Kerr v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KARL F. KERR, et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25 - 3691 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK), Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Karl F. Kerr, Reginald Mammah, and Hector DelCallar supervised maintenance crews at the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) until they were terminated in 2024. They brought this lawsuit under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), alleging that their terminations were the result of racial discrimination. Amtrak counters that it terminated all three Plaintiffs for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: Mr. Kerr for submitting false reports, Mr. Mammah for committing a safety violation, and Mr. DelCallar for failing to report Mr. Mammah’s violation. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Amtrak’s stated reasons for the Plaintiffs’ terminations were pretextual or that race played a role in those decisions, the Court grants summary judgment to Amtrak. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The Court draws the facts from the Parties’ Statements of Material Facts and the underlying materials referenced in those statements. See Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (JSOF), ECF No. 30. The Court assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been specifically disputed, and it assumes the truth of other undisputed statements in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also LCvR 7(h)(1).1 The Plaintiffs—Mr. Kerr, Mr. Mammah, and Mr. DelCallar—all held supervisory positions in Amtrak’s Mechanical Department at the Washington Terminal at the time of their terminations in 2024. JSOF ¶¶ 8, 122, 125, 222–23, 263, 265. The Washington Terminal has two locations: Union Station and Ivy City. JSOF ¶ 8. The Court first describes the supervisory and discipline structure of Amtrak’s Mechanical Department before recounting the events that led to the Plaintiffs’ terminations. 1. Amtrak’s Mechanical Department Amtrak’s Mechanical Department is made up of four departments, including, as relevant here, the Conventional Department and the Locomotive Department. JSOF ¶¶ 1, 3–4. Within each department are superintendents, who supervise foremen. The General Foreman position is a nonagreement management position responsible for overseeing other foremen, entering safety records, and initiating investigations into employee misconduct. JSOF ¶¶ 39–40. Below the General Foremen are Foremen III, and below them are Foremen II. JSOF ¶¶ 40, 44–45. Unlike General Foremen, Foremen II and III are agreement employees—that is, they are covered by Amtrak’s collective bargaining agreement with the American Railway Supervisors Association (ARASA-ME). JSOF ¶¶ 40, 49, 97–98. Although Foremen III supervise Foremen II, they have substantially similar responsibilities, which primarily include overseeing the craft employees (electricians, pipefitters, carmen, machinists, utility workers, and cleaners). JSOF ¶¶ 60, 64. A 1 Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). 2 Foreman III may fill in as acting General Foreman when the General Foreman is absent, but neither Foremen III nor Foremen II may impose formal discipline. JSOF ¶¶ 46, 50–51, 53. The disciplinary process for agreement employees follows a set path. Management conducts an initial investigation and, if it concludes that an incident presents a potential disciplinary matter, it refers the matter to Amtrak’s Labor Relations. JSOF ¶ 85. Labor Relations selects the proposed level of discipline and issues a charge letter identifying the matter to be addressed at a formal hearing. JSOF ¶¶ 87–88, 99, 314. A formal hearing may be canceled if the employee signs a waiver, which is automatically offered for first level, second level, or final level disciplinary actions, but not for termination investigations. JSOF ¶ 89. If a hearing is held, a hearing officer in Amtrak’s Office of Disciplinary Investigation conducts that hearing and decides whether the charge is proven. JSOF ¶¶ 90–91, 196, 334. Amtrak’s Agreement Employee Discipline Policy permits termination for a first offense in cases of serious violations—including when an operating-rule violation “may endanger” others and was committed “intentionally, willfully, or recklessly,” and for “certain serious company-rule or policy violations.” JSOF ¶¶ 105, 305. The disciplinary process for General Foremen—who hold nonagreement management positions—generally mirrors the process for agreement