Debra Pratt v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-1901 DEBRA PRATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WISCONSIN ALUMINUM FOUNDRY, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 1:22-cv-00568 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JANUARY 28, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2026 ____________________ Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. After reporting claims of dis- crimination and harassment at the Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry (WAF), human resources manager Debra Pratt found herself under attack. Other managers targeted her, she received a poor performance review, and after she com- plained about discrimination and retaliation, she was fired. Pratt sued, alleging sex discrimination, pay discrimination, 2 No. 24-1901 and retaliation. WAF said it fired Pratt because of the perfor- mance review as well as a lack of trust in Pratt’s department and confidentiality issues. The district court granted sum- mary judgment in favor of WAF on all of Pratt’s claims. We reverse in part. Pratt presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII such that a reasonable jury could find in her favor on those claims. To be sure, WAF presented an alternative narrative that Pratt was fired for poor performance, but summary judgment is not the time to decide which narrative to believe. The time for weigh- ing competing evidence is trial, and the job is for a jury not a judge. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be.”); Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (“As we have said many times, summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.” (citation omitted)). We agree with the district court, however, that WAF is entitled to summary judgment on Pratt’s pay discrim- ination claim. Accordingly, we remand for trial on Pratt’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims. BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed, except where other- wise noted, and viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt as the non-movant. Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 628, 630 (7th Cir. 2022). No. 24-1901 3 I. Factual Background WAF is a family-owned aluminum foundry in Manitowoc, Wisconsin. Pratt began working for WAF in 2016 in the hu- man resources department. In 2017, she was promoted to hu- man resources manager. Her new responsibilities included developing and implementing personnel policies, maintain- ing personnel records, and responding to and investigating employee complaints. The parties dispute the scope of her responsibilities for en- vironmental health and safety, which bears on her pay dis- crimination claim. Pratt’s predecessor performed those du- ties, but WAF contends that Pratt did not when she was pro- moted. A few months after Pratt was promoted, WAF hired Emery Coonen to be its Environmental Health and Safety Manager, and he took over these responsibilities. Coonen was hired at an annual salary of $85,328. Pratt’s starting salary as HR manager was $65,016. Pratt performed well in her first year as HR manager and received a bonus and a raise at the end of 2017, bringing her annual salary to $69,567. But she experienced some early set- backs. In early 2018, she committed errors on a benefits spreadsheet and did not catch a rate change for insurance pre- miums. She also filled a union position with an external can- didate, which WAF contends violated its collective bargaining agreement. Pratt also began to ruffle some feathers within the com- pany by reporting concerns of discrimination and harassment to her supervisor, Ben Jacobs, WAF’s Senior Vice President and Chief Product Officer. She believed her predecessor, who had been in the role for over thirty years, did not do enough 4 No. 24-1901 to investigate employee complaints. So, she took it upon her- self to ensure that, under her direction, the department would take complaints seriously and report them to WAF leadership. Between 2017 and 2018, Pratt reported multiple employee complaints of harassment and discrimination to Jacobs and other managers. Employees complained to Pratt about dis- crimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, and disability. She also shared with Jacobs her personal experiences as a female manager at WAF. Eugene Boyd, WAF’s Vice President of Operations, was the subject of many of these complaints. Pratt not only re- ported other employees’ complaints about Boyd, but her own as well. For instance, in conversation with Pratt, Boyd referred to another female manager as a “bitch” and told Pratt he could “rile her up.” Boyd also treated Pratt and her employees in the HR department—composed wholly of women—as secretar- ies, asking them to do menial tasks not related to their job du- ties. One of Pratt’s reports to Jacobs involved Boyd discussing a female employee’s “ass” at a meeting. During that meeting, Boyd’s female subordinate, Lili Goehring, remarked that she fell down the stairs and bruised her buttocks. The parties dis- pute what happened next, but they agree that Pratt later told Jacobs that, after Goehring’s remarks, Boyd told Goehring to get up on the table and show him her “ass.” One meeting at- tendee told Pratt that Boyd also stuck his thumb up on the table and told Goehring to “sit on it and he would spin