Astrachan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB350032
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Astrachan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
BRYAN ASTRACHAN, B350032
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV15483)
v.
LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Lia Martin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Shegerian & Associates, Mahru Madjidi, John David, Kyle Tehrani and
Melineh Jingozian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, David A. Urban and Danny Y. Yoo for
Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Bryan Astrachan sued his former employer, the Los Angeles
Community College District (LACCD), and his former supervisor, Rick Von
Kolen. The trial court sustained a demurrer to Astrachan’s pleading. We
reverse. The first amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to support
Astrachan’s claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual History1
Astrachan is a military veteran who is at least 56 years old.2 On June
8, 2022, Astrachan interviewed for the Director of Human Resources position
with LACCD. During the interview, Astrachan was given written exercises
which only covered human resources functions “related to the [COVID-19]
pandemic.” Astrachan was not familiar with these practices because he was
on military duty during the pandemic. When Astrachan explained this to the
interviewers, one of them commented “in a cynical and demeaning manner, ‘I
don’t know anything about the military[.]’”
LACCD notified Astrachan on July 11, 2022 that he did not receive a
passing score on the oral examination portion of his interview. When
Astrachan called LACCD’s personnel commission to request a copy of his
scores and express his desire to appeal the decision, the commission’s staffer
told him that he could not appeal unless Astrachan reviewed the exam
results, but denied Astrachan access to the results. Astrachan subsequently
1 We take this summary from the allegations in the complaint,
construing them (as we must in this appeal from the sustaining of a
demurrer) in the light most favorable to Astrachan.
2 Both the original complaint (filed July 3, 2023) and the first amended
complaint (filed July 24, 2024) alleged that Astrachan is 56 years old.
2
appealed the decision, complaining about procedural error, discrimination
based on military service, and abuse of discretion or bias. LACCD denied his
appeal.
In the meantime, Astrachan was hired by LACCD on or around July 1,
2022 as an employee and labor relations specialist at LACCD’s educational
service center in Los Angeles. His direct supervisor was Rick Von Kolen,
director of employee and labor relations. During his employment, Von Kolen
repeatedly told Astrachan he was “not as fast as [he] could be.” Von Kolen
also called Astrachan’s methods an “old way of doing things.” Von Kolen
excluded Astrachan from a human resources association event while inviting
younger female employees to participate. Von Kolen and other younger
employees would also halt their conversations when Astrachan walked into
the office. Astrachan submitted formal complaints to LACCD alleging
“discrimination, bias, and military service disfavor” in August and September
2022. LACCD rejected the complaints on September 22, 2022.
Separately, on August 30, 2022, Astrachan “observed an unknown
armed male carrying altered scissors while directly standing in front of the
district building.” Astrachan reported the individual to the driver of the
shuttle bus used by employees to reach the parking area. Astrachan then
walked off the bus to ensure the safety of a coworker who was approached by
the unknown individual. After, Astrachan reported the incident to Von
Kolen, complaining that he and other employees felt unsafe. Von Kolen
dismissed the complaint, saying “here you should expect that.”
In September 2022, Von Kolen began holding weekly one-on-one
meetings with Astrachan before the regularly-scheduled staff meetings.
During these meetings, Von Kolen asked Astrachan whether the job was “too
fast for [him].”
3
Around the same period as the weekly one-on-one meetings, Von Kolen
directed Astrachan to indicate in a discipline package that an employee had
been on unpaid leave. This statement was false: the employee had been on
paid leave for approximately six months. Astrachan refused Von Kolen’s
instruction.
In early October 2022, Astrachan reported to LACCD that Von Kolen
had overridden background check disqualifications and granted appeal rights
to applicants who had been denied employment because their background
checks revealed sex offenses. On October 10, 2022, Von Kolen terminated
Astrachan. Von Kolen’s letter terminating Astrachan stated only that
“Unfortunately, I have determined that your employment as an Employee
and Labor Relations Specialist at LACCD should not continue.” The letter
gave no further explanation.
II. Procedural History
Astrachan filed a complaint against LACCD and Von Kolen on July 3,
2023. He alleged 19 causes of action including discrimination and
harassment on the basis of age and military veteran status, retaliation in
violation of FEHA and various provisions of the Labor and Education Codes,
and wage, contract, and tort claims. LACCD demurred to the original
complaint in its entirety. The trial court sustained the demurrer, granting
leave to amend as to seven causes of action. The court denied leave to amend
as to the remaining 12 causes of action.
