Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 1 of 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13876 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ LARRY L. THOMAS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MAJOR RON JAMES, Thomas County Sheriff, DEPUTY DYLAN GROVES, Thomas County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 7:25-cv-00117-WLS ____________________ Before NEWSOM, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 2 of 6 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13876 Larry Thomas, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s order denying with prejudice his second motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in his civil rights action for his failure to establish his status as a pauper. See Dist. Ct. Doc. 6 (“October 21 Order”). On appeal, Thomas argues that the district court should have granted his IFP motion, as his financial affidavit and supporting materials established his indi- gency, and asserts that the court’s denial was because of the court’s personal bias against him and conflicted with another judge’s find- ing that he was a pauper in a separate case that was based on the same information he provided in this case. 1 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) for abuse of discretion. Mar- tinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determina- tion, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). A complaint dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Bi- lal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2001). “A claim is friv- olous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Id. at 1349. We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal 1 In deference to his pro se status, we collectively consider both Thomas’s premature brief and subsequent merits brief in presenting his argument on appeal. USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 3 of 6 25-13876 Opinion of the Court 3 of a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), using the same standard as when reviewing a dismissal under Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and view the allegations in the complaint as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). “When considering a motion filed pursuant to § 1915(a), the only determination to be made by the court is whether the state- ments in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Mar- tinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (quotation and ellipsis omitted). Absent se- rious misrepresentation, an affidavit should be accepted as true and show the litigant, because of their poverty, is unable to pay the costs and fees. Id. A litigant need not be “absolutely destitute” to qualify for IFP status. Id. Once an affidavit demonstrates economic eligibility, “the court should first docket the case,” then proceed to screen the complaint. Id. (quotation omitted). At step two, district courts are directed to dismiss the com- plaint of any plaintiff proceeding IFP if the court determines that the complaint is (i) frivolous or malicious, or (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). To survive screening under § 1915(e)(2), a complaint, viewed in light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all allegations in the complaint as true, must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2015); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff generally gets at least one chance to amend before USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 4 of 6 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13876 the court dismisses the case with prejudice. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (narrowing Bank to pro se plaintiffs only). A district court is not required to allow the opportunity for amendment when (1) there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated fail- ure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) al- lowing an amendment would cause undue prejudice to the oppos- ing party; or (3) an amendment would be futile. Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). While pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be liberally construed, a court may not “serve as de facto counsel for a party [or] rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, liberally construing Thomas’s briefs together, the dis- trict court abused its discretion by finding that Thomas failed to show he was financially eligible for IFP status. Thomas’s affidavits consistently stated that he was homeless, unemployed, and did not have savings or assets. If credited, those statements establish that Thomas could not pay the costs of litigation. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. Thomas’s submission of his SNAP transaction history ad- dressed the district court’s skepticism about how he paid for his basic necessities. Rather than crediting that corroboration or iden- tifying any other possible instance of misrepresentation, the district court held that the mere receipt of SNAP benefits was insufficient USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 5 of 6 25-13876 Opinion of the Court 5 to overcome its doubts about Thomas’s representations in his affi- davit that he had no income, expenses, debts, or assets. However, Thomas was not required to show he was “absolutely destitute” to qualify for IFP status. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. Thus, the district court applied a more stringent pauper standard than called for un- der Martinez and, thus, abused its discretion. See id.; see Martin, 307 F.3d at 1336. In the district court’s October 21 Order, which we review in this appeal, the district court denied Thomas’s IFP motion on the sole basis that Thomas had provided insufficient information to en- able the district Court to make a finding of poverty. We now hold that the district court erred in so ruling. However—after Thomas had filed on October 29, 2025, a notice appealing the October 21 Order—the district court addressed Thomas’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis. See Dist. Ct. Doc. 16 (“January 16, 2026, Order”). In that order, the district court held that, even if Thomas had satisfied the poverty requirement, the district court “would have dismissed the complaint as frivolous.” Id. at 6. In addition, the district court suggested that Thomas’s case might have been dismissed as a sanc- tion for his bad faith, litigious prosecution of frivolous claims. As- suming arguendo that we can consider—as actions in furtherance of a pending appeal, see Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2003)—the statements of the district court in its post-appeal, Janu- ary 16, 2026, order, we nevertheless conclude that this case should be vacated and remanded. With respect to the district court’s state- ment—i.e. “even if the Court had found Plaintiff to meet the pov- erty requirements of § 1915, it would have dismissed the complaint USCA11 Case: 25-13876 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 6 of 6 6 Opinion of the Court 25-13876 as frivolous,” id. at 6—the district court’s analysis failed to address Thomas’s primary claims that the defendants refused to provide requested records in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. We do not believe that the district court’s analysis of the frivolity issue is sufficient to enable meaningful appellate review, and, in any event, we prefer that the district court address the fail- ure-to-provide-reports claims in the first instance. With respect to the sanctions issue, it is not at all clear that the district court actually imposed the sanction of dismissing Thomas’s case. 2 Even assum- ing the district court may have intended, either on October 21, 2025, or on January 16, 2026, to dismiss the case as a sanction, its analysis in support thereof is insufficient to allow meaningful ap- pellate review. Moreover, there is no briefing at all on the issue; Thomas’s brief on appeal does not address the issue and there is no appellee brief. For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment denying Thomas’s motion to proceed IFP is vacated, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not incon- sistent with this opinion VACATED AND REMANDED. 2 It is clear that the district court’s October 21 Order, the order which is before us on appeal, did not impose the sanction of dismissal; it denied Thomas’s mo- tion solely because he failed to satisfy the poverty requirement.