her.” Another attendee informed Pratt that while the jokes did not seem to bother Goehring, the innuendo made them uncom- fortable. No. 24-1901 5 After learning about this incident, Pratt prepared a written report for Jacobs summarizing her conversations with the wit- nesses who approached her. The report included her “find- ings,” in which she wrote that the “sexual harassment” be- tween Boyd and Goehring was her “biggest concern.” She noted that the interaction “appear[ed] to be of a joking na- ture,” but it was “still unprofessional and against the law.” She advised that any witnesses to the interaction would “have the ability to file a sexual harassment complaint with the com- pany as well as the EEOC” and that it “would be a difficult case to defend.” Pratt sent the report to Jacobs a few weeks later. She did not know, however, that Jacobs already had a copy of it. An- other manager at WAF told Jacobs that he found the report on a copy machine near where Pratt worked. Jacobs was con- cerned that a confidential report was apparently left out in the open, so WAF engaged its outside counsel to investigate. The investigator spoke to Pratt, who admitted preparing the re- port but was surprised that someone else had found it. Pratt was later reprimanded for breaching confidentiality. Jacobs was also concerned about the way Pratt conducted her inves- tigation before compiling the report, and she was given addi- tional training on conducting and documenting HR investiga- tions. Neither Boyd nor Goehring were disciplined for their part, although Jacobs testified they were given additional “training.” The problems with Boyd were not isolated incidents. The same female manager Boyd called a “bitch” complained to Pratt about Boyd barring her from necessary work meetings. Pratt reported another incident to Jacobs in which Boyd ob- scenely flipped off a female receptionist with his middle fin- 6 No. 24-1901 ger after she asked him to move his car from a visitor parking lot. Pratt’s reports to Jacobs also involved complaints of race discrimination, including a number complaining of Tom Culp, a white shift leader at WAF. Based on complaints she received, Pratt grew concerned that Culp treated his minority employees differently than his white employees and reported multiple incidents to Jacobs and to Boyd, Culp’s supervisor. Finally, Pratt also told Jacobs about her own experiences with discrimination and harassment at WAF. She reported that another manager called her a “cunt” and “bitch” because she asked him to sign a payroll change form. Pratt also re- ported that Boyd’s subordinates hounded an HR employee for a date, and one of them sent her an email stating “U Smoken Hot.” Pratt and the other employees in the HR de- partment felt uncomfortable with these remarks and the email, and Pratt reported as much to Jacobs. Pratt’s reporting did not make her popular within the company. Jacobs testified that managers complained to him about the “direction” the HR department was moving in and expressed their distrust of Pratt. Suspicions about Pratt were later memorialized when she was reviewed by a third-party consulting group, Utech. Utech, which WAF engaged to help manage its growth, interviewed about 50 WAF employees and managers, including Pratt, about the strengths and weak- nesses of the company and its leaders. Utech compiled the employee feedback into a September 2018 report that identified strengths and weaknesses with WAF’s culture generally. Utech noted that “[m]orale [had] gone downhill over [the] last 3 years,” (predating Pratt’s hir- No. 24-1901 7 ing) and that there was a lack of trust and accountability. Fur- ther, Utech observed that “[t]he current culture at WAF is one of gossip and drama. Issues are avoided or talked about indi- rectly, causing more division within the organization. Sides are being taken, people are protective of their areas and peo- ple are really unsure who to trust . . . This starts with leader- ship.” Utech also provided individual feedback for WAF’s man- agers, including Pratt, Boyd, and Jacobs. Under Pratt’s strengths, the report said that she worked hard to “make things better” and knew her job well. The Utech report elabo- rated that “Deb hasn’t been in her role long[,] yet is seen as trying to make improvements within the HR department and the organization, but has been met with some resistance.” The report also said that Pratt lacked the trust of other employees who believed that she had a “hidden agenda,” gossiped, and held grudges. The report further stated that many employees thought Pratt “[i]nvestigates people instead of focusing on what’s best for the company.” The Utech report also criticized each of the other WAF managers. Some of the criticism was starkly similar to Pratt’s. The report stated that employees did not trust Jacobs because, for example, he shared “information with others that was told to him in confidence.” Employees at WAF also found that he lacked assertiveness. The report stated that Kory Brockman, WAF’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, had a “hidden agenda” and perpetuated “drama” within the com- pany. Boyd, who was at a similar level within the organiza- tion as Pratt, received feedback that he lacked “respect and professionalism” and “instigate[d] and perpetuate[d] drama.” The report stated that Tom