employees, except that Human Resources also participates in the discipline process. JSOF ¶ 75. As with agreement employees, Amtrak’s Management Employee Discipline Policy provides that some violations “may be deemed so serious as to warrant termination of employment upon a first offense,” including fraud, theft, and dishonesty. JSOF ¶¶ 76–77. Amtrak also has multiple collective bargaining agreements, including an agreement with the Joint Council of Carmen, Helpers, Coach Cleaners and Apprentices (JCC) that covers certain 3 employees, including carmen. JSOF ¶¶ 79–80. Under Rule 2(e) of that agreement, a supervisor removed from his position may “return to his tools” in the craft unless he was dismissed for cause. JSOF ¶¶ 82, 365. As relevant here, Amtrak employees must follow specified safety precautions. Before employees in the Washington Terminal may begin work on, under, or between equipment, certain safeguards—known as “blue signal protection”—must be in place. JSOF ¶ 146. Union Station and Ivy City have different rules, but both are governed by the system-wide Mechanical Department Blue Signal Rules. JSOF ¶¶ 150–52. The “worker in charge” is responsible for establishing blue signal protection. JSOF ¶ 147. A blue signal violation is a “major rule violation” prohibited by Amtrak’s Code of Ethics and Standards for Behavior. JSOF ¶¶ 148–49. A blue signal violation may “warrant termination,” but not every violation ends in termination. JSOF ¶¶ 317–18. Amtrak’s managers distinguish between a blue signal violation and a lesser “procedural error[.]” JSOF ¶¶ 244–46. A procedural error occurs when a step is incomplete, but the “track remains protected” and there is no risk of movement posing danger to life. JSOF ¶¶ 244–46, 430–32. A General Foreman or higher-level manager determines whether an incident is a procedural error or a violation. JSOF ¶ 194. 2. Terminations At the time of the Plaintiffs’ terminations in 2024, Brandon Hodge, who is Black, served as Superintendent I of the Conventional Department. JSOF ¶¶ 4, 9, 16. He oversaw about 300 employees, including 10 General Foremen, eight of whom were Black. JSOF ¶¶ 7, 14, 19. Among his responsibilities as Superintendent I, Mr. Hodge investigated allegations and violation reports of employees. JSOF ¶¶ 24, 37. Mr. Hodge reported to Chad Jones, Superintendent II, who is white and who oversaw both the Conventional and Locomotive Departments. JSOF ¶¶ 9–11, 17. 4  a. Mr. Kerr’s Termination Mr. Kerr, who is Black, worked for Amtrak for more than 20 years before his termination in 2024. JSOF ¶¶ 123–24. Mr. Kerr worked his way up from a carman and became a General Foreman in May 2023. JSOF ¶¶ 107, 125. His duties included submitting monthly reports in Amtrak’s Safety, Performance and Record Tracking Network (SPARTN), a database that Amtrak uses to document compliance with Federal Railroad Administration requirements. JSOF ¶¶ 108– 11. In July 2024, while auditing records of employees on leave, Mr. Hodge discovered that Mr. Kerr had submitted reports concerning two employees, Edward Spady and Albert Robinson, whom Amtrak’s records listed as being on extended leaves of absence. JSOF ¶¶ 112, 131. Mr. Hodge identified 11 such entries—6 for Mr. Robinson and 5 for Mr. Spady—that recorded that Mr. Kerr had personally observed the employees even though they had been on extended leave. JSOF ¶¶ 113, 116; Kerr Disciplinary Rs. at 5–6, Pls.’ Ex. 27, ECF No. 25-28. Mr. Hodge believed from the outset that the entries were dishonest, because he had seen managers falsify entries “to boost their test numbers[.]” Hodge Dep. (May 21, 2026) at 107:1–19, Pls.’ Ex. 9, ECF No. 25-10. Mr. Hodge contacted Human Resources about the erroneous reports, and on August 6, 2024, he and Mr. Jones met with Mr. Kerr. JSOF ¶¶ 115, 132–33. Mr. Kerr explained that he believed he had seen one of the employees at a safety meeting and that he sometimes relied on other foremen to identify employees. JSOF ¶¶ 134–35. Mr. Kerr has maintained throughout the investigation and this litigation that the entries were honest mistakes. Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92, ECF No. 25-39. Mr. Hodge then reviewed Mr. Kerr’s other SPARTN reports and found that some entries had been copied and pasted for different employees. JSOF ¶¶ 117, 141. On August 13, 2024, 5 Mr. Hodge interviewed two of the employees named in those reports, Christopher Lawhorn and Marc Williams, outside Mr. Kerr’s presence. JSOF ¶ 141. Both Mr. Lawhorn and Mr. Williams denied several of the conversations that Mr. Kerr had reported. Kerr Disciplinary Rs. at 25. Reporting on the false reports to Human Resources, Mr. Hodge explained “[t]here’s only one quality test here” and others “did not take place at all.” Id. at 26. He labeled the conduct “gross negligence” and expressed that “[Mr. Kerr] should not be a manager any longer.” Id. Mr. Hodge did not follow up with Mr. Kerr about the witness statements or his findings. JSOF ¶ 142. On August 14, 2024, Deborah Benham, the Human Resources business partner for the Mechanical Department, submitted a write-up to Amtrak’s Human Resources Discipline Review team. JSOF ¶ 144; Kerr Disciplinary Rs. at 2–3. It stated that the Mechanical Department leadership had “lost all confidence in [Mr. Kerr’s] ability to lead” because of his “dishonest practices” and wished to remove Mr. Kerr as General Foreman. Kerr Disciplinary Records at 3. After searching Amtrak’s records for similar past cases, the Review Panel found that employees previously separated for falsifying SPARTN records had been designated “not eligible for rehire.” Hinderliter Decl. ¶ 10, Def.’s Ex. 17, ECF No. 21-19. Labor Relations then advised that Mr. Kerr would not be able to return to his former carman position under JCC Rule 2(e) because he had been removed for cause. JSOF ¶¶ 82, 119–21, 365; Hinderliter Decl. ¶¶ 8–14. The panel approved termination, and on August 22, 2024, Amtrak fired Mr. Kerr for “misconduct, including his failure to carry out responsibilities, dishonesty by falsifying safety sensitive records in the SPARTN system and further dishonesty during management’s subsequent investigation[.]” JSOF ¶ 122. b. Mr. Mammah’s and Mr. DelCallar’s Terminations Mr. Mammah’s and Mr. DelCallar’s terminations intersect. In 2024, Mr. Mammah, who is Black, was a Foreman II at Union Station. JSOF ¶¶ 197–99. Mr. DelCallar, who is Asian, was a 6 Foreman III at both Union Station and Ivy City. JSOF ¶¶ 261–62, 265. On September 28, 2024, Mr. DelCallar stepped in as acting General Foreman supervising Mr. Mammah because both General Foremen were absent. JSOF ¶¶ 225–27, 267. That evening, Mr. Mammah was the designated “worker in charge” responsible for establishing “blue signal protection” during a locomotive change at Union Station. JSOF ¶¶ 207, 229, 266. Mr. Mammah testified that he arranged for the track to be secured against outside movement and placed a blue light on the platform and in one of the two locomotives. JSOF ¶¶ 230– 32. But Mr. Mammah neglected to tag or place a light on a second diesel locomotive that had been moved onto the track but was uncoupled from the train. JSOF ¶¶ 208–09, 243. The carman set to perform the change, Jay Calica, informed Mr. Mammah that the blue signal protection had not yet been established. JSOF ¶ 206. Mr. Calica performed the work anyway. JSOF ¶ 210. Mr. Mammah later acknowledged that he did not complete all blue-signal procedures before the carman performed his work, but he maintains that K Tower, which electronically controls the switches at Union Station, had secured the track against outside movement. JSOF ¶¶ 230, 331. After finishing, Mr. Calica pointed out the missing light to Mr. DelCallar. JSOF ¶¶ 211, 290. Mr. DelCallar then reminded Mr. Mammah that “any locomotive inside a protected track should have been flagged whether it is coupled or not.” JSOF ¶ 271. Mr. DelCallar did not report the incident to a General Foreman or Superintendent. JSOF ¶ 282. After Mr. Calica reported the incident to a Superintendent and to his union representative, Amtrak began an investigation. JSOF ¶¶ 213–14. Mr. Hodge investigated the incident for management, collected written statements from Mr. Calica, Mr. Mammah, and Mr. DelCallar, and concluded that Mr. Mammah had committed a blue signal violation and that Mr. DelCallar had failed to report one. JSOF ¶¶ 228, 236, 239, 273. On October 1, Mr. DelCallar acknowledged: “I failed to inform or notify General 7 Foreman Brown nor General Foreman Walker regarding the incident that occurred that day. There is no excuse for not reporting a sensitive incident to my superiors[.]” JSOF ¶ 272. Amtrak suspended both men that day pending investigation. JSOF ¶¶ 254, 294. Mr. Hodge forwarded the statements to Senior Labor Relations Manager, Jeremy Milewski, and recommended termination. JSOF ¶¶ 238, 240. Mr. Milewski testified that management’s recommendation influenced the level of the charge. JSOF ¶¶ 240–41. He attested that he did not know either man’s race when the matters were referred to him. Milewski Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12, ECF No. 21-33. On