Full Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KENNETH CHARLES SHILLING, No. 25-291 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-01047- CAB-DDL v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; KELLY A. MARTINEZ, in her official OPINION capacity as Sheriff of County of San Diego, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 20, 2026 Pasadena, California Filed November 20, 2026 Before: Kenneth K. Lee, Patrick J. Bumatay, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Bumatay 2 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO SUMMARY* Sovereign Immunity / First Amendment / Second Amendment The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Kenneth Charles Shilling’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the County of San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff, in which Shilling alleged that the revocation of his concealed-carry weapon (“CCW”) license over his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club violated his First Amendment right of free association and his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and remanded for further proceedings. Before January 1, 2024, California’s CCW licensing scheme was a “may issue” regime, which included a “good moral character” requirement that allowed the county sheriff to grant a CCW license if the sheriff determined the applicant was of “good moral character.” A determination that a person was not of “good moral character” would be grounds to either deny a CCW license application or revoke an existing license. In December 2023, San Diego County Sheriff Kelly Martinez used the “good moral character” requirement to revoke Shilling’s CCW license. Shilling was notified that his license was revoked due to his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described as a “criminal street gang.” * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 3 The panel first held that that the San Diego County Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,” and thus, is not entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Applying the three-factor test of Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), as refined in Nilsen v. Univ. of Wash., 186 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2026), the panel concluded California sheriffs are not “arms of the state” for sovereign-immunity purposes because: (1) California law shows an intent to create the county sheriff as a legally independent entity from the State; (2) nothing indicates that the State of California is formally liable for judgments against the San Diego County Sheriff; and (3) although California appears to exercise some degree of control over county sheriffs, the presence of some state supervisory authority doesn’t overcome the strong signals that the State created the county sheriff as a separate legal entity. The panel next held that the County of San Diego may be liable under § 1983 because the revocation of a CCW license for “good moral character” is a county policy. When Shilling’s license was revoked, Sheriff Martinez had the discretion to both define and enforce the “good moral character” requirement, and, thus, she was the “final policymaker” for the county. Because Sheriff Martinez acted as a final policymaker for San Diego County when she enforced the “good moral character” policy, the County can be held liable under § 1983 for her actions in revoking Shilling’s CCW license. The panel further held that Shilling’s Second Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory relief is not moot because, assuming a violation of his Second Amendment right, the district court can grant Shilling 4 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO effective relief by ordering the destruction of his CCW revocation records. Lastly, the panel held that Shilling adequately pleaded a violation of his First Amendment freedom-of-association right where he alleged that his CCW license was revoked solely for his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, and that the Sheriff penalized him for joining a lawful group without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing. COUNSEL Gary W. Gorski (argued), Veterans Law Center, Folsom, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. David M. Stotland (argued), Deputy County Counsel, San Diego Office of County Counsel, San Diego, California, for Defendants-Appellees. OPINION BUMATAY, Circuit Judge: The San Diego County Sheriff revoked Kenneth Shilling’s concealed-carry weapon (“CCW”) license over his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club. This case presents several important questions. First, is the San Diego County Sheriff entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as an “arm of the state”? Second, was the revocation of a CCW license in 2023 a “county policy” SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 5 for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Third, did the adoption of a new CCW law in 2024 moot Shilling’s Second Amendment claim? And finally, did the district court correctly dismiss Shilling’s First Amendment free- association claim for failure to state a claim? Our answers: the Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,” revoking CCW licenses was a “county policy,” Shilling’s Second Amendment claim is not moot, and the district court improperly dismissed his First Amendment claim. We thus reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. California regulates who may