Astrachan filed a first amended complaint. The first four causes of
action alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of
FEHA and failure to prevent that conduct. Causes of action five through
seven alleged retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5, 6310, and
6311. LACCD demurred and challenged each cause of action as inadequately
4
pled. Astrachan opposed and, in the alternative, asked for leave to file a
second amended complaint.
On July 22, 2025, the trial court heard argument and sustained the
demurrer to all seven causes of action without leave to amend. The trial
court found that Astrachan’s allegations of discriminatory or retaliatory
motive were improper speculation or conclusions insufficient to establish a
causal link to his termination. The trial court stated that temporal proximity
alone was not sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory animus under
the Labor Code. The trial court also considered Astrachan’s allegations of
harassment too “isolated, sporadic, or trivial” to rise to the level of actionable
harassment. Judgment of dismissal was entered on September 29, 2025.
Astrachan timely filed his notice of appeal from the judgment that same day.
DISCUSSION
Astrachan contends that the trial court erred by sustaining LACCD’s
demurrer as to four FEHA-based claims—discrimination and harassment
based on age and military status, retaliation, and failure to prevent that
conduct—and as to his claim under Labor Code section 1102.5.3 We agree
with Astrachan that these claims were adequately pled.4
3 Astrachan originally appealed the trial court’s order sustaining the
demurrer without leave as to all seven causes of action. However, his
opening brief does not address the merits of his sixth and seventh causes of
action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 6310 and 6311. Nor
does his reply brief, despite LACCD noting their absence in its responding
brief. Astrachan has therefore forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s
ruling on the sixth and seventh causes of action.
4 LACCD also moves to strike portions of Astrachan’s reply brief
pertaining to the existence of additional unpled facts which could be alleged
in a second amended complaint. Since we conclude that the first amended
complaint pleads sufficient facts as it is, we do not reach the motion to strike.
5
I. Standard of Review
“‘Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a
pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an
appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.’”
(United Talent Agency v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.)
“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also
consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context.’” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
II. Employment Discrimination
Astrachan first argues that his claim for employment discrimination
under FEHA was adequately pled. To state a prima facie case of
discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) qualification for the position which the plaintiff held or
sought; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances suggesting a
discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317,
355 (Guz) [stating elements of cause of action]; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd (a).)
Here, Astrachan alleged (and LACCD does not dispute) that he was a
member of two classes protected from discrimination under FEHA:
(1) persons above the age of 40, and (2) military veterans. (Gov. Code,
§§ 12926, subd. (b) [defining “age”]; 12940, subd. (a).) Astrachan alleged that
LACCD discriminated against him based on his membership in these two
classes. LACCD concedes that Astrachan has adequately pled all elements of
an employment discrimination claim—whether based on an age
discrimination or military-status discrimination theory—save one. LACCD
argues that Astrachan did not adequately plead factual circumstances
6
suggesting a discriminatory motive by LACCD. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 355; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd (a).) We disagree.
A. Age Discrimination
Astrachan alleged that in the three months he was employed by
LACCD, his supervisor singled him out for exclusion from events and for
additional meetings, repeatedly criticized him as slow and having antiquated
methods—comments which can reasonably be read as age-related—and
summarily terminated Astrachan without explanation. These facts are
sufficient to allege a discriminatory motive by LACCD based on Astrachan’s
age—construing, as we must, the first amended complaint as a whole, in its
full context, and in the light most favorable to Astrachan. (Reid v. Google,
Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 540–541.)
More specifically, Astrachan alleged that Von Kolen repeatedly
criticized Astrachan as slow, telling him he was “not as fast as [he] could be.”
Von Kolen also called Astrachan’s methods as an “old way of doing things.”
During the one-on-one meetings with Astrachan—to which, he alleged, no
other employee was subjected—Von Kolen made similar comments, such as
asking whether the job was “too fast for [him].” Astrachan also alleged that
Von Kolen excluded him from a human resources association event and
required Astrachan to attend additional one-on-one meetings with him.
During those meetings, Von Kolen made additional age-related comments
regarding Astrachan’s ability to keep pace with the job. Von Kolen and other
younger employees would also pause conversations when Astrachan walked
into the office.
LACCD argues that Von Kolen’s alleged comments are neutral
statements that “do not necessarily or even actually refer to age” and
dismisses any connection to age as a “subjective” belief of Astrachan.
7
However, construing, as we must, the allegations as a whole in the light most
favorable to Astrachan, the comments can be easily interpreted as relating to
Astrachan’s age. It is well-established that comments by a supervisor
regarding an employee’s age are circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory
motive. (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 325–326.)
