Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Astrachan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR BRYAN ASTRACHAN, B350032 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV15483) v. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Shegerian & Associates, Mahru Madjidi, John David, Kyle Tehrani and Melineh Jingozian for Plaintiff and Appellant. Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, David A. Urban and Danny Y. Yoo for Defendants and Respondents. INTRODUCTION Bryan Astrachan sued his former employer, the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD), and his former supervisor, Rick Von Kolen. The trial court sustained a demurrer to Astrachan’s pleading. We reverse. The first amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to support Astrachan’s claims. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Factual History1 Astrachan is a military veteran who is at least 56 years old.2 On June 8, 2022, Astrachan interviewed for the Director of Human Resources position with LACCD. During the interview, Astrachan was given written exercises which only covered human resources functions “related to the [COVID-19] pandemic.” Astrachan was not familiar with these practices because he was on military duty during the pandemic. When Astrachan explained this to the interviewers, one of them commented “in a cynical and demeaning manner, ‘I don’t know anything about the military[.]’” LACCD notified Astrachan on July 11, 2022 that he did not receive a passing score on the oral examination portion of his interview. When Astrachan called LACCD’s personnel commission to request a copy of his scores and express his desire to appeal the decision, the commission’s staffer told him that he could not appeal unless Astrachan reviewed the exam results, but denied Astrachan access to the results. Astrachan subsequently 1 We take this summary from the allegations in the complaint, construing them (as we must in this appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer) in the light most favorable to Astrachan. 2 Both the original complaint (filed July 3, 2023) and the first amended complaint (filed July 24, 2024) alleged that Astrachan is 56 years old. 2 appealed the decision, complaining about procedural error, discrimination based on military service, and abuse of discretion or bias. LACCD denied his appeal. In the meantime, Astrachan was hired by LACCD on or around July 1, 2022 as an employee and labor relations specialist at LACCD’s educational service center in Los Angeles. His direct supervisor was Rick Von Kolen, director of employee and labor relations. During his employment, Von Kolen repeatedly told Astrachan he was “not as fast as [he] could be.” Von Kolen also called Astrachan’s methods an “old way of doing things.” Von Kolen excluded Astrachan from a human resources association event while inviting younger female employees to participate. Von Kolen and other younger employees would also halt their conversations when Astrachan walked into the office. Astrachan submitted formal complaints to LACCD alleging “discrimination, bias, and military service disfavor” in August and September 2022. LACCD rejected the complaints on September 22, 2022. Separately, on August 30, 2022, Astrachan “observed an unknown armed male carrying altered scissors while directly standing in front of the district building.” Astrachan reported the individual to the driver of the shuttle bus used by employees to reach the parking area. Astrachan then walked off the bus to ensure the safety of a coworker who was approached by the unknown individual. After, Astrachan reported the incident to Von Kolen, complaining that he and other employees felt unsafe. Von Kolen dismissed the complaint, saying “here you should expect that.” In September 2022, Von Kolen began holding weekly one-on-one meetings with Astrachan before the regularly-scheduled staff meetings. During these meetings, Von Kolen asked Astrachan whether the job was “too fast for [him].” 3 Around the same period as the weekly one-on-one meetings, Von Kolen directed Astrachan to indicate in a discipline package that an employee had been on unpaid leave. This statement was false: the employee had been on paid leave for approximately six months. Astrachan refused Von Kolen’s instruction. In early October 2022, Astrachan reported to LACCD that Von Kolen had overridden background check disqualifications and granted appeal rights to applicants who had been denied employment because their background checks revealed sex offenses. On October 10, 2022, Von Kolen terminated Astrachan. Von Kolen’s letter terminating Astrachan stated only that “Unfortunately, I have determined that your employment as an Employee and Labor Relations Specialist at LACCD should not continue.” The letter gave no further explanation. II. Procedural History Astrachan filed a complaint against LACCD and Von Kolen on July 3, 2023. He alleged 19 causes of action including discrimination and harassment on the basis of age and military veteran status, retaliation in violation of FEHA and various provisions of the Labor and Education Codes, and wage, contract, and tort claims. LACCD demurred to the original complaint in its entirety. The trial court sustained the demurrer, granting leave to amend as to seven causes of action. The court denied leave to amend as to the remaining 12 causes of action. Astrachan filed a first amended complaint. The first four causes of action alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA and failure to prevent that conduct. Causes of action five through seven alleged retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5, 6310, and 6311. LACCD demurred and challenged each cause of action as inadequately 4 pled. Astrachan opposed and, in the alternative, asked for leave to file a second amended complaint. On July 22, 2025, the trial court heard argument and sustained the demurrer to all seven causes of action without