receive a CCW license “to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Cal. Penal Code § 26150. The State imposes several requirements on applicants, such as mandatory training, mandatory background checks, and fingerprint collection. Id. §§ 26150, 26165, 26175, 26185. Each county sheriff is required to “publish and make available a written policy summarizing” state laws that govern the CCW license application process. Id. § 26160. Before January 1, 2024, California’s CCW licensing scheme was a “may issue” regime, which included a “good moral character” requirement. Cal. Penal Code § 26150(a)(1) (2016) (amended 2023). This allowed the “sheriff of the county” to grant a CCW license if the sheriff determined the applicant was of “good moral character.” Id. A determination that a person was not of “good moral character” would be grounds to either deny a CCW license 6 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO application or revoke an existing license. Id.; see also Cal. Penal Code § 26202 (2012) (repealed and replaced 2023). Effective January 1, 2024, the “good moral character” requirement was replaced. That’s because the California legislature changed its CCW licensing scheme in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The “good moral character” requirement was removed and swapped with an exclusion based on a likelihood of dangerousness. Cal. Penal Code §§ 26150(a)(1), 26170(a)(1), 26202(a)(1). B. Kenneth Charles Shilling resides in San Diego, California. He’s a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which, according to Shilling, was founded in 1946 by World War II veterans. In his view, it’s not like some other motorcycle clubs, which are known for criminal and gang activity. Instead, the Boozefighters focus on charitable work and the “core values of family, work, and community.” Shilling’s record is clean; he has no criminal history. In June 2022, when the “good moral character” requirement still existed, Shilling applied for and received a CCW license from then-San Diego County Sheriff Anthony Ray. This was short lived. Less than a year and a half later, in December 2023, a different San Diego County Sheriff, Kelly Martinez, used the “good moral character” requirement to revoke Shilling’s CCW license. In a letter notifying Shilling of the revocation, Sheriff Martinez explained that the “San Diego Sheriff’s Department[’s] good moral character definition” excludes a person who: Has a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 7 application or investigation for a license. This includes, but is not limited to, evidence of criminal behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang. In making this determination, the Sheriff’s Department shall use an objective inquiry, considering the facts and circumstances known at the time of the application or through the investigation. The letter said that Shilling’s license was revoked due to his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described as a “criminal street gang.” Shilling was not given the opportunity to contest the allegations before his license was revoked, but he could request reconsideration of the decision. The new CCW regime with the “dangerousness” requirement took effect on January 1, 2024, shortly after Shilling’s license was revoked. C. Shilling sued the County of San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the revocation of his CCW license violated his First Amendment right of free association and his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. He alleged that the revocation falsely associated him with criminal conduct and the record of the revocation may make it harder for him to obtain another CCW license. And he sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and the destruction of his revocation records. Sheriff Martinez and the County moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion. The district court concluded that the Sheriff is immune from suit under the 8 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO Eleventh Amendment and that the County was an improper defendant because revocation of CCW licenses was a state policy—not a county policy. It also ruled that Shilling failed to plead a sufficient First Amendment claim but gave him leave to amend. After Shilling filed a motion for reconsideration, the district court further ruled that Shilling’s Second Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory relief was moot. And because Shilling failed to amend his First Amendment claim, the district court said its order dismissing the claim was a “final appealable decision.” Shilling now challenges these decisions. We review each de novo. See Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (sovereign immunity); Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing county policy); Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003) (mootness); Glazer Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Forescout Techs., Inc., 63 F.4th 747, 763 (9th Cir. 2023) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). II. California Sheriffs Are Not Arms of the State Shilling first appeals the holding that the San Diego Sheriff is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Because the San Diego Sheriff is not an “arm of the State,” she is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. A. In the Ninth Circuit, any question about sovereign immunity must start with Kohn v. State Bar of California. There, we reconsidered whether an entity is an “arm of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity based on recent changes in Supreme Court doctrine. 