Behnke, also at a similar 8 No. 24-1901 level, talked “badly about people” and could be “hot-headed and unprofessional.” Of the 11 managers reviewed in the Utech report, Pratt was the only woman. In November 2018, relying on the Utech report, Jacobs gave Pratt a yearly performance review. Out of a total possible score of 32, Pratt received a 10. Citing the Utech report, Jacobs wrote that Pratt had been a “very [divisive] figure at WAF.” He also stated that while she was “good on the benefits side,” she required more training on the “HR side.” Because of her low score, Pratt did not receive a performance bonus for 2018 as she had in 2017. Concerned with her score, Pratt met with Jacobs in Decem- ber 2018 to ask for additional feedback. During that meeting, Pratt shared that she felt she was being retaliated against for making reports about harassment and discrimination, partic- ularly her report about Boyd and Goehring. She felt like she had a target on her back. Pratt was unsatisfied with Jacobs’ response during that meeting and raised her concerns again in an email to Jacobs on March 7, 2019. She wanted specific examples of her work that warranted the low scores. In this email, she also ex- pressed her concerns that Jacobs told other WAF employees not to approach her for HR purposes and that, by doing so, he was perpetuating a culture of distrust and gossip. She con- cluded by explaining that she felt she had been retaliated against because she reported the incident between Boyd and Goehring and could not “turn a blind eye” to it. One week later, on March 15, 2019, Pratt was fired. No. 24-1901 9 II. Procedural History Pratt brought claims against WAF under Title VII for retal- iation, sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and pay discrimination. The district court dismissed Pratt’s hostile work environment claim at the pleading stage but allowed the remainder of her claims to proceed. Pratt does not challenge this dismissal on appeal. After discovery, the district court granted summary judg- ment in favor of WAF on all the remaining claims. Applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), it con- cluded that Pratt could not state a prima facie claim for sex discrimination because she was not meeting WAF’s legitimate performance expectations. As to Pratt’s pay discrimination claim, the court concluded that she had not identified a suffi- ciently close comparator. Finally, on Pratt’s retaliation claim, the court concluded that she did not engage in a protected ac- tivity. DISCUSSION We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs., 953 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judg- ment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pratt, we must “try to focus on the most persuasive story possible on [her] behalf when asking whether a verdict in her favor would be reasonable or could result only from irrational speculation.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 928. At summary judgment, we are careful not to usurp the role of the jury. See Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1041 (7th Cir. 2023) (We “try to discern what the record shows” to 10 No. 24-1901 ensure a plaintiff is not “wrongly deprived of a trial.”). As long as there is “at least one reasonable way to tell the story in favor of” the non-movant, “a jury rather than appellate judges must choose among them.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 935 (emphasis in original). I. Title VII Sex Discrimination In granting summary judgment to WAF on Pratt’s Title VII sex discrimination claim, the district court concluded that she abandoned this claim because her arguments opposing sum- mary judgment focused only on her retaliation claim. Argu- ments may be waived if they are “perfunctory and underde- veloped” or if they are so “unsupported by pertinent author- ity” that the court must conduct research and form arguments on behalf of the party. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)). Because waived claims cannot be consid- ered on appeal, we do not find waiver lightly. If there is even “a (barely) adequate basis on which to follow [the] argu- ment,” we will not find waiver. Id. Applying this principle, we disagree that Pratt abandoned her discrimination claim. Pratt’s brief in opposition to sum- mary judgment argued that WAF was not entitled to judg- ment on her discriminatory discharge claim and was suffi- ciently fleshed out over multiple paragraphs with citations to both record evidence and case law. She argued that her evi- dence was sufficient to meet each prima facie element of a dis- crimination claim. While some of these arguments bled into her retaliation arguments, that is no basis to find waiver of an entire claim. We therefore turn to the merits. No. 24-1901 11 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discrimi- nate against an employee “because of” the employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Pratt sets out her arguments in the framework of McDonnell Douglas, but the question before us is simple: “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge . . . .” