Shilling v. County of San Diego
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-291
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENNETH CHARLES SHILLING, No. 25-291
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant,
3:24-cv-01047-
CAB-DDL
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; KELLY
A. MARTINEZ, in her official OPINION
capacity as Sheriff of County of San
Diego,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 20, 2026
Pasadena, California
Filed November 20, 2026
Before: Kenneth K. Lee, Patrick J. Bumatay, and Jennifer
Sung, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bumatay
2 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
SUMMARY*
Sovereign Immunity / First Amendment / Second
Amendment
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of
Kenneth Charles Shilling’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
the County of San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff,
in which Shilling alleged that the revocation of his
concealed-carry weapon (“CCW”) license over his
affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club violated
his First Amendment right of free association and his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and remanded for
further proceedings.
Before January 1, 2024, California’s CCW licensing
scheme was a “may issue” regime, which included a “good
moral character” requirement that allowed the county sheriff
to grant a CCW license if the sheriff determined the
applicant was of “good moral character.” A determination
that a person was not of “good moral character” would be
grounds to either deny a CCW license application or revoke
an existing license.
In December 2023, San Diego County Sheriff Kelly
Martinez used the “good moral character” requirement to
revoke Shilling’s CCW license. Shilling was notified that
his license was revoked due to his association with the
Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described
as a “criminal street gang.”
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 3
The panel first held that that the San Diego County
Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,” and thus, is not entitled
to immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Applying the three-factor test of Kohn v. State
Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), as
refined in Nilsen v. Univ. of Wash., 186 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir.
2026), the panel concluded California sheriffs are not “arms
of the state” for sovereign-immunity purposes because:
(1) California law shows an intent to create the county
sheriff as a legally independent entity from the State;
(2) nothing indicates that the State of California is formally
liable for judgments against the San Diego County Sheriff;
and (3) although California appears to exercise some degree
of control over county sheriffs, the presence of some state
supervisory authority doesn’t overcome the strong signals
that the State created the county sheriff as a separate legal
entity.
The panel next held that the County of San Diego may
be liable under § 1983 because the revocation of a CCW
license for “good moral character” is a county policy. When
Shilling’s license was revoked, Sheriff Martinez had the
discretion to both define and enforce the “good moral
character” requirement, and, thus, she was the “final
policymaker” for the county. Because Sheriff Martinez
acted as a final policymaker for San Diego County when she
enforced the “good moral character” policy, the County can
be held liable under § 1983 for her actions in revoking
Shilling’s CCW license.
The panel further held that Shilling’s Second
Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory relief is not
moot because, assuming a violation of his Second
Amendment right, the district court can grant Shilling
4 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
effective relief by ordering the destruction of his CCW
revocation records.
Lastly, the panel held that Shilling adequately pleaded a
violation of his First Amendment freedom-of-association
right where he alleged that his CCW license was revoked
solely for his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle
Club, and that the Sheriff penalized him for joining a lawful
group without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
COUNSEL
Gary W. Gorski (argued), Veterans Law Center, Folsom,
California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David M. Stotland (argued), Deputy County Counsel, San
Diego Office of County Counsel, San Diego, California, for
Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:
The San Diego County Sheriff revoked Kenneth
Shilling’s concealed-carry weapon (“CCW”) license over
his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club. This
case presents several important questions. First, is the San
Diego County Sheriff entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity as an “arm of the state”? Second, was
the revocation of a CCW license in 2023 a “county policy”
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 5
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Third, did the adoption
of a new CCW law in 2024 moot Shilling’s Second
Amendment claim? And finally, did the district court
correctly dismiss Shilling’s First Amendment free-
association claim for failure to state a claim?
Our answers: the Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,”
revoking CCW licenses was a “county policy,” Shilling’s
Second Amendment claim is not moot, and the district court
improperly dismissed his First Amendment claim. We thus
reverse and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
California regulates who may receive a CCW license “to
carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being
concealed upon the person.” Cal. Penal Code § 26150. The
State imposes several requirements on applicants, such as
mandatory training, mandatory background checks, and
fingerprint collection. Id. §§ 26150, 26165, 26175, 26185.
Each county sheriff is required to “publish and make
available a written policy summarizing” state laws that
govern the CCW license application process. Id. § 26160.