87 F.4th at 1027. Kohn SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9 marked two significant developments in the sovereign- immunity analysis. First, we announced a new three-factor test to decide whether an entity is an “arm of the state.” Id. at 1030. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 607 U.S. 509 (2026), we further refined the three factors. See Nilsen v. Univ. of Wash., 186 F.4th 1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2026). Now, to determine whether an entity is “an arm of the state,” we consider: (1) whether the State intended to create a legally independent entity, which is shown by the entity’s form and treatment under state law; (2) whether the State is formally liable for the entity’s debts or liabilities, including judgments; and (3) the degree of control the State exercises over the entity. Id. at 1138. “The first factor bears the most weight, and the third bears the least.” Id. While state law informs the inquiry, it does not control it. Instead, “[w]hether an entity is an arm of the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is a question of federal law.” Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1025. Second, whether an entity is an “arm of the state” is an “entity-based” analysis, not a function-based one. Id. at 1031. “[A]n entity either is or is not an arm of the state: The status of an entity does not change from one case to the next based on the nature of the suit, the state’s financial responsibility in one case as compared to another, or other variable factors.” Id. at 1031 (simplified). So once an entity is considered an “arm of the state” for one case, it is considered an “arm of the state” for all cases. We need not 10 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO examine the specific government function or activity challenged in a given case. B. Since Kohn, we’ve not had the opportunity to consider whether California sheriffs are “arms of the State.” Pre- Kohn cases applied the function-based approach, and the outcome depended on the specific actions challenged—not the structure of the office itself. See, e.g., Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 566 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department was “not acting as an arm of the state when administering the local county jails”). Under the revamped Kohn framework, California sheriffs are not “arms of the State” and so the San Diego County Sheriff does not have Eleventh Amendment immunity. 1. First, California law shows an intent to create the county sheriff as a legally independent entity from the State. See Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1138. While independent corporate status is the “clearest evidence” of separate status, other “structure[s]” may “signal[] the State has created a legally separate entity”—“[m]ost obvious[]” is “describ[ing] [the entity] as a ‘separate legal entity.’” Galette, 607 U.S. at 524– 25 (simplified). “The ultimate question remains whether the State structured the entity as part of itself or as legally independent.” Id. at 525. Start with the California Constitution. Sheriffs are designated as county officers. Cal. Const. art. XI, § 1(b) (“The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 11 assessor, and an elected governing body in each county.”). They are not members of the State’s executive department. Cf. id. art. V, § 11 (listing state executive officials). Under the California Constitution, a county charter must “provide for the ‘compensation, terms and removal’ of the sheriff.” Penrod v. County of San Bernardino, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717, 720 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4). Only the county governing body—not state officials—may provide for the “election or appointment,” Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4(c), and “the manner of filling all vacancies” for sheriffs, id. art. XI § 4(e). Thus, “the office of sheriff is an independent office created by the state Constitution.” People v. Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 801 (Ct. App. 2023). Next, by state statute, sheriffs are officers of a county. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 24000(b). Sheriffs must generally maintain an office at the county seat—the same as other county officers. See id. § 24250. And sheriffs must be elected by the people of each county—not appointed by a state official. See id. §§ 24009, 24205. And only the board of supervisors—not the State—may contract out the services of the sheriff. See id. § 53069.8(a); Streit, 236 F.3d at 562. The county must also generally provide for the sheriff’s fiscal needs. See Cal. Penal Code § 4015(a) (“The board of supervisors shall provide the sheriff with necessary food, clothing, and bedding, for those prisoners [committed to jail]” and, with some exception, “the expenses thereof shall be paid out of the county treasury.”). Thus, sheriffs appear to retain many hallmarks of “legal separateness” from the State, like holding property, making contracts, and incurring debts. See Galette, 607 U.S. at 524–25. State constitutional and statutory law thus confirm that “[t]he sheriff is a county officer, not a state official.” Penrod, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720; see also Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr. 12 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 3d at 801 (“[T]he sheriff’s department is a political subdivision of the county[.]”); Trejo v. County of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2020) (sheriff’s department is “a political subunit” of the county); Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We found that these various state provisions lead inexorably to the conclusion that the sheriff is tied to the County in its political, administrative, and fiscal capacities.” (simplified)). While these cases didn’t decide sovereign- immunity questions, they show that California law intended county sheriffs to be legally separate entities from the State. Thus, the weightiest of the Kohn factors favors no sovereign immunity for county sheriffs. 