October 4, 2024, Labor Relations issued Mr. Mammah and Mr. DelCallar a Notice of Formal Investigation for Termination. JSOF ¶¶ 255, 295. Mr. Mammah’s notice charged him with failing to establish the required protection. JSOF ¶ 256. Mr. DelCallar’s notice charged him with failing to report a blue signal violation after Mr. Calica had notified him of it. JSOF ¶ 296. Each notice stated that the employee, “if found culpable,” would be terminated in all capacities. JSOF ¶¶ 297,323–24. Both Mr. Mammah and Mr. DelCallar received hearings before a Hearing Officer, Dalia Chaudhri, on December 13, 2024. JSOF ¶¶ 260, 343. Keith Grimes, a Foreman III and union representative, represented both men. JSOF ¶¶ 330, 344. On December 24, the hearing officer found both charges proven. JSOF ¶¶ 332–33, 345–46. Crediting Mr. Calica’s testimony, she found that Mr. Mammah “did not deny that the track required blue light flag protection” but had “erroneously thought” that flags were required only for coupled locomotives. Mammah Hr’g Decision at 2, Pls.’ Ex. 23, ECF No. 25-24. As to Mr. DelCallar, she concluded that he “did not deny seeing the blue light violation after it was reported to [him],” believed “a verbal counseling to the [worker in charge] was sufficient,” but was “required to report this incident.” DelCallar Hr’g Decision at 2, Pls.’ Ex. 25, ECF No. 25-26. 8  After the hearing officer substantiated the charges, Labor Relations confirmed that management still wished to proceed with termination. JSOF ¶¶ 300–01, 335, 350. On December 26, 2024, Amtrak dismissed both men in all capacities. JSOF ¶¶ 242, 349. Neither was offered a waiver allowing him to remain employed. JSOF ¶¶ 288, 356, 360. B. Procedural Background In August 2025, Mr. Kerr filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Notice of Removal ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. The next month, Mr. Kerr filed an Amended Complaint adding Mr. DelCallar and Mr. Mammah as Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 3. The Amended Complaint alleges that Amtrak fired each Plaintiff because of his race in violation of the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1)(A). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64–96, Ex. B to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Amtrak then removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1349, 1441(a), and 1446. Notice of Removal ¶ 15. After discovery, Amtrak moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 21. The Defendant’s motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. Summ. J. (Opp’n), ECF No. 25; Def.’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. Summ. J. (Reply), ECF No. 28; see also Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File Limited Surreply (Surreply), ECF No. 29.2 LEGAL STANDARD A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To defeat summary 2 The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Limited Surreply, ECF No. 29, which Amtrak opposes. The Court grants that motion and has considered the Plaintiffs’ additional arguments in granting summary judgment to Amtrak. 9 judgment, the nonmovant must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (cleaned up). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court “may not make credibility determinations or otherwise weigh the evidence.” Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Instead, it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in that light, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Steele v. Mattis, 899 F.3d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2018). DISCUSSION Amtrak moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ DCHRA race discrimination claims, or, in the alternative, for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the RLA preempts the claims. The Court, satisfied that it has jurisdiction, agrees that summary judgment is warranted. The Plaintiffs fail to identify record evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Amtrak’s proffered reasons for their terminations were pretextual or that race affected those decisions. A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction At the threshold, Amtrak contends that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims. In Amtrak’s view, the RLA preempts those claims because resolving them would require interpreting the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that governed the Plaintiffs’ employment. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Mot.) at 16–20, ECF No. 21-1. The Court disagrees. The RLA promotes “stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes” in the railroad industry. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994); see also 45 U.S.C. § 151a. To that end, the statute establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for two classes of disputes. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252. 10 “Major” disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas “minor” disputes “gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Id. at 252–53 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). A minor dispute is thus a “controvers[y] over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation,” and it must be resolved through the RLA’s prescribed procedures. Id. at 253 (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957)); see 45 U.S.C. § 153. The D.C. Circuit has interpreted these provisions to be jurisdictional, meaning that a court has no power to decide a dispute covered by the RLA. Oakey v. U.S. Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the RLA’s parallel provision for air carriers “is jurisdictional regarding its adjustment board arbitration requirement”); see also Said v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 390 F. Supp. 3d 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2019) (treating RLA preemption as jurisdictional in a suit against a rail carrier), aff’d, 815 F. App’x 561 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Whether the RLA preempts a claim turns on whether the claim is “grounded in the CBA,” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 256, or is instead “independent of the CBA,” id. at 266 (holding that an employee’s state-law retaliatory-discharge claims were not preempted). A claim “will be preempted if it cannot be adjudicated without interpreting the CBA, or if it can be conclusively resolved by interpreting the CBA.” Oakey, 723 F.3d at 234 (quoting Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001)). But “purely factual questions” about “an employee’s conduct or an employer’s conduct and motives” do not “requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988)). 11  Amtrak’s theory is that the Plaintiffs’ claims belong in arbitration because they are “rooted in” various CBAs. Mot. at 17. Specifically, Amtrak contends that the “Plaintiffs’ challenges require interpretations of Amtrak’s agreements”—namely, the JCC provision that bars a supervisor dismissed for cause from returning to work, the ARASA-ME procedures under which Amtrak investigated and disciplined the Plaintiffs, and the agreements that covered the comparators on whom the Plaintiffs rely. Mot. at 18–20; Reply at 19–22. The Court is not convinced. The Plaintiffs seek “to enforce rights that are independent of the CBA,” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 256, namely the DCHRA’s guarantee against racial discrimination in employment. Their theory is that Amtrak investigated, charged, and disciplined them more harshly than comparable white employees. Whether race influenced that treatment turns on testimony, emails, and investigative and disciplinary records. It is a question of what Amtrak’s decisionmakers did and why, not of the meaning of any CBA. See Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261; see also Giles v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 703 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The mere need to consult a collective bargaining agreement does not require preemption.” (cleaned up)). For its part, Amtrak defends the terminations on the ground that the Plaintiffs were fired for falsifying safety records, for a blue signal violation, and for failing to report one. JSOF ¶¶ 122, 149, 333, 346. And this misconduct is defined by Amtrak’s Code of Ethics and Standards for Behavior and its Blue Signal Rules, not by any CBA. JSOF ¶¶ 122, 149, 333, 346. Thus, resolving the Plaintiffs’ claims does not require interpreting any agreement. In urging otherwise, Amtrak principally relies on Said v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., which involved a termination under a CBA rule deeming an employee to have resigned after being absent for 10 days “without notifying” Amtrak. 