Before January 1, 2024, California’s CCW licensing
scheme was a “may issue” regime, which included a “good
moral character” requirement. Cal. Penal Code
§ 26150(a)(1) (2016) (amended 2023). This allowed the
“sheriff of the county” to grant a CCW license if the sheriff
determined the applicant was of “good moral character.” Id.
A determination that a person was not of “good moral
character” would be grounds to either deny a CCW license
6 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
application or revoke an existing license. Id.; see also Cal.
Penal Code § 26202 (2012) (repealed and replaced 2023).
Effective January 1, 2024, the “good moral character”
requirement was replaced. That’s because the California
legislature changed its CCW licensing scheme in response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The “good moral
character” requirement was removed and swapped with an
exclusion based on a likelihood of dangerousness. Cal.
Penal Code §§ 26150(a)(1), 26170(a)(1), 26202(a)(1).
B.
Kenneth Charles Shilling resides in San Diego,
California. He’s a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle
Club, which, according to Shilling, was founded in 1946 by
World War II veterans. In his view, it’s not like some other
motorcycle clubs, which are known for criminal and gang
activity. Instead, the Boozefighters focus on charitable work
and the “core values of family, work, and community.”
Shilling’s record is clean; he has no criminal history.
In June 2022, when the “good moral character”
requirement still existed, Shilling applied for and received a
CCW license from then-San Diego County Sheriff Anthony
Ray. This was short lived. Less than a year and a half later,
in December 2023, a different San Diego County Sheriff,
Kelly Martinez, used the “good moral character”
requirement to revoke Shilling’s CCW license. In a letter
notifying Shilling of the revocation, Sheriff Martinez
explained that the “San Diego Sheriff’s Department[’s] good
moral character definition” excludes a person who:
Has a pattern of or propensity for criminal
conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 7
application or investigation for a license.
This includes, but is not limited to, evidence
of criminal behavior or a close nexus to a
criminal gang. In making this determination,
the Sheriff’s Department shall use an
objective inquiry, considering the facts and
circumstances known at the time of the
application or through the investigation.
The letter said that Shilling’s license was revoked due to
his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club,
which the Sheriff described as a “criminal street gang.”
Shilling was not given the opportunity to contest the
allegations before his license was revoked, but he could
request reconsideration of the decision. The new CCW
regime with the “dangerousness” requirement took effect on
January 1, 2024, shortly after Shilling’s license was revoked.
C.
Shilling sued the County of San Diego and the San Diego
County Sheriff in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983, alleging that the revocation of his CCW license
violated his First Amendment right of free association and
his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. He
alleged that the revocation falsely associated him with
criminal conduct and the record of the revocation may make
it harder for him to obtain another CCW license. And he
sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and the
destruction of his revocation records.
Sheriff Martinez and the County moved to dismiss the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The district court granted the motion. The district court
concluded that the Sheriff is immune from suit under the
8 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
Eleventh Amendment and that the County was an improper
defendant because revocation of CCW licenses was a state
policy—not a county policy. It also ruled that Shilling failed
to plead a sufficient First Amendment claim but gave him
leave to amend. After Shilling filed a motion for
reconsideration, the district court further ruled that Shilling’s
Second Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief was moot. And because Shilling failed to amend his
First Amendment claim, the district court said its order
dismissing the claim was a “final appealable decision.”
Shilling now challenges these decisions. We review
each de novo. See Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021,
1025 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (sovereign immunity); Cortez
v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.
2002) (reviewing county policy); Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d
742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003) (mootness); Glazer Cap. Mgmt.,
L.P. v. Forescout Techs., Inc., 63 F.4th 747, 763 (9th Cir.
2023) (dismissal for failure to state a claim).
II.
California Sheriffs Are Not Arms of the State
Shilling first appeals the holding that the San Diego
Sheriff is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Because the San Diego Sheriff is not an “arm of the State,”
she is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
A.
In the Ninth Circuit, any question about sovereign
immunity must start with Kohn v. State Bar of California.
There, we reconsidered whether an entity is an “arm of the
state” for purposes of sovereign immunity based on recent
changes in Supreme Court doctrine. 87 F.4th at 1027. Kohn
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9
marked two significant developments in the sovereign-
immunity analysis.