2. Second, nothing indicates that the State of California “is formally liable for judgments against” the San Diego County Sheriff. Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1137. This inquiry focuses “only on who ultimately pays—whether the state is formally liable for judgments against the entity, or the entity’s other debts or liabilities.” Id. (simplified). “If the State is formally liable for judgments against an entity, that entity is more likely to be an arm of the State because its liabilities necessarily undermine the State’s ability to make choices about how to allocate the State fisc.” Galette, 607 U.S. at 525. Conversely, evidence of a “practical financial relationship with the State” is not enough. Id. at 525–26. Whether the county sheriff may receive state funding or whether California “would cover . . . judgments [against the sheriff] if needed” is “less relevan[t]” than the State’s “formal legal liability.” Id. at 525. And here, Sheriff Martinez hasn’t shown that California “is formally liable for judgments against” her. Id. State law SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 13 indicates otherwise. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (a “public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity”); see also Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 869 (Cal. 1974) (county derivatively liable for acts by sheriff under section 815.2). So, “[u]nder California law, monetary damages for section 1983 claims [against sheriffs’ departments] are paid by the County and not the state.” Streit, 236 F.3d at 562 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2); see also Brewster, 275 F.3d at 807 (“[A] county [is] liable for [a] sheriff’s actions.”). True, California courts have held that sheriffs act as state agents for purposes of § 1983 liability when performing their “crime investigation functions.” Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2004). But see Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 764–66 (9th Cir. 2014) (disagreeing with Venegas). Even so, that narrow holding is unlikely to affect the state treasury since state officials receive qualified immunity. See Venegas, 87 P.3d. at 12–13. So this limited liability doesn’t “undermine the State’s ability to make choices about how to allocate the State fisc.” Galette, 607 U.S. at 525. And ultimately, whether the sheriff is an “arm of the state” turns on federal law—not on how state courts handle a related issue. See Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1025. This second factor thus cuts against sovereign immunity for a county sheriff. 3. Third, California appears to exercise some “degree of control” over county sheriffs. See Nilsen, 186 F.4th at 1136. But this is the least important factor—“the State’s degree of control over the entity should be considered only with 14 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO caution” because “it is difficult to gauge.” Id. at 1138, 1142 (simplified). At most, this factor ends in a wash. California law gives sheriffs substantial independence from the State. Control can be gauged based on “how members of the governing body of the entity are appointed and removed, as well as whether the state can directly supervise and control the entity’s ongoing operations.” Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1030 (simplified). As noted, counties establish the election, appointment, replacement, and removal of sheriffs. Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4. And, although they may not interfere with “investigative function[s],” the county board of supervisors exercises significant oversight of sheriffs. Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303. The county board “supervise[s] the official conduct of” sheriffs and “shall see that they faithfully perform their duties.” Id. This includes supervising the sheriff’s budget. Id. To be sure, some supervisory authority is shared with the State Attorney General. The California Constitution also gives the Attorney General “direct supervision over every . . . sheriff . . . in all matters pertaining to the duties of their . . . office[,]” and the Attorney General “may require” the sheriff to “make reports concerning the investigation, detection, [and] punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions.” Cal. Const. art. V, § 13. By statute, the Attorney General may “direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation or detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff, and may direct the service of subpoenas, warrants of arrest, or other processes of court in connection therewith.