390 F. Supp. 3d at 49–50, 55. But Said does not help Amtrak. There, the plaintiff’s pretext theory was that she had in fact notified Amtrak and that 12 Amtrak should have done more to reach her before invoking the CBA rule. Id. at 55–57. The court held that the RLA barred it from considering that evidence, which “clearly [took] issue with Amtrak’s interpretation of [the CBA rule] and its determination that [the plaintiff] violated that Rule.” Id. at 55. The court reasoned that to evaluate the plaintiff’s theory, “a jury would have to interpret [the CBA rule] to determine the meaning of its requirement that an employee ‘notify[ ]’ Amtrak.” Id. Here, by contrast, the Plaintiffs’ pretext theory does not depend on the meaning of any contractual provision. Their claim is not that Amtrak misapplied a CBA rule to them but that it singled them out because of their race. A factfinder could examine the disciplinary histories, the charges, and the resulting findings and penalties, and ask whether race drove Amtrak’s choices about whom to investigate, charge, and terminate—all without interpreting any CBA. Unlike in Said, no juror would “have to interpret” a CBA rule to decide these claims. Id. at 55. At bottom, the Plaintiffs assert a right conferred by an independent D.C. statute, not by any of Amtrak’s CBAs, and resolving their claims does not require interpreting any CBA. The Court therefore has subject-matter jurisdiction. B. Disparate Treatment Having concluded that it has subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court turns to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The DCHRA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon” his race. D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a). “The burdens of persuasion and production for claims raised under . . . the D.C. law are identical to those for claims alleging discriminatory treatment in violation of Title VII.” Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Under the DCHRA, the Plaintiffs must show that race was “a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Rose 13 v. United Gen. Contractors, 285 A.3d 186, 197 (D.C. 2022) (cleaned up); Furline v. Morrison, 953 A.2d 344, 353 & n.28 (D.C. 2008). Here, the Plaintiffs do not offer any direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (describing direct evidence as, for example, a “statement that itself shows racial or gender bias in the [employment] decision” (citation omitted)). So the Court must turn to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973), to evaluate the Plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence. After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See id. at 802. The plaintiff then has an opportunity to show that the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 804. But the D.C. Circuit has instructed that once the employer has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the Court “need not— and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Off. of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The question instead is whether the plaintiff has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race[.]” Id. In determining whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination, the Court considers “all the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action and other evidence of [discrimination].” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual may include: the employer’s better treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected group, its inconsistent or dishonest explanations, its deviation 14  from established procedures or criteria, the employer’s pattern of poor treatment of other employees in the same protected group as the plaintiff, or other relevant evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude evinces an illicit motive. Jeffries v. Barr, 965 F.3d 843, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Because Amtrak has supplied a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for terminating each Plaintiff, the Court proceeds directly to deciding whether the evidence, considered as a whole and with all reasonable inferences drawn in each Plaintiff’s favor, would permit a reasonable jury to find unlawful race discrimination. 1. Mr. Kerr Amtrak maintains that it fired Mr. Kerr for falsifying safety-sensitive SPARTN records. JSOF ¶ 122. Mr. Kerr primarily attacks Amtrak’s explanation for his termination on four fronts: (1) that he did not intentionally falsify records, (2) that his investigation was unfair, (3) that Mr. Hodge expressed annoyance about a complaint, and (4) that Amtrak treated white employees more favorably. None of these arguments succeeds. First, Mr. Kerr contends that Amtrak’s termination determination was pretextual because he did not intentionally falsify SPARTN entries. Opp’n at 10, 13–14. But at summary judgment, “[t]he question is not whether the underlying . . . incident occurred; rather, the issue is whether the employer honestly and reasonably believed that the underlying . . . incident occurred.