First, we announced a new three-factor test to decide
whether an entity is an “arm of the state.” Id. at 1030. After
the Supreme Court’s decision in Galette v. New Jersey
Transit Corp., 607 U.S. 509 (2026), we further refined the
three factors. See Nilsen v. Univ. of Wash., 186 F.4th 1133,
1137–38 (9th Cir. 2026). Now, to determine whether an
entity is “an arm of the state,” we consider:
(1) whether the State intended to create a
legally independent entity, which is shown by
the entity’s form and treatment under state
law; (2) whether the State is formally liable
for the entity’s debts or liabilities, including
judgments; and (3) the degree of control the
State exercises over the entity.
Id. at 1138. “The first factor bears the most weight, and the
third bears the least.” Id. While state law informs the
inquiry, it does not control it. Instead, “[w]hether an entity
is an arm of the state within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment is a question of federal law.” Kohn, 87 F.4th at
1025.
Second, whether an entity is an “arm of the state” is an
“entity-based” analysis, not a function-based one. Id. at
1031. “[A]n entity either is or is not an arm of the state: The
status of an entity does not change from one case to the next
based on the nature of the suit, the state’s financial
responsibility in one case as compared to another, or other
variable factors.” Id. at 1031 (simplified). So once an entity
is considered an “arm of the state” for one case, it is
considered an “arm of the state” for all cases. We need not
10 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
examine the specific government function or activity
challenged in a given case.
B.
Since Kohn, we’ve not had the opportunity to consider
whether California sheriffs are “arms of the State.” Pre-
Kohn cases applied the function-based approach, and the
outcome depended on the specific actions challenged—not
the structure of the office itself. See, e.g., Streit v. County of
Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 566 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department was “not
acting as an arm of the state when administering the local
county jails”).
Under the revamped Kohn framework, California
sheriffs are not “arms of the State” and so the San Diego
County Sheriff does not have Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
1.
First, California law shows an intent to create the county
sheriff as a legally independent entity from the State. See
Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1138. While independent corporate
status is the “clearest evidence” of separate status, other
“structure[s]” may “signal[] the State has created a legally
separate entity”—“[m]ost obvious[]” is “describ[ing] [the
entity] as a ‘separate legal entity.’” Galette, 607 U.S. at 524–
25 (simplified). “The ultimate question remains whether the
State structured the entity as part of itself or as legally
independent.” Id. at 525.
Start with the California Constitution. Sheriffs are
designated as county officers. Cal. Const. art. XI, § 1(b)
(“The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an
elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 11
assessor, and an elected governing body in each county.”).
They are not members of the State’s executive department.
Cf. id. art. V, § 11 (listing state executive officials). Under
the California Constitution, a county charter must “provide
for the ‘compensation, terms and removal’ of the sheriff.”
Penrod v. County of San Bernardino, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717,
720 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4). Only
the county governing body—not state officials—may
provide for the “election or appointment,” Cal. Const. art.
XI, § 4(c), and “the manner of filling all vacancies” for
sheriffs, id. art. XI § 4(e). Thus, “the office of sheriff is an
independent office created by the state Constitution.”
People v. Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 801 (Ct. App. 2023).
Next, by state statute, sheriffs are officers of a county.
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 24000(b). Sheriffs must generally
maintain an office at the county seat—the same as other
county officers. See id. § 24250. And sheriffs must be
elected by the people of each county—not appointed by a
state official. See id. §§ 24009, 24205. And only the board
of supervisors—not the State—may contract out the services
of the sheriff. See id. § 53069.8(a); Streit, 236 F.3d at 562.
The county must also generally provide for the sheriff’s
fiscal needs. See Cal. Penal Code § 4015(a) (“The board of
supervisors shall provide the sheriff with necessary food,
clothing, and bedding, for those prisoners [committed to
jail]” and, with some exception, “the expenses thereof shall
be paid out of the county treasury.”). Thus, sheriffs appear
to retain many hallmarks of “legal separateness” from the
State, like holding property, making contracts, and incurring
debts. See Galette, 607 U.S. at 524–25.
State constitutional and statutory law thus confirm that
“[t]he sheriff is a county officer, not a state official.”
Penrod, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720; see also Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr.
12 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
3d at 801 (“[T]he sheriff’s department is a political
subdivision of the county[.]”); Trejo v. County of Los
Angeles, 263 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2020)
(sheriff’s department is “a political subunit” of the county);
Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir.