LACCD also argues that the allegations indicating disparate treatment
by Von Kolen of younger workers do not demonstrate a discriminatory motive
because Astrachan did not allege that the other employees were
“significantly” younger, citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 366. But Guz
addresses the sufficiency of the evidentiary showing for a discrimination
claim at the summary judgment stage, not the pleading stage. (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th. at pp. 354–366.) At this stage, Astrachan’s references to younger
workers can be construed as referring to significantly younger workers. And
even if we were to accept LACCD’s argument on this point, the allegations of
disparate treatment of younger workers, read as a whole and combined with
the other indicia of age-based discrimination alleged by Astrachan, would
still suffice to allege an overall pattern of treatment based on discriminatory
motive.
B. Military Status Discrimination
Astrachan also sufficiently alleged discriminatory motive based on his
military status. Astrachan alleged that he sat for an interview for LACCD’s
director of human resources position whose written exercises principally
concerned COVID-19 pandemic-era practices. When Astrachan explained to
the interviewers that he was on military duty at the time—and thus
unfamiliar with these practices—one of the interviewers responded “‘I don’t
know anything about the military[.]’” Astrachan describes the interviewer as
making this comment “in a cynical and demeaning manner[.]” After the
8
interview, Astrachan was informed that he had not passed the oral section of
the interview. Astrachan was also falsely informed that he could not appeal
the decision without reviewing his exam results—which he was not permitted
to see.
LACCD again argues that the interviewer’s comments were facially
“neutral” and that Astrachan’s allegation that they were discriminatory is
“subjective.” Again, this misses the point. At the pleading stage, we must
construe these allegations in the light most favorable to Astrachan, not
LACCD. Doing so, Astrachan plainly alleged that the interviewer was hostile
to Astrachan based on his military status, i.e., that there was a
discriminatory motive.
We also are not persuaded by LACCD’s argument that the first
amended complaint is missing detailed factual allegations describing how the
scoring and appeal process operated, or whether Astrachan was treated
differently from others based on his military status. These allegations were
not necessary to Astrachan’s claim, and at this stage Astrachan needed only
to allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Roger v. County of Riverside
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510, 533.)
III. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
To plead harassment via the creation of a hostile work environment in
violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) they are a member of a
protected class; (2) that they were subjected to unwelcome harassment;
(3) that the harassment was based on the employee’s protected status; (4) the
harassment unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work performance
by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) defendants are liable for the harassment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j).)
The complained-of conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
9
the conditions of employment to create a work environment that qualifies as
hostile or abusive to an employee because of their protected status. (Lyle v.
Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 278–279.)
The existence of a hostile work environment depends on the totality of the
circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)
Like his discrimination claim, Astrachan advanced separate theories of
harassment based on age and military status. As to each theory, LACCD
raises only one argument—that Astrachan did not allege conduct that was
sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to constitute harassment. We conclude
Astrachan sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment as a pleading
matter.
Regarding age-based harassment, LACCD argues that Astrachan
alleged “only several facially neutral comments, social interactions that
[Astrachan] perceived as exclusionary ... and weekly meetings with a
supervisor.” LACCD asserts that this is insufficient to state a FEHA
harassment claim because there are no allegations establishing a broader
pattern of bias or a “concerted pattern” of harassment.
But Astrachan did not need to allege a “concerted pattern” of
harassment. (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 865, 880 [reversing grant of summary judgment because trial
court improperly relied on authority requiring “concerted pattern of
harassment” that was superseded by Gov. Code, § 12923].) The linchpin of
LACCD’s argument is that Von Kolen’s comments were “facially neutral.”
But, read in the light most favorable to Astrachan, Von Kolen’s statements
and actions were not “neutral” and describe a pattern of biased age-related
comments and activities. Moreover, contrary to an argument raised by
LACCD, personnel management actions can be evidence of harassment
10
where, as here, they serve the secondary function of conveying a hostile
message. (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 708.)
As for harassment based on military status, the allegations also suffice.
To summarize: an interviewer dismissed Astrachan’s military service in a
derisive tone of voice; Astrachan was given false information regarding the
appeals process; and LACCD rejected his appeals, communicating hostility to
Astrachan based on his veteran status. While LACCD is free to dispute these
allegations, read as a whole and in the light most favorable to Astrachan they
suffice to allege a work environment in which hostility based on military
status was severe, pervasive, or both.
IV. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA
To state a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) “he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer
subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal
link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (h).) The causal link may be established by circumstantial
evidence. (See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th
703, 710 (Lawson).)
Astrachan alleged that he submitted formal complaints to LACCD
alleging “discrimination, bias, and military service disfavor” in August and
September 2022. LACCD rejected the complaints on September 22, 2022.
On October 10, 2022, Von Kolen terminated Astrachan.