leave to amend. The trial court found that Astrachan’s allegations of discriminatory or retaliatory motive were improper speculation or conclusions insufficient to establish a causal link to his termination. The trial court stated that temporal proximity alone was not sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory animus under the Labor Code. The trial court also considered Astrachan’s allegations of harassment too “isolated, sporadic, or trivial” to rise to the level of actionable harassment. Judgment of dismissal was entered on September 29, 2025. Astrachan timely filed his notice of appeal from the judgment that same day. DISCUSSION Astrachan contends that the trial court erred by sustaining LACCD’s demurrer as to four FEHA-based claims—discrimination and harassment based on age and military status, retaliation, and failure to prevent that conduct—and as to his claim under Labor Code section 1102.5.3 We agree with Astrachan that these claims were adequately pled.4 3 Astrachan originally appealed the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave as to all seven causes of action. However, his opening brief does not address the merits of his sixth and seventh causes of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 6310 and 6311. Nor does his reply brief, despite LACCD noting their absence in its responding brief. Astrachan has therefore forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the sixth and seventh causes of action. 4 LACCD also moves to strike portions of Astrachan’s reply brief pertaining to the existence of additional unpled facts which could be alleged in a second amended complaint. Since we conclude that the first amended complaint pleads sufficient facts as it is, we do not reach the motion to strike. 5 I. Standard of Review “‘Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.’” (United Talent Agency v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) II. Employment Discrimination Astrachan first argues that his claim for employment discrimination under FEHA was adequately pled. To state a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the position which the plaintiff held or sought; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances suggesting a discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Guz) [stating elements of cause of action]; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd (a).) Here, Astrachan alleged (and LACCD does not dispute) that he was a member of two classes protected from discrimination under FEHA: (1) persons above the age of 40, and (2) military veterans. (Gov. Code, §§ 12926, subd. (b) [defining “age”]; 12940, subd. (a).) Astrachan alleged that LACCD discriminated against him based on his membership in these two classes. LACCD concedes that Astrachan has adequately pled all elements of an employment discrimination claim—whether based on an age discrimination or military-status discrimination theory—save one. LACCD argues that Astrachan did not adequately plead factual circumstances 6 suggesting a discriminatory motive by LACCD. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd (a).) We disagree. A. Age Discrimination Astrachan alleged that in the three months he was employed by LACCD, his supervisor singled him out for exclusion from events and for additional meetings, repeatedly criticized him as slow and having antiquated methods—comments which can reasonably be read as age-related—and summarily terminated Astrachan without explanation. These facts are sufficient to allege a discriminatory motive by LACCD based on Astrachan’s age—construing, as we must, the first amended complaint as a whole, in its full context, and in the light most favorable to Astrachan. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 540–541.) More specifically, Astrachan alleged that Von Kolen repeatedly criticized Astrachan as slow, telling him he was “not as fast as [he] could be.” Von Kolen also called Astrachan’s methods as an “old way of doing things.” During the one-on-one meetings with Astrachan—to which, he alleged, no other employee was subjected—Von Kolen made similar comments, such as asking whether the job was “too fast for [him].” Astrachan also alleged that Von Kolen excluded him from a human resources association event and required Astrachan to attend additional one-on-one meetings with him. During those meetings, Von Kolen made additional age-related comments regarding Astrachan’s ability to keep pace with the job. Von Kolen and other younger employees would also pause conversations when Astrachan walked into the office. LACCD argues that Von Kolen’s alleged comments are neutral statements that “do not necessarily or even actually refer to age” and dismisses any connection to age as a “subjective” belief of Astrachan. 7 However, construing, as we must, the allegations as a whole in the light most favorable to Astrachan, the comments can be easily interpreted as relating to Astrachan’s age. It is well-established that comments by a supervisor regarding an employee’s age are circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 325–326.) LACCD also argues that the allegations indicating disparate treatment by Von Kolen of younger workers do not demonstrate a discriminatory motive because Astrachan did not allege that the other employees were “significantly” younger, citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 366. But Guz addresses the sufficiency of the evidentiary showing for a discrimination claim at the summary judgment stage, not the pleading stage. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th. at pp. 354–366.) At this stage, Astrachan’s references to younger workers can be construed as referring to significantly younger workers. And even if we were to accept LACCD’s argument on this point, the allegations of disparate treatment of younger workers, read as a whole and combined with the other indicia of age-based discrimination alleged by Astrachan, would still suffice to allege an overall pattern of treatment based on discriminatory motive. B. Military Status Discrimination Astrachan also sufficiently alleged discriminatory motive based on his military status. Astrachan alleged that he sat for an interview for LACCD’s director of human resources position whose written exercises principally concerned COVID-19 pandemic-era practices. When Astrachan explained to the interviewers that he was on military duty at the time—and thus unfamiliar with these practices—one of the interviewers responded “‘I don’t know anything about the military[.]’” Astrachan describes the interviewer as making this comment “in a cynical and demeaning manner[.]” After the 8 interview, Astrachan was informed that he had not passed the oral section of the interview. Astrachan was also falsely informed that he could not appeal the decision without reviewing his exam results—which he was not permitted to see. LACCD again argues that the interviewer’s comments were facially “neutral” and that Astrachan’s allegation that they were discriminatory is “subjective.” Again, this misses the point. At the pleading stage, we must construe these allegations in the light most favorable to Astrachan, not LACCD. Doing so, Astrachan plainly alleged that the interviewer was hostile to Astrachan based on his military status, i.e., that there was a discriminatory motive. We also are not persuaded by LACCD’s argument that the first amended complaint is missing detailed factual allegations describing how the scoring and appeal process operated, or whether Astrachan was treated differently from others based on his military status. These allegations were not necessary to Astrachan’s claim, and at this stage Astrachan needed only to allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Roger v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510, 533.) III. Hostile Work Environment Harassment To plead harassment via the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) they are a member of a protected class; (2) that they were subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on the employee’s protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j).) The complained-of conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 9 the conditions of employment to create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to an employee because of their protected status. (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 278–279.) The existence of a hostile work environment depends on the totality of the circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).) Like his discrimination claim, Astrachan advanced separate theories of harassment based on age and military status. As to each theory, LACCD raises only one argument—that Astrachan did not allege conduct that was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to constitute harassment. We conclude Astrachan sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment as a pleading matter. Regarding age-based harassment, LACCD argues that Astrachan alleged “only several facially neutral comments, social interactions that [Astrachan] perceived as exclusionary ... and weekly meetings with a supervisor.” LACCD asserts that this is insufficient to state a FEHA harassment claim because there are no allegations establishing a broader pattern of bias or a “concerted pattern” of harassment. But Astrachan did not need to allege a “concerted pattern” of harassment. (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 880 [reversing grant of summary judgment because trial court improperly relied on authority requiring “concerted pattern of harassment” that was superseded by Gov. Code, § 12923].) The linchpin of LACCD’s argument is that Von Kolen’s comments were “facially neutral.” But, read in the light most favorable to Astrachan, Von Kolen’s statements and actions were not “neutral” and describe a pattern of biased age-related comments and activities. Moreover, contrary to an argument raised by LACCD, personnel management actions can be evidence of harassment 10 where, as here, they serve the secondary function of conveying a hostile message. (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 708.) As for harassment based on military status, the allegations also suffice. To summarize: an interviewer dismissed Astrachan’s military service in a derisive tone of voice; Astrachan was given false information regarding the appeals process; and LACCD rejected his appeals, communicating hostility to Astrachan based on his veteran status. While LACCD is free to dispute these allegations, read as a whole and in the light most favorable to Astrachan they suffice to allege a work environment in which hostility based on military status was severe, pervasive, or both. IV. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA To state a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) “he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) The causal link may be established by circumstantial evidence. (See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 710 (Lawson).) Astrachan alleged that he submitted formal complaints to LACCD alleging “discrimination, bias, and military service disfavor” in August and September 2022. LACCD rejected the complaints on September 22, 2022. On October 10, 2022, Von Kolen terminated Astrachan. These allegations suffice to support a claim for retaliation. Astrachan alleged (1) that he opposed discriminatory practices (a protected activity under FEHA), (2) that he was terminated (an adverse employment action), and (3) that these events occurred roughly a month apart. Close temporal 11 proximity is circumstantial evidence supporting a causal inference of a prima facie case of retaliation. (Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476; Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 244.) LACCD argues that the allegations are insufficient because Astrachan did not allege that Von Kolen knew about Astrachan’s appeals or complaints. But LACCD, not Von Kolen, was Astrachan’s employer. Astrachan alleged that he submitted complaints of discrimination directly to LACCD, enough to allege knowledge of the complaints by his employer. LACCD is also wrong to argue that temporal proximity cannot suffice to establish a prima facie case of retaliation as a pleading matter. On the contrary, temporal proximity between a complaint and an adverse employment action is strong circumstantial evidence at the prima facie stage that the adverse employment action was improper retaliation. (Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 563, 578.)5 V. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, or Retaliation The parties agree that the fourth cause of action is derivative. Since we hold that the demurrer should have been overruled as to the causes of action for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, it should also have been overruled as to the cause of action alleging LACCD failure to prevent the same conduct. 5 Of course, at the summary judgment stage, if an employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, temporal proximity alone is insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual. (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353.) But we are not at the summary judgment stage, and the only issue before us is whether Astrachan has stated a prima facie claim for retaliation as a pleading matter. 12 VI. Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5 Finally, we also agree that the trial court should not have sustained the demurrer to the fifth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Under Labor Code section 1102.5, an employer may not retaliate against an employee for “disclosing information … to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance … if the employee has the reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation[.]” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) An employer also may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would violate state or federal law, or that would violate or not comply with a local, state or federal rule or regulation. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (c).) To prevail under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a “contributing factor” to an adverse employment action against the plaintiff. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6; Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 712.) LACCD concedes that most of these elements have been pled, but argues that the first amended complaint is defective because Astrachan did not specify the law or regulation that would have been violated. That is not required at the pleading stage. Astrachan is only required to allege that he disclosed information that he reasonably believed disclosed a violation of law or refused to participate in an activity which he reasonably believed would violate the law. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subds. (b), (c).) Here, Astrachan did so. He made several reports alleging conduct that might reasonably be considered as violating the law or a regulation, including his safety report to 13 Von Kolen regarding the man carrying altered scissors outside the office on August 30, 2022, his refusal to follow Von Kolen’s instruction to misrepresent an employee’s paid leave as unpaid, and his report to LACCD human resources that Von Kolen had improperly granted appeal rights to individuals who had been rejected for background checks revealing sex offenses. Astrachan alleged that the last of these occurred “[i]n early October,” i.e., sometime between October 1 and October 10, 2022, when Von Kolen terminated him. LACCD also argues that the allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 because they do not set forth any facts other than temporal proximity which tend to show that Astrachan’s reports contributed to his termination. LACCD cites to Visalia v. Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 844 (Visalia), and the trial court apparently relied on this citation in sustaining the demurrer. But Visalia has little or nothing to do with this case. Visalia concerned a petition for writ of review of an administrative decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) asserting retaliation for participating in union activity under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). (Visalia, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 851–852.) Visalia concerned retaliation under the EERA, not the Labor Code, and applied PERB precedent interpreting the EERA, not the Labor Code. (Id. at pp. 861, 868.) Under Labor Code section 1102.5, the law is clear that “[c]ircumstantial evidence such as proximity in time between protected activity and alleged retaliation may establish a causal link.” (Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384, 394; Taswell v. Regents of University of California (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 343, 365, citing Mokler v. 14 County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 138, disapproved on other grounds in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718, fn. 2.) In short, Astrachan adequately pled a cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5.6 DISPOSITION The trial court’s judgment of dismissal entered September 29, 2025 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order sustaining LACCD’s demurrer to the first amended complaint and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the first five causes of action. Astrachan shall recover his costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DAUM, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. MORI, J. 6 Since we find that Astrachan’s first amended complaint adequately states his causes of action as pled, we need not address his alternative argument that the trial court should have granted him leave to amend. 15