2001) (“We found that these various state provisions lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the sheriff is tied to the
County in its political, administrative, and fiscal capacities.”
(simplified)). While these cases didn’t decide sovereign-
immunity questions, they show that California law intended
county sheriffs to be legally separate entities from the State.
Thus, the weightiest of the Kohn factors favors no
sovereign immunity for county sheriffs.
2.
Second, nothing indicates that the State of California “is
formally liable for judgments against” the San Diego County
Sheriff. Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1137. This inquiry focuses
“only on who ultimately pays—whether the state is formally
liable for judgments against the entity, or the entity’s other
debts or liabilities.” Id. (simplified). “If the State is formally
liable for judgments against an entity, that entity is more
likely to be an arm of the State because its liabilities
necessarily undermine the State’s ability to make choices
about how to allocate the State fisc.” Galette, 607 U.S. at
525. Conversely, evidence of a “practical financial
relationship with the State” is not enough. Id. at 525–26.
Whether the county sheriff may receive state funding or
whether California “would cover . . . judgments [against the
sheriff] if needed” is “less relevan[t]” than the State’s
“formal legal liability.” Id. at 525.
And here, Sheriff Martinez hasn’t shown that California
“is formally liable for judgments against” her. Id. State law
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 13
indicates otherwise. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (a “public
entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or
omission of an employee of the public entity”); see also
Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 869 (Cal.
1974) (county derivatively liable for acts by sheriff under
section 815.2). So, “[u]nder California law, monetary
damages for section 1983 claims [against sheriffs’
departments] are paid by the County and not the state.”
Streit, 236 F.3d at 562 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2); see
also Brewster, 275 F.3d at 807 (“[A] county [is] liable for
[a] sheriff’s actions.”).
True, California courts have held that sheriffs act as state
agents for purposes of § 1983 liability when performing their
“crime investigation functions.” Venegas v. County of Los
Angeles, 87 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2004). But see Jackson v. Barnes,
749 F.3d 755, 764–66 (9th Cir. 2014) (disagreeing with
Venegas). Even so, that narrow holding is unlikely to affect
the state treasury since state officials receive qualified
immunity. See Venegas, 87 P.3d. at 12–13. So this limited
liability doesn’t “undermine the State’s ability to make
choices about how to allocate the State fisc.” Galette, 607
U.S. at 525. And ultimately, whether the sheriff is an “arm
of the state” turns on federal law—not on how state courts
handle a related issue. See Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1025.
This second factor thus cuts against sovereign immunity
for a county sheriff.
3.
Third, California appears to exercise some “degree of
control” over county sheriffs. See Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1136.
But this is the least important factor—“the State’s degree of
control over the entity should be considered only with
14 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
caution” because “it is difficult to gauge.” Id. at 1138, 1142
(simplified). At most, this factor ends in a wash.
California law gives sheriffs substantial independence
from the State. Control can be gauged based on “how
members of the governing body of the entity are appointed
and removed, as well as whether the state can directly
supervise and control the entity’s ongoing operations.”
Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1030 (simplified). As noted, counties
establish the election, appointment, replacement, and
removal of sheriffs. Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4. And, although
they may not interfere with “investigative function[s],” the
county board of supervisors exercises significant oversight
of sheriffs. Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303. The county board
“supervise[s] the official conduct of” sheriffs and “shall see
that they faithfully perform their duties.” Id. This includes
supervising the sheriff’s budget. Id.
To be sure, some supervisory authority is shared with the
State Attorney General. The California Constitution also
gives the Attorney General “direct supervision over
every . . . sheriff . . . in all matters pertaining to the duties of
their . . . office[,]” and the Attorney General “may require”
the sheriff to “make reports concerning the investigation,
detection, [and] punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions.” Cal. Const. art. V, § 13. By statute, the
Attorney General may “direct the activities of any sheriff
relative to the investigation or detection of crime within the
jurisdiction of the sheriff, and may direct the service of
subpoenas, warrants of arrest, or other processes of court in
connection therewith.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12560. And, as
Sheriff Martinez emphasizes here, state law requires sheriffs
to use uniform CCW license applications as prescribed by
the Attorney General. Cal. Penal Code § 26175(a)(1)(A).
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 15
Other state laws regulate CCW licenses statewide. See id.