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12560. And, as Sheriff Martinez emphasizes here, state law requires sheriffs to use uniform CCW license applications as prescribed by the Attorney General. Cal. Penal Code § 26175(a)(1)(A). SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 15 Other state laws regulate CCW licenses statewide. See id. §§ 26185(a)(1), 26195, 26225. But while the Attorney General’s supervision of sheriffs appears nontrivial, it is not enough to “change the overall conclusion here.” Galette, 607 U.S. at 530. We can’t overlook the substantial supervisory role counties have over sheriffs, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303, and, under Kohn, we don’t focus on the precise function challenged but on state control over the sheriff’s office as a whole. See Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1031. So it’s not dispositive if state law dictates how CCW licenses are processed. Finally, the amount of control that the Attorney General exercises over sheriffs is far less than the “substantial” authority the State exerted over the transit board deemed not an “arm of the State” in Galette. 607 U.S. at 530 (observing that the governor had appointment and removal power over the board, a state cabinet member chaired the board, the governor could veto any of the board’s actions, and the state legislature could veto some actions). So the presence of some state supervisory authority doesn’t overcome the strong signals that the State created the county sheriff as a “separate legal entity.” Id. at 525. *** Putting the Kohn factors together, California sheriffs are not “arms of the state” for sovereign-immunity purposes, and it was improper to grant San Diego County Sheriff Martinez sovereign immunity. To the extent the district court relied on McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), in its Eleventh Amendment analysis, that was error. McMillian didn’t deal with the question here—whether an entity is an “arm of the state” for sovereign-immunity purposes. McMillian stands 16 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO for a related but distinct concept: whether an action is state or county policy for purposes of § 1983 liability. Id. at 784– 86; see also Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 534 (5th Cir. 2022) (“McMillian did not concern the Eleventh Amendment. Instead, it dealt with the issue of county liability in § 1983 lawsuits.” (simplified)). While the question of county liability may turn on the precise function or action challenged, the sovereign-immunity question does not. It looks only to the entity as a whole. Kohn, 87 F.4th at 1031. And based on California constitutional and statutory law, the Sheriff is a separate legal entity from the State and not an “arm of the state.” Finally, because the Sheriff is not an “arm of the state,” we need not address Shilling’s alternative argument that the State of California should have been joined as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). III. The Revocation of a CCW License Is a County Policy Shilling next challenges the district court’s ruling that the County of San Diego was an improper defendant under § 1983 because the San Diego County Sheriff acts as a representative of the State of California—and not the County—in revoking CCW licenses. As we said earlier, this is a separate inquiry from whether the Sheriff is an “arm of the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Rather, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), governs whether a county may be liable under § 1983. Under Monell, a plaintiff can establish § 1983 liability against a municipality in three ways: “(1) the municipal employee committed the constitutional violation pursuant to an official policy; (2) the employee acted pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; and (3) the SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 17 employee functioned as a final policymaker.” Barone v. City of Springfield, 902 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2018). The question here is whether Sheriff Martinez acted as a “final policymaker” in revoking CCW licenses under the “good moral character” requirement. Once again, state law informs this inquiry and, under McMillian, “we look to whether the individual had final policymaking authority ‘in a particular area, or on a particular issue’” for the local government. Id. (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785). “A municipal policy may arise where a government chooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation.” Id. (simplified). “The course of action must be made from among various alternatives by the official . . . responsible for establishing final policy on the subject matter in question.” Id. (simplified). Under state law, the San Diego County Sheriff had wide latitude in implementing CCW revocations under the “good moral character” requirement and, thus, she was the “final policymaker” for the County. Start again with the California Constitution. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787 (beginning with the Alabama Constitution). Unlike the Alabama Constitution, “the California Constitution does not list sheriffs as part of ‘the state executive department.’” Streit, 236 F.3d at 561 (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 787). Instead, the California Constitution creates the office of the sheriff as “an independent office” and makes the sheriff a “county officer, not a state official.” Tice, 305 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 801 (citing Cal. Const. art. XI, §§ 1(b), 4(c)) (simplified). Further, no provision in the California Constitution provides that the sheriff acts for the State when administering CCW revocations based on the “good moral character” requirement. See Brewster, 275 F.3d at 806. 