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496. And the record establishes that Amtrak’s belief was well founded. Mr. Kerr agrees that his eleven observations “were not accurate,” Kerr Dep. at 98:11–14, Pls.’ Ex. 5, ECF No. 25-6, that he “did a report on the wrong worker,” id. at 117:19–21, and that he cannot recall the five entries for Mr. Spady at all, id. at 116:22–117:1, 130:8–9. Mr. Hodge thus had before him 11 entries, spread over months, recording that Mr. Kerr had personally observed two employees who had not been at work in over a year. Kerr Disciplinary Records at 5–6; JSOF ¶ 131. When 15 asked about the inaccuracies, Mr. Kerr offered a mistaken-identity account for Mr. Robinson and none for Mr. Spady. JSOF ¶¶ 134–35. The Foreman whom Mr. Kerr said he relied on told management that both men had been out for at least a year. Kerr Disciplinary Records at 3. And two employees named in Mr. Kerr’s other entries said that the conversations recorded in those entries had never happened. Id. at 25. On this record, there is nothing to support a finding that Amtrak did not honestly believe that Mr. Kerr had falsified records. At summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot reach a jury “merely by denying the underlying allegation of misconduct[.]” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496; see also Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he plausibility of those differing observations and inferences is not, without more, grounds on which a reasonable jury could conclude that [the investigator] was so far off base as to suggest that he acted with a racial motive.”). Second, Mr. Kerr claims that Amtrak ran an “inexplicably unfair” investigation “designed to support management’s predetermined termination decision rather than determine whether [he] intentionally falsified the disputed entries.” Opp’n at 17. He contends that the “investigation’s timing, scope, selective evidence, shifting conclusions, and denial of a meaningful response permit a jury to find . . . Amtrak’s stated reason pretextual.” Opp’n at 17. A materially flawed investigation can support an inference of pretext. Burley, 801 F.3d at 299 (“A reasonable jury can conclude that an employer’s reasons were pretextual . . . if a plaintiff can show that an employer’s investigation . . . was not just flawed but inexplicably unfair.” (cleaned up)). But the errors that Mr. Kerr identifies fall far short of that mark. Mr. Kerr first argues that Amtrak “change[d] its characterization of [his] conduct”: Mr. Hodge called his conduct “gross negligence,” Human Resources called it “dishonest practices,” and the draft termination letter called it “further dishonesty.” Opp’n at 15–16. Although 16 “shifting and inconsistent justifications are probative of pretext,” Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up), Amtrak’s reason for terminating Mr. Kerr did not shift. From the start, that reason was the inaccurate SPARTN reports that Mr. Kerr had submitted. In the email in which Mr. Hodge described the conduct as “gross negligence,” he also concluded that the reported tests “did not take place at all,” consistent with his testimony that he believed from the outset that the entries were dishonest. Hodge Dep. (May 21, 2026) at 107:1– 19, Pls.’ Ex. 9, ECF No. 25-10. The use of slightly different labels to describe Mr. Kerr’s misconduct does not amount to inconsistent justifications. Mr. Kerr also contends that management “predetermined” his “removal before completing its investigation” and then ran an investigation that was “inexplicably unfair.” Opp’n at 14–17. To be sure, on August 1, before speaking with Mr. Kerr, Mr. Hodge wrote that management would “proceed with removing him from the job.” Hodge Dep. (May 21, 2026) at 179:8–15. But it is reasonable for a manager who has reviewed eleven inaccurate entries to form an initial view. To raise a genuine dispute about pretext, Mr. Kerr must show that the ensuing investigation was “so unsystematic and incomplete that a factfinder could conclude that the employer sought, not to discover the truth, but to cover up its own discrimination.” Burley, 801 F.3d at 296. This investigation does not fit that description. Mr. Hodge found the inaccurate entries in a review of employees on leave, not a targeted review of Mr. Kerr. JSOF ¶ 131. Mr. Hodge then interviewed Mr. Kerr and heard his explanation, reviewed Mr. Kerr’s other entries, and interviewed two of the employees named in the entries. JSOF ¶¶ 115, 117, 136, 141. Those are “steps one would expect of an investigator who sincerely sought to determine what actually happened.” Burley, 801 F.3d at 299. 