§§ 26185(a)(1), 26195, 26225.
But while the Attorney General’s supervision of sheriffs
appears nontrivial, it is not enough to “change the overall
conclusion here.” Galette, 607 U.S. at 530. We can’t
overlook the substantial supervisory role counties have over
sheriffs, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303, and, under Kohn, we
don’t focus on the precise function challenged but on state
control over the sheriff’s office as a whole. See Kohn, 87
F.4th at 1031. So it’s not dispositive if state law dictates how
CCW licenses are processed. Finally, the amount of control
that the Attorney General exercises over sheriffs is far less
than the “substantial” authority the State exerted over the
transit board deemed not an “arm of the State” in Galette.
607 U.S. at 530 (observing that the governor had
appointment and removal power over the board, a state
cabinet member chaired the board, the governor could veto
any of the board’s actions, and the state legislature could
veto some actions). So the presence of some state
supervisory authority doesn’t overcome the strong signals
that the State created the county sheriff as a “separate legal
entity.” Id. at 525.
***
Putting the Kohn factors together, California sheriffs are
not “arms of the state” for sovereign-immunity purposes,
and it was improper to grant San Diego County Sheriff
Martinez sovereign immunity.
To the extent the district court relied on McMillian v.
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), in its Eleventh
Amendment analysis, that was error. McMillian didn’t deal
with the question here—whether an entity is an “arm of the
state” for sovereign-immunity purposes. McMillian stands
16 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
for a related but distinct concept: whether an action is state
or county policy for purposes of § 1983 liability. Id. at 784–
86; see also Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 534 (5th
Cir. 2022) (“McMillian did not concern the Eleventh
Amendment. Instead, it dealt with the issue of county
liability in § 1983 lawsuits.” (simplified)). While the
question of county liability may turn on the precise function
or action challenged, the sovereign-immunity question does
not. It looks only to the entity as a whole. Kohn, 87 F.4th at
1031. And based on California constitutional and statutory
law, the Sheriff is a separate legal entity from the State and
not an “arm of the state.”
Finally, because the Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,”
we need not address Shilling’s alternative argument that the
State of California should have been joined as a necessary
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a).
III.
The Revocation of a CCW License Is a County Policy
Shilling next challenges the district court’s ruling that the
County of San Diego was an improper defendant under
§ 1983 because the San Diego County Sheriff acts as a
representative of the State of California—and not the
County—in revoking CCW licenses. As we said earlier, this
is a separate inquiry from whether the Sheriff is an “arm of
the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Rather,
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), governs whether a county may be liable under
§ 1983. Under Monell, a plaintiff can establish § 1983
liability against a municipality in three ways: “(1) the
municipal employee committed the constitutional violation
pursuant to an official policy; (2) the employee acted
pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; and (3) the
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 17
employee functioned as a final policymaker.” Barone v. City
of Springfield, 902 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2018).
The question here is whether Sheriff Martinez acted as a
“final policymaker” in revoking CCW licenses under the
“good moral character” requirement. Once again, state law
informs this inquiry and, under McMillian, “we look to
whether the individual had final policymaking authority ‘in
a particular area, or on a particular issue’” for the local
government. Id. (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785). “A
municipal policy may arise where a government chooses a
course of action tailored to a particular situation.” Id.
(simplified). “The course of action must be made from
among various alternatives by the official . . . responsible for
establishing final policy on the subject matter in question.”
Id. (simplified). Under state law, the San Diego County
Sheriff had wide latitude in implementing CCW revocations
under the “good moral character” requirement and, thus, she
was the “final policymaker” for the County.
Start again with the California Constitution. See
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787 (beginning with the Alabama
Constitution). Unlike the Alabama Constitution, “the
California Constitution does not list sheriffs as part of ‘the
state executive department.’” Streit, 236 F.3d at 561
(quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787). Instead, the
California Constitution creates the office of the sheriff as “an
independent office” and makes the sheriff a “county officer,
not a state official.” Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 801 (citing
Cal. Const. art. XI, §§ 1(b), 4(c)) (simplified). Further, no
provision in the California Constitution provides that the
sheriff acts for the State when administering CCW
revocations based on the “good moral character”
requirement. See Brewster, 275 F.3d at 806.
