it “does not confer 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 13 of 173 upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.” Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985). But we have not previously addressed whether the exemption applies to a decision based on race and religion, sex and religion, or national origin and religion. In considering that question here, we conclude that Title VII’s proscription of employment decisions based on race, sex, or national origin applies to religious organizations even when the decision is also motivated by religion.4 We have twice addressed cases involving sex discrimination claims against religious employers. In Rayburn, the plaintiff alleged she was passed over for two pastoral positions for race- and sex-based reasons. Id. at 1165. Though we ultimately found that the ministerial exception prohibited enforcement of Title VII, we first employed the canon of constitutional avoidance and sought to find a plausible reading that shielded the employer from liability. Id. at 1166. But after considering “the wording of the statute and the history behind it,” we held “that Title VII, by ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress, clearly expressed,’ applies to the employment decision [at issue].” Id. at 1167 (quoting NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)). In other words, section 702 did not reflect a congressional intent that religious organizations be exempt from Title VII claims based on anything other than religion. See id. at 1166–67 (“It was open to 4 We are using the term “religion” as defined in Title VII, encompassing “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 14 of 173 Congress to exempt from Title VII the religious employer, not simply one basis of employment, and Congress plainly did not.”). Nearly forty years passed before we next considered a similar claim, in which case a Catholic school argued that section 702 should shield it from liability for terminating a teacher when the school learned he planned to marry his same-sex partner. Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., 101 F.4th 316, 320, 322 (4th Cir. 2024). The school argued “that if religion motivates an employment decision—even one that also discriminates based on sex—then Title VII no longer applies.” Id. at 323. We referenced Rayburn in noting that “we have understood [section 702] to operate as a defense only to claims of religious discrimination—allowing religious institutions to favor co-religionists in hiring—and not to claims of race or sex discrimination.” Id. at 322. We further expressed concern that adopting an interpretation of section 702 that shielded the school from liability for sex discrimination claims “would entail a reworking of Fourth Circuit precedent to leave all employees of religious institutions subject to forms of discrimination previously . . . prohibited by Title VII.” Id. at 328 n.6. However, rather than decide the statutory question, for practical reasons, the Court opted to forego the typical protocol of exhausting non-constitutional grounds before addressing constitutional issues, ultimately finding that the ministerial exception applied. Id. at 327, 333. In sum, our Circuit has not definitively answered how Title VII applies to an employment decision based on race, sex, or national origin and motivated by religious belief. Accordingly, we must interpret the statute to determine its reach. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 15 of 173 2. Our endeavor to interpret Title VII to answer the question presented in this case must “begin[] with the plain language of the statute.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). To discern the proper interpretation, we “read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation modified). In so doing, we “disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). Only “if the text of a statute is ambiguous[ may] we look to other indicia of congressional intent such as the legislative history to interpret the statute.” Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). In Rayburn, this Court undertook a thorough analysis of the statutory text and legislative history to conclude that section 702 did not immunize the religious employer from sex and race discrimination claims. See 772 F.2d at 1166–67. We held that the text reflected a single basis for exemption from Title VII, employment decisions “based upon religious preference,” and that the language represented Congress’s choice not to entirely immunize religious employers from enforcement of the statute. See id. Further, our review of the legislative history in Rayburn confirmed that Congress considered and rejected this wholesale exemption. Id. As for the question before us today, we start with the plain text: the statute provides in relevant part that “[t]his subchapter,” meaning Title VII, “shall not apply” to religious employers “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” § 2000e-1(a). This is susceptible to at least two different interpretations: for religious 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 16 of 173 employers, (1) Title VII liability cannot be premised on religious discrimination, or (2) any employment decision based on a religious motivation is exempt from Title VII liability. We conclude that the first is the most plausible interpretation of the statute as a whole, considering the structure and purpose of the statutory scheme. Our Circuit “recognize[s] the general rule of construction that exemptions from remedial statutes are to be construed narrowly.” Olsen v. Lake Country, Inc., 955 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1991); see also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress.”); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (observing “the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes”). “The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title VII in particular, is remedial. Its aim is to eliminate employment discrimination by creating a federal cause of action to promote and effectuate its goals.” Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983). Interpreting limitations to Title VII narrowly “honor[s] the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole,” which is appropriate so long as the “particular purpose” of the limitation is not negated. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982). In sum, based on the statutory text, including a broad interpretation of the protective provisions of Title VII and narrow interpretation of its limitations, we hold that even when an employment decision is motivated by religious belief, section 702 does not apply to claims of discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin. The opposite 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 17 of 173 interpretation—that section 702 permits religious organizations to discriminate on any basis so long as a religious reason attended—would allow the exemption to swallow the rule, which would undermine rather than respect the remedial goals of Title VII. 5 And though we limit the reach of the exemption, our holding does not negate its purpose— religious institutions may continue to “favor co-religionists in hiring,” Billard, 101 F.4th at 322, or “terminate an employee whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of its employer,” Kennedy, 657 F.3d at 192 (citation modified), so long as the employment decision is not based on the employee’s race, sex, or national origin. This interpretation also remains faithful to our familiar mixed-motive framework for Title VII cases. “[T]he plaintiff’s sex need not be the sole or primary cause of the employer’s adverse action”; the action remains prohibited under Title VII even if the employer “point[s] to some other, nonprotected trait and insist[s] it was the more important factor in the adverse employment outcome.” Bostock, 590 U.S. at 665. Here, section 702 renders religion a nonprotected trait, but so long as race, sex, or national origin is a but-for cause of the employment decision, “it has no significance here if [religion] . . . might also be at 5 The dissent criticizes this widely accepted canon of statutory interpretation as an unacceptable “policy argument.” Diss. Op. at 172. It is uncontroversial that, generally, courts interpret statutory exceptions so as not to let an exception swallow the rule. See, e.g., EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Ref., L.L.C., 145 S. Ct. 1735, 1751 (2025) (“Congress, after all, is unlikely to intend for an exception to swallow the rule.”); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s “exception for a ‘bona fide occupational qualification’ was not intended to swallow the rule”). Certainly, employing the tools of statutory interpretation is an appropriate judicial task. 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1569 Doc: 174 Filed: 10/16/2026 Pg: 18 of 173 work, or even play a more important role in the employer’s decision.” See id. We break no new ground with this rule. 6 6 The Sixth Circuit, in considering claims made by unmarried pregnant teachers at Catholic schools, articulated that Title VII tolerates employment decisions based on religious doctrine only insofar as the decision is not based on pregnancy status—a protected characteristic. See Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Cath. Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 2000). And the Ninth Circuit refused to allow a religious school to justify an unequal compensation scheme—excluding married women from the employer-sponsored health insurance program—by reference to its religious belief. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364–66 (9th Cir. 1986). Recently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that a religious employer that made an employment decision based on sexual orientation “generally remains bound by state and federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, or other protected grounds for all non-ministerial positions.” McMahon v. World Vision, Inc., 147 F.4th 959, 973 n.7 (9th Cir. 2025). The court ultimately found that the ministerial exception applied. Id. at 977. Even more recently, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested that Title VII’s religious exemption protects employment decisions for non-ministerial positions that are rooted in sincerely held religious belief. See Union Gospel Mission of Yakima v. Brown, 162 F.4th 1190, 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2026), vacated, No. 24-7246 (9th Cir. June 18, 2026) (finding for the religious employer under the church autonomy doctrine and commenting that the protections it identified for the employer are the same as what the employer “otherwise would receive under Title VII and various state analogs”). We address this case further infra Section V.B.2. The Third Circuit, too, has suggested that employment decisions based on religious belief may not be applied disparately based on sex. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 2006). In that case, the plaintiff was terminated after signing a pro-choice advertisement in the local newspaper, and she sued for sex discrimination under a disparate treatment theory. Id. at 132–