17  Mr. Kerr identifies three additional quibbles with the investigation: that Mr. Hodge did not go back to him with the witnesses’ statements, did not contact the two employees on leave, and did not check whether a second person with the same name worked the shift. Opp’n at 17; JSOF ¶¶ 138–39, 142. But Mr. Kerr stops short of explaining how any of those alleged shortcomings would have changed the outcome, given the ample evidence of his inaccurate reporting. See Burley, 801 F.3d at 299–300 (finding no inference of discrimination from an investigator’s failure to take a step when the plaintiff “has not identified any fact” it “would have revealed that might have affected the disciplinary proceedings”). Moreover, an investigation need not be flawless. An employer may act on a “reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given even though that reason may turn out to be false.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005). That is plainly true on this record. Third, as evidence of pretext, Mr. Kerr offers his own testimony that Mr. Hodge was “annoyed” about his complaint in May 2024 that a less-experienced white General Foreman had the day shift while he worked midnights. Opp’n at 12. After their conversation, as Mr. Kerr sees it, Mr. Hodge “all of a sudden . . . had a problem with the quality of [his] work.” Kerr Dep. at 151:2–20. This does not establish pretext. Even assuming that Mr. Hodge was irritated by Mr. Kerr’s complaint, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Hodge’s irritation amounted to racial animus. Mr. Kerr’s evidence of pretext is further undermined by the fact that the Amtrak official who reviewed his removal stated that she “did not know Plaintiff Kerr’s race” and that the Human Resources review team did not consider it. Hinderliter Decl. ¶¶ 5–7. Fourth, Mr. Kerr relies on comparator evidence—pointing the Court to a slew of other Amtrak employees, including Jason DiGiacomo, Benjamin Wadsworth, Keith Grimes, Brandon Truitt, Corey Crummitt, and Steven Davis. See Opp’n at 16, 19–25. Evidence that others outside 18 the plaintiff’s class were treated more favorably is “[e]specially relevant” to pretext, Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1115 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804), but only if the comparators “were charged with offenses of comparable seriousness” and “all of the relevant aspects of [their] employment situation were nearly identical” to his, Burley, 801 F.3d at 301 (cleaned up). The relevant aspects include “the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s jobs and job duties, whether they were disciplined by the same supervisor, and, in cases involving discipline, the similarity of their offenses.” Id. Mr. Kerr primarily holds out Mr. DiGiacomo, a General Foreman also supervised by Mr. Hodge, as a comparator. But Mr. DiGiacomo’s offense was not of “comparable seriousness,” Burley, 801 F.3d at 302. In an event that Amtrak’s managers concluded was “a pure accident,” Galinato Dep. at 193:6–16, Pls.’ Ex. 12, ECF No. 25-13, Mr. DiGiacomo did not open a smoke door on a particular track and misjudged the height of a catenary wire, which caused himself burns and sent sparks flying towards nearby craft employees, JSOF ¶¶ 184–87. And Mr. Kerr’s remaining comparators are not similarly situated. Mr. Wadsworth, a General Foreman, was in a different department under a different Superintendent. JSOF ¶¶ 382, 389. Mr. Grimes, Mr. Truitt, and Mr. Crummitt all held different positions, were subject to a different disciplinary system, and their incidents involved the blue signal procedure, not inaccurate records. JSOF ¶¶ 396, 413, 419, 421–22. And Steven Davis, who was not disciplined despite minor inaccuracies in SPARTN entries, is also Black. Opp’n at 16 n.3; Davis Dep. at 60:3–61:12, 65:1–21, 69:7–21, Pls.’ Ex. 17, ECF No. 25-18; see George, 407 F.3d at 412 (explaining that a plaintiff may support an inference of discrimination by pointing to differential treatment of “similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class” (emphasis added)). Mr. Kerr thus fails to identify an apt comparator. 19  Considering all the evidence together, the record is utterly devoid of evidence that race factored into Amtrak’s decision to terminate Mr.