18 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
We next look to the California Code for whether sheriffs
act for the county or the State. When the Sheriff revoked
Shilling’s CCW license in 2023, California’s CCW law was
a “may issue” regime—giving sheriffs discretion to issue,
deny, or revoke licenses. See People v. Mosqueda, 315 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 439, 443 (Ct. App. 2023). That law provided: “[t]he
county sheriff or chief of police ‘may issue’ a license to carry
a concealed handgun upon proof that ‘good cause’ exists for
issuing the license.” Id. (citing then-Cal. Penal Code
§ 26150). In addition to other requirements, that law also
required the applicant to “prove that he or she is of ‘good
moral character,’ resides or works in the issuing county or
city, and has completed a firearm safety course.” Id. (citing
then-§§ 26150(a)(1), (3)-(4); 26155(a)(1), (3)-(4); 26185(a);
26195(a)). California left it to sheriffs to figure out whether
these requirements were met.
Importantly, then-§ 26150 didn’t define “good moral
character.” See People v. Miller, 312 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 658
(Ct. App. 2023) (“Neither ‘good moral character’ nor ‘good
cause’ [was] further defined by statute.”). So then-§ 21650
gave sheriffs “discretionary statutory authority to deny a
handgun license based on the applicant’s good moral
character.” Mosqueda, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 449–50
(considering defendants’ claim that “section 26150’s failure
to define ‘good moral character’ rendered the law
unconstitutional . . . because local officials had unbridled
discretion to define the term how they pleased”). Indeed, the
letter revoking Shilling’s license established the “San Diego
Sheriff’s Department[’s] good moral character definition.”
Under this policy, “good moral character” excluded those
who showed “a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct,
as demonstrated by anything in the application or
investigation for a license,” including “evidence of criminal
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 19
behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang.” No state law
mandated this County-specific definition. In other words,
the County of San Diego—not California—made
association with the Boozefighters a basis to revoke a CCW
license.
After Bruen, the California legislature amended the
concealed-carry law to restrict sheriffs’ discretion and
eliminate the “good moral character” requirement. See Cal.
Penal Code § 26202 (2023) (replacing the former Cal. Penal
Code § 26202 (2012)); see also id. §§ 26150(a)(1) (2023),
26170(a)(1) (2023). This reform replaced the “may issue”
regime with a “shall issue” one that required sheriffs to either
deny or grant licenses when certain criteria were met.
People v. Bey, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 917 (Ct. App. 2025);
see Cal. Penal Code §§ 26150(a)(1), 26170(a)(1), 26202.
But this new “shall issue” regime became effective January
1, 2024. Bey, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 917. So when Shilling’s
license was revoked in December 2023, Sheriff Martinez
had the discretion to both define and enforce the “good moral
character” requirement. Thus, she was acting as a final
policymaker for the County—not the State—in revoking
Shilling’s CCW license.
Sure, the County can point to several concealed-carry
requirements that are uniform statewide. They say that state
laws provide that (1) all California CCW applications are to
be on the same forms prescribed by the Attorney General,
Cal. Penal Code § 26175(a)(1)(A); (2) all applicants must be
fingerprinted using forms created by and sent to the
California Department of Justice, id. § 26185(a)(1);
(3) sheriffs are required to give the State notice of any grant,
denial, or revocation of a CCW license, id. § 26225(b); and
(4) licenses shall not be issued to individuals who are subject
to a federal or state firearms prohibition, id. § 26195(a)(1).
20 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
But these requirements do not change that the Sheriff made
decisions “from among various alternatives” and
“establish[ed] final policy” for CCW revocations in the
County. Barone, 902 F.3d at 1107 (simplified).
So Sheriff Martinez acted as a final policymaker for San
Diego County when she enforced the “good moral character”
policy. This accords with our other decisions concluding
that sheriffs act as county—not state—policymakers for
other functions. See Jackson, 749 F.3d at 766 (conducting
criminal investigations); Brewster, 275 F.3d at 807 (same);
Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1189 (administering jails); Streit, 236
F.3d at 564–65 (same).
So the district court erred in dismissing the County as an
improper defendant—it can be held liable under § 1983 for
the actions of Sheriff Martinez in revoking Shilling’s CCW
license. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
IV.