These allegations suffice to support a claim for retaliation. Astrachan
alleged (1) that he opposed discriminatory practices (a protected activity
under FEHA), (2) that he was terminated (an adverse employment action),
and (3) that these events occurred roughly a month apart. Close temporal
11
proximity is circumstantial evidence supporting a causal inference of a prima
facie case of retaliation. (Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 467, 476; Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 237, 244.)
LACCD argues that the allegations are insufficient because Astrachan
did not allege that Von Kolen knew about Astrachan’s appeals or complaints.
But LACCD, not Von Kolen, was Astrachan’s employer. Astrachan alleged
that he submitted complaints of discrimination directly to LACCD, enough to
allege knowledge of the complaints by his employer. LACCD is also wrong to
argue that temporal proximity cannot suffice to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation as a pleading matter. On the contrary, temporal proximity
between a complaint and an adverse employment action is strong
circumstantial evidence at the prima facie stage that the adverse
employment action was improper retaliation. (Zirpel v. Alki David
Productions, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 563, 578.)5
V. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, or Retaliation
The parties agree that the fourth cause of action is derivative. Since we
hold that the demurrer should have been overruled as to the causes of action
for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, it should also have been
overruled as to the cause of action alleging LACCD failure to prevent the
same conduct.
5 Of course, at the summary judgment stage, if an employer offers a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action,
temporal proximity alone is insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact
as to whether the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual. (Arteaga v.
Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353.) But we are not at the
summary judgment stage, and the only issue before us is whether Astrachan
has stated a prima facie claim for retaliation as a pleading matter.
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VI. Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5
Finally, we also agree that the trial court should not have sustained the
demurrer to the fifth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code
section 1102.5.
Under Labor Code section 1102.5, an employer may not retaliate
against an employee for “disclosing information … to a person with authority
over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance … if the employee has the
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state
or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or
federal rule or regulation[.]” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) An employer
also may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an
activity that would violate state or federal law, or that would violate or not
comply with a local, state or federal rule or regulation. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5,
subd. (c).) To prevail under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the plaintiff’s protected activity was a “contributing factor” to an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6; Lawson,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 712.)
LACCD concedes that most of these elements have been pled, but
argues that the first amended complaint is defective because Astrachan did
not specify the law or regulation that would have been violated. That is not
required at the pleading stage. Astrachan is only required to allege that he
disclosed information that he reasonably believed disclosed a violation of law
or refused to participate in an activity which he reasonably believed would
violate the law. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subds. (b), (c).) Here, Astrachan did so.
He made several reports alleging conduct that might reasonably be
considered as violating the law or a regulation, including his safety report to
13
Von Kolen regarding the man carrying altered scissors outside the office on
August 30, 2022, his refusal to follow Von Kolen’s instruction to misrepresent
an employee’s paid leave as unpaid, and his report to LACCD human
resources that Von Kolen had improperly granted appeal rights to individuals
who had been rejected for background checks revealing sex offenses.
Astrachan alleged that the last of these occurred “[i]n early October,” i.e.,
sometime between October 1 and October 10, 2022, when Von Kolen
terminated him.
LACCD also argues that the allegations are insufficient to state a claim
under Labor Code section 1102.5 because they do not set forth any facts other
than temporal proximity which tend to show that Astrachan’s reports
contributed to his termination. LACCD cites to Visalia v. Unified School
Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 844 (Visalia),
and the trial court apparently relied on this citation in sustaining the
demurrer. But Visalia has little or nothing to do with this case. Visalia
concerned a petition for writ of review of an administrative decision by the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) asserting retaliation for
participating in union activity under the Educational Employment Relations
Act (EERA). (Visalia, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 851–852.) Visalia
concerned retaliation under the EERA, not the Labor Code, and applied
PERB precedent interpreting the EERA, not the Labor Code. (Id. at pp. 861,
868.) Under Labor Code section 1102.5, the law is clear that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence such as proximity in time between protected
activity and alleged retaliation may establish a causal link.” (Hawkins v.
City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384, 394; Taswell v. Regents of
University of California (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 343, 365, citing Mokler v.
14
County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 138, disapproved on other
grounds in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718, fn. 2.)
In short, Astrachan adequately pled a cause of action under Labor Code
section 1102.5.6
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment of dismissal entered September 29, 2025 is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate
the order sustaining LACCD’s demurrer to the first amended complaint and
to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the first five causes of
action. Astrachan shall recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
6 Since we find that Astrachan’s first amended complaint adequately
states his causes of action as pled, we need not address his alternative
argument that the trial court should have granted him leave to amend.
15