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A plaintiff may put forth and a court may analyze ev- idence using the McDonnell Douglas framework, but neither must do so.”); Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 884 F.3d 708, 720 (7th Cir. 2018) (“However the plaintiff chooses to proceed, at the sum- mary judgment stage the court must consider all admissible evidence . . . .” (citation omitted)). Here, as in many Title VII cases, the “sole question that matters” is causation: “whether a statutorily proscribed factor caused” a discharge. Joll, 953 F.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Put another way, the issue is whether the employer would have fired Pratt if she had been a man and everything else had re- mained the same. Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1994). To assess causation in employment discrimination cases, we “ask whether the totality of the evidence shows discrimi- nation, eschewing any framework or formula.” Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th Cir. 2021) (cit- ing Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). “[A]ll evidence belongs in a single pile,” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766, because “[d]irect as well as cir- cumstantial evidence may support an inference of causation, and thus intent” in Title VII cases, Joll, 953 F.3d at 929 (citing Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764); see also Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth 12 No. 24-1901 Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 325 (2025) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quot- ing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003)) (“That ‘[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation’—that a plaintiff can proceed with direct or circumstantial evidence—applies with full force to Title VII cases.”). “The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evi- dence alike is both clear and deep-rooted: ‘Circumstantial ev- idence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, sat- isfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n. 17 (1957)). The import of circumstantial evidence is especially acute in the employment discrimination context given that it is the rare discrimination case that might “permit easy inferences, such as the fabled employer who admits to firing an employee because of race.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Be- cause “[f]ew discrimination cases are so straightforward—in- deed they are often factually complex and require sifting through ambiguous pieces of evidence,” id., we have made clear that “[a] plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination through a chain of inferences.” Downing v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 804 (7th Cir. 2022). Broadly, three types of circumstantial evidence can sup- port an inference of intentional discrimination: “[1] ambigu- ous or suggestive comments or conduct; [2] better treatment of people similarly situated but for the protected characteris- tic; and [3] dishonest employer justifications for disparate treatment.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. Pratt has produced substan- tial evidence falling within each of these categories. Viewing this evidence holistically, we conclude that there is at least one reasonable way to tell the story in favor of her sex discrimina- tion claim. No. 24-1901 13 A. Ambiguous or Suggestive Comments or Conduct The record reflects the culture at WAF as one in which “suggestive comments” flowed freely. WAF does not dispute that men in managerial roles regularly made inappropriate comments and jokes to and at the expense of women employ- ees. Pratt’s own experience reflects this. She and her HR em- ployees felt that they were treated like secretaries and not asked to perform their actual job duties because of their sex. Pratt also received pushback for reporting workplace harass- ment and discrimination and was called a “bitch” and a “cunt” for trying to do her job. Such offensive commentary is far from “suggestive.” It is definitively sexist. See Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 665 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “bitch” and “cunt” are “sexually degrading, gender-specific epithets” (citation omitted)). Pratt reported this conduct to Jacobs repeatedly and he took little to no action to address it. Pratt’s declaration that Jacobs “did not” address discrimination at WAF is particu- larly telling because Pratt, of all WAF employees, was best sit- uated to know what actions Jacobs was or was not taking in response to reports. After all, she maintained personnel rec- ords and investigated complaints. At a certain point, a reason- able jury could view Jacobs’ inaction as acquiescence, even tacit approval of the conduct Pratt experienced firsthand. 1 1 Our dissenting colleague suggests that Pratt’s claim fails because Ja- cobs did not make any of the alleged sexist comments, and “stray remarks made by nondecisionmakers are not evidence that the decision had a dis- criminatory motive.” Post at 33 (quoting Crabtree v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 261 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2001)). But Crabtree found only that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding, at trial, a single suggestive re- mark, made two years after the alleged adverse employment action. See 14 No. 24-1901 Culture is often set by those at the top. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (“The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances.” (citation omitted)). Considering Jacobs’ senior executive role at WAF, a jury might reasonably deduce that he was influenced by this sexist environment, and in fact, had lent it his imprimatur by failing to intervene and address Pratt’s complaints. See Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 528 (7th Cir. 2008), as cor- rected (Jan. 21, 2009) (courts are “not require[d]” to “ignore comments made by someone who is not directly responsible for an employee’s supervision” especially where such com- ments “incited” discriminatory comments from other em- ployees and “may have instigated” an employee’s termina- tion). Further, Jacobs had knowledge of his subordinates’ bias and of their participation in the Utech report, but appar- ently—and in spite of Pratt’s complaints to him on the sub- ject—did not question whether the report could have been tainted by a broader culture of sexism at WAF. This is a theory of sex discrimination that we have blessed in the past. See Pe- rez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (panel majority rejected dissent’s argument that non-deci- sionmaker’s sexist comments were “stray remarks” where those remarks did not “st[an]d alone,” and the decisionmaker “was informed of [the non-decisionmaker’s] bias,” but “chose 261 F.3d at 723. Crabtree is silent on whether a panoply of sexist remarks and conduct by managers leading up to, and possibly contributing to a termination, can be considered on de novo review at summary judgment. See id.; see also Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (making clear that courts must take care not to over-read “stray remarks” cases). No. 24-1901 15 to credit” the non-decisionmaker’s account of the employee’s alleged infractions). As a result, a jury could find that because Jacobs relied on input he understood to be discriminatory and acceded to the discriminatory atmosphere, his own decision to discharge Pratt was made because of her sex. Context matters, and where derogatory comments do not stand alone, and are im- plicated within a larger web of investigations and complaints to decisionmakers, “we allow the jury to hear such evidence and weigh it for what it is worth.” Id. at 710; cf. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases) (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory ani- mus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”). In highly similar contexts, several of our sister circuits long have recognized the importance of assessing workplace culture in discrimination claims by considering discrimina- tory comments and actions by non-decisionmakers. See, e.g. Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for employer be- cause, while the views/actions of other employees cannot be attributed to an ultimate decisionmaker, “at some point the corporate environment in which [the decisionmaker] worked places” the employment decision in a “less neutral context”); Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for employer because “dis- criminatory remarks, even by a nondecisionmaker, can serve as probative evidence of pretext” and that type of circumstan- tial evidence may establish the evidence of a “discriminatory atmosphere”); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refin. Corp., 72 F.3d 16 No. 24-1901 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for em- ployer because, although “stray remarks by non-deci- sionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight,” such statements “may provide some relevant evidence of discrimination” at trial). Because we treat the evidence holistically, we cannot ignore the environment Pratt worked in and must consider those facts in the light most favorable to her. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. On its own, this discriminatory culture evidence may not be enough to conclude that Pratt’s discrimination claim sur- vives summary judgment. But viewed with the rest of the rec- ord evidence, the alleged sexist “remarks are part of the evi- dence of pretext that the jury should have the opportunity to weigh at trial.” Perez, 731 F.3d at 710. B. Dishonest Justifications for Disparate Treatment Pratt also presented evidence of “dishonest employer jus- tifications for disparate treatment.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. WAF claims it had three reasons for terminating Pratt in March 2019: (1) the negative feedback she received in the Utech re- port, particularly that employees did not trust her; (2) con- cerns about her ability to keep sensitive HR information con- fidential; and (3) errors she made in early 2018 related to a change in WAF’s benefits plan for its employees and hiring an external candidate for a union position. But none of these reasons compel us to rule for WAF as a matter of law. Some occurred a year before she was fired, and other employees who had similarly negative feedback in the Utech report received bonuses, not notices of termination. A reasonable jury could infer that these stated reasons were dis- No. 24-1901 17 honest. Evidence of Pratt’s performance issues does not jus- tify automatically keeping her claims from a jury. “Federal employment discrimination laws do not limit their protection to perfect employees.” Paterakos v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2025). Starting