Shilling’s Second Amendment Claim Is Not Moot
Shilling also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
Second Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief as moot. “The test for mootness of an appeal is
whether the appellate court can give the plaintiff any
effective relief in the event that it decides the matter on the
merits in his favor.” Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc)
(simplified). If the court can grant any effective relief, “the
matter is not moot.” Id. (simplified). “In the context of
injunctive relief, a case is not moot if the court is able to
‘undo’ the effects of the alleged illegal action.” Id.
(simplified).
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 21
The district court mooted out Shilling’s Second
Amendment claim because his CCW license expired.
Because his revoked license expired, the district court found
that it could not be returned and Shilling would need to
reapply for a new license under the new law without the
“good moral character” requirement. It thus concluded that
there was no live controversy regarding that challenged
requirement.
But that’s wrong. Shilling requested several forms of
injunctive relief. He sought (1) an injunction precluding the
Sheriff from revoking CCW licenses without proof of a
crime or specific gang-related activity, (2) the immediate
return of his license, and (3) the destruction of all records of
his CCW revocation. While the adoption of the new
licensing regime and the expiration of Shilling’s license
moot the first two forms of injunctive relief, they do not
negate his request for the destruction of records. In
Shilling’s view, these records may affect his ability to obtain
another CCW license in the County or elsewhere and may
show up in criminal background checks. Destroying these
records would then undo the potential effects of the
revocation.
So Shilling’s Second Amendment claim for injunctive
relief is not moot. Assuming a violation of his Second
Amendment right, the district court can grant Shilling
effective relief by ordering the destruction of his CCW
revocation records. See Carvalho, 148 F.4th at 1026. We
thus remand this claim to the district court.
22 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
V.
Shilling’s First Amendment Freedom of Association
Claim
Shilling finally appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his First Amendment freedom-of-association claim for
failing to state a claim. Shilling alleged that his CCW license
was revoked solely for his association with the
Boozefighters Motorcycle Club. The Sheriff, he asserts,
penalized him for joining a lawful group without any
evidence of criminal wrongdoing. These allegations are
enough to sustain a First Amendment claim.
A.
The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the
“right to associate with others.” Ams. for Prosperity Found.
v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 606 (2021). “While the freedom of
association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has
long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech,
assembly, and petition.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181
(1972). Without it, the government can prevent Americans
from “safely shar[ing] the same soapbox” and “the same
church,” “reduce any assembly to a party of one,” and limit
“the right to petition . . . to sign[ing] one’s own name alone.”
First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 608
U.S. 174, 184 (2026). So the right protects groups of
individuals “in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious and cultural ends.” Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). And
“government actions tending to curtail the freedom to
associate warrant the closest scrutiny under the First
Amendment.” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., 608 U.S. at
184 (simplified).
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 23
The government may infringe the freedom of association
in “varied ways,” including by “punish[ing] individuals for
their affiliations.” Id. at 185. The government cannot
impose “criminal sanctions or deny[] rights and privileges
solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular
organization.” Healy, 408 U.S. at 186. For example, a group
of students could not be denied the “benefits” of official
campus recognition at a state college merely because of its
affiliation with a national organization associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity. Id. at 174, 186; see
also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920
(1982) (“Civil liability may not be imposed merely because
an individual belonged to a group, some members of which
committed acts of violence.”).
If the government seeks to deprive an individual of a
benefit, privilege, or right based on association with an
alleged criminal organization, “it is necessary to establish
that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the
individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.”
NAACP, 458 U.S. at 920. The government has the burden
of proving the organization’s unlawful goals and the
individual’s “specific intent to further those illegal aims.”
Healy, 408 U.S. at 186. So denying a benefit, privilege, or
right to an individual “solely because of [his] association
with an unpopular organization,” without justification,
violates the free-association right. Id.
Given this understanding of the First Amendment,
Shilling easily pleaded a violation of his freedom of
association. He asserted that the San Diego County Sheriff
revoked his CCW license solely based on his membership in
the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club—an organization he
alleges is known for its charitable activities and community-
oriented initiatives. Indeed, the Sheriff’s letter revoking
24 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
Shilling’s CCW license stated that her office “received
information that [he was] involved with the Boozefighters
Motorcycle Club,” which she conclusorily labeled a
“criminal street gang,” and “[t]herefore, based on the
seriousness of this information, [his] CCW ha[d] been
revoked.”
These allegations sufficiently raise an infringement of
Shilling’s free-associati