Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 25 CV 00669 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 18, 2026 ____________________ Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges. KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. In 2024, Illinois enacted Senate Bill 2930 (S.B. 2930), which requires certain nonprofit 2 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 organizations to compile demographic information from their directors and officers and post the collected demographic in- formation on their respective websites. The American Alli- ance for Equal Rights (the Alliance) challenged S.B. 2930, al- leging that the law compels speech and induces unlawful dis- crimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend- ments. The United States intervened, bringing the same Four- teenth Amendment claim. Both the Alliance and the United States moved for preliminary injunctions. Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The district court resolved all the motions by finding that the Alliance lacked standing for some of its claims and the United States lacked standing entirely, denying injunctive relief on those grounds. Because we disagree with the district court’s stand- ing analysis, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of both complaints, vacate the denial of injunctive relief, and remand for further proceedings. I Effective January 1, 2025, Illinois S.B. 2930 mandates that any charitable organization reporting grants of $1,000,000 or more to other charitable organizations “shall post” on its web- site “the aggregated demographic information of the corpo- ration’s directors and officers.” 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/114.15(a). This demographic information includes “race, ethnicity, gender, disability status, veteran status, sexual ori- entation, and gender identity” and must remain on the organ- ization’s website for at least three years. Id. While the demo- graphic categories are set by law, the Illinois Department of Human Rights is tasked with preparing and publishing a “standardized list of demographic classifications” to be used Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 3 in complying with the law. 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/114.15(b). The Department published its first standardized list of demo- graphic classifications in July 2025. See Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Rts., Requirements for Charitable Organizations, https://perma.cc/ 9TBA-T3DK. When collecting this demographic data, S.B. 2930 mandates that covered organizations “shall allow for an individual to decline to disclose any or all personal demo- graphic information.” 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/114.15(c). On January 21, 2025, the American Alliance for Equal Rights brought a pre-enforcement challenge against S.B. 2930 on behalf of its pseudonymous member organizations, Mem- bers A and B, against the Attorney General of Illinois, the Di- rector of the Illinois Department of Human Rights, and the Secretary of State of Illinois. The Alliance argued that S.B. 2930 violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by inducing unlawful discrimination and the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause by compelling speech, and it sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States then intervened by the procedures set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, making the same Fourteenth Amendment claim and seeking the same relief. The United States added the Governor of Illinois and the State of Illinois as defendants. Because of the limited scope of § 2000h-2, the United States did not bring a First Amendment challenge. Both the Alliance and the United States moved for prelim- inary injunctions against Illinois’s enforcement of S.B. 2930. Defendants opposed the motions and moved to dismiss the United States’ and the Alliance’s complaints under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants ar- gued that the law could be separated into two components— the collection of demographic data and the posting of that 4 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 data—and that neither the Alliance nor the United States had standing to challenge either component. The district court ruled on all these motions at once, enter- ing an order that (1) dismissed the portion of the Alliance’s complaint that dealt with the posting of director and officer demographic information for lack of standing; (2) dismissed the United States’ amended complaint in its entirety for lack of standing; (3) denied the Alliance’s motion for a preliminary injunction; and (4) denied the United States’ motion for a pre- liminary injunction as moot. The Alliance and the United States each appealed the district court’s standing determina- tions as well as its denial of their requests for preliminary in- junctions. We consolidated the appeals for briefing and dis- position. II Before addressing appellants’ claims, we must assure our- selves of jurisdiction. See Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2012). Generally, a district court must issue a fi- nal order before an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As an exception to that rule, this case merits interlocutory review because the district court de- nied a preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In addition, the Alliance and the United States ask us to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to expand the scope of our re- view beyond just the denial of injunctive relief. They request that we also review the district court’s standing determina- tions in its ruling on the motions to dismiss. Under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine, appel- late courts may “review an otherwise unappealable interloc- utory order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 5 one.” Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 647. We have called this a “narrow doctrine” because resolving appeals from nonfinal decisions is generally incompatible with the final judgment rule. Id. (cit- ing Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 43–51 (1995)). Accordingly, we have looked for those “extraordinary cir- cumstances” in which it is “practically indispensable” that the court “address the merits of the unappealable order in order to resolve the properly-taken appeal.” Id. (quotation omitted). We have exercised this limited authority when two orders “concern the same single issue.” Rsch. Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court based its denial of the United States’ motion for a preliminary injunction entirely on its ju- risdictional determination, finding the question moot once the complaint had been dismissed. The district court con- cluded that because S.B. 2930 does not interfere with activities carried out by the federal government, the United States has not alleged an adequate injury in fact to confer Article III standing. Similarly, the district court used its determination on the Alliance’s standing as the key consideration for deny- ing the Alliance’s motion for a preliminary injunction. While the district court found that the Alliance had standing as to S.B. 2930’s requirement for Members A and B to collect demo- graphic information, the district court determined that the Al- liance did not have standing regarding the law’s mandate for Members A and B to publish the collected information. Once the district court dismissed the Alliance’s complaint as it re- lated to the publication of demographic information, it denied their motion for a preliminary injunction on those grounds. Because the district court’s preliminary injunction rulings were ultimately based on its standing determinations alone, 6 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 the pendent appellate jurisdiction test is satisfied for the standing issues raised by both appellants. For the United States, the analysis is straightforward. The district court’s sole reason for denying the United States’ mo- tion was its determination that the United States lacked stand- ing. The decision to dismiss the United States’ complaint was thus inextricably intertwined with the decision to deny the preliminary injunction. The appealable denial of injunctive relief concerns the same issue as the decision to dismiss the United States’ complaint, and we must resolve the standing question to properly assess the appealable order. For the Alliance, the analysis is similar. The district court determined that the Alliance’s arguments in favor of a prelim- inary injunction centered on the posting of demographic data, but because it had already dismissed any claims related to that alleged harm, the district court rejected the motion in its entirety. Again, the standing determination was inextricably intertwined with the decision to deny the preliminary injunc- tion, and our analysis of the appealable preliminary injunc- tion order would be meaningless without first addressing the standing issue. The decisions of several of our sister circuits bolster our conclusion. The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have all ex- ercised pendent appellate jurisdiction when a district court denies a preliminary injunction based on its analysis of stand- ing or the related issue of ripeness. See Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 371–73 (2d Cir. 2004) (standing); Siemens USA Holdings Inc v. Geisenberger, 17 F.4th 393, 406–07, 410–12 (3d Cir. 2021) (ripeness); Cath. Healthcare Int'l, Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township, 82 F.4th 442, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2023) (ripeness). In sum, we are satisfied that we may Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 7 reach the standing issues presented in this case by both the United States and the Alliance. III Generally, Article III standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) that it has “suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;” (2) that “the injury was likely caused” by the challenged conduct; and (3) that “the injury would likely be redressed by judicial re- lief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). An injury in fact may be “a physical injury, a monetary injury, an injury to one’s property, or an injury to one’s constitutional rights, to take just a few common examples.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1556 (2024). Further, “[g]overnment regulations that require or forbid some action by the plaintiff almost invariably satisfy both the injury in fact and causation requirements.” Id. Plaintiffs seeking prospec- tive relief “must establish a sufficient likelihood of future in- jury.” Id. The district court made three determinations on standing that are challenged by the parties. First, as noted above, it found that the United States lacked Article III standing to in- tervene. Second, the district court found that the Alliance lacked standing to challenge the portion of the law that re- quires covered organizations to post their collected demo- graphic information. Third, the district court found that the Alliance’s decision to keep Members A and B pseudonymous did not impact its Article III standing analysis. We address each issue in turn. 8 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 A The United States intervened in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, which states that the U.S. Attorney General may intervene “for or in the name of the United States” in any federal lawsuit “seeking relief from the denial of equal pro- tection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution on account of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2. We do not need to decide whether this statutory authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment overrides Article III’s case or controversy requirement—an issue the Supreme Court has not taken up—to conclude that the United States has standing here. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could override states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity). The district court dismissed the United States’ complaint by applying traditional private-plaintiff standing doctrine. But when the government brings a case to enforce its laws, the analysis for injury in fact works differently than for private individuals. As a general proposition, it is “beyond doubt” that an alleged violation of federal laws “asserts an injury to the United States.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). This “injury to its sover- eignty” explains why the federal government may bring crim- inal lawsuits without alleging any specific injury in fact. Id. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this general principle. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Court rejected a private individual’s generalized grievance that al- leged “only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws.” Id. at 573–74. The Court highlighted that “[v]indicating the public interest (in- cluding the public interest in Government observance of the Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 9 Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” Id. at 576. Most clearly, the Court articulated this principle in TransUnion: A regime where Congress could freely authorize un- harmed plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate federal law not only would violate Article III but also would infringe on the Executive Branch's Article II authority. We accept the “displacement of the democratically elected branches when necessary to decide an actual case.” But otherwise, the choice of how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law falls within the discre- tion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of private plaintiffs (and their attorneys). Private plain- tiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant's general compliance with regulatory law. 141 S. Ct. at 2207 (citation omitted) (quoting John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219, 1230 (1993)). The premise underlying these two cases is clear: The federal government may bring a suit to enforce its laws even when a private individual cannot. The Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurispru- dence confirms how the statements in Lujan and TransUnion work in practice. In United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down gender-restricted ad- missions at the Virginia Military Institute after the federal government sued to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of its citizens. Id. at 519. That VMI’s policy did not in- terfere in activities carried out by the federal government did not enter the analysis. Further, in Pasadena City Board of 10 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), which dealt directly with 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, the Supreme Court held that even though the case would ordinarily have been moot after the original plaintiffs were removed, the United States’ presence as an intervenor under § 2000h-2 preserved Article III juris- diction. Id. at 430–31. Put simply, the Supreme Court has consistently found that the United States has standing to enforce the rights of its citi- zens under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, especially when it has clear statutory authority to do so. And there is no doubt that the United States has standing to inter- vene here. To find otherwise would call into question the abil- ity of the United States to defend its laws and the mandates of the Constitution. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla- tion, the provisions of this article.”); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (“[T]here is the highest public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on private rights, and we think it perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the United States to be the guardian of that public interest in a suit for injunctive relief.”). And indeed, defendants conceded at oral argument that if we have appellate jurisdiction to reach standing, the United States would have standing here to in- tervene. B We turn now to the Alliance’s standing. An organization may bring claims on behalf of its members when “(a) its mem- bers would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organi- zation’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 11 relief requested requires the participation of individual mem- bers in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). When determining whether a suffi- cient injury in fact has occurred for an organization’s mem- bers, the Supreme Court has required “specific allegations es- tablishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009). Further, while an allegation of a future injury in fact will not suffice if it rests on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013), Article III standing for preliminary relief can be based on “commonsense inferences” about “third party behavior,” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (2026) (quoting Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. EPA, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 2136 (2025)). 1 We first address whether Members A and B have alleged a sufficient injury in fact to have standing in their own right. We conclude that they have. At the outset, we agree with the district court that the injury with regard to the collection of data is clear. It is undisputed that Members A and B will have to go through the effort to at least attempt to collect demo- graphic data, which establishes a sufficient likelihood of fu- ture injury to find an injury in fact as to that element of the law. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1556. The question whether the Alliance has a sufficiently immi- nent injury in fact regarding the posting of demographic in- formation, however, requires further discussion. All parties agree that there are two ways for the Alliance to satisfy stand- ing here. It is undisputed that if S.B. 2930 requires Members A and B to post what they have collected even if no officers or 12 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 directors respond (e.g., “100% of officers and directors de- clined to respond”), the standing analysis would be over. The Alliance’s members would be required to post something, creating an injury in fact for the same reasons that the collec- tion of data does. Alternatively, even if S.B. 2930 does not re- quire Members A and B to post nonresponses, both parties agree that if even one officer or director provides any demo- graphic information, the organizations would have to post at least that information, conferring standing. The district court mistakenly concluded that the Alliance does not have standing by determining that S.B. 2930 does not require Members A and B to post anything if all officers and directors refuse to answer the demographic questions. It then reasoned that because the submitted declarations of Members A and B indicated that their officers and directors would de- cline to submit any data, there would be no publication re- quirement under S.B. 2930 and no injury in fact. Specifically, the district court relied on declarations by Of- ficers A and B for their respective member organizations. Of- ficer A stated, “Member A, its board, its staff, and I do not want to be forced to promote these messages.” Officer B in turn stated, “Member B, and many if not all its officers and directors, do not believe in ‘gender identity’ and object to sug- gesting that someone can identify as a gender that’s different from their biological sex,” continuing that Member B believes “concepts like racial consciousness, proportional representa- tion, and gender identity” are “incoherent, immoral, and wrong.” From those statements, the district court concluded that there is no imminent injury in fact because there is no real risk of disclosure if all the officers and directors of Members A and B refuse to submit their demographic information. Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 13 We find that the district court erred in its analysis. We do not need to reach the correct reading of S.B. 2930’s require- ments under Illinois law because even if the district court’s reading of the statute is correct, we may make the com- monsense inference that at least some officers and directors of the Alliance’s members are highly likely to fill out the demo- graphic survey. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019), is instructive. There, New York challenged the addition of a citizenship question on the census, alleging that it would cause nonciti- zens to refrain from answering the census entirely. Id. at 2565. The Court found standing, even though declining to answer the census is a federal crime, because New York had demon- strated that “third parties will likely react in predictable ways.” Id. at 2566. So too here. The statements that the officers and directors of Members A and B do “not want” to promote the messages implied by S.B. 2930 is not enough to defeat standing. Just as the Supreme Court was willing to assume that noncitizens might not want to violate federal law but might still do so given the circumstances, we can assume that the officers and directors of Members A and B may not want to reveal their demographic information but still might do so. Further, the statement from Officer B explicitly acknowledges the possibility that not all of Member B’s officers and directors share Officer B’s convictions, indicating that some officers and directors may well answer at least some of the demo- graphic questions despite the contents of the declarations. This conclusion does not require mere speculation or con- jecture but rather is rooted in basic reality: When the law tells corporate officers and directors to do something, they typi- cally comply. Especially given that S.B. 2930 asks about sev- eral demographic categories, many of them uncontroversial, 14 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 it seems highly unlikely that not a single officer or director would respond with, say, their gender or veteran status. Then, if even one officer or director responds, the organiza- tion would be required to post that information, conferring standing. 2 Finally, defendants have asked us to review the portion of the district court’s order that addresses the Alliance’s decision to keep its members pseudonymous in its complaint. The dis- trict court rejected defendants’ argument that members need to be identified by name to proceed with associational stand- ing at the motion to dismiss stage, noting that it had not found a single case holding as much. We agree. Defendants’ arguments stem from two sources. First is the Supreme Court’s language in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, requiring that “at least one identified member … would suf- fer harm.” 555 U.S. at 498. Second, defendants point to our circuit’s precedents regarding pseudonymous parties in which we typically disfavor pseudonymity as “contrary to the rights of the public” and require “exceptional circumstances” for the privilege. Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376– 77 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). We have yet to address the question of whether Summers’s “identified member” requirement mandates that an organiza- tion specifically name its members. See Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, 163 F.4th 1061, 1069 & n.10 (7th Cir. 2026). Our case law preceding Summers plainly allowed organizations to keep their members pseudonymous, but we have previously re- served the question of whether that case law survives Sum- mers for another day. Id. Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 15 Today we find that our prior case law is not disturbed by Summers and that the Alliance’s decision to use pseudonyms for its members in its complaint does not defeat its organiza- tional standing. All the other circuits that have faced this question have permitted pseudonymity at this stage of litiga- tion. See, e.g., Am. All. for Equal Rts. v. Fearless Fund Mgmt., LLC, 103 F.4th 765, 773 (11th Cir. 2024); Speech First, Inc. v. Shrum, 92 F.4th 947, 951–52 (10th Cir. 2024). And the only cir- cuit to even temporarily find that Summers contains a naming requirement at the pleading stage vacated that portion of its opinion on rehearing. See Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 96 F.4th 106, 115–19 (2d Cir. 2024), vacated on reh’g, 126 F.4th 109 (2d Cir. 2025). Most tellingly, in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023), the Supreme Court found that Students for Fair Ad- missions is “indisputably a voluntary membership organiza- tion with identifiable members,” despite the fact that those members remained anonymous in the complaint. Id. at 2157– 58. Defendants’ other arguments fail because our cases about pseudonymous parties are inapplicable here. All parties in this case are named. It’s the members of the Alliance that have been kept pseudonymous, and the law is clear that Article III associational standing is not significantly threatened by an or- ganization’s decision to keep individual members pseudony- mous. * * * Having now concluded that both the United States and the Alliance have standing to bring their challenges to S.B. 2930 and that the district court erred in denying their motions for a preliminary injunction on those grounds, we decline to go 16 Nos. 25-2461 & 25-2487 further. The parties raise several issues on the merits, includ- ing the proper level of scrutiny for both the First and the Four- teenth Amendment claims, that would benefit from first re- view at the district court. We thus REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the United States’ and the Alliance’s complaints, VACATE the denial of both parties’ preliminary injunctions, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.