with the Utech report, Pratt was the only woman reviewed in the report. Even though her negative feedback was not unique, she was the only one punished for it. Jacobs, Brockman, and Boyd, who all received negative feedback, some very similar to Pratt’s, were rewarded with performance bonuses at the end of 2018. This differential treatment sup- ports an inference that WAF’s reliance on the Utech report to justify Pratt’s termination is dishonest. See Marnocha v. St. Vin- cent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 2019)) (“All things being equal, if an employer takes an action against one employee in a protected class but not another outside that class, one can infer discrim- ination.”). Regarding Pratt’s handling of confidential information and early 2018 errors as justifications for WAF’s decision to fire Pratt, both occurred nearly a year before she was fired. As for the union hiring issue, it is unclear from the record when this occurred. Beyond their staleness, these reasons are incon- sistent with the feedback Pratt received; in her 2018 perfor- mance report, Jacobs stated that she was “good on the benefits side” and made no mention of issues with union hiring or confidentiality. WAF’s reliance on this stale evidence and its conflict with Pratt’s 2018 performance review combined with the culture evidence discussed above could lead a jury to con- clude that the real reason for its decision to terminate Pratt 18 No. 24-1901 was based on her sex. See Joll, 953 F.3d at 932; Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (“[A]n employer who advances a fishy reason takes the risk that disbelief of the reason will support an inference that it is a pretext for discrimination.”). C. Better Treatment of Employees Outside Pratt’s Pro- tected Group Pratt has also presented evidence of “better treatment of people similarly situated but for [her] protected characteris- tic.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. Namely, the male managers in the Utech report. Pratt points to two similarly situated employ- ees, Boyd and Behnke, both men, who were at a similar man- agerial level as Pratt, reported to the same supervisor, and were subject to the same feedback process through the Utech report. Even though Boyd and Behnke also received negative feedback, neither was disciplined or fired, and Boyd received a bonus in 2018. They therefore provide a “meaningful com- parison” to Pratt “to permit a reasonable jury to infer discrim- ination.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012). While it is true that Boyd and Behnke were not HR man- agers like Pratt, we have been clear that a comparator need not be “identical.” Id. at 846. Pratt must only point us to an analogue, not a twin. See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 895 (quoting Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841) (noting that Coleman “warned against using a mechanical ‘magic formula’ for the similarly- situated inquiry”). Here, it would be impossible to find Pratt’s twin given that Pratt was the sole leader of WAF’s HR depart- ment, and thus, no one else at WAF had the same job descrip- tion as her (or, most likely, comparable experience, education, and other qualifications). We decline to read a gaping hole No. 24-1901 19 into Title VII precluding executives, without direct profes- sional peers, from proving their discrimination claims. Because “this is not a hard and fast test . . . the require- ment to find a similarly situated comparator is really just the same requirement that any case demands—the requirement to submit relevant evidence.” Id. Here, the Utech report pro- vides strong evidence that Behnke and Boyd are similarly sit- uated comparators insofar as they were reviewed in the same category as Pratt under the same criteria. See Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 810 (7th Cir. 2025) (relying on com- pany’s “annual performance assessment,” which “assign[ed] employees to assessment groups based on similar roles and with similar experience, even if employees have different job titles, report to different supervisors, and work in different lo- cations across the country” to identify similarly situated com- parators). The Utech report grouped Boyd, Behnke, and Pratt in the “individual leaders” section and provided a review of each leader’s strengths and weaknesses based on standard- ized interviews with the same staff members. The weaknesses identified for Boyd, Behnke, and Pratt centered around the same key issues: a purported penchant for drama, as well as a lack of professionalism. Boyd was said to “ha[ve] people do his dirty work,” “be intimidating and aggressive,” and “insti- gate[] and perpetuate[] drama.” Behnke, meanwhile was said to “talk[] badly about people” and “be hot-headed and un- professional.” And Pratt was said to “ha[ve] a hidden agenda,” engage in “[g]ossip and backstabbing,” and “hold[] grudges against people.” These reviews suggest a climate of distrust in Boyd’s, Behnke’s, and Pratt’s departments at WAF. Pratt has therefore provided us with “evidence about how [Boyd and Behnke] compared in the [Utech] assessment pro- 20 No. 24-1901 cess,” as well as evidence “show[ing] that [Pratt, Boyd, and Behnke] were assessed unfavorably in comparison to others in their assessment group[],” namely, individual leaders at WAF. Mitchell, 143 F.4th at 812. Boyd and Behnke were not disciplined or demoted based on the Utech report’s findings (like Pratt was). Considering the totality of the evidence, there is “at least one reasonable way to tell the story” in Pratt’s favor, support- ing an inference that she was fired because of her sex. Joll, 953 F.3d at 935. And rather than “weigh[ing] any conflicting evi- dence” ourselves, we must allow a jury to connect the dots. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, WAF is not entitled to summary judg- ment on Pratt’s Title VII sex discrimination claim. 2 2 Our dissenting colleague does not consider the totality of the evi- dence and instead insists that we are breaking “our rules on stray remarks, cat’s paw liability, [and] hostile work environment.” Post at 33. But we have made clear that to assess causation in employment discrimination cases, we “ask whether the totality of the evidence shows discrimination, eschewing any framework or formula.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 958 (citing Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). The “sole question that matters” is “[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [Pratt] would have kept [her] job if [s]he had a different [sex], and everything else had remained the same.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764. We stray from this fundamental inquiry and mis- takenly step into the jury’s role if we dismiss evidence as unworthy of our consideration because it does not fall neatly into a doctrinal bucket. After all, evidence that might support a discriminatory discharge might also support a hostile work environment claim, and vice versa. And evidence of other managers’ remarks and biases might place Pratt’s termination in a “less neutral context.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 301. We cannot disregard the cumulative impact of such evidence simply by isolating bits and pieces of evidence and labeling it as relevant only to one particular theory of dis- No. 24-1901 21 II. Title VII Retaliation We turn next to Pratt’s retaliation claim. Pratt contends she was fired in retaliation for reporting harassment and discrim- ination at WAF and for complaining to Jacobs that she be- lieved she was being retaliated against. Title VII prohibits employers from “retaliating against an employee for opposing or participating in an investigation of an unlawful employment practice.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Our analysis focuses on one fundamental question: “could a rea- sonable trier of fact infer retaliation . . . ?” Castro v. Devry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). To prevail, Pratt must offer evidence that would permit a rea- sonable juror to find that: (1) she engaged in protected activ- crimination. A jury must sort through and weigh all the evidence Pratt has put forward. At any rate, this is not a stray remarks case. See supra at n. 1. This is also not a cat’s paw case. Pratt does not suggest that Jacobs was an “un- witting manager” or an “unbiased individual” who terminated her solely because he was beguiled by Pratt’s sexist coworkers, Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2011); instead, Pratt con- tends Jacobs knew of, and adopted, his colleagues’ sexist bias. Last, while Pratt abandoned her hostile work environment claim on appeal, we need not put blinders on and automatically dismiss evidence merely because it more self-evidently fits into one sort of sex discrimination theory than an- other. Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (acknowl- edging overlap between hostile work environment claim and sexual har- assment claim). Rather, per Ortiz’s instruction, we consider all of the evi- dence “in a single pile,” 834 F.3d at 766, and focus on “whether a statuto- rily proscribed factor caused” Pratt’s discharge, Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. More precisely, we consider whether a reasonable jury considering all that evi- dence could reasonably find that the employer discharged Pratt because of her sex. The answer is yes. 22 No. 24-1901 ity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and that adverse employment action. Gnutek v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 80 F.4th 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2023). There is no dispute that Pratt meets the second element; she was fired. We focus our analy- sis on the first and third elements. A. Protected Activity For her claim to survive, Pratt must show that she sin- cerely and reasonably believed that she was reporting con- duct prohibited by Title VII. Castro, 786 F.3d at 564. Her claim falls within the opposition clause in Title VII, which protects an employee who opposes “any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “Oppose” carries its ordinary meaning: “to resist or antago- nize; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand.” Craw- ford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (citation modified). “When an employee communi- cates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communica- tion virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Title VII does not just protect employees who can accu- rately divine whether a claim has merit before reporting it to a supervisor. Rather, it protects all who honestly a