18 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO We next look to the California Code for whether sheriffs act for the county or the State. When the Sheriff revoked Shilling’s CCW license in 2023, California’s CCW law was a “may issue” regime—giving sheriffs discretion to issue, deny, or revoke licenses. See People v. Mosqueda, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439, 443 (Ct. App. 2023). That law provided: “[t]he county sheriff or chief of police ‘may issue’ a license to carry a concealed handgun upon proof that ‘good cause’ exists for issuing the license.” Id. (citing then-Cal. Penal Code § 26150). In addition to other requirements, that law also required the applicant to “prove that he or she is of ‘good moral character,’ resides or works in the issuing county or city, and has completed a firearm safety course.” Id. (citing then-§§ 26150(a)(1), (3)-(4); 26155(a)(1), (3)-(4); 26185(a); 26195(a)). California left it to sheriffs to figure out whether these requirements were met. Importantly, then-§ 26150 didn’t define “good moral character.” See People v. Miller, 312 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 658 (Ct. App. 2023) (“Neither ‘good moral character’ nor ‘good cause’ [was] further defined by statute.”). So then-§ 21650 gave sheriffs “discretionary statutory authority to deny a handgun license based on the applicant’s good moral character.” Mosqueda, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 449–50 (considering defendants’ claim that “section 26150’s failure to define ‘good moral character’ rendered the law unconstitutional . . . because local officials had unbridled discretion to define the term how they pleased”). Indeed, the letter revoking Shilling’s license established the “San Diego Sheriff’s Department[’s] good moral character definition.” Under this policy, “good moral character” excluded those who showed “a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the application or investigation for a license,” including “evidence of criminal SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 19 behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang.” No state law mandated this County-specific definition. In other words, the County of San Diego—not California—made association with the Boozefighters a basis to revoke a CCW license. After Bruen, the California legislature amended the concealed-carry law to restrict sheriffs’ discretion and eliminate the “good moral character” requirement. See Cal. Penal Code § 26202 (2023) (replacing the former Cal. Penal Code § 26202 (2012)); see also id. §§ 26150(a)(1) (2023), 26170(a)(1) (2023). This reform replaced the “may issue” regime with a “shall issue” one that required sheriffs to either deny or grant licenses when certain criteria were met. People v. Bey, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 917 (Ct. App. 2025); see Cal. Penal Code §§ 26150(a)(1), 26170(a)(1), 26202. But this new “shall issue” regime became effective January 1, 2024. Bey, 328 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 917. So when Shilling’s license was revoked in December 2023, Sheriff Martinez had the discretion to both define and enforce the “good moral character” requirement. Thus, she was acting as a final policymaker for the County—not the State—in revoking Shilling’s CCW license. Sure, the County can point to several concealed-carry requirements that are uniform statewide. They say that state laws provide that (1) all California CCW applications are to be on the same forms prescribed by the Attorney General, Cal. Penal Code § 26175(a)(1)(A); (2) all applicants must be fingerprinted using forms created by and sent to the California Department of Justice, id. § 26185(a)(1); (3) sheriffs are required to give the State notice of any grant, denial, or revocation of a CCW license, id. § 26225(b); and (4) licenses shall not be issued to individuals who are subject to a federal or state firearms prohibition, id. § 26195(a)(1). 20 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO But these requirements do not change that the Sheriff made decisions “from among various alternatives” and “establish[ed] final policy” for CCW revocations in the County. Barone, 902 F.3d at 1107 (simplified). So Sheriff Martinez acted as a final policymaker for San Diego County when she enforced the “good moral character” policy. This accords with our other decisions concluding that sheriffs act as county—not state—policymakers for other functions. See Jackson, 749 F.3d at 766 (conducting criminal investigations); Brewster, 275 F.3d at 807 (same); Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1189 (administering jails); Streit, 236 F.3d at 564–65 (same). So the district court erred in dismissing the County as an improper defendant—it can be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of Sheriff Martinez in revoking Shilling’s CCW license. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. IV. Shilling’s Second Amendment Claim Is Not Moot Shilling also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Second Amendment claim for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot. “The test for mootness of an appeal is whether the appellate court can give the plaintiff any effective relief in the event that it decides the matter on the merits in his favor.” Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (simplified). If the court can grant any effective relief, “the matter is not moot.” Id. (simplified). “In the context of injunctive relief, a case is not moot if the court is able to ‘undo’ the effects of the alleged illegal action.” Id. (simplified). SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 21 The district court mooted out Shilling’s Second Amendment claim because his CCW license expired. Because his revoked license expired, the district court found that it could not be returned and Shilling would need to reapply for a new license under the new law without the “good moral character” requirement. It thus concluded that there was no live controversy regarding that challenged requirement. But that’s wrong. Shilling requested several forms of injunctive relief. He sought (1) an injunction precluding the Sheriff from revoking CCW licenses without proof of a crime or specific gang-related activity, (2) the immediate return of his license, and (3) the destruction of all records of his CCW revocation. While the adoption of the new licensing regime and the expiration of Shilling’s license moot the first two forms of injunctive relief, they do not negate his request for the destruction of records. In Shilling’s view, these records may affect his ability to obtain another CCW license in the County or elsewhere and may show up in criminal background checks. Destroying these records would then undo the potential effects of the revocation. So Shilling’s Second Amendment claim for injunctive relief is not moot. Assuming a violation of his Second Amendment right, the district court can grant Shilling effective relief by ordering the destruction of his CCW revocation records. See Carvalho, 148 F.4th at 1026. We thus remand this claim to the district court. 22 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO V. Shilling’s First Amendment Freedom of Association Claim Shilling finally appeals the district court’s dismissal of his First Amendment freedom-of-association claim for failing to state a claim. Shilling alleged that his CCW license was revoked solely for his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club. The Sheriff, he asserts, penalized him for joining a lawful group without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing. These allegations are enough to sustain a First Amendment claim. A. The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the “right to associate with others.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 606 (2021). “While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). Without it, the government can prevent Americans from “safely shar[ing] the same soapbox” and “the same church,” “reduce any assembly to a party of one,” and limit “the right to petition . . . to sign[ing] one’s own name alone.” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 608 U.S. 174, 184 (2026). So the right protects groups of individuals “in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). And “government actions tending to curtail the freedom to associate warrant the closest scrutiny under the First Amendment.” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., 608 U.S. at 184 (simplified). SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 23 The government may infringe the freedom of association in “varied ways,” including by “punish[ing] individuals for their affiliations.” Id. at 185. The government cannot impose “criminal sanctions or deny[] rights and privileges solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular organization.” Healy, 408 U.S. at 186. For example, a group of students could not be denied the “benefits” of official campus recognition at a state college merely because of its affiliation with a national organization associated with disruptive and violent campus activity. Id. at 174, 186; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (“Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence.”). If the government seeks to deprive an individual of a benefit, privilege, or right based on association with an alleged criminal organization, “it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” NAACP, 458 U.S. at 920. The government has the burden of proving the organization’s unlawful goals and the individual’s “specific intent to further those illegal aims.” Healy, 408 U.S. at 186. So denying a benefit, privilege, or right to an individual “solely because of [his] association with an unpopular organization,” without justification, violates the free-association right. Id. Given this understanding of the First Amendment, Shilling easily pleaded a violation of his freedom of association. He asserted that the San Diego County Sheriff revoked his CCW license solely based on his membership in the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club—an organization he alleges is known for its charitable activities and community- oriented initiatives. Indeed, the Sheriff’s letter revoking 24 SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO Shilling’s CCW license stated that her office “received information that [he was] involved with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club,” which she conclusorily labeled a “criminal street gang,” and “[t]herefore, based on the seriousness of this information, [his] CCW ha[d] been revoked.” These allegations sufficiently raise an infringement of Shilling’s free-associati