Heriberto Valiente v. 5 Star Nutrition, LLC
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2026-0228
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
HERIBERTO VALIENTE,
Appellant,
v.
5 STAR NUTRITION, LLC,
Appellee.
No. 4D2026-0228
[November 18, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Woody R. Clermont, Judge; L.T. Case No.
062025SC077812AXXXSO.
James P. Gitkin of Salpeter Gitkin, LLP, Hollywood, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
MAY, J.
The plaintiff appeals an order dismissing his complaint with prejudice
for failure to state a claim. He argues the trial court erred in dismissing
his complaint with prejudice. We agree and reverse.
• The Facts
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in small claims
court, alleging violations of Florida’s Security of Communications Act,
chapter 934, Florida Statutes (2024), and invasion of privacy. The plaintiff
alleged the defendant operated a commercial website that installed third-
party scripts on visitors’ web browsers without their consent, enabling the
defendant and third parties to collect personal information, intercept
electronic communications, and monitor visitors’ internet activity.
The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
The defendant argued that standard website analytics and advertising
tools did not constitute unlawful interception under the Florida Security
of Communications Act because they collected routing and identifying
information rather than the contents of electronic communications. The
defendant also argued that it could not unlawfully intercept
communications directed to itself and that the alleged conduct did not
constitute an actionable invasion of privacy. The defendant requested
dismissal with prejudice.
The defendant submitted a proposed order granting its motion to
dismiss with prejudice. Two days later, and seventeen days after the
defendant filed its motion, the trial court entered the order dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court concluded that the
collection of IP addresses, routing data, and related technical information
did not constitute interception of the contents of electronic
communications under chapter 934. The trial court further determined
that ordinary website analytics did not constitute unlawful wiretapping,
the plaintiff failed to state an actionable invasion-of-privacy claim, and any
amendment would be futile because the deficiencies were legal rather than
factual.
The trial court entered the dismissal order without holding a hearing.
The record does not reflect that the plaintiff either filed a response
opposing dismissal or requested a hearing during the seventeen days
between the filing of the motion and the court’s ruling. 1 Nor does the
record reflect that the trial court expressly invoked the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure pursuant to Florida Small Claims Rule 7.020(c).
From the dismissal order, the plaintiff now appeals.
• The Analysis
The plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint
with prejudice because the Florida Small Claims Rules do not authorize
the defendant’s motion for dismissal before the plaintiff presents evidence,
and the trial court never invoked the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.140(b)(6). We agree with the plaintiff.
We have de novo review of an order granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and whether a small claims court properly invoked
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gilison v. Flagler Bank, 303 So.
3d 999, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Bribiesca,
394 So. 3d 82, 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).
1
Although a hearing on the defendant’s separate motion to continue the pretrial
conference was scheduled for later that day, the motion to dismiss was never
noticed for hearing.
2
While the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a defendant to file
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim at the outset of the
proceedings, the Florida Small Claims Rules do not authorize a defendant
to move to dismiss an action before the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence.
Compare Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6), with Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.110(b). The
Small Claims Rules do not incorporate Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.140(b).
A small claims court may invoke the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure—
including rule 1.140—upon application of a party, stipulation of all
parties, or the court’s own motion. Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.020(c). But unless
the court has invoked the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to
rule 7.020(c), a pre-evidence motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
is not authorized in small claims court.
Court invocation under rule 7.020(c) requires an affirmative act, such
as a case-specific order or a standing administrative order applying the
Rules of Civil Procedure to designated cases. See Mech v. Brazilian Waxing
By Sisters, Inc., 349 So. 3d 453, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (recognizing the
trial court’s written order invoking the Rules of Civil Procedure). Merely
granting a motion brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure does not
itself establish that the court invoked those rules. Further, parties cannot
unilaterally invoke the Rules of Civil Procedure by filing a motion premised
on those rules’ application. Fisher v. Aberdeen Golf & Country Club, Inc.,
352 So. 3d 350, 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
Here, the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s procedurally
improper motion to dismiss. The defendant filed the motion before the
plaintiff had presented any evidence, and the trial court granted it with
prejudice. The record does not establish that rule 1.140(b) had been
invoked, pursuant to rule 7.020(c), by motion, stipulation, or order. Cf.
Mech, 349 So. 3d at 455. Thus, the trial court lacked a procedural basis
to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
We therefore reverse the order dismissing the plaintiff’s action with
prejudice and remand for further proceedings. Our decision on the first
issue moots the plaintiff’s second issue.
Reversed and remanded.
